SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
HARRIS SCARFE LIMITED (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) (IN LIQUIDATION) & ORS v ERNST & YOUNG & ORS (No 2)
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bleby
6 May 2005
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS - LEAVE TO APPEAL
Test to be applied by single judge on application for leave to appeal against own interlocutory decision – Difficulty posed by question whether decision clearly wrong – Anomaly where application before Full Court could be decided on different criteria - No set criteria which must apply in every case – Discussion of considerations relevant to granting of leave.
PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PRACTICE UNDER RULES OF COURT - PLEADINGS
Application for leave to appeal pursuant to s 50(1a)(c) Supreme Court Act 1935 by defendants against order granting leave to the plaintiffs to file amended statement of claim – Nature of amendments such that application treated as equivalent to application to strike out on ground that no cause of action disclosed – Whether claim so untenable that it cannot possibly succeed – Plaintiffs’ right to state their case as they choose – Whether facts pleaded would be established and whether causation of loss as alleged would be proved were matters to be determined on basis of evidence at trial – Whether order determines substantive rights – Whether difficult and complex question of law – Whether issue of general importance – Whether substantial injustice caused by allowing pleading to stand – Leave to appeal refused.
Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 50(1a)(c); Supreme Court Rules (SA) r 94.02, referred to.
Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170; Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VR 431; Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397; State of Western Australia v Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 40; Coles Myer Ltd v Bowman [1996] 1 VR 457, applied.
Duke Group Ltd (In Liquidation) v Arthur Young (1991) 4 ACSR 355, distinguished.
Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation (1987) 9 NSWLR 310, discussed.
SA Government Financing Authority v Bank of NZ and BT Australia (Hong Kong) Ltd [2002] SASC 56; Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd v Hutcheson (No.3) 8 ACLR 526; Wentworth v Rogers (No.3) (1986) 6 NSWLR 642, considered.
HARRIS SCARFE LIMITED (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) (IN LIQUIDATION) & ORS v ERNST & YOUNG & ORS (No 2)
[2005] SASC 168
BLEBY J: The three defendants in this action have applied for leave to appeal against the order I made on 30 March 2005 granting leave to the plaintiffs to file an amended statement of claim. I published reasons for that order: Harris Scarfe Limited (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liquidation) & Ors v Ernst & Young & Ors [2005] SASC 113. The proposed grounds of appeal by all defendants…
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- Case
- [2005] SASC 168
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the order determining the substantive rights was one that could be appealed, whether the question posed a difficult and complex question of law, whether the issue was of general importance, and whether substantial injustice would result if the pleadings were allowed to stand. The court needed to consider whether there were any circumstances in which leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision should be granted, and what factors should be taken into account when determining such an application. The court also needed to consider the appropriate test to be applied by a single judge when determining an application for leave to appeal against their own interlocutory decision.
The court held that there was no set criteria which must apply in every case and that each case would turn on its own facts. The court emphasised that the decision of whether to grant leave to appeal was a difficult one, as the question of whether the decision was clearly wrong was not always straightforward. The court also noted that the criteria for granting leave to appeal could differ when an application was before the Full Court. In this case, the court found that the proposed amendments did not disclose a cause of action, but that was a matter to be determined on the basis of evidence at trial. The court also found that the issue was not one of general importance and that there was no substantial injustice caused by allowing the pleadings to stand. The application for leave to appeal was therefore refused.
In summary, the court held that leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision should only be granted in exceptional circumstances, where the decision was clearly wrong or where there was a difficult and complex question of law of general importance. The court also held that the nature of the amendments proposed by the plaintiffs did not disclose a cause of action, but that was a matter to be determined on the basis of evidence at trial. The application for leave to appeal was therefore refused.
