SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Land and Valuation Division: Application)
HALL & ORS v CITY OF BURNSIDE & ORS (No 3)
[2007] SASC 3
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bleby
15 January 2007
EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS
ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS
Action for judicial review, declaratory and injunctive relief in respect of final development approval on ground of alleged invalidity – Application by plaintiffs for an interlocutory injunction to restrain proposed development pending hearing of the action – Full Court in separate proceedings having declared that same development approval was valid – Full Court on appeal in these proceedings having refused to extend time for commencement of judicial review proceedings – Whether balance of convenience favours the granting of interlocutory injunction – Possible abuse of process to proceed with declaratory and injunctive relief – Consideration of claim based on apprehended nuisance – Consideration of possible prejudice to the developer – Previous interim injunction revoked – Plaintiffs’ application for an interlocutory injunction dismissed.
Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) s 98.01, s 98.06; Development Act 1993 (SA) s 40, s 84, s 85; Development Regulations 1993 (SA) Reg 48, referred to.
Hall and Another v City of Burnside and City Apartments Pty Ltd (2005) 92 SASR 579; Hall & Ors v City of Burnside & Ors [2006] SASC 86; Hall & Ors v City of Burnside & Ors [2006] SASC 283; Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135, discussed.
City Apartments Pty Ltd v City of Burnside & Hall [2004] SAERD 94; City of Burnside & Ors v City Apartments Pty Ltd (2004) 236 LSJS 47; Hall v City of Burnside & Another (2005) 91 SASR 532; Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v The State of South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148; O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237; Meagher v Stephenson (1993) 30 NSWLR 736, considered.
HALL & ORS v CITY OF BURNSIDE & ORS (No 3)
[2007] SASC 3
BLEBY J: This action, commenced on 31 January 2006, is an application for declarations of invalidity and judicial review of the decision of a building certifier, Katnich Dodd, to grant provisional building rules consent and of the decision of the City of Burnside (“the Council”) to grant final development approval in respect of a proposed development at Glen Osmond. The applicant for development consent is City Apartments Pty Ltd (“City Apartments”). I will refer in more detail to the relief claimed in due course.
Rule 98.06 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) requires an application for judicial review to be brought within six months from the date when the grounds for review first arose. That time expired, in the case of the building rules consent, on 4 September 2005, and in the case of the final development approval, on 21 September 2005.
On 2 March 2006 I extended the time within which…
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- Case
- [2007] SASC 3
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted to prevent the proposed development from proceeding, given that the Full Court had already declared the development approval valid in separate proceedings. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief, predicated on an apprehended nuisance, was an abuse of process, and whether the plaintiffs had a viable claim. The court also had to weigh the possible prejudice to the developer against the plaintiffs' rights and interests.
The court found that the Full Court's determination of the validity of the development approval precluded the plaintiffs from pursuing the matter further, as the Full Court had already refused to extend the time for the commencement of the judicial review proceedings. The court further found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the balance of convenience favoured the granting of an interlocutory injunction, nor had they shown that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted. The court also held that the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief based on an apprehended nuisance was an abuse of process, and that there was no evidence to support such a claim. Additionally, the court noted the potential prejudice to the developer if an injunction was granted.
Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' application for an interlocutory injunction. The court also revoked the previous interim injunction that had been granted in the matter. This decision underscored the importance of respecting the finality of judicial decisions and the need to balance the interests of all parties involved in a dispute.
Background
Background to the litigation
In the current case, the plaintiffs applied for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the development from proceeding pending the hearing of their action. They argue that the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction and that proceeding with the development could constitute an abuse of process. Additionally, the plaintiffs raised a claim based on the apprehended nuisance the development would cause, considering the potential for significant environmental and planning implications. They also expressed concerns about possible prejudice to the developer if the injunction were to be granted after the development was completed. The court previously issued an interim injunction, which was later revoked.
Ultimately, the plaintiffs' application for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed. The court considered the Full Court's earlier decision on the validity of the development approval, the refusal to extend the time for the commencement of the judicial review proceedings, and the balance of convenience in favour of the City of Burnside proceeding with the development. The court also weighed the potential for prejudice to both the plaintiffs and the developer, leading to the conclusion that the interlocutory injunction should not be granted at that stage of the proceedings.
The procedural history of Hall v City of Burnside (No 3) begins with the plaintiffs, Hall, initiating an action for judicial review, declaratory, and injunctive relief concerning the final development approval granted to the defendant, City of Burnside, on grounds of alleged invalidity. The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the proposed development pending the hearing of their action. This application came before the court following a series of significant rulings in separate proceedings, where the Full Court had previously declared the same development approval valid. In the current proceedings, the Full Court had also ruled on an appeal, refusing to extend the time for the commencement of the judicial review action. Consequently, the court had to consider whether the balance of convenience favoured granting an interlocutory injunction, alongside the potential for abuse of process in proceeding with the declaratory and injunctive relief.
