Hall v City of Burnside (No 8)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

HALL & ANOR v CITY OF BURNSIDE & ORS (No 8)

[2008] SASC 318

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Sulan and The Honourable Justice Kourakis)

19 November 2008

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - EXTENSION OF TIME FOR APPEAL

Application for permission to appeal against an interlocutory ruling refusing to extend time for the setting down of the appeal – appellants had six months in which to set down appeal for hearing before the Full Court – as the six month limit drew near the appeal books had been substantially prepared but remained to be certified by the respondents - on the last day of the six month period, the appellants were unable to obtain the consent of the respondents to the contents of the appeal books, and on that day they sought an extension of time for the setting down of the appeal - a judge of this Court refused to extend time, with the consequence that the appellants' appeal and supplementary appeal were, by force of the Rules, dismissed – whether the Judge failed to give effect to the principles identified in Jackamarra – whether the Judge erred in accepting the respondents’ submission that the long history of the matter was such as to amount to an unusual circumstance which justified the refusal to extend time – whether any prejudice existed in extending time – whether the Judge took into account an irrelevant consideration in referring to the appellants as experienced litigants.

Held – granting permission to appeal from the order of the Judge refusing the extension of time and allowing the appeal:

(per Kourakis J, with Sulan J agreeing): the Judge erred by failing to differentiate between the prejudice suffered by the respondents after the institution of the appeal and the prejudice they have suffered from the time of the first challenge to the validity of the development approval – the Judge failed to have regard to the fact that the respondents took no steps to ensure that the appeal was promptly prosecuted, or, alternatively, dismissed after a period of two months lapsed;

(per Gray J): the Judge failed to give full effect to the principles identified in Jackamarra – the Judge placed too much weight on what were said to be prejudices to the respondents – the Judge did not give sufficient weight to the minimal delay that would occur in the setting down or to the consideration that through an early listing of the appeal, any delay in setting down could be addressed;

(per Gray J, with Sulan and Kourakis JJ agreeing):  in reconsidering the exercise of the discretion as to whether to extend time, the extension of time is granted.

Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 295; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 84.12, r 98.03 and r 98.06, referred to.
Hall & Anor v City of Burnside & Ors (2006)…

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Details
Case
[2008] SASC 318
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Hall v City of Burnside (No 8), the appellants sought permission to appeal an interlocutory ruling that refused to extend the time for setting down their appeal. The appeal related to a development approval which had been challenged by the respondents. The appellants had six months to set down their appeal for hearing before the Full Court, but on the last day of this period, they were unable to obtain the respondents' consent to the appeal books' contents. Consequently, they sought an extension of time for setting down the appeal. A judge of the Court denied this request, resulting in the dismissal of the appellants' appeal and supplementary appeal under the Rules.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the judge erred in refusing the extension of time, and whether the judge failed to give effect to the principles identified in Jackamarra. The Court also considered whether the judge erred in accepting the respondents’ submission that the long history of the matter amounted to an unusual circumstance justifying the refusal to extend time, and whether any prejudice existed in extending time. Additionally, the Court examined whether the judge took into account an irrelevant consideration in referring to the appellants as experienced litigants.

The Court held that the judge erred in not differentiating between the prejudice suffered by the respondents after the institution of the appeal and the prejudice they suffered from the time of the first challenge to the validity of the development approval. The judge also failed to consider that the respondents did not take steps to ensure the appeal was promptly prosecuted. The Court found that it was an error of law to regard prejudice suffered before the institution of the appeal in the same way as prejudice suffered thereafter. The Court granted permission to appeal, allowed the appeal, and extended the time for setting down the appeal. The Court also waived compliance with the rules requiring certification of the appeal book and directed that the appeal be set down by a specific date. The Court heard the parties regarding further directions to expedite the hearing of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

There were a number of avenues available to address any possible prejudice that might arise to the respondents. One such avenue was to waive compliance with the rules of Court requiring certification. Another was to fast-track the appeal. Had either course been followed, the substantive proceedings could be expected to have been heard and disposed of by now.Conclusion Having regard to the foregoing, I would grant permission to appeal, allow the appeal, and extend time for the setting down of the appeal. I would waive compliance with the rules requiring certification of the appeal book, and direct that the appeal be set down by 5.00pm on Thursday 20 November 2008. I would hear the parties as to the giving of further directions to enable the hearing of the appeal to be expedited. SULAN J: I agree with the reasons of Kourakis J. I agree with the orders proposed by Gray J. KOURAKIS J: I gratefully adopt the summary of the material facts appearing in the judgment of Gray J. I agree with the orders he proposes. For the reasons that follow I have concluded that the Judge who heard the application erred by failing to differentiate between the prejudice suffered by the respondents after the institution of the appeal and the prejudice they have suffered from the time of the first challenge to the validity of the development approval. I hold that it is an error of law to regard prejudice suffered before the institution of the appeal in the same way as prejudice suffered thereafter. Furthermore, the Judge failed to have regard to the fact that the respondents took no steps to ensure that the appeal was promptly prosecuted, or alternatively, dismissed after the period of two months lapsed. Where a statute or a statutory instrument limits the time within which to institute proceedings or to take a step in an action, it commonly confers a discretion on a court to extend that time. It is well accepted that subject to an express provision to the contrary, the length of the delay of a party in instituting an action or taking a step in an action is relevant to the exercise of that discretion. It appears to me that there are two reasons why that is so. The first is that the length of delay is a measure of the applicant’s fault. The second is that the degree of prejudice suffered by the innocent party is likely to be greater where the delay is longer. Although the length of the delay may, in itself, without reference to fault or prejudice, have some weight, it is unlikely to be substantial. If it be accepted that one of the reasons that the length of the delay is a material consideration is its capacity to cause prejudice, then it appears to me that the extent to which the prejudice is directly related to the delay is in itself a relevant consideration. The point I make can be simply illustrated. A delay of just one day after a three year limitation period might, in the ordinary course, be regarded as trivial and would not militate against an extension of time because the degree of fault is minor. However, if important evidence was lost in that day, then the strength of the case for an extension would be substantially weakened, precisely because the loss of the evidence is directly related to the delay. On the other hand, if the same evidence were lost in the first day after the date on which the action could have been brought, then the loss of that evidence would not weigh as strongly against extending the time within which to proceed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established