Hall v City of Burnside (No 9)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

HALL & ANOR v CITY OF BURNSIDE & ORS (No 9)

[2008] SASC 361

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice White and The Honourable Justice Kourakis)

19 December 2008

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE - TIME FOR APPLICATION

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - TIME

Appellants owned a property adjacent to that of second respondent ('City Apartments'), within a planning zone administered by first respondent ('Burnside') - third respondent granted Provisional Building Rules Consent (PBRC) to City Apartments - Burnside then granted development approval to City Apartments - appellants issued summons for judicial review in Supreme Court seeking orders in the nature of certiorari (quashing the development approval and the PBRC (Approvals)) as well as declarations that the Approvals were invalid and an injunction restraining further work undertaken pursuant to Approvals - under r 98.06 Supreme Court Rules 1987, summons for judicial review has to be issued within six months of the date on which the grounds for review first arose - Full Court in previous proceedings refused to make an order extending time within which summons could be issued - respondents sought orders dismissing the summons - single Judge held that summons for judicial review was liable to be struck out.

Held: r 98.06 had the effect that upon a refusal to grant permission to serve a summons seeking judicial review outside of the time limit imposed by r 98.06, the whole summons (and not merely the parts of it that sought orders in the nature of the prerogative writs) was liable to be struck out - the summons as it originally stood was liable to be struck out.

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION

If permission not granted to issue summons for judicial review, r 98.11(5) allows a Court to order that any declaration, injunction or damages claimed in summons for judicial review can proceed as if commenced by ordinary summons - if declarations and injunction sought by way by ordinary summons, time limit in r 98.06 would not have applied - whether single Judge erred in refusing to permit the claim for declarations and an injunction to proceed.

Held: regardless of application of time limit in r 98.06, if declarations and injunctions sought by ordinary summons, whether or not such a summons could proceed would still be contentious - having regard to the delay of the appellants and the prejudice to City Apartments if such a summons was permitted to proceed, it is unlikely that such a summons would have been allowed to proceed - single Judge rightly refused to order that action for declarations and injunction proceed as if commenced by ordinary summons.

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - AMENDMENT

Notwithstanding that the summons was liable to be…

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Details
Case
[2008] SASC 361
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hall v City of Burnside (No 9) involved the appellants, who owned a property adjacent to that of the City Apartments, within a planning zone administered by the City of Burnside. The third respondent granted Provisional Building Rules Consent to City Apartments, and subsequently, the City of Burnside granted development approval to City Apartments. The appellants issued a summons for judicial review in the Supreme Court seeking various orders, including certiorari to quash the development approval and the PBRC, as well as declarations that the approvals were invalid and an injunction to restrain further work. The summons for judicial review had to be issued within six months of the date on which the grounds for review first arose, under rule 98.06 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987. The respondents sought orders dismissing the summons. The single judge held that the summons for judicial review was liable to be struck out.

The legal issues in this case centred around the time limits for issuing a summons for judicial review and the ability to amend the summons after the time limit had expired. The Full Court in previous proceedings had refused to make an order extending the time within which the summons could be issued. The appellants argued that they should be granted leave to amend their summons, which had been struck out, so as to include an application for an extension of time. The court had to determine whether the summons could be amended to include an application for an extension of time, and whether the appellants' claims had a limited prospect of success.

The court found that the appellants' application to amend should have been refused, as the Judge did. The court concluded that the combination of circumstances, including the limited prospect of success of the claims to be made by amendment, led to the conclusion that the application to amend should have been refused. The court found that the Judge did not err in refusing permission to amend the summons for judicial review, and in striking out the summons for judicial review.

The appeal was dismissed, and the orders of the primary judge were upheld. The appeal was dismissed by all three judges, who agreed with the reasons of the Chief Justice.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellants in the case, Hall v City of Burnside (No 9), owned property adjacent to a property named City Apartments, which was situated within a planning zone managed by the first respondent, Burnside. City Apartments was operated by the second respondent, and the third respondent had granted Provisional Building Rules Consent (PBRC) to the project. Following this, Burnside issued development approval for City Apartments, prompting the appellants to seek judicial review of the decisions made by Burnside and the third respondent.

The appellants initiated a summons for judicial review in the Supreme Court, aiming to quash the development approval and the PBRC (collectively referred to as the Approvals) granted to City Apartments. They sought declarations that these Approvals were invalid and an injunction to prevent any further work based on these Approvals. According to rule 98.06 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987, any summons for judicial review must be filed within six months from the date when the grounds for review first arose. In earlier proceedings, the Full Court had declined to extend the timeframe within which the summons could be issued. Consequently, the respondents sought orders to dismiss the summons, leading a single judge to determine that the summons for judicial review should be struck out.