The court also considered the plaintiffs' claim based on the apprehended nuisance and weighed it against the possible prejudice to the developer. The matter was further complicated by a previous interim injunction that had been revoked. Given these circumstances, the plaintiffs' application for an interlocutory injunction was ultimately dismissed. The court's decision was informed by the interplay of these procedural steps and rulings, including the Full Court’s earlier determinations regarding the validity of the development approval and the timeliness of the judicial review action.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the balance of convenience favours the granting of an interlocutory injunction to restrain the proposed development pending the hearing of the action for judicial review?
2. Whether it would constitute an abuse of process for the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim for declaratory and injunctive relief?
3. Whether the court should consider the claim based on the apprehension of nuisance in determining the interlocutory injunction application?
4. Whether the court should consider the possible prejudice to the developer in determining the interlocutory injunction application?
5. Whether the revocation of the previous interim injunction affects the current application for an interlocutory injunction?
Held
1. Whether the balance of convenience favours the granting of an interlocutory injunction to restrain the proposed development pending the hearing of the action for judicial review?
The court concluded that the balance of convenience did not favour the granting of an interlocutory injunction. The result was that the interlocutory injunction was not granted.
2. Whether it would constitute an abuse of process for the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim for declaratory and injunctive relief?
The court concluded that it would not be an abuse of process for the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim. The result was that the application for declaratory and injunctive relief could proceed.
3. Whether the court should consider the claim based on the apprehension of nuisance in determining the interlocutory injunction application?
The court concluded that it should not consider the claim based on the apprehension of nuisance in determining the interlocutory injunction application. The result was that this claim was not taken into account.
4. Whether the court should consider the possible prejudice to the developer in determining the interlocutory injunction application?
The court concluded that it should consider the possible prejudice to the developer in determining the interlocutory injunction application. The result was that this factor was taken into account in the decision.
5. Whether the revocation of the previous interim injunction affects the current application for an interlocutory injunction?
The court concluded that the revocation of the previous interim injunction did affect the current application for an interlocutory injunction. The result was that this revocation was a significant factor in dismissing the current application.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Hall v City of Burnside (No 3), the plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant, the City of Burnside, from proceeding with a proposed development. This application was made pending the hearing of an action for judicial review, declaratory, and injunctive relief on the grounds of the alleged invalidity of the development approval. The Full Court considered several factors in determining whether to grant the interlocutory injunction.
First, the court examined whether the balance of convenience favoured the granting of an interlocutory injunction. The Full Court, in a separate proceeding, had already declared the development approval valid, which weighed against the grant of an interlocutory injunction. Additionally, the Full Court had refused to extend the time for the commencement of the judicial review proceedings, suggesting that the plaintiffs’ case lacked merit. The court held that the balance of convenience did not favour the plaintiffs because granting an interlocutory injunction would likely cause more harm to the City of Burnside and the developers than allowing the development to proceed.
Second, the court considered whether it would constitute an abuse of process for the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. Given that the Full Court had already declared the development approval valid and had refused to extend the time for judicial review, the court found that the plaintiffs' persistence in seeking an interlocutory injunction demonstrated an abuse of process. This conclusion was based on the notion that the plaintiffs' application appeared to be an attempt to circumvent the earlier decisions, which had already addressed the merits of the development approval.
Third, the court addressed whether it should consider the claim based on the apprehension of nuisance in determining the interlocutory injunction application. The court noted that the apprehension of nuisance was not the primary ground for the interlocutory injunction and did not form part of the action for judicial review. The court held that because the apprehension of nuisance was not the central issue in the pending action for judicial review, it should not be the basis for granting an interlocutory injunction.
Fourth, the court examined the possible prejudice to the developer in determining the interlocutory injunction application. The court found that granting an interlocutory injunction would cause significant prejudice to the developer, including financial loss and disruption to the development process. The Full Court’s earlier decisions indicated that the development approval was valid, suggesting that the development would proceed lawfully. This finding reinforced the conclusion that the balance of convenience did not favour the plaintiffs, as the potential prejudice to the developer outweighed any benefit to the plaintiffs.
Finally, the court considered whether the revocation of the previous interim injunction affected the current application for an interlocutory injunction. The court held that the revocation of the interim injunction by the Full Court was a relevant factor, indicating that the Full Court had already reviewed the merits of the development approval and found it valid. This prior decision influenced the current interlocutory injunction application, further supporting the conclusion that the balance of convenience did not favour the plaintiffs.
In summary, the Full Court dismissed the plaintiffs' application for an interlocutory injunction. The reasoning was grounded in the balance of convenience, the abuse of process, the irrelevance of the apprehension of nuisance, the significant prejudice to the developer, and the prior revocation of the interim injunction. The ratio decidendi of this case is that where a Full Court has already declared a development approval valid and refused to extend time for judicial review, and where granting an interlocutory injunction would cause significant prejudice to the developer, the balance of convenience will generally not favour the plaintiff. Furthermore, if the application appears to be an abuse of process, the court is unlikely to grant an interlocutory injunction.