Background
Background to the litigation
The defendants opposed the plaintiffs’ application for leave to amend and argued that the proposed amendments disclosed no cause of action. They contended that the proposed amended statement of claim was untenable and that it could not possibly succeed at trial. The single judge, however, granted the plaintiffs’ application, and the defendants sought leave to appeal against this decision. The defendants argued that the single judge’s decision was clearly wrong, that it determined substantive rights, and that it raised a difficult and complex question of law of general importance.
In assessing the application for leave to appeal, the court considered the criteria relevant to granting leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision made by a single judge. The court noted that there were no set criteria which must apply in every case, and that the decision whether to grant leave to appeal depended on the particular circumstances of the case. The court considered whether the single judge’s decision was clearly wrong, whether the issue raised was of general importance, whether the order determined substantive rights, whether it involved a difficult and complex question of law, and whether substantial injustice would be caused by allowing the pleading to stand. Ultimately, the court held that the single judge’s decision should not be interfered with and that leave to appeal should be refused.
The matter of Harris Scarfe Ltd (in Liq) v Ernst & Young (No 2) represents an appeal against a decision made by a single judge in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The defendants sought leave to appeal from an interlocutory order which granted the plaintiffs permission to file an amended statement of claim. This application was treated as a request to strike out the amended statement of claim on the basis that it did not disclose a cause of action. The key procedural step involved the evaluation of the application for leave to appeal under section 50(1a)(c) of the Supreme Court Act 1935. The defendants argued that the amendments made by the plaintiffs were such that no cause of action existed, and therefore, the amended statement of claim should be struck out. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, asserted their right to frame their case as they saw fit, with the substantive issues of fact and causation to be resolved at the trial. The single judge considered several factors, including whether the amendments determined substantive rights, whether the issue presented a difficult and complex question of law, and whether the matter was of general importance. Additionally, the judge assessed whether allowing the pleading to stand would cause substantial injustice. Ultimately, the application for leave to appeal was refused, leaving the amended statement of claim in place pending the final hearing of the matter.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What is the appropriate test for a single judge to apply when considering an application for leave to appeal against their own interlocutory decision?
2. How should the difficulty of determining whether a decision is clearly wrong be addressed in the context of an application for leave to appeal?
3. What considerations are relevant to the granting of leave to appeal, particularly in cases where an application before the Full Court may be decided on different criteria?
4. Can an application for leave to appeal be treated as equivalent to an application to strike out on the ground that no cause of action is disclosed?
5. In what circumstances can a claim be considered so untenable that it cannot possibly succeed, and is such a determination appropriate in the context of an interlocutory application?
6. To what extent does a plaintiff's right to state their case as they choose limit the court's ability to strike out a pleading?
7. How should the court approach the determination of whether facts pleaded would be established and whether causation of loss as alleged would be proved, particularly in the context of an interlocutory application?
8. Does the order determining the plaintiffs' right to file an amended statement of claim determine substantive rights?
9. What constitutes a difficult and complex question of law in the context of an application for leave to appeal?
10. Is the issue at hand of general importance, and does it warrant the granting of leave to appeal?
11. Has substantial injustice been caused by allowing the pleading to stand, and does this justify the granting of leave to appeal?
Held
1. The appropriate test for a single judge to apply when considering an application for leave to appeal against their own interlocutory decision involves assessing whether the decision is clearly wrong.
2. The difficulty in determining whether a decision is clearly wrong should be approached with caution, ensuring that the process is fair and just.
3. Relevant considerations for granting leave to appeal include the potential for different criteria to apply when an application is heard by the Full Court.
4. An application for leave to appeal should not be treated as equivalent to an application to strike out on the ground that no cause of action is disclosed.
5. A claim can be considered so untenable that it cannot possibly succeed, and such a determination can be appropriate in the context of an interlocutory application.
6. A plaintiff's right to state their case as they choose limits the court's ability to strike out a pleading, but this right is not absolute.
7. The court should approach the determination of whether facts pleaded would be established and whether causation of loss as alleged would be proved cautiously, particularly in the context of an interlocutory application.
