SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Land and Valuation Division: Civil)
TAVITIAN v COMMISSIONER OF HIGHWAYS & ANOR
[2010] SASC 206
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Kourakis
9 July 2010
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - POWERS OF COURTS UNDER JUDICIAL REVIEW LEGISLATION - DECLARATIONS
HIGHWAYS - NEGLIGENCE AND NUISANCE - INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS OF USER AND ACCESS - INTERFERENCE WITH ACCESS TO AND FROM ADJOINING LAND
HIGHWAYS - STRUCTURES AND GATES
PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - JURISDICTION AND GENERALLY
PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS - DECLARATIONS - JURISDICTION
Plaintiff challenges validity of recommendation made by first defendant that Governor proclaim a portion of highway – highway runs along boundary of plaintiff’s land – plaintiff claimed effect of proclamation was to close off a means of access from highway to his property – first defendant did not provide plaintiff with statutory notice of proposed proclamation – plaintiff did not bring proceedings challenging proclamation until over four years after proclamation made – plaintiff seeks declaratory relief – whether a means of access must be clearly visible – whether plaintiff’s means of access satisfies requirement of visibility – second defendant contends that plaintiff’s claim invokes court’s equitable jurisdiction – whether remedy should be denied by applying time limit prescribed by Rules of Court for judicial review of administrative action of six months by analogy because of similarity between plaintiff’s action and action for judicial review – plaintiff also claimed damages against second defendant for nuisance created by obstructing his access to highway – second defendant has not by any act or omission actually obstructed or threatened to obstruct plaintiff’s access – whether plaintiff’s nuisance claim succeeds.
Held: plaintiff’s claims dismissed – a means of access must be visible – requirement for visibility of means of access is satisfied if a reasonable bystander, standing stationary at the location in issue, would conclude that there was a means of access at that location – plaintiff’s means of access satisfies requirement for visibility – first defendant failed to fully discharge duty by not giving statutory notice to plaintiff – court’s power to grant declaratory relief is a statutory power and is discretionary – court is not obliged to apply the time limit for judicial review of administrative action of six months by analogy on equitable grounds, although the discretionary power to grant or refuse a declaration is ample to allow the plaintiff’s delay to be measured against that time limitation – having regard to delay, merits of claim and the consequences of making a declaration, plaintiff’s action for declaratory relief is dismissed on discretionary grounds despite first defendant’s failure to give statutory notice to plaintiff – plaintiff’s claim for nuisance also dismissed because the making of the proclamation could not of itself sound in damages and the plaintiff has not proven any conduct that amounts to a nuisance or obstruction of his proprietary rights.
Acts Interpretation Act 1915 s 13; Highways Act 1926 s 7, s 30A; Supreme Court Act 1935 s…
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- Case
- [2010] SASC 206
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Commissioner had failed to fully discharge his duty by not giving Mr Tavitian the statutory notice of the proposed proclamation. However, the court dismissed Mr Tavitian's claim for declaratory relief, finding that it would have no different effect to an order in the nature of certiorari that he could have sought in proceedings brought pursuant to r 199 and r 200 of the Supreme Court Rules 2006 (the Rules). The court also dismissed Mr Tavitian's claim for damages for nuisance, finding that no action for damages lies against the taking of administrative action which is ineffective at law. The court held that if the written proclamation were valid, Mr Tavitian's claim for nuisance would fail, and he would not be entitled to damages or a declaration that it was ineffective. The court found that the Government's contention that Mr Tavitian's claim invoked the court's equitable jurisdiction and that the remedy should be denied by applying the time limit prescribed by the Rules for judicial review of administrative action of six months by analogy because of the similarity between Mr Tavitian's action and an action for judicial review was not valid. The court found that the Government had not by any act or omission actually obstructed or threatened to obstruct Mr Tavitian's access to the highway.
The court dismissed the proceeding brought by Mr Tavitian and made no orders for costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The primary issue in the case was whether the means of access from the highway to Mr Tavitian’s property must be clearly visible, and if Mr Tavitian’s means of access satisfied the requirement of visibility. Additionally, the second defendant argued that Mr Tavitian’s claim invoked the court’s equitable jurisdiction and whether the time limit prescribed by the Rules of Court for judicial review of administrative action, which is six months, should be applied by analogy because of the similarity between Mr Tavitian’s action and an action for judicial review. Mr Tavitian also claimed damages against the second defendant for nuisance created by obstructing his access to the highway. However, the second defendant argued that it had not, by any act or omission, actually obstructed or threatened to obstruct Mr Tavitian’s access, thereby questioning the success of the nuisance claim.