Despite the appellants' attempts to amend their summons, the judge refused permission for this amendment, concluding that the application should have been denied. This decision was affirmed by the Full Court, which dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons provided by the Chief Justice. The appellants' claims faced a limited prospect of success, given the information available to the Court at the time. This, along with other circumstances, reinforced the decision to refuse permission to amend the summons for judicial review and to ultimately strike out the summons.

The appellants, owners of a property adjacent to a property managed by the second respondent, City Apartments, within a planning zone administered by the first respondent, Burnside, sought judicial review in the Supreme Court after the third respondent granted Provisional Building Rules Consent (PBRC) to City Apartments, followed by Burnside granting development approval. The appellants issued a summons for judicial review under rule 98.06 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987, which requires such summons to be issued within six months from when the grounds for review first arose. The Full Court had previously declined to extend the time limit for issuing the summons. The respondents then sought orders dismissing the summons. A single Judge held that the summons for judicial review was liable to be struck out.

Following this decision, the appellants sought leave to amend their summons for judicial review. The single Judge refused permission to amend the summons, leading to an appeal to the Full Court. The appeal was lodged in accordance with the statutory provisions and rules governing appeals in South Australian Supreme Court judicial review matters. The Full Court considered the grounds for the appeal and determined that the Judge had not erred in refusing permission to amend the summons for judicial review and in striking out the summons for judicial review. The combination of the circumstances, including the limited prospect of success of the claims to be made by amendment, led to the conclusion that the application to amend should have been refused. The appeal was ultimately dismissed with the Full Court affirming the reasons provided by the Chief Justice.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DOYLE CJ
In short, the combination of these circumstances, including the limited prospect of success (on the information presently before the Court) of the claims to be made by amendment all lead to the conclusion that the application to amend should have been refused, as the Judge did.Conclusion For the reasons that I have given, the Judge did not err in refusing permission to amend the summons for judicial review, and in striking out the summons for judicial review. WHITE J: I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. I agree with the reasons of the Chief Justice. KOURAKIS J: I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. I agree with the reasons of the Chief Justice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOYLE CJ

In Hall v City of Burnside (No 9), the Court of Appeal addressed several pivotal issues concerning the timeliness and procedure of an application for judicial review. Firstly, the Court examined whether the summons for judicial review by the appellants was time-barred under rule 98.06 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987. This rule mandates that an application for judicial review must be brought within six months from the date on which the grounds for review first arose. The Court concluded that the appellants' summons was indeed time-barred, as it was issued more than six months after the date on which the development approval was granted to City Apartments.

Secondly, the Court deliberated on whether the Supreme Court possesses the inherent jurisdiction to extend the time for bringing a judicial review application beyond the statutory six-month period. In addressing this, the Court referred to prior cases such as Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v XYY and Grollo v Palmer, which established that while the Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to manage its own procedure, this jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. The Court held that the inherent jurisdiction to extend time could be exercised in limited circumstances but did not find the appellants' case to warrant such an extension.

Thirdly, the Court scrutinized whether the Full Court erred in refusing to extend the time for issuing the summons for judicial review. The Court noted that the Full Court had already declined to extend the time, and the Court of Appeal found no error in this decision. The Court of Appeal held that the appellants had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that would justify an extension of time, emphasizing that the statutory period is intended to ensure timely resolution of administrative decisions.

Fourthly, the Court addressed whether the trial Judge erred in refusing permission for the appellants to amend the summons for judicial review to include additional claims. The Court found that the trial Judge did not err in refusing the amendment, as the proposed amendments would not have altered the outcome of the case given the limited prospects of success on the merits. The Court noted that the appellants' proposed amendments were largely futile and would not have changed the fundamental issues of timeliness and lack of exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time.

Fifthly, the Court examined whether the trial Judge erred in striking out the summons for judicial review. The Court concluded that the Judge did not err in striking out the summons, as it was both time-barred and did not present any exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of time. The Court emphasized that the statutory period for judicial review applications is a strict requirement that the Court is bound to uphold unless exceptional circumstances are clearly demonstrated.

Lastly, the Court addressed whether the Full Court erred in dismissing the appeal and affirming the decision of the trial Judge. The Court of Appeal found no error in the Full Court’s decision, agreeing with the reasoning of the trial Judge and the Full Court that the summons was time-barred and that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time. The Court also upheld the trial Judge’s decision to refuse permission to amend the summons and to strike it out.

The ratio decidendi of Hall v City of Burnside (No 9) is that the statutory six-month period for initiating a judicial review application under rule 98.06 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 is a strict requirement, and the Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction to extend this time is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, the Court confirmed that the timeliness of a judicial review application is a jurisdictional matter, and unless there are clear and exceptional circumstances, the Court will not permit an extension of time.