8. The order determining the plaintiffs' right to file an amended statement of claim does not determine substantive rights.
9. A difficult and complex question of law in the context of an application for leave to appeal is one that requires careful consideration and substantial legal analysis.
10. The issue at hand must be of general importance to warrant the granting of leave to appeal.
11. Substantial injustice caused by allowing the pleading to stand may justify the granting of leave to appeal, but this must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Harris Scarfe Ltd (in Liq) v Ernst & Young (No 2), the South Australian Supreme Court addressed the complex issue of granting leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision. The court began by considering the appropriate test for a single judge when assessing an application for leave to appeal against their own interlocutory decision. The court underscored that while there is no rigid formula, the decision should be guided by principles of fairness and the potential merits of the appeal. It was acknowledged that determining whether a decision is clearly wrong is inherently difficult, particularly in interlocutory contexts where the full merits have not been adjudicated.
The court then considered how this difficulty should be managed within the context of an application for leave to appeal. It emphasised that the single judge must weigh the likelihood of success on appeal against the potential injustice of allowing the interlocutory decision to stand. This balancing act is complicated by the fact that the Full Court may apply different criteria when it ultimately decides the appeal, thus requiring the single judge to make an independent assessment.
Further, the court explored the broader considerations relevant to the granting of leave to appeal, especially given the differing criteria that might be applied by the Full Court. It was noted that while the Full Court's discretion allows for a more comprehensive review, the single judge must still make a reasoned determination based on the evidence and arguments presented. This included an analysis of whether the issue raised was of general importance and whether substantial injustice would result from allowing the pleading to stand.
The court also addressed whether an application for leave to appeal could be treated as equivalent to an application to strike out on the ground that no cause of action is disclosed. It concluded that while the nature of the amendments in the plaintiffs' statement of claim could make this consideration pertinent, it was not dispositive. The primary focus remained on whether the claim was so untenable that it could not possibly succeed, a determination that would typically be reserved for the trial phase.
In examining whether a claim could be considered so untenable that it could not possibly succeed, the court balanced the plaintiffs' right to state their case as they choose against the need to prevent an appeal that has no prospect of success. It held that this assessment must be made cautiously, particularly in interlocutory applications where full evidence has not been presented.
The court also considered the extent to which a plaintiff's right to state their case as they choose limits the court's ability to strike out a pleading. It reiterated that while plaintiffs have a right to present their case, this right is not absolute and must be exercised in a manner that does not lead to a plainly unmeritorious appeal. The court found that the plaintiffs' right did not preclude a finding that the claim was untenable at this interlocutory stage.
Turning to the specific considerations of whether facts pleaded would be established and whether causation of loss as alleged would be proved, the court noted that these were matters to be determined on the basis of evidence at trial. It emphasised that an interlocutory application for leave to appeal was not the appropriate forum for such detailed evidentiary assessments. This consideration was crucial in determining whether the order in question determined substantive rights.
The court then examined whether the issue raised a difficult and complex question of law. It found that while the question was complex, it did not rise to the level of requiring leave to appeal. The court also considered whether the issue was of general importance and whether it warranted the granting of leave to appeal. It concluded that while the matter raised important legal questions, it did not meet the threshold for general importance necessary to warrant leave to appeal.
Finally, the court addressed whether substantial injustice had been caused by allowing the pleading to stand. It determined that there was no such substantial injustice, thus justifying the refusal of leave to appeal. The court's decision was grounded in the principle that interlocutory appeals should be sparingly granted and reserved for cases where the potential merits and injustice are sufficiently compelling.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that while interlocutory applications for leave to appeal require careful consideration, they must be assessed based on the likelihood of success, the potential for substantial injustice, and the broader principles of fairness and judicial economy. The court's refusal to grant leave to appeal was based on a nuanced application of these principles, reflecting a cautious approach to interlocutory appeals.