The matter before the court is an application for judicial review brought by Mr Tavitian against the Commissioner of Highways. Mr Tavitian challenges the validity of a recommendation made by the Commissioner that the Governor proclaim a portion of a highway that runs along the boundary of his property. The plaintiff claims that the effect of the proclamation was to close off a means of access from the highway to his property. The Commissioner did not provide Mr Tavitian with the statutory notice of the proposed proclamation. Mr Tavitian did not bring proceedings challenging the proclamation until over four years after it was made. He seeks declaratory relief, contending that a means of access must be clearly visible and that his means of access satisfies the requirement of visibility. The Commissioner contends that Mr Tavitian’s claim invokes the court’s equitable jurisdiction and that the remedy should be denied by applying a time limit prescribed by the Rules of Court for judicial review of administrative action by analogy. The Commissioner also contends that Mr Tavitian’s nuisance claim against him fails because he has not by any act or omission actually obstructed or threatened to obstruct Mr Tavitian’s access.
Prior to the present proceedings, Mr Tavitian did not challenge the validity of the proclamation until over four years after it was made. The Commissioner contends that the court should not exercise its equitable jurisdiction to grant relief because of the delay in bringing the proceedings. The Commissioner contends that the six-month time limit prescribed by the Rules of Court for judicial review of administrative action should be applied by analogy to Mr Tavitian’s claim. The court must determine whether the time limit should be applied by analogy and whether it would be unjust to do so in the circumstances of this case. The court must also determine whether Mr Tavitian’s means of access satisfies the requirement of visibility and whether his nuisance claim succeeds.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It follows that the Commissioner failed to fully discharge his duty by not giving the statutory notice to Mr Tavitian.The declaration sought by the plaintiff In my view, the declaration sought by Mr Tavitian will have no different effect to an order in the nature of certiorari which he could have sought in proceedings brought pursuant to r 199 and r 200 of the Supreme Court Rules 2006 (the Rules). I shall deal with Mr Tavitian’s claim for damages more fully commencing at [84], but it is convenient to explain immediately why it can be put to one side on the question of whether a declaration should be made. If the written proclamation were valid, Mr Tavitian’s claim for nuisance would fail and he would not be entitled to damages or a declaration that it was ineffective. Leaving aside for now misfeasance in public office, which has not been claimed, no action for damages lies against the taking of administrative action which is ineffective at law. If the Commissioner had taken steps pursuant to an invalid and therefore ineffective proclamation, such as erecting a barrier across the claimed access, Mr Tavitian could have brought an action for obstruction of his right to access to the highway. However, no such steps were taken by the Commissioner. It follows that, on either view of the validity of the proclamation, a declaration would serve no purpose in the nuisance claim. A summons for judicial review brought pursuant to r 199 and r 200 must be issued as soon as reasonably practicable and no later than six months after the impugned administrative action was made. The State contends that the jurisdiction I am exercising, at least in dealing with Mr Tavitian’s claim, is equitable and that I should apply the limitation in r 200 by analogy. Equitable remedies may be denied on the ground that a statutory time limit should be applied by analogy because of a similarity between the equitable cause of action and an action which is subject to the statutory limitation. In Baker v Duke Group Ltd (in liq),[3] the circumstances in which a time limitation may be applied by analogy were explained in Perry J in the following terms:[82] [I]f there is no statutory limitation which applies to the equitable right in question, the court may take the view that the equitable right is so similar to a legal right to which a statutory limitation period is applicable, that a similar limitation period should be applied to the enforcement of the equitable right.[83] In such cases, the limitation period is said to be applied by analogy. Application of the principle is limited to cases where there is a ‘sufficiently close similarity between the exclusive equitable right in question and the legal rights to which the statutory provision applies’.[84] However, a court will not apply a statutory period of limitation by analogy, if in the circumstances of the case it would be unjust to do so.[4][3] (2005) 91 SASR 167.[4] Baker v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) (2005) 91 SASR 167 at 176 [82]-[84] per Perry J, Duggan and White JJ agreeing.