Zweck v Town of Gawler

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

ZWECK v TOWN OF GAWLER

[2015] SASCFC 172

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)

25 November 2015

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONTROL OF PARTICULAR MATTERS - SUBDIVISION - PRINCIPLES GOVERNING CONSENT OR APPROVAL - CONSIDERATION OF DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS

Appeal against dismissal by Environment Court of appeal against refusal of development plan consent for land division.

The appellant sought development approval to divide 32 hectares of rural land into 3 allotments including two 4 hectare allotments. The land is the subject of a land management agreement under section 57 of the Development Act 1993 (SA) between the Council and the appellant’s predecessors in title which contains clause 2.4 precluding any division of the land or any application for development authorisation to divide the land.

The Development Assessment Panel considered that the application was for a hypothetical development because it was precluded by the land management agreement and declined to consider and determine it.

On the appellant’s appeal to the Environment Court, the Judge held that the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain a collateral challenge to the validity of clause 2.4 of the land management agreement and in any event a discretion should be exercised against entertaining such a challenge. The Judge held that in any event clause 2.4 of the land management agreement was valid. The Judge held that, while the proposed development was not hypothetical, the Panel rightly declined to consider it because this may have made it complicit in a potential breach of the agreement and arguably of the Development Act.

Held:

1.      The Environment Court had power to determine whether clause 2.4 of the agreement was valid at (at [69] per Blue J (Nicholson J agreeing); [13] per Kourakis CJ).

2.      The Environment Court had no discretion to decline to determine that question (at [74] per Blue J (Nicholson J agreeing); [13] per Kourakis CJ).

3. The first limb of clause 2.4 precluding division related to the “development of land” within the meaning of section 57(2) and was valid (at [94] per Blue J (Kourakis CJ and Nicholson J agreeing)).

4.      The second limb of clause 2.4 preventing lodgement of an application for development authorisation was invalid (at [99] per Blue J (Kourakis CJ and Nicholson J agreeing)).

5.      The proposed development was not hypothetical so as to entitle the Environment Court to decline to consider it (at [106] per Blue J (Nicholson J agreeing); [16] per Kourakis CJ).

6.      Appeal allowed. Application remitted to the Development Assessment Panel for consideration and determination (at [108]) per Blue J (Kourakis CJ and Nicholson J agreeing)).

Development Act 1993 (SA), s4, s32, s35, s57, s86, s88; Environment, Resources and Development Court Act 1993 (SA), s4, s5, s7; Taxation Administration Act 1992 (SA), s92, referred to.
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Details
Case
[2015] SASCFC 172
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia by Noel Tiver against a decision of the Environment Court regarding two development applications lodged with the Corporation of the Town of Gawler. The applications sought to redivide land owned by the Tivers from ten allotments to nineteen allotments, with several proposed allotments being less than four hectares, constituting a non-complying development. The core of the dispute revolved around the validity and enforceability of clause 2.4 of the Development Plan, which purportedly restricted the division of land into allotments smaller than four hectares, and whether the Environment Court had the jurisdiction and discretion to determine this validity.

The legal issues before the Supreme Court included whether the Environment Court possessed the jurisdiction to determine if clause 2.4 of the Development Plan was *ultra vires* section 57(2) of the relevant Act, and if so, whether the Environment Court had a discretion not to determine that question and if that discretion was properly exercised. Further, the Court considered whether clause 2.4 was unenforceable as being *ultra vires* section 57(2) of the Act, and whether the development applications were hypothetical to such a degree that the Development Assessment Panel or the Environment Court was entitled to decline to consider or determine them on their merits.

The Supreme Court held that the Judge in the Environment Court had both the power and the obligation to determine the validity of clause 2.4 in relation to the development of land under section 57(2) of the Act. The Court reasoned that the proposed development was not hypothetical to the extent that would preclude its consideration. The Court concluded that the first limb of clause 2.4 was valid, but the second limb was invalid. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the development applications were remitted to the Development Assessment Panel for consideration and determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal raises the following issues:1.Did the Environment Court have jurisdiction or power to determine whether clause 2.4 is ultra vires section 57(2) of the Act?2.If so, did the Environment Court have a discretion not to determine that question and if so did the Judge properly exercise that discretion?3.Is clause 2.4 unenforceable as ultra vires section 57(2) of the Act?4.Did the application relate to a hypothetical development such that the Panel was entitled to decline to consider and determine it or the Environment Court was entitled to decline to determine on appeal the merits? Background In 2005, the Tivers owned 62 hectares of land at Uleybury situated within the Corporation of the Town of Gawler (the Council). The land was comprised in eight certificates of title. The land was bordered on the north by a four hectare property owned by the Smiths and another four hectare property owned by the Hilliards. In December 2005, Noel Tiver lodged with the Council two development applications to redivide the 70 hectares referred to in the previous paragraph (the Gawler land) from 10 allotments to 19 allotments. Mr Tiver also lodged with the City of Playford a development application to redivide land owned by the Tivers to the east of the Gawler land (the Playford land). The first development application lodged with the Council sought to create a two hectare allotment to be retained by the Smiths (Lot 3), a two hectare allotment to be retained by the Hilliards (Lot 2) and a two hectare allotment to be retained by the Tivers (Lot 1). It sought to create a 31 hectare allotment at the northern end to be owned by the Tivers and to incorporate also the balance of the land owned by the Smiths and Hilliards not retained in Lots 3 and 2 (Lot 7).[5] It sought to create a 32.55 hectare allotment at the southern end owned by the Tivers (Lot 105). [5] Lot 7 was also to incorporate 11 hectares situated within the City of Playford and therefore totaled 42 hectares altogether. The second development application lodged with the Council sought to divide Lot 7 into 13 lots generally of approximately 2 hectares each to be the subject of community titles.[6][6] A fourteenth lot would comprise the 11 hectares situated within the City of Playford. Division of land into allotments less than four hectares was a non-complying use. Both development applications were therefore for non-complying developments. The Tivers’ planning consultant told the Council that, by amalgamating five certificates of title into Lot 105, the proposed division would “deliver an opportunity for the vast majority of the arable land to continue to be used for the traditional broad acre agricultural purposes of cropping and grazing”. In June 2006, it was agreed between the Tivers and the Council that the Council would approve the development applications in return for the Tivers entering into a land management agreement under section 57 of the Act agreeing amongst other things not to divide Lot 105 in future.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

NICHOLSON J
If development authorisation were granted, for the reasons given above, either it would override clause 2.4 pro tanto or the grant would be a relevant factor to be considered by the Environment Court in enforcement proceedings brought under section 85 of the Act. If the latter applies, it cannot be said in advance that the Environment Court would not exercise its discretion against enforcement. Accordingly, the proposed development is not hypothetical to the degree required by the hypotheticality principle.Conclusion The Judge had power and an obligation to determine whether clause 2.4 was valid as relating to the development of land within the meaning of section 57(2) of the Act. The Judge ought to have determined that the first limb was valid but the second limb was invalid. The appeal should be allowed and the development application remitted to the Development Assessment Panel to consider and determine the application. I agree with the orders proposed by Blue J for the reasons his Honour has given. I prefer to express no view at this stage on the extent to which or manner by which the so called hypotheticality principle might apply in planning appeals, as discussed by Kourakis CJ. I agree with Blue J that this appeal can be determined on the assumption that the hypotheticality principle is available to be invoked at first instance.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NICHOLSON J