Lester Land Holdings Pty Ltd v The Development Assessment Commission

Link copied
Case Copied 72 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application for Judicial Review)

LESTER LAND HOLDINGS PTY LTD & ORS v THE DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION & ANOR

[2020] SASC 170

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Parker

15 September 2020

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - UNREASONABLENESS

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS

This is an application for judicial review of a decision made by the first defendant on 21 January 2016 to grant development plan consent under s 33(2) of the Development Act 1993 (SA) in favour of the second defendant for the proposed development of land located at the south-east corner of the junction of North Terrace and West Terrace. The first and second plaintiffs are respectively the owners of land located on West Terrace and North Terrace immediately adjacent to the site of the proposed development.

The site of the proposed development is occupied by the Newmarket Hotel (Hotel), a heritage listed place pursuant to the Heritage Places Act 1993 (SA). The Hotel consists of a three-storey stone structure and a number of outbuildings associated with that structure. The proposed development relates to the demolition of the outbuildings associated with the three-storey structure, conservation of the Hotel and construction of two towers comprising a ground floor and 24 upper floors consisting of retail, consulting rooms and residential apartments, supported by basement car parking.

The plaintiffs submit that in reaching its decision to grant development plan consent, the first defendant incorrectly classified the development as a Category 1 development for the purposes of s 38 of the Development Act. The plaintiffs submit that the proposed development is non-complying and a Category 3 development, therefore, the first defendant failed to comply with the mandatory notification provisions in s 38(5) of the Development Act.

The plaintiffs submit that upon receipt of additional information and plans from the second defendant which were not before the first defendant at its initial meeting considering the development application on 17 December 2015, the first defendant failed to comply with its statutory duty to refer the matter back to the delegate of the Minister contrary to reg 27(1) of the Development Regulations 2008 (SA).

The plaintiffs submit that certain conditions attached to the first defendant’s decision to grant development plan consent are impermissible and have the effect of invalidating the development plan consent.

The plaintiffs submit that the first defendant failed to exercise jurisdiction, failed to take into account a relevant mandatory matter or acted unreasonably by failing to assess the development plan application against Principle of Development Control 67 of the Council Wide provisions in the Adelaide (City) Development Plan (Development Plan) as required by s 33(1)(a) of the Development Act.

The plaintiffs contend that the first defendant exceeded its jurisdiction and acted unlawfully by failing to…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Lester Land Holdings Pty Ltd v The Development Assessment Co... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2020] SASC 170
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Lester Land Holdings Pty Ltd, as a group of residents and business owners in the vicinity of the subject site, sought judicial review of a decision by the Development Assessment Commission (DAC) to grant development plan consent to One North Terrace. The dispute centred on the validity of the decision to approve the proposed demolition of certain structures on the site, which is heritage-listed, and the adequacy of the decision-making process. The case was heard and determined in the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether DAC had failed to consider relevant matters, had taken into account irrelevant considerations, and whether the decision was otherwise unreasonable. The Court was required to examine the decision-making process and the evidence presented to DAC to determine if the decision was legally sound and based on relevant considerations.

In examining the decision-making process, the Court noted that DAC had delegated its decision-making authority to the Inner Metropolitan Development Assessment Commission (IMDAC), as required by the Development Regulations. The Court found that IMDAC was appropriately constituted and had the necessary expertise to make the decision. The Court then turned to the substantive issues, first considering whether DAC had failed to consider relevant matters. The Court found that while DAC had not provided detailed reasons for its decision, the totality of the evidence, including the report provided by the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure and the information supplied by One North Terrace, indicated that DAC had considered the relevant matters. The Court also found that the onus was on the plaintiffs to establish that an irrelevant consideration had been taken into account by DAC. Given the lack of evidence to support such a claim, the Court rejected this ground of review.

Finally, the Court considered whether the decision was otherwise unreasonable. The Court found that the decision was based on a rational and justifiable assessment of the evidence and that DAC had not erred in law. The Court noted that the proposed development was consistent with the surrounding area, which was undergoing extensive redevelopment, and that the new building was designed to complement the heritage building.

The Court dismissed the proceedings, finding that DAC had not erred in granting development plan consent to One North Terrace. The decision was lawful, based on relevant considerations, and not otherwise unreasonable. The proposed development was therefore approved, and the plaintiffs' challenge to the decision was unsuccessful.

