SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
HALL & ANOR v CITY OF BURNSIDE & ORS (No 8)
[2008] SASC 318
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Sulan and The Honourable Justice Kourakis)
19 November 2008
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - EXTENSION OF TIME FOR APPEAL
Application for permission to appeal against an interlocutory ruling refusing to extend time for the setting down of the appeal – appellants had six months in which to set down appeal for hearing before the Full Court – as the six month limit drew near the appeal books had been substantially prepared but remained to be certified by the respondents - on the last day of the six month period, the appellants were unable to obtain the consent of the respondents to the contents of the appeal books, and on that day they sought an extension of time for the setting down of the appeal - a judge of this Court refused to extend time, with the consequence that the appellants' appeal and supplementary appeal were, by force of the Rules, dismissed – whether the Judge failed to give effect to the principles identified in Jackamarra – whether the Judge erred in accepting the respondents’ submission that the long history of the matter was such as to amount to an unusual circumstance which justified the refusal to extend time – whether any prejudice existed in extending time – whether the Judge took into account an irrelevant consideration in referring to the appellants as experienced litigants.
Held – granting permission to appeal from the order of the Judge refusing the extension of time and allowing the appeal:
(per Kourakis J, with Sulan J agreeing): the Judge erred by failing to differentiate between the prejudice suffered by the respondents after the institution of the appeal and the prejudice they have suffered from the time of the first challenge to the validity of the development approval – the Judge failed to have regard to the fact that the respondents took no steps to ensure that the appeal was promptly prosecuted, or, alternatively, dismissed after a period of two months lapsed;
(per Gray J): the Judge failed to give full effect to the principles identified in Jackamarra – the Judge placed too much weight on what were said to be prejudices to the respondents – the Judge did not give sufficient weight to the minimal delay that would occur in the setting down or to the consideration that through an early listing of the appeal, any delay in setting down could be addressed;
(per Gray J, with Sulan and Kourakis JJ agreeing): in reconsidering the exercise of the discretion as to whether to extend time, the extension of time is granted.
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 295; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 84.12, r 98.03 and r 98.06, referred to.
Hall & Anor v City of Burnside & Ors (2006)…
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- Case
- [2008] SASC 318
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the judge erred in refusing the extension of time, and whether the judge failed to give effect to the principles identified in Jackamarra. The Court also considered whether the judge erred in accepting the respondents’ submission that the long history of the matter amounted to an unusual circumstance justifying the refusal to extend time, and whether any prejudice existed in extending time. Additionally, the Court examined whether the judge took into account an irrelevant consideration in referring to the appellants as experienced litigants.
The Court held that the judge erred in not differentiating between the prejudice suffered by the respondents after the institution of the appeal and the prejudice they suffered from the time of the first challenge to the validity of the development approval. The judge also failed to consider that the respondents did not take steps to ensure the appeal was promptly prosecuted. The Court found that it was an error of law to regard prejudice suffered before the institution of the appeal in the same way as prejudice suffered thereafter. The Court granted permission to appeal, allowed the appeal, and extended the time for setting down the appeal. The Court also waived compliance with the rules requiring certification of the appeal book and directed that the appeal be set down by a specific date. The Court heard the parties regarding further directions to expedite the hearing of the appeal.
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