SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeal to a Single Judge)
LAURO v MINTER ELLISON (A FIRM) (No 3)
[2025] SASC 135
Judgment of the Honourable Justice B Doyle
26 August 2025
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENT - APPEAL, REVIEW OR REFERENCE - OTHER MATTERS
COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS - REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS GENERALLY
On 17 June 2022 the appellant filed an originating application for a taxation of costs as between solicitor and client (‘the underlying action’). An Auxiliary Associate Justice with conduct of that matter declined to accede to the appellant’s request that she recuse herself. The appellant appeals against that decision.
In the course of the underlying action, the Auxiliary Associate Justice made procedural orders on 27 June 2024 and 10 July 2024 (‘the procedural orders’) concerning the listing of interlocutory applications lodged by both the appellant and the respondent. The appellant made an application during the hearing of the appeal for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal against those orders.
Held, dismissing the appeal and declining to grant an extension of time or leave to appeal in respect of the procedural orders:
1.considered individually and cumulatively, the matters raised by the appellant are not such as might cause a fair minded lay observer reasonably to apprehend that the Auxiliary Associate Justice might not deal with the underlying action by reference to its merits;
2.the various grounds upon which the appellant wishes to challenge the procedural orders lack material prospects of success and it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal against those orders.
At the outset of the hearing of the appeal, the appellant by his litigation guardian made a third application that the Supreme Court Justice hearing the appeal recuse himself. The application was refused with reasons to be given later. This judgment contains those reasons.
Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) sch 3 cl 37; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 50(4)(b); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 288(1)(a)(i); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 12.1(2)(c), 102.2, 214.1, referred to.
Commonwealth v Saadat (2019) 134 SASR 184, applied.
Anderson v National Australia Bank [2007] VSCA 172; Brooks v Brooks [2022] SASC 1; Budd v Kambah Tea Tree Plantations Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 180; Candetti Constructions Pty Ltd v M & I Samaras (No 1) Pty Ltd & Ors [2011] SASC 189; CM v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2021] NSWCA; Glenauchen Pty Ltd v Circuit Finance Pty Ltd [2001] SASC 61; Hanna v Flinders University [2025] SASC 81; Harris Scarfe Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liq) v Ernst & Young (No 2) [2005] SASC 168; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd v Seas Sapfor Forests Pty Ltd (1999) 78 SASR 151; Karbowiak v Mitolo [2024] SASCA 31
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- Case
- [2025] SASC 135
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the judge's conduct, including asking Mr Lauro if his comments about avoiding another appeal constituted a threat, did not cause a fair-minded observer to apprehend bias. The court also found that the cumulative effect of the various matters raised by Mr Lauro did not lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that the judge had failed to determine the correct identity of the respondent, holding that the evidence did not support Mr Lauro's claim that the retainer was with the larger national entity rather than the South Australian partnership. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that any appeal on these grounds would be liable to be dismissed on its merits.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
If the basis for the complaint is simply the conduct which, by these reasons, I have found would not cause a fair minded observer to form any concern about the judge’s neutrality, to treat the making of the complaint as grounds for recusal (without more) would be to entitle a litigant to ‘veto judges at will’.[54][54] CM v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2021] NSWCA 244 at [8] (Macfarlan, Brereton and McCallum JJA).Consideration of matters in combination In these reasons I have addressed the main matters relied upon in the notice of appeal, written submissions and oral submissions of the appellant.[55][55] To the extent that there are some aspects of the grounds of appeal I have not explicitly addressed, such as Appeal grounds [10.2], I indicate that I have considered and rejected the grounds as insubstantial and unconvincing. It is important not to be dismissive of the possibility that the cumulative effect of a number of occasions would be to raise a reasonable apprehension of bias even though, considered in isolation, each matter would not justify that conclusion. I do not consider that the various matters raised by Mr Lauro might, in combination, cause a fair minded observer reasonably to apprehend that the judge will deviate from her assessment of the merits in progressing the proceeding to a hearing or conclusion.Disposition There is a question about whether, notwithstanding that the judge granted Mr Lauro leave to appeal against her decisions on 29 January 2025 and 4 March 2025 not to recuse herself, those decisions are capable of appeal.[56] I need not resolve that question because I am satisfied that any appeal on those grounds is liable to be dismissed on its merits.[56] Hanna v Flinders University [2025] SASC 81 at [77]-[81]. In respect of the other challenged orders, for the reasons I have earlier given, because the grounds upon which they are sought to be challenged lack sufficient merit to warrant a grant of leave to appeal, I would refuse leave and an extension of time within which to appeal against those orders. The result is that the appellate proceeding will be dismissed. ANNEXUREGrounds of appeal in Notice of Appeal – Revision 2IError in failing to recuse herself for apprehended bias1. The learned Judicial Officer erred in finding that a fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend that she might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the determination of the issues in the originating proceedings.2. The learned Judicial Officer failed to consider that the Appellant’s concerns about bias were exacerbated by the learned Judicial Officer’s judicial conduct in, and case management of, the originating proceedings including, but not limited to: 2.1 not considering relevant matters; 2.2 considering and giving weight to irrelevant matters; 2.3 prejudging matters that have not been argued; 2.4 inferring at [1] of her judgment delivered on 29 January 2025 that the Appellant is infirm by reason of his age, without basis; 2.5 failing to take action with respect to Respondent’s obligation and failure to serve filed documents, as raised by the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian at the hearing on 4 March 2025; 2.6 failing to adequately address or explain the rationale for procedural decisions that gave rise to reasonable apprehension of bias, including orders made without the presence or participation of the Appellant or his Litigation Guardian. 