Background

Background to the litigation

Regulation 107(2a) provides for the membership of IMDAC. Each relevant local council must nominate a list of three members from their Development Assessment Panel and one person from each list is appointed to IMDAC by the Minister. In practice, only a member nominated by the relevant local council, in this case the City of Adelaide, will sit with other IMDAC members to determine an application. The Court was informed that the City of Adelaide nominee is very experienced in planning and development matters and had been for many years a Commissioner of the Environment Resources and Development Court (ERD Court). Each of the other members appointed to IMDAC by the Minister is also a member of DAC. Given the criteria for appointment to DAC set out in s 10(3) of the Development Act, counsel for the second defendant submitted that the Court should accept that each of the members of IMDAC was competent to read and understand site plans, floor plans and the like. That submission was not controverted by the other parties. Background On 21 January 2016, the first defendant, the Development Assessment Commission (DAC) granted development plan consent under s 33(2) of the Development Act 1993 (SA) to the second defendant (One North Terrace) for the proposed development of land located at the south-east corner of the junction of North Terrace and West Terrace. The land is variously described as being located at 1 North Terrace or 1 - 9 West Terrace. This site has been occupied by the Newmarket Hotel (the Hotel) since the mid-19th Century.[2] There is a heritage listing in force under s 18 of the Heritage Places Act 1993 (SA). The owner of the subject land is Azure Realty Pty Ltd. That company is not a party to these proceedings.[2] The present building erected in 1883 replaced a structure dating from early colonial times. The Hotel includes a three-storey stone building with substantial frontages to North Terrace and West Terrace. This three-storey structure was erected in 1883. Certain outbuildings have long been closely associated with the three‑storey structure. The proposed demolition of those structures is an important issue in these proceedings. On both the North Terrace and West Terrace sides of the three-storey building there are structures apparently erected in the 1970s or 1980s that the defendants propose to demolish.[3] These relatively recent structures are clearly distinct from the outbuildings referred to in the preceding paragraph. It is arguable that all structures affixed to the subject land prior to provisional heritage listing in 1981, or final listing in 1982, are covered by the listing as it does not exclude any structures.[4] However, there has been no suggestion by any of the parties, or in the evidence of Mr Jason Schulz, a specialist in heritage matters who provided advice to the second defendant in support of its development application, that the relatively recent additions have any heritage value even if it were established that one or both pre-dated heritage listing. The observations I made at the view left me with no doubt about the lack of heritage significance of these relatively recent additions. [3] On the southern side of the land facing West Terrace is a building that formerly contained a nightclub while on the eastern side facing North Terrace is an extension to the main Hotel. [4] This is in contrast to some other listings recorded in Table Adel/1 in the DP.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I also accept the correctness of the sixth proposition advanced by the first defendant that merely because a party cannot identify the precise reasoning process followed by an expert body, such as DAC, does not mean that its reasoning must be inferred from the DPTI report. Having said that, I also consider that the totality of the evidence may enable an inference to be drawn as to whether or not a particular matter was taken into account by DAC. That is apparent from the three decisions made by Debelle J to which I have referred. The evidence will include the report provided by DPTI and also the information supplied by the party seeking development plan consent. While it is not an easy task for a plaintiff to persuade a court that a collective decision making body has erred in circumstances where it was not required to provide reasons for its decision, the task is by no means impossible.The evidence of Mr Schulz Mr Jason Schulz, of DASH Architects, was called by the second defendant. Mr Schulz is an architect with particular expertise concerning heritage buildings and issues. He had prepared what he described as a Heritage Impact Assessment in support of the defendant’s application to DAC. He also prepared an expert witness report for use in these proceedings. Although the plaintiffs elected not to call an expert witness on heritage issues, the expert report prepared by Mr Schulz was, to a large extent, compiled in response to an expert report that had been prepared by Mr Sam Hosking on instructions from the plaintiffs. While Mr Hosking’s report was not tendered as evidence, the response to that report by Mr Schulz was an important part of the latter’s evidence. Mr Schulz stated in his Heritage Impact Assessment that the project architects had indicated that they had designed the proposed new building to complement rather than compete with the heritage building. In support of that contention, Mr Schulz pointed to several features that were intended to “establish a design and contextual relationship with the heritage place”. Mr Schulz also noted that the precinct in the vicinity of the Hotel was undergoing extensive redevelopment with high-rise buildings that included the new Royal Adelaide Hospital, the South Australian Health and Medical Research Institute and other health and university buildings. Mr Schulz suggested that the proposed development needed to be considered in that context. The focus of submissions concerning the heritage issue was the proposed demolition of certain structures located at the rear of the three-storey building. These structures comprise a two-storey wing that adjoins the southern wall of the three‑storey building, another structure that was originally the hotel stables and a single yard wall that was the continuation of one of the walls of the stable. Mr Schulz noted that in the absence of any definitive plans or photographs showing the rear of the Hotel prior to 1900, he could not be certain as to the date of construction of the two-storey southern wing. However, based on his inspection, he considered that the wing most likely dated from the time of construction of the main building. He considered that the two-storey wing could not be described as a standalone building in its own right. He also considered that the stables had been most likely built when the main Hotel was constructed. He also considered that the wall of the stable or yard had been constructed at the same time as the stable and Hotel and had originally connected the two buildings. Mr Schulz based his opinion on photographs dating from, and plans taken or prepared from, 1928 onwards and his inspection of the premises. He also had regard to information contained in an objection to heritage registration lodged by the owner of the Hotel in 1982 and the evaluation conducted by a historian prior to the grant of heritage status.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In preparing this judgment I am very conscious of the time elapsed since the trial. During the course of the trial, I made detailed annotations upon the plans in accordance with the oral evidence and submissions. I have refreshed my memory by referring to those annotations, my notes and also the notes taken by my associate. I have also read the transcript comprising almost 500 pages, the numerous documents received into evidence and the written submissions of the parties. I have also frequently re-read key passages in the transcript and documents. The need to undertake this substantial body of work after a long interval has unavoidably further delayed the delivery of judgment. The decision maker The first defendant to these proceedings is the Development Assessment Commission (DAC). However, the actual decision maker was the Inner Metropolitan Development Assessment Commission (IMDAC). For the reasons that follow, the delegation of power by DAC to IMDAC is required by the Development Act and by the Development Regulations 2008 (SA). Section 16(1)(a) of the Development Act requires that a statutory body must establish such committees as the regulations may require. The term “statutory body”, inter alia, includes DAC. Section 20(2)(b) requires that a delegation must be made in prescribed circumstances to a committee or sub-committee of DAC, established by the regulations. Regulation 107(2) requires that DAC must establish IMDAC to act as its delegate to determine applications for which DAC is the relevant authority under cl 4B or 4C of Schedule 10 of the Regulations. Clause 4B of Schedule 10 to the Regulations requires that developments of a total value exceeding $10 million in the area of the City of Adelaide must be referred to IMDAC. For that reason, IMDAC acted as the delegate of DAC to decide the subject application. Because IMDAC decided the matter as a delegate of DAC, and thus the first defendant has been correctly identified as DAC, I have generally referred in these reasons to DAC, rather than IMDAC, as the decision maker. That is consistent with the approach generally adopted by counsel for the parties and also in the correspondence received into evidence. However, at some points, it has been necessary to distinguish between DAC and IMDAC. Regulation 107(2a) provides for the membership of IMDAC. Each relevant local council must nominate a list of three members from their Development Assessment Panel and one person from each list is appointed to IMDAC by the Minister. In practice, only a member nominated by the relevant local council, in this case the City of Adelaide, will sit with other IMDAC members to determine an application. The Court was informed that the City of Adelaide nominee is very experienced in planning and development matters and had been for many years a Commissioner of the Environment Resources and Development Court (ERD Court). Each of the other members appointed to IMDAC by the Minister is also a member of DAC. Given the criteria for appointment to DAC set out in s 10(3) of the Development Act, counsel for the second defendant submitted that the Court should accept that each of the members of IMDAC was competent to read and understand site plans, floor plans and the like. That submission was not controverted by the other parties. Background

