SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
ZWECK v TOWN OF GAWLER
[2015] SASCFC 172
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)
25 November 2015
ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONTROL OF PARTICULAR MATTERS - SUBDIVISION - PRINCIPLES GOVERNING CONSENT OR APPROVAL - CONSIDERATION OF DEVELOPMENT PLAN
ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS
Appeal against dismissal by Environment Court of appeal against refusal of development plan consent for land division.
The appellant sought development approval to divide 32 hectares of rural land into 3 allotments including two 4 hectare allotments. The land is the subject of a land management agreement under section 57 of the Development Act 1993 (SA) between the Council and the appellant’s predecessors in title which contains clause 2.4 precluding any division of the land or any application for development authorisation to divide the land.
The Development Assessment Panel considered that the application was for a hypothetical development because it was precluded by the land management agreement and declined to consider and determine it.
On the appellant’s appeal to the Environment Court, the Judge held that the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain a collateral challenge to the validity of clause 2.4 of the land management agreement and in any event a discretion should be exercised against entertaining such a challenge. The Judge held that in any event clause 2.4 of the land management agreement was valid. The Judge held that, while the proposed development was not hypothetical, the Panel rightly declined to consider it because this may have made it complicit in a potential breach of the agreement and arguably of the Development Act.
Held:
1. The Environment Court had power to determine whether clause 2.4 of the agreement was valid at (at [69] per Blue J (Nicholson J agreeing); [13] per Kourakis CJ).
2. The Environment Court had no discretion to decline to determine that question (at [74] per Blue J (Nicholson J agreeing); [13] per Kourakis CJ).
3. The first limb of clause 2.4 precluding division related to the “development of land” within the meaning of section 57(2) and was valid (at [94] per Blue J (Kourakis CJ and Nicholson J agreeing)).
4. The second limb of clause 2.4 preventing lodgement of an application for development authorisation was invalid (at [99] per Blue J (Kourakis CJ and Nicholson J agreeing)).
5. The proposed development was not hypothetical so as to entitle the Environment Court to decline to consider it (at [106] per Blue J (Nicholson J agreeing); [16] per Kourakis CJ).
6. Appeal allowed. Application remitted to the Development Assessment Panel for consideration and determination (at [108]) per Blue J (Kourakis CJ and Nicholson J agreeing)).
Development Act 1993 (SA), s4, s32, s35, s57, s86, s88; Environment, Resources and Development Court Act 1993 (SA), s4, s5, s7; Taxation Administration Act 1992 (SA), s92, referred to.
Director of Housing…
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- Case
- [2015] SASCFC 172
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Supreme Court included whether the Environment Court possessed the jurisdiction to determine if clause 2.4 of the Development Plan was *ultra vires* section 57(2) of the relevant Act, and if so, whether the Environment Court had a discretion not to determine that question and if that discretion was properly exercised. Further, the Court considered whether clause 2.4 was unenforceable as being *ultra vires* section 57(2) of the Act, and whether the development applications were hypothetical to such a degree that the Development Assessment Panel or the Environment Court was entitled to decline to consider or determine them on their merits.
The Supreme Court held that the Judge in the Environment Court had both the power and the obligation to determine the validity of clause 2.4 in relation to the development of land under section 57(2) of the Act. The Court reasoned that the proposed development was not hypothetical to the extent that would preclude its consideration. The Court concluded that the first limb of clause 2.4 was valid, but the second limb was invalid. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the development applications were remitted to the Development Assessment Panel for consideration and determination.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: NICHOLSON J