Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) (No 3)

Link copied
Case Copied 62 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeal to a Single Judge)

LAURO v MINTER ELLISON (A FIRM) (No 3)

[2025] SASC 135

Judgment of the Honourable Justice B Doyle  

26 August 2025

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENT - APPEAL, REVIEW OR REFERENCE - OTHER MATTERS

COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS - REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