JACOBS v ONESTEEL MANUFACTURING PTY LTD & WORKCOVER CORPORATION OF SA
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Duggan, The Honourable Justice Debelle, The Honourable Justice Besanko, The Honourable Justice Vanstone and The Honourable Justice Layton)
3 February 2006
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - GENERALLY
Case stated by Full Bench of Workers Compensation Tribunal pursuant to Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986, s 86A – whether Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine validity of rules of Tribunal as collateral issue – if so, whether rules of Tribunal prescribing scale of costs valid – if so, whether such rules inconsistent with regulations and thereby invalid.
Held – Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine validity of rules of Tribunal as collateral issue where challenge to validity based on ground of simple ultra vires or inconsistency with regulations – rules of Tribunal prescribing scale of costs valid exercise of rule-making power in s 88E of Act – no direct inconsistency between rules and regulations – regulations do not evince intention to cover field – rules valid.
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Jacobs v OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd [2006] SASC 32
Case
[2006] SASC 32
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the case of Jacobs v OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd, the Full Bench of the Workers Compensation Tribunal posed several questions regarding the jurisdiction and validity of certain rules. The primary dispute involved the worker's entitlement to compensation for injuries sustained in the course of his employment, which was ultimately upheld. The core issues were whether the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of its own rules as a collateral matter and whether the specific rules prescribing a scale of costs were consistent with the relevant regulations.
The legal issues before the court were multifaceted, focusing on the Tribunal's authority to assess its own procedural rules. The court needed to determine if such an assessment was permissible as a collateral issue and whether the rules in question were valid, particularly in light of their consistency with the regulations. The Tribunal's rule-making power under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 was also scrutinized.
The court concluded that the Tribunal indeed had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of its rules as a collateral issue when the challenge was based on grounds such as simple ultra vires or inconsistency with regulations. It further found that the rules prescribing a scale of costs were a valid exercise of the Tribunal's rule-making power. The court emphasized that there was no direct inconsistency between the rules and the relevant regulations, and the regulations did not demonstrate an intention to comprehensively cover the field of costs. Consequently, the rules were deemed valid.
This comprehensive analysis led to the final determination that the worker's challenge to the validity of the Tribunal's rules was unsuccessful. The specific answers to the questions posed by the Tribunal were: 1) Yes, the Tribunal has jurisdiction, 2) Yes, the rules are valid, 3) No, there is no inconsistency with the regulations, 4) Yes, the rules are consistent, and 5) No, the rules are not invalid.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
DUGGAN J
DEBELLE J
(dissent)
Both rules are therefore consistent with reg 7(2) and are valid. The answer to both questions 3 and 5 is no.Conclusion For these reasons, the worker’s challenge to the validity of the Rules must fail. The questions in the case stated must be given the following answers.1. Yes2. Yes3. No4. Yes5. No BESANKO J: The Full Bench of the Workers Compensation Tribunal has stated a case pursuant to s 86A of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (“the Act”) raising five questions of law for the opinion of this Court.Background to the case stated The Full Bench of the Tribunal has set out the facts in the case stated and what follows is taken from the case stated. Mr Robert Jacobs was employed by OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd. That company was formerly known as BHP Integrated Steel. OneSteel Manufacturing was registered as an exempt employer under Division 1 of Part 5 of the Act. In April 1998 the worker suffered injuries to his hand and arms, and, as a result, an incapacity. On 19 February 1999 he gave notice of a work-related injury to the exempt employer and he made a claim for compensation for the injuries which he alleged he sustained in the course of his employment. On 23 September 1999 the exempt employer rejected the worker’s claim for compensation. The worker filed a notice of dispute with the Tribunal and, following an unsuccessful conciliation, the proceedings were referred for immediate judicial determination. The proceedings came on for hearing before his Honour Deputy President Judge McCusker on 30 August 2001. The hearing extended over eight sitting days between August 2001 and October 2003. Both the worker and the exempt employer were represented by counsel. The main issue in dispute was whether the worker’s injuries were caused or contributed to by his employment. On 31 August 2004 his Honour delivered his decision. He found in favour of the worker and upheld his application for compensation. Final orders have not yet been made. The worker applied for an order that he have his costs of and incidental to the proceedings. That application was not opposed by the exempt employer. The worker also applied for an order that rule Twenty-Eight (7)(d) of the Workers Compensation Tribunal Rules 2001 not apply to the claim for costs in respect of the worker’s counsel fees. I will set out the terms of that rule a little later, but it is appropriate that at this point I provide a brief explanation of its operation. The Workers Compensation Tribunal Rules 2001 were made by the President of the Tribunal pursuant to s 88E of the Act and they came into effect on 12 November 2001. The 2001 rules have been replaced by rules made in 2005, but the latter rules are not relevant to this matter. Rule Twenty-Eight of the 2001 rules dealt with the costs of proceedings at judicial determination. Rule Twenty-Eight (7) set out the principles to be applied in determining the quantum of a party’s costs and subrule (7)(d) provided for a sliding scale of counsel fees. It specified a figure for a fee on brief (an amount not exceeding $1,850.00) and hourly rates for periods in excess of the first five hours in court. The hourly rate decreased the longer the hearing continued. It was $165.00 for the period between 5 and 10 hours, $110.00 for the period between 10 and 20 hours and $70.00 for time spent beyond 20 hours. The effect of the sliding scale may be illustrated by an example. Assuming five-hour days in the Tribunal, the counsel fees for day five and beyond would have been $350.00 per day. Subrule (7)(e) gave a presidential member of the Tribunal the power to award an amount of up to $165.00 per hour for counsel fees for any period spent in court after the first five hours if the presidential member was of the opinion that the party against whom a costs order was to be made had unnecessarily prolonged the hearing.