Hall & Ors v City of Burnside & Ors

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Civil)

HALL & ORS v CITY OF BURNSIDE & ORS

[2006] SASC 283

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Duggan and The Honourable Justice Gray)

12 September 2006

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE - EXTENSION OF TIME

Application for leave to appeal against a decision by a Supreme Court Judge extending the time within which an action for judicial review could be brought to review the grant of provisional and final building approval pursuant to s 33(1)(b) and 33(4) of the Development Act 1993 (SA) - proceedings brought 11 months out of time - whether an extension of time should be granted - the appellant has committed considerable finance to the development the subject of the appeal - the respondents' claim inter alia that the development approval is invalid for the reason that it was granted out of time and for the reason that it now fails to comply with the approval so granted - the respondents also raise a claim as to nuisance relating to the potential for the development to interfere with property owned by Dr Halcrow - the prejudice relied upon by the appellant is not answered by the respondents' argument that the respondents could bring the same claims by way of another action other than an action for judicial review - consideration of the applicable Supreme Court Rules - consideration of the rules and of relevant case law - the public interest is best served by strict application of the limitation period applicable to claims for judicial review - arguable case disclosed by the appellants' appeal - application for leave to appeal granted - appeal allowed.

Development Act 1993 (SA) s 33(1)(b), 33(4); Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 3.04(d), 6.02(1), 94.03(c), 98.01(3), 98.06, 98.11(5), referred to.
Hall v City of Burnside & City Apartments Pty Ltd (2005) 92 SASR 579; Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; Clayton v Ralphs (1987) 45 SASR 347; Xenophon v State of South Australia (2000) 78 SASR 251; Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000] 1 WLR 1988; Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516; Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga [1989] 2 WAR 196; Palata Investments Ltd v Burt and Sinfield Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 942; McKay v Alexandrina Council (2003) 227 LSJS 442, discussed.

HALL & ORS v CITY OF BURNSIDE & ORS
[2006] SASC 283

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Duggan and Gray JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ: A Judge made an order extending the period of six months, specified by r 98.06 of the Supreme Court Rules 1987, within which Mr and Mrs Hall (“the Halls”) as first plaintiff and Dr Halcrow (as second plaintiff) could commence proceedings seeking judicial review. The proceedings challenge the validity of a decision to grant provisional building rules consent pursuant to s 33(1)(b) of the Development Act 1993 (SA)…

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Details
Case
[2006] SASC 283
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hall & Ors v City of Burnside & Ors involved an application for leave to appeal against a decision by a Supreme Court Judge extending the time within which an action for judicial review could be brought. The original proceedings were brought 11 months out of the statutory time limit. The appellants sought to challenge the validity of provisional and final building approval granted under the Development Act 1993 (SA). The respondents argued that the development approval was invalid for being granted out of time and for failing to comply with the approval. The respondents also raised a claim of nuisance regarding the potential interference with property owned by Dr Halcrow.

The legal issues before the court included whether an extension of time should be granted, considering the substantial financial investment by the appellants in the development. The court had to balance the interests of the appellants in pursuing their claims against the public interest in enforcing limitation periods for judicial review. The court considered relevant Supreme Court Rules, particularly r 98.06 which mandates proceedings be brought as promptly as possible, and r 98.11(5) which allows for the continuation of proceedings as if begun by summons.

The court concluded that while the six-month limitation period for judicial review applications is a general rule, the interests of justice may require an extension in certain circumstances. The court found that the appellants had acted reasonably and with diligence once they became aware of potential issues with the building consent and development approval. The relatively short delay and the existence of alternative remedies not subject to a limitation period supported the grant of an extension. The court emphasised the importance of the limitation period in protecting the validity of decisions and the public interest in enforcing such periods. The appellants had demonstrated an arguable case that justified the grant of leave to appeal and the extension of time.

