Bunnings Group Limited v Sunshine Coast Regional Council

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Bunnings Group Limited v Sunshine Coast Regional Council & Ors [2019] QCA 252

PARTIES:

In Appeal No 11706 of 2018:

BUNNINGS GROUP LIMITED
ACN 008 672 179
(applicant)
v
SUNSHINE COAST REGIONAL COUNCIL
(first respondent)
RAYMOND BARBER
(second respondent)
BRENNAN CAROLAN
(third respondent)
JENEANE CAROLAN
(fourth respondent)
COOLUM RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION INC
ABN 87 796 991 988
(fifth respondent)
DEVELOPMENT WATCH INC
ABN 53 627 632 278
(sixth respondent)
CAROL GOODWILLIE
(seventh respondent)
AMY-ROSE WEST
(eighth respondent)

In Appeal No 11708 of 2018:

BUNNINGS GROUP LIMITED
ACN 008 672 179
(applicant)
v
SUNSHINE COAST REGIONAL COUNCIL
(first respondent)
DON CAROLAN
(second respondent)
SUSAN CAROLAN
(third respondent)
COOLUM RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION INC
ABN 87 796 991 988
(fourth respondent)
DEVELOPMENT WATCH INC
ABN 53 627 632 278
(fifth respondent)
DIANE GOODWILLIE
(sixth respondent)
RICHARD JAMES KOERNER
(seventh respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 11706 of 2018
Appeal No 11708 of 2018
P & E Appeal No 2838 of 2016
P & E Appeal No 4368 of 2016

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave Sustainable Planning Act

ORIGINATING COURT:

Planning and Environment Court at Brisbane – [2018] QPEC 42 (Everson DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

15 November 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

30 May 2019

JUDGES:

Gotterson and McMurdo JJA and Boddice J

ORDERS:

In Appeal No 11706 of 2018:

Application for leave to appeal refused with costs.

In Appeal No 11708 of 2018:

Application for leave to appeal refused with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING – ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING – PLANNING SCHEMES AND INSTRUMENTS – QUEENSLAND – OTHER MATTERS – where the applicant sought two alternative development permits for a material change of use to establish a Bunnings Warehouse at Coolum – where the relevant council refused to issue either permit and the Planning and Environment Court dismissed appeals against those refusals – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal against the decision of the Planning & Environment Court – whether the judge misconstrued the relevant planning scheme – whether the judge placed undue reliance upon a previous decision of the Court of Appeal that dismissed a similar application – whether the judge failed to give adequate reasons – whether any error of law consequential to the outcome of the judge’s decision is demonstrated

Bell v Brisbane City Council & Ors (2018) 230 LGERA 374; [2018] QCA 84, cited
Coolum Properties Pty Ltd v Maroochy Shire Council & Ors [2008] QPELR 145; [2007] QCA 351, considered
Coolum Properties Pty Ltd v Maroochy Shire Council & Ors
[2007] QPELR 400; [2007] QPEC 13, considered
Grosser & Anor v Council of the City of the Gold Coast (2001) 117 LGERA 153; [2001] QCA 423, considered
Kentucky Fried Chicken Pty Ltd v Gantidis & Anor (1979) 140 CLR 675; [1979] HCA 20, distinguished
Koerner & Ors v Maroochy Shire Council& J T Barnes & L J Barnes [2004] QPELR 211; [2003] QPEC 54, considered

COUNSEL:

In Appeal No 11706 of 2018:
D R Gore…

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Details
Case
[2019] QCA 252
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Bunnings Group Limited v Sunshine Coast Regional Council, the applicant sought two alternative development permits for a material change of use to establish a Bunnings Warehouse at Coolum. The Sunshine Coast Regional Council refused to issue either permit, and the Planning and Environment Court subsequently dismissed appeals against those refusals. Bunnings sought leave to appeal against the decision of the Planning and Environment Court. The central issues before the court were whether the judge misconstrued the relevant planning scheme, placed undue reliance on a previous Court of Appeal decision that dismissed a similar application, failed to give adequate reasons, and if any error of law consequential to the outcome of the judge’s decision was demonstrated.

The court found that the primary judge was correct in determining that the proposed development was in conflict with the Planning Scheme due to the absence of a Master Plan. The Planning Scheme required a Local Area Master Plan or other Development Plan for the precinct if it were to be redeveloped, and the opportunity to redevelop land within this Precinct had been lost unless a case could be made for departing from the scheme under s 326. The court also found that while the primary judge may have placed undue reliance on the previous Court of Appeal decision, the reasoning in that case was persuasive and relevant. The court concluded that the primary judge's interpretation of the Planning Scheme was correct and that the proposed development was significantly larger than in the previous case.

The court ultimately refused Bunnings' application for leave to appeal, with costs awarded against the applicant in both appeal applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

In Appeal No 11706 of 2018:

Application for leave to appeal refused with costs.