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The sixth proposition advanced by the first defendant is that the fact that a party cannot identify the reasoning process applied by DAC cannot mean in law that its reasoning must be inferred by default from a particular report. That would clearly be a non sequitur. Thus, for example, the DAC members may not have adopted a common reasoning process. The onus lies on the plaintiffs to establish that an irrelevant consideration was taken into account by DAC. As Pearlman CJ observed in the Hospital Action Group case, that burden is difficult to discharge.Consideration In several cases Debelle J found that an inference could be drawn that a planning authority had failed to consider a particular matter. In Mar Mina (SA) Pty Ltd v City of Marion the issue was whether the development assessment panel had considered if a proposed development was seriously at variance with the development plan as required by s 35(2) of the Development Act.[18] The council planning officer had submitted a report to the panel. Debelle J noted that in Upham v The Grand Hotel (SA) Pty Ltd the Full Court had observed that because a planning authority does not give detailed reasons for its decision, the Court “must decide an attack on validity on the grounds of relevance by considering the material before the relevant authority, and the decision made”.[19] Debelle J found in Mar Mina that the planner’s report had failed to direct the attention of the panel to the question whether the application was seriously at variance with the development plan. His Honour therefore held that it was reasonable to infer that the panel had failed to consider this issue.[20][18] (2008) 163 LGERA 24.[19] Ibid at [45], quoting Upham v The Grand Hotel (SA)Pty Ltd (1999) 74 SASR 557 at [157] (Doyle CJ and Bleby J with Wicks J agreeing).[20] Ibid at [45]. The issue in Rhylyn v District Council of Willunga was also whether the council had considered the seriously at variance question.[21] A planning officer had provided a brief report recommending that the application be approved. The “seriously at variance” issue was not mentioned in the report. The application was first considered by a committee of the council. The committee proceed on the basis that all proposals would be approved as recommended by the planning officer unless a member required that a particular application be discussed. If so, that application would be separately considered and resolved. The committee adopted the recommendation of the planner and referred the matter to the council. Later that evening the council adopted the recommendation of the committee.[21] [1994] SASC 4919. Debelle J held that it was reasonable to infer, in the absence of any evidence as to what had occurred at the meetings, that the application had not been discussed by the council other than to adopt the recommendation of the planning officer and the committee. Debelle J noted that the plaintiff carried the burden of proof and had discharged that burden. In view of his Honour, there was an irresistible inference that neither the committee nor the council had addressed their minds to the question of whether the proposal was seriously at variance with the development plan. However, while the council had failed to discharge its duty under the Development Act, Debelle J declined to grant relief on discretionary grounds as the departure from the development plan was minimal.