The Break Surf Park Investments Pty Ltd v Tate

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

THE BREAK SURF PARK INVESTMENTS PTY LTD v TATE & ORS

[2025] SASCA 63

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice S Doyle and the Honourable Justice Bleby)

16 June 2025

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS - LEAVE TO APPEAL

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - REVIEWABLE DECISIONS AND CONDUCT - EXISTENCE OF OTHER REVIEW OR APPEAL RIGHTS

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS - EXTENSION OF TIME

Application for leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision.

On 7 March 2025, the respondents filed an Originating Application for Review of a decision to grant planning consent to a development application lodged by the applicant, The Break Surf Park Pty Ltd (‘Break Surf’). The respondents own property in the immediate vicinity of land the subject of the development application. By Interlocutory Application (FDN 2), the respondents sought leave to file the Originating Application out of time. On 1 April 2025, Break Surf filed an Interlocutory Application (FDN 15) for a separate and expedited hearing of the application for an extension of time to commence the action.

On 25 April 2024, a single judge of this court dismissed the Interlocutory Application (FDN 15). She ordered that the application for an extension of time was to be heard and determined together with the action for judicial review.

Break Surf raised two main issues for consideration on appeal:

1.Whether the trial judge erred in law in misconstruing and/or misapplying r 256.5 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (‘UCR’) (Ground 1.a.); and

2.Whether the judge erred in law or mixed fact and law by failing to hold that urgent and separate disposition of the extension of time application was warranted by the evidence adduced by the applicant (Ground 2).

Ground 1 was particularised with further complaints about various aspects of the judge’s reasoning.

Held (by Livesey P and Bleby JA) granting leave to appeal on ground 1.a. but dismissing the appeal:

1.The judge erred as a matter of law in holding that r 256.5(2) of the UCR does not create a default position, in effect, that no further steps are to be taken in respect of an application for judicial review until the Interlocutory Application for an extension of time to file the Originating Application is determined.

2.The remaining complaints do not warrant a grant of leave to appeal, having regard to the matters to which the judge had regard and the evidential support for the judge’s exercise of the discretion.

Held (by S Doyle JA, agreeing in the result):

1.The judge did not err as a matter of principle as there is no basis to infer that she overlooked the existence of the overarching onus of proof upon an applicant who issues out-of-time judicial review proceedings to demonstrate a basis for a grant of…

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Details
Case
[2025] SASCA 63
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia considered an appeal by Break Surf Park Investments Pty Ltd against a decision of a single judge. The dispute arose from a judicial review application challenging a planning consent granted to Break Surf Park for a surf park. The primary issue on appeal concerned the procedural orders made by the trial judge regarding an application for an extension of time to commence the judicial review proceedings.

The court was required to determine whether the trial judge erred in exercising their discretion by ordering that the application for an extension of time to commence judicial review proceedings be heard concurrently with the merits of the judicial review application itself. This involved interpreting the relevant rules governing judicial review applications, particularly those concerning extensions of time and the mandatory dismissal of proceedings if certain conditions are not met. The court also had to consider the appropriateness of granting leave to appeal from such an interlocutory decision, taking into account the judge's ex tempore reasons and the case management considerations involved.

The Full Court reasoned that the trial judge's decision to hear the extension of time application with the merits was a valid exercise of case management discretion, consistent with the court's encouragement of expeditious handling of procedural matters. The court noted that the reasons provided were ex tempore, as is common in such matters, and that this practice does not diminish the validity of the decision. The court applied the principles governing interlocutory appeals, which require a demonstration of error or a question of general importance. The court found that the trial judge's interpretation and application of the rules, particularly rule 256.5(3)(b), were not demonstrably wrong and that the decision was within the bounds of proper judicial discretion.

