SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application for Judicial Review)
LESTER LAND HOLDINGS PTY LTD & ORS v THE DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION & ANOR
[2020] SASC 170
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Parker
15 September 2020
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - UNREASONABLENESS
ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS
This is an application for judicial review of a decision made by the first defendant on 21 January 2016 to grant development plan consent under s 33(2) of the Development Act 1993 (SA) in favour of the second defendant for the proposed development of land located at the south-east corner of the junction of North Terrace and West Terrace. The first and second plaintiffs are respectively the owners of land located on West Terrace and North Terrace immediately adjacent to the site of the proposed development.
The site of the proposed development is occupied by the Newmarket Hotel (Hotel), a heritage listed place pursuant to the Heritage Places Act 1993 (SA). The Hotel consists of a three-storey stone structure and a number of outbuildings associated with that structure. The proposed development relates to the demolition of the outbuildings associated with the three-storey structure, conservation of the Hotel and construction of two towers comprising a ground floor and 24 upper floors consisting of retail, consulting rooms and residential apartments, supported by basement car parking.
The plaintiffs submit that in reaching its decision to grant development plan consent, the first defendant incorrectly classified the development as a Category 1 development for the purposes of s 38 of the Development Act. The plaintiffs submit that the proposed development is non-complying and a Category 3 development, therefore, the first defendant failed to comply with the mandatory notification provisions in s 38(5) of the Development Act.
The plaintiffs submit that upon receipt of additional information and plans from the second defendant which were not before the first defendant at its initial meeting considering the development application on 17 December 2015, the first defendant failed to comply with its statutory duty to refer the matter back to the delegate of the Minister contrary to reg 27(1) of the Development Regulations 2008 (SA).
The plaintiffs submit that certain conditions attached to the first defendant’s decision to grant development plan consent are impermissible and have the effect of invalidating the development plan consent.
The plaintiffs submit that the first defendant failed to exercise jurisdiction, failed to take into account a relevant mandatory matter or acted unreasonably by failing to assess the development plan application against Principle of Development Control 67 of the Council Wide provisions in the Adelaide (City) Development Plan (Development Plan) as required by s 33(1)(a) of the Development Act.
The plaintiffs contend that the first defendant exceeded its jurisdiction and acted unlawfully by failing to…
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- Case
- [2020] SASC 170
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court were whether DAC had failed to consider relevant matters, had taken into account irrelevant considerations, and whether the decision was otherwise unreasonable. The Court was required to examine the decision-making process and the evidence presented to DAC to determine if the decision was legally sound and based on relevant considerations.
In examining the decision-making process, the Court noted that DAC had delegated its decision-making authority to the Inner Metropolitan Development Assessment Commission (IMDAC), as required by the Development Regulations. The Court found that IMDAC was appropriately constituted and had the necessary expertise to make the decision. The Court then turned to the substantive issues, first considering whether DAC had failed to consider relevant matters. The Court found that while DAC had not provided detailed reasons for its decision, the totality of the evidence, including the report provided by the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure and the information supplied by One North Terrace, indicated that DAC had considered the relevant matters. The Court also found that the onus was on the plaintiffs to establish that an irrelevant consideration had been taken into account by DAC. Given the lack of evidence to support such a claim, the Court rejected this ground of review.
Finally, the Court considered whether the decision was otherwise unreasonable. The Court found that the decision was based on a rational and justifiable assessment of the evidence and that DAC had not erred in law. The Court noted that the proposed development was consistent with the surrounding area, which was undergoing extensive redevelopment, and that the new building was designed to complement the heritage building.
The Court dismissed the proceedings, finding that DAC had not erred in granting development plan consent to One North Terrace. The decision was lawful, based on relevant considerations, and not otherwise unreasonable. The proposed development was therefore approved, and the plaintiffs' challenge to the decision was unsuccessful.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The sixth proposition advanced by the first defendant is that the fact that a party cannot identify the reasoning process applied by DAC cannot mean in law that its reasoning must be inferred by default from a particular report. That would clearly be a non sequitur. Thus, for example, the DAC members may not have adopted a common reasoning process. The onus lies on the plaintiffs to establish that an irrelevant consideration was taken into account by DAC. As Pearlman CJ observed in the Hospital Action Group case, that burden is difficult to discharge.Consideration In several cases Debelle J found that an inference could be drawn that a planning authority had failed to consider a particular matter. In Mar Mina (SA) Pty Ltd v City of Marion the issue was whether the development assessment panel had considered if a proposed development was seriously at variance with the development plan as required by s 35(2) of the Development Act.[18] The council planning officer had submitted a report to the panel. Debelle J noted that in Upham v The Grand Hotel (SA) Pty Ltd the Full Court had observed that because a planning authority does not give detailed reasons for its decision, the Court “must decide an attack on validity on the grounds of relevance by considering the material before the relevant authority, and the decision made”.[19] Debelle J found in Mar Mina that the planner’s report had failed to direct the attention of the panel to the question whether the application was seriously at variance with the development plan. His Honour therefore held that it was reasonable to infer that the panel had failed to consider this issue.[20][18] (2008) 163 LGERA 24.[19] Ibid at [45], quoting Upham v The Grand Hotel (SA)Pty Ltd (1999) 74 SASR 557 at [157] (Doyle CJ and Bleby J with Wicks J agreeing).[20] Ibid at [45]. The issue in Rhylyn v District Council of Willunga was also whether the council had considered the seriously at variance question.[21] A planning officer had provided a brief report recommending that the application be approved. The “seriously at variance” issue was not mentioned in the report. The application was first considered by a committee of the council. The committee proceed on the basis that all proposals would be approved as recommended by the planning officer unless a member required that a particular application be discussed. If so, that application would be separately considered and resolved. The committee adopted the recommendation of the planner and referred the matter to the council. Later that evening the council adopted the recommendation of the committee.[21] [1994] SASC 4919. Debelle J held that it was reasonable to infer, in the absence of any evidence as to what had occurred at the meetings, that the application had not been discussed by the council other than to adopt the recommendation of the planning officer and the committee. Debelle J noted that the plaintiff carried the burden of proof and had discharged that burden. In view of his Honour, there was an irresistible inference that neither the committee nor the council had addressed their minds to the question of whether the proposal was seriously at variance with the development plan. However, while the council had failed to discharge its duty under the Development Act, Debelle J declined to grant relief on discretionary grounds as the departure from the development plan was minimal.