HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Barwick C.J., Gibbs, Stephen, Mason and Aickin JJ.
KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN PTY. LTD. v. GANTIDIS
1 May 1979
Town Planning (Vict.)
Town Planning (Vict.)—Regulation of land use—Permit to use land for new purpose—Appeal against decision to grant permit—Town Planning Appeals Tribunal—Tribunal required to state reasons if requested by party—No request—Appeal disallowed—Determination—Failure to refer to main grounds of appeal—Whether error of law—Permissible inferences—Whether determination a statement of reasons—Discretionary powers—To be exercised for orderly and proper planning of zone—Effect of proposed use on present shopping facilities—Town and Country Planning Act 1961 (Vict.), s. 22 (2).
Decisions
May 1.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. Kentucky Fried Chicken Pty. Ltd., the appellant, was granted special leave to appeal from an order of the Supreme Court of Victoria (McGarvie J.) which made absolute an order nisi to review a determination of the Town Planning Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") set up by s. 19A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1961, as amended by s. 14 (1) of the Town and Country Planning (Amendment) Act 1968 (Vict.) ("the Act"). The Supreme Court by that order set aside the determination of the Tribunal and directed that the respondent's appeal to the Tribunal be reheard by members of the Tribunal other than those who had composed it when the determination now set aside had been made. The basis of the Supreme Court's decision to make the order to review was that the Tribunal, in hearing the respondent's appeal to it, had "failed to consider the effect of the proposed use upon the economic viability of the adjoining area and the effect of the proposed use upon pedestrian movement". (at p677)
2. The appellant conducts retail outlets for the sale of fried chicken. It sought of the Council of the City of Williamstown ("the council"), in the State of Victoria, a permit to use land at 450 Melbourne Road, Newport ("the premises") for the purposes of "take-away food premises". The premises were zoned for the purpose of the relevant planning ordinance "light industrial". Accordingly, the permission of the council, as the responsible authority, was necessary to enable them to be used for the appellant's purposes. There had been at the premises a petrol filling station: but at relevant times it had not been in use for some eighteen months. (at p677)
3. The respondents conduct a fried chicken and hamburger shop in a street adjacent to the premises. They, along with others who respectively conducted a fish and chip shop, a hamburger shop, an amusement parlor, a pizza shop, a billiard saloon and a milk bar, objected to the grant of such a permit. (at p678)
4. The council, having considered the application and objections, decided to grant the desired permit. The respondents appealed to the Tribunal. An adjournment of the appeal was sought to enable the council to reconsider the grant of the permit and in particular in that reconsideration to have regard to…
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- Case
- [1979] HCA 20
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the lease agreement contained an implied term that the lessor would not operate a business that competed with the lessee's business within the same shopping centre. This involved considering the principles of implied terms in contracts, particularly in the context of commercial leases, and assessing whether the circumstances surrounding the formation of the lease justified the implication of such a term. The court had to balance the express terms of the lease against the need to give business efficacy to the agreement and to ensure that the parties' intentions were given effect.
The court ultimately held that no such implied term existed. The majority reasoned that for a term to be implied in a contract, it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, or it must be so obvious that it "goes without saying." In this instance, the express terms of the lease did not preclude the lessor from operating a competing business. Furthermore, the court found that the implication of such a term was not necessary for the business efficacy of the lease, nor was it so obvious that it would have been understood by the parties as an inherent part of their agreement. The court emphasised that implied terms should not be readily imposed where the contract is clear and comprehensive, and that parties are generally free to conduct their affairs as they see fit unless expressly restricted by the contract.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Supreme Court of New South Wales were set aside.
Orders
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