Leave to appeal was refused. The court concluded that the trial judge had not made an error of law or principle in their case management decision, and therefore, there was no basis to interfere with the interlocutory orders made.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The determination by the trial judge to order that the application for an extension of time be heard together with the merits of the judicial review application required an exercise of discretion in case management. It was necessary that the judge determine Break Surf Park’s application expeditiously. The judge delivered a ruling with ex tempore reasons, a practice that this Court encourages in matters of practice and procedure of this kind. It is a concomitant of that desirable practice that the reasons given will not necessarily be as comprehensive as might be expected on a reserved judgment that has had the advantages of reflection and opportunity for more detailed analysis. These considerations all go to the appropriateness of a grant of leave to appeal.Background The essential history of the matter is as follows. On 30 October 2023, Break Surf Park lodged a development application with the City of Onkaparinga seeking planning consent for a surf park at Aldinga (‘the Original Application’). Break Surf Park is one company in a group of corporate entities, collectively called ‘the Break Group’. On 2 May 2024, the sixth respondent, the City of Onkaparinga Assessment Panel, met to consider whether to grant or refuse planning consent to the Original Application. It determined to grant planning consent, subject to conditions and reserved matters. The reserved matters included an acoustic matter. On or shortly after 2 May 2024, the second respondent, Ms Zervas, learned about the grant of planning consent from her husband, the first respondent Mr Tate. Ms Zervas’s evidence was that Mr Tate told her in or around December 2023 that there was no public notification process or avenue to raise concerns or objections over the proposed development. Craig Andrew Mitchell, a director of corporate entities in the Break Group (but not including Break Surf Park), filed affidavit evidence about, among other things, expenditure incurred by the Break Group in respect of the proposed development. His evidence was that between June 2022 and February 2025, the Break Group had spent a total of $6,778,998 on the project. It spent $2,255,410 of that following the grant of planning consent and $1,157,914 of that after 2 November 2024. The significance of that last date is that it was six months after the grant of planning consent. It was on that date that the time to commence an action for judicial review to challenge the grant of planning consent, prescribed by UCR 256.3(1)(b), expired. On 20 November 2024, Break Surf Park lodged a Variation Application, seeking planning consent for a variation to the original application. The Variation Application included lighting specifications (specifically, lighting towers) and a light spill diagram. The Variation Application was publicly notified until 20 January 2025. Ms Zervas gave affidavit evidence to the following effect:·on or around 3 January 2025, Ms Zervas viewed the Variation Application for the first time;·on or around 4 January 2025, the first four respondents engaged a town planner to prepare a representation opposing the Variation Application on their behalf;·on 9 January 2025, a council staff member told Ms Zervas that she could not comment on the original application as part of her representation on the Variation Application, and that Break Surf Park had a right of appeal, but she did not;·on 19 January 2025, Ms Zervas attended a meeting about the Variation Application. At that meeting, she learned for the first time that judicial review may be an avenue for challenging the planning consent;·on 7 February 2025, the solicitors for the first four respondents wrote to Break Surf Park asserting that the planning consent for the development was invalid;·on 28 February 2025, the first four respondents met with the Chief Executive Officer of Break Surf Park on a without prejudice basis.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In particular, r 256.4(5) provides that if an action is instituted more than six months after the decision, act or omission in question, the application must be accompanied by an interlocutory application and supporting affidavit seeking an extension of time to commence the action and leave of the Court to proceed with the action. Rule 256.5 then provides:256.5—Application for leave or summary judgment(1) This rule applies if—(a)an applicant files an interlocutory application seeking an extension of time to commence the action and leave to proceed with the action under rule 256.4(5); or(b)within 14 days after service of the Originating Application documents, a respondent files an interlocutory application for summary judgment under rule 144.2.(2) If this rule applies, no further steps are required to be taken by any party in the action (including filing responding documents) other than for the purpose of the interlocutory application in question until that application has been determined by the Court.(3) If this rule applies, the Court will dismiss the action (insofar as judicial review is sought)—(a)unless the Court is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for the action for judicial review; and(b)if subrule (1)(a) applies—the Court either grants an extension of time or orders that the application be heard and determined with the merits of the proceeding.(4) If the Court dismisses the action insofar as judicial review is sought but a balance of the proceeding under rule 256.4(7) remains, the Court will make orders for the future conduct of the balance of the proceeding.(5) If the Court does not dismiss the action insofar as judicial review is sought, the Court will make orders for the future conduct of the action. Central to the operation of these rules is r 256.5(2), which mandates that ‘no further steps’ are required to be taken by any party in the action other than for the purpose of the interlocutory application ‘until that application has been determined by the Court’. In a case where an extension of time is sought, r 256.5(3) then requires that the action for judicial review be dismissed unless both of the matters that follow are addressed. The primary complaint by Break Surf Park on the application for leave to appeal concerns the judge’s interpretation of r 256.5(3) in ordering, pursuant to r 256.5(3)(b), that the first four respondents’ application for an extension of time should be heard and determined with the merits of the proceeding. That rule, and the importance of the question of interpretation said to be raised in respect of that rule, must be considered in the context of the other rules set out above.The interlocutory applications The first four respondents cast their application for an extension of time (FDN 2) on the following grounds:1.The applicants at all times from becoming aware that Development Application ID 23031140 (Original Application) had been lodged sought to challenge the lack of public consultation in relation to it and sought to be heard on the issue of planning consent from in or around December 2023.2.The Applicants were notified by the City of Onkaparinga that the decision of the Third Respondent could not be appealed which the Applicants understood to mean could not be subject to challenge;3.The Applicants have sought to challenge the decision as soon as reasonably practicable having sought legal advice;4.The application has reasonable prospects of success in light of clear legal errors committed by the Third Respondent in the course of granting planning consent to the Original Application;5.There is some public interest in ventilating the provisions of the Character Preservation (McLaren Vale) Act 2012 (CP Act), yet to be subject to judicial analysis; and6.The application is out of time by only 4 months and the delay in bringing the review proceedings causes no material prejudice to the Respondents in circumstances where:a. The Original Application has not yet obtained building consent or final development approval;b. The Variation Application is under assessment;c. No site or other works have commenced on the Development Site.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established