The final orders were that the application for leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal was allowed. This decision underscored the court's commitment to the principle that limitation periods are imposed to balance the interests of public order and the need for expeditious resolution of disputes, but also recognised the necessity to consider exceptional circumstances that might warrant an extension.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The six month period expired in relation to the building consent on 4 September 2005, and in relation to a development approval on 21 September 2005.The Judge’s decision The Judge began on the basis that the plaintiffs had an arguable case that the building consent and development approval were not valid, and an arguable case that no building consent had been granted in respect of the excavation and filling. That conclusion is not challenged at present. There is a discrepancy between the terms of the building consent and the terms of the development approval. As I have already noted, the Judge treated the Halls as having standing, and Dr Halcrow as having standing at least in relation to a claim in nuisance. That finding is not challenged at this stage. The Judge noted that r 98.01(3) provides that a declaration or an injunction may be sought in a summons for judicial review. They may be granted if the Court considers it “just and convenient” to do so. The Judge referred to r 98.11(5) which provides:Where the relief sought is a declaration, an injunction or damages, and the Court considers that it should not be granted on a summons for judicial review but might have been granted if it had been sought in an action begun by summons by the plaintiff at the time of commencing of the action, the Court may instead of refusing the judicial review, order the proceedings to continue as if they had been begun by summons other than under this Rule and the Court may give directions accordingly.The Judge concluded that the relief claimed in all five paragraphs could be sought in the proceedings. The Judge then noted that the six month limitation period applies only to an application for judicial review. He said that to the extent that the Halls and Dr Halcrow could claim relief by way of declaration and injunction, and not in proceedings by way of judicial review, the six month time limit did not apply, and no other relevant limitation period barred the claim. The Judge suggested that an extension of time should be granted so that “all relevant matters and possible relief can be considered at the same time”: [24]. He said that City Apartments had not identified any prejudice attributable to the grant of an extension beyond the prejudice they would suffer if the plaintiffs pursued the “alternative remedies of declaration and injunction”: [24]. I will return to that point. The Judge said there were four factors to be considered in deciding whether to grant an extension of time. They are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the applicant’s prospects of success and the extent of any prejudice to the defendant as a result of extending the time: [32]. As to the length of the delay and the reason for the delay, the Judge said that the delay was only five months, and that in the circumstances the Halls had acted reasonably in not pursuing their doubts about the building consent until after the single Judge’s decision invalidating the development approval was reversed. He said that they then moved with reasonable diligence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Having regard to these circumstances, the Judge said that an extension of time should be granted. He added at [42]:However, given that there are also other remedies available against at least one of the parties based on similar grounds, and those remedies are not subject to an initiating time limit, the case for an extension of time becomes compelling, and any ground for opposing leave to serve based on delay falls away.Consideration of submissions In my respectful opinion, a number of Mr Roder’s criticisms of the Judge’s approach are valid. As McHugh J said in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 553, the six month limitation period is “the general rule”. It is not “an arbitrary cut off point”. The six month limit represents a judgment as to an appropriate time limit having regard to the public interest and having regard to the interest of individuals who have an interest in the particular case that arises. A limitation period is imposed, and the length of the period is determined, recognising that the limitation period may result in a cause of action being defeated. A six month time limit for proceedings by way of judicial review is common in Australia, and in some jurisdictions the time limit is even shorter: see Aronson, Dyer, Groves, Judicial Review of Administration Action (3rd ed, Lawbook Co, 2004), pp 718-719. The relatively short limitation period reflects the fact that judicial review is concerned with the validity of decision making by individuals and bodies exercising statutory and other powers that must be exercised in the public interest. Such decisions often have direct and consequential effects on persons other than those immediately affected. In a range of circumstances it will often be a matter of significance for other persons and authorities to know whether or not such a decision is valid or has been subject to a legal challenge. There is a substantial public interest in being able to say, after a specified time, that such a decision can be treated as beyond attack. The very fact that the standing rules permit challenges to validity to be made by persons other than those directly involved in the decision making process is a reason why there should be a relatively short period within which any such attack should be mounted. The fact that r 98.06 requires that quite apart from the six month time limit, proceedings should be brought “as promptly as possible” emphasises the significance of the time limit. I do not suggest that the Judge overlooked this point. I merely emphasise that when considering whether the interests of justice require that an extension be granted (as the plaintiffs had to demonstrate), substantial weight should be given to the fact that the time limit has been imposed, and to the public interest and any relevant private interest (here, the interests of City Apartments) in the validity of the decision after the expiry of the limitation period. I do not agree with the Judge’s conclusion that the prejudice to City Apartments was minimal.