3.The learned Judicial Officer failed to give weight to the reasonable apprehension of bias arising from her remarks during hearings, including her indication that the Appellant’s reference to an appeal was a “threat,” which displayed a pre-judgment of the issues. 4.The learned Judicial Officer failed to: 4.1 properly apply the principles in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 (“Ebner”) by, among other things, not adequately identifying and addressing the logical connection between the impugned conduct and the apprehension of bias; 4.2 apply the cumulative approach to assessing apprehended bias, ignoring the totality of circumstances which would lead a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend bias. II.Failure to determine the correct identity of the Respondent before proceeding 5.The learned Judicial Officer erred by failing to first hear and determine, as a preliminary threshold issue, the argument on whether the correct Respondent was properly named and was appearing or duly represented in the originating proceedings, and by failing to order that the Respondent provide information consistent with the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) regarding the identity of the relevant legal entity/ies associated with the retainer.6.The learned Judicial Officer mischaracterised and prejudged the Appellant’s argument by agreeing with the Respondent that the retainer was with “Minter Ellison (South Australian Partnership)” when documentary evidence including the underlying retainer, indicated that the retainer was with the larger national entity. 7.The learned Judicial Officer failed to give proper weight to the Appellant’s affidavit evidence on this point, and her refusal to first hear and determine this preliminary threshold issue prejudiced the fairness of the proceedings. III. Denial of procedural fairness in Directions Hearings 8.At the hearing on 27 June 2024, the learned Judicial Officer erred, thereby denying the Appellant procedural fairness, by: 8.1 commencing the hearing in violation of the “15-minute” rule, which violation allowed the purported representative for the Respondent to make unopposed substantive submissions and/or to influence the learned Judicial Officer in the absence of any representative for the Appellant; 8.2 failing to duly acknowledge that the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian had vacated the Courtroom due to safety concerns and had requested an adjournment, thereby denying the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian the opportunity to present the case and respond to the proposed Orders, which were subsequently made adverse to the Applicant’s interests. 9.At the hearing on 10 July 2024, the learned Judicial Officer erred, thereby denying the Appellant procedural fairness, by failing to address the concerns raised by the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian regarding the Orders made on 27 June 2024, despite those Orders expressly providing for the opportunity to do so. 10. At the hearing on 4 March 2025, the learned Judicial Officer: 10.1 erred, thereby denying the Appellant procedural fairness, by dismissing in its entirety the urgent Application filed by the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian (FDN 66) without hearing argument on all the Orders sought or giving reasons for refusing the renewed recusal request; 10.2 failed to provide adequate reasons for dismissal of the recusal application, or to order that voice recordings of the proceedings be provided at first instance, contrary to principles of transparency and procedural fairness and to mitigate the prejudice suffered by the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian. IV.Prejudgment of the issues and failure to properly consider the Appellant’s submissions and evidence 11.At the hearing on 10 July 2024, the learned Judicial Officer erred in storming out of the Courtroom, thereby failing to address the Appellant’s submissions, including specific objections to references to the Minter Ellison (South Australian Partnership)’s challenged default judgment in other proceedings and concerns about the 27 June 2024 orders, notwithstanding that those Orders purported to provide an opportunity to vary them. 12.The learned Judicial Officer erred in pre-judging key issues, including the proper identity of the respondent and the basis for taxation of costs, without properly engaging with the Appellant’s submissions. 13.The learned Judicial Officer failed to properly consider the Appellant’s affidavit of facts, which raised concerns about the management of the proceedings, procedural fairness and irregularities arising therefrom. V.Misapplication of the Law on recusal and apprehended bias 14.The learned Judicial Officer erred in failing to correctly apply the three-step test for apprehended bias in Ebner. 15.The learned Judicial Officer erred in failing to consider the cumulative effect of the procedural irregularities, judicial remarks and other conduct on a fair-minded lay observer’s perception of impartiality. 16.The learned Judicial Officer failed to properly consider the High Court’s guidance in Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 regarding the appearance of justice being done. 17.The learned Judicial Officer erred in failing to apply the principle that procedural fairness requires a judicial officer to engage meaningfully with all submissions and Affidavit evidence before making case management decisions. VI.Challenge to the Orders made on 27 June and 10 July 2024 18.The learned Judicial Officer erred in law and/or acted unreasonably in the exercise of her discretion by: 18.1 failing to first hear and determine the issue of the Respondent's standing as a threshold issue. 18.2 refusing, on 10 July 2024, to hear and determine the Appellant's request to vary the procedural timetable set on 27 June 2024, in circumstances where the learned Judicial Officer had permitted the Appellant to notify the Court by close of business on 5 July 2024 if the relevant timetable was unsuitable to the Appellant, and the Appellant duly did so.