In Appeal No 11708 of 2018:

Application for leave to appeal refused with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The final part of the Primary Judgment, which was expressed under the heading “Grounds”, discussed the arguments for Bunnings in support of the approval of either development, notwithstanding any conflict with the Planning Scheme, under s 326(1)(b) of the SPA. Section 326 relevantly provided as follows:“Other decision rules(1)The assessment manager’s decision must not conflict with a relevant instrument unless—…(b)there are sufficient grounds to justify the decision, despite the conflict; …”The term “grounds” was defined for s 326(1)(b) to mean “matters of public interest”.[37][37]SPA schedule 3. Everson DCJ referred to the decisions of this Court in Lockyer Valley Regional Council v Westlink Pty Ltd[38] and, more recently, Bell v Brisbane City Council & Ors,[39] quoting from paragraphs [66], [68] and [70] of that judgment.[38][2013] 2 Qd R 302; [2012] QCA 370.[39](2018) 230 LGERA 374; [2018] QCA 84. His Honour identified five grounds which were advanced by Bunnings as sufficient to justify the decision for which it contended. The first of them was that the proposed development was of a type which was identified as appropriate in Precinct 7, or was materially similar to that type of development. His Honour rejected that argument, for the reasons that the scale of the proposed developments fundamentally conflicted with the retail hierarchy set out in the Planning Scheme, and that there was no master planning for the site. The second ground was that the relevant provisions of the Planning Scheme had been overtaken by subsequent events. Everson DCJ observed that “[s]uch an argument is unattractive at first blush when a developer elects to proceed via a development application (superseded planning scheme)”.[40] In support of the argument, Bunnings referred to certain approvals which had been granted for two supermarkets and a liquor outlet in the Planning Area, during the life of the Planning Scheme. His Honour concluded that “[t]hese isolated developments are readily explicable as examples of the exercise of sound planning discretion”, and were not examples of the Planning Scheme being overtaken by events.[41][40]Primary Judgment [53].[41]Primary Judgment [54]. The third ground advanced by Bunnings was that there was a need for the proposed development. Earlier in the judgment, under the heading “Planning need”, Everson DCJ discussed this question, but without reference to s 326. His Honour referred to Bell v Brisbane City Council & Ors, where I observed that a question of whether there was a need for that development was different from a question of whether the development would satisfy “community and economic needs”.[42] I was there discussing an issue of need as it arose under the terms of a particular provision of the planning scheme for the Brisbane City Council.[42](2018) 230 LGERA 374 at 386 [43]; [2018] QCA 84 at [43]. His Honour accepted that there was a likely demand for the proposed development, but added that “[i]n determining whether there is a need for a Bunnings Warehouse on this site, the question must be also asked whether there is a latent unsatisfied demand for one which is not being currently met by other Bunnings Warehouses.”[43] He said that there were already Bunnings Warehouses at Noosaville and Maroochydore, each accessible by car within 15 to 20 minutes, a journey which was “not unreasonable for … this type of retail facility”.[44] His Honour concluded that there was “not a strong level of planning need for a new Bunnings Warehouse on the site that is not being adequately met by the existing outlets at Noosaville and Maroochydore.”[45] Consequently, his Honour rejected this third ground advanced by Bunnings under s 326.[46][43]Primary Judgment [35].[44]Ibid.[45]Primary Judgment [37].[46]Primary Judgment [55].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is submitted that the primary judge was wrong to hold that there was a significant conflict with the Planning Scheme because of the absence of a Master Plan. The argument refers to provisions of the Planning Scheme which contemplate that the Council will request a development proponent to carry out master planning for a locality, and points out that no such request had been made in the present case. More generally, it is said that it was impossible to incorporate a Master Plan into an instrument that no longer existed, namely the Planning Scheme (which had become a superseded scheme). That argument cannot be accepted. The provisions for this Precinct consistently required a Master Plan if this Precinct was to be redeveloped under this scheme. In particular, there was the unambiguous statement that:“Council considers that a Local Area Master Plan, overall master plan or other Development Plan for this precinct is required if the precinct were to be redeveloped.”[60]If that had become impossible, because the Planning Scheme had been replaced by another scheme, it did not follow that these provisions were to be ignored. Rather, the opportunity to redevelop land within this Precinct, consistently with this Planning Scheme, had been lost unless a case could be made for departing from the scheme under s 326. There was no error in his Honour’s finding that the development was in conflict with the Planning Scheme in this respect.[60]Planning Scheme volume 3 cl 3.11.4(7).Errors in the consideration of matters of principle Next, it is submitted that the primary judge placed undue reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Coolum Properties. That judgment resulted in a refusal of leave to appeal, so that, it is submitted, it did not bind his Honour. That may be accepted, but the judgment was of persuasive authority and the primary judge could hardly have disregarded it. As it happens, in his own words, he reasoned in the same way as this Court had endorsed. As I have said, it is submitted that the development in question in Coolum Properties was significantly larger than in the present case, and that the primary judge incorrectly thought otherwise. His Honour considered that the subject application in that case involved a development with a total floor area of 8,315 square metres. It is said that the correct figure was 17,515 square metres. It is true that the application for a material change of use in Coolum Properties was to add four showrooms, with a total area of 8,315 square metres, to a development which had been already approved (and which was the subject of the Koerner appeal), which would have meant a development overall of that scale. But his Honour did not misunderstand the position.[61] The interpretation by Dodds DCJ of the same provisions of the Planning Scheme was what mattered, and that interpretation was just as relevant if the overall scale of the proposed development was less than the total development which would have resulted from an approval in Coolum Properties.[61]Primary Judgment [28].