HARRADINE v The State of SA

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

HARRADINE v THE STATE OF SA

[2024] SASCA 123

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Livesey and the Honourable Justice Bleby)

23 October 2024

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - BY LEAVE OF COURT - INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS

This is an application for leave to appeal against three interlocutory decisions of a single judge of this Court. The judge dismissed applications seeking orders for the respondent’s counsel to be restrained from continuing to act, for default judgment under r 146.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), and for the judge to disqualify herself from hearing the r 146.1 application owing to an apprehension of bias.

The Notice of Appeal raises eight grounds of complaint. Broadly speaking, the applicant claims that aspects of the primary Judge’s conduct regarding her purported advocacy for the respondent’s case, unqualified acceptance of the respondent’s explanations and disregard of the applicant’s submissions demonstrated bias, necessarily leading to error in her Honour’s failure to self-disqualify. He otherwise complains that the judge provided inadequate reasons in considering the applications which gave insufficient weight or no regard to submissions supporting the dismissed applications while placing undue reliance on those factors speaking to the application’s dismissal.

Held (by the Court), refusing leave to appeal and ordering the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of the application:

1.None of the orders appealed against determines a substantive right of the applicant or caused the applicant irreparable prejudice.

2.The applicant has not identified any serious issue of principle or general importance arising on the application.

3.The proposed grounds of appeal have little or no prospect of success.

Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), referred to.

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Harris Scarfe Limited (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liquidation) [2005] SASC 168, discussed.

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170; Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 27; Resi Corporation v Munzer [2016] SASCFC 15; Keith v Gal [2013] NSWCA 339; Testel Australia Pty Ltd v KRG Electrics Pty Ltd & Anor [2013] SASC 91; Kallinicos & Anor v Hunt (2005) 64 NSWLR 52; Coppola v Nobile [2012] SASC 42, considered.

HARRADINE v THE STATE OF SA
[2024] SASCA 123

Court of Appeal – Civil:  Livesey P and Bleby JA

  1. THE COURT: This is an application for leave to appeal against three interlocutory decisions of a single judge of this Court. The judge dismissed applications seeking:

    ·an order that the respondent’s counsel, Mr Ambrose, be restrained from continuing to act for the respondent (FDN 141);

    ·judgment in default of compliance by the respondent pursuant to the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (UCR) r 146.1 (FDN 120); and

    ·that the primary judge disqualify herself from hearing the application FDN 120 on the grounds of apprehended…

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Details
Case
[2024] SASCA 123
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter comes before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia on an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order. The applicant, Mr. Harradine, sought leave to appeal against a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court. The core of the dispute concerned the applicant's complaints about the conduct of the respondents and his submissions regarding the exercise of discretion to enter default judgment against him.

The legal issues before the Full Court were whether the application for leave to appeal raised any issue of principle or general importance, and whether the grounds of appeal were reasonably arguable. Specifically, the court considered whether the primary judge erred in refusing to disqualify herself from hearing the matter, following the applicant's submissions that the judge had made comments during argument that were perceived as favourable to the respondent. The court also examined whether the applicant had demonstrated that the judge might decide the matter on a basis other than its legal and factual merits.

The Full Court reasoned that the applicant had not identified any serious issue of principle or general importance warranting leave to appeal. While the applicant detailed his grievances about the respondents' conduct and argued for the discretion to enter default judgment to be exercised in his favour, this did not, in itself, raise a serious issue of principle. The court found that the applicant's complaints regarding the judge's alleged bias did not meet the test established in *Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy*, as they were grounded in the applicant's perception of the reasonableness of his own arguments and the judge's disagreement with them, rather than demonstrating a feared deviation from deciding the case on its merits.

Consequently, the Full Court concluded that the application for leave to appeal did not raise any serious question of principle or general importance, nor were the grounds of appeal reasonably arguable. Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

We turn to the question whether the application raises any issue of principle or general importance that would warrant leave being granted. UCR r 146.1 provides:146.1—Judgment in default of compliance(1) If a party-(a) commits serious or persistent breaches of these Rules or an order of the Court which seriously prejudice the proper and expeditious conduct of an action;(b) fails to file a substitute originating process, pleading or affidavit within the time specified by the terms of leave granted under r 70.3, 85.1 or 87.1; or(c) manifests an inability or unwillingness to prosecute or defend an action with due diligence, another party may apply for default judgment against that party.Another party may apply for default judgment against that party. The applicant has not identified any serious issue of principle or general importance arising on this application. He has identified, at length, his complaints about the conduct of the respondents and made comprehensive submissions about why the discretion to enter default judgment should have been made in his favour. That is not the same thing. The applicant’s submissions extend to submitting that the ‘invaluable purpose’ of the rule would be undermined if the respondent’s conduct in committing ‘serious and persistent breaches’ was its typical modus operandi. That does not of itself raise a serious issue of principle. The applicant did not adduce any evidence of a modus operandi, other than his complaints and the matters he relied on with respect to his characterisation of the respondent’s conduct in this matter. As to the application FDN 120 and the oral application that the judge disqualify herself, the applicant did not identify any serious question of principle arising. The contentions he raised in support of these applications show them to be simply occasions of application of established principles to the facts. We turn to whether the grounds are reasonably arguable. Ground 1 concerns the refusal of the primary judge to disqualify herself following the applicant’s submissions in support of FDN 120. The entire transcript relating to that oral application is set out above. The applicant did not identify how the matters of which he complained met the test in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy.[6] His complaint was grounded in his assertion that the judge had, in the course of argument, made comments that he regarded as favourable to the respondent. His view of the undue nature of that favourability appears to be grounded in his perception of the reasonableness of his arguments.[6] (2000) 205 CLR 337 [6]-[7]. The particularisation of this ground of appeal expands considerably upon the complaint made on the oral application. The applicant did not, on the application, identify what it was that might cause the judge to decide the matter on a basis other than its legal and factual merits. Neither did he identify the logical connection between the matter identified and ‘the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits’.[7] His complaint did not rise beyond saying that the judge, in the course of argument, made comments that indicated disagreement with his submissions, which submissions he regarded as reasonable.[7] (2000) 205 CLR 337 [8].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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