Colmer & Ors v Alexandrina Council & Anor

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Land and Valuation Division: Application for Judicial Review)

COLMER & ORS v ALEXANDRINA COUNCIL & ANOR

[2009] SASC 13

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bleby

23 January 2009

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - STANDING TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS

Whether plaintiffs have standing - no private right affected - whether plaintiffs have a special interest in the subject matter of the action - development interferes with view from plaintiffs' land - plaintiffs would have a right to make representations to Council if Development Approval set aside and a future application made - plaintiffs have standing.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE - EXTENSION OF TIME

Application for extension of time within which to commence judicial review proceedings - proceedings eight months out of time - no good reason for delay - defendant will suffer substantial prejudice if extension of time granted - plaintiff has arguable case.

Extension of time refused - application for judicial review dismissed.

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - BUILDING CONTROL - COUNCIL CONSENT AND APPROVAL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS

Application for judicial review of Development Approval - whether development properly classified as Category 1 development - whether "site" of development is held exclusively with dwelling - whether curtilage of dwelling includes right of way - site is held exclusively with dwelling - whether development comprises one dwelling - development consists of distinct and separate elements, being a residence and separate garage and studio - development is not a detached dwelling - improperly classified as Category 1.

Development Act 1993 (SA) s 38, s 84, s 85; Development Regulations 1993 (SA) reg 32, sch 9 cl 2, reg 3, sch 1; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 117, r 200; Planning and Development Act 1966 (SA); Planning Act 1982 (SA) s 53, referred to.
Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v The Commonwealth of Australia (1980) 146 CLR 493; Hutchens v City of Holdfast Bay (2007) 98 SASR 412, applied.
Bade v Rural City of Murray Bridge (2008) 101 SASR 302, distinguished.
McNamara v City of Charles Sturt [2001] SASC 368; Polites v City of Holdfast Bay (No 2) (1998) 72 SASR 475; Baker v City of Norwood (2003) 127 LGERA 200; Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v The State of South Australia (1990) 53 SASR 349; Day v Pinglen Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 289; Hall v City of Burnside (2006) LSJS 440, discussed.
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516, considered.

WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED

"Curtilage"

COLMER & ORS v ALEXANDRINA COUNCIL & ANOR
[2009] SASC 13

Land and Valuation Division

BLEBY J.

Introduction

  1. This is an application for judicial review of a Development Approval granted by the first defendant in respect of land owned by the second defendant.  The plaintiffs require an extension of time in which to commence proceedings.  Provisional Development Plan consent was granted in July 2007 and, by the time these proceedings were commenced in September 2008, construction was…

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Details
Case
[2009] SASC 13
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiffs, Colmer and others, sought judicial review of a decision by the Alexandrina Council and another respondent, concerning development approval. The dispute centred on whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the proceedings, the classification of the development as Category 1, and the procedural issue of an extension of time to commence the judicial review proceedings. The court had to determine if the plaintiffs had a sufficient interest in the matter to have standing, whether the development was properly classified, and if an extension of time to commence the judicial review should be granted.

The primary legal issues were whether the plaintiffs had standing to institute the proceedings and whether the application for an extension of time should be allowed. The court considered whether the plaintiffs had a special interest in the subject matter of the action, given that the development interfered with their view from their land and that they would have a right to make representations to the Council if the Development Approval were set aside and a future application made. Regarding the classification of the development, the court had to determine if the development was properly categorised as Category 1. Additionally, the court assessed the application for an extension of time, considering the significant delay and the potential prejudice to the defendants.

The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the proceedings as they had a special interest in the subject matter. Regarding the classification of the development, the court found that the development was not a detached dwelling and was improperly classified as Category 1. The court was not persuaded that there was a good reason for the substantial delay in bringing the proceedings and found that granting an extension of time would cause substantial prejudice to the defendants. Consequently, the application for an extension of time was refused, and the application for judicial review was dismissed.

The court ordered that the application for an extension of time be refused and that the application for judicial review be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

BLEBY J
The length of the delay is substantial. The reason for the delay is not satisfactorily explained. While there is clearly an arguable case that the development consent is invalid by virtue of the Council treating it as a Category 1 development, the prejudice to the defendant by granting the extension of time is substantial and cannot easily be measured in financial terms. Even though the decision of the Council is vulnerable, the public interest in insulating defective decisions from attack after such a relatively long time has not been displaced.Conclusion For these reasons the plaintiffs’ application for extension of time is refused. The application for judicial review is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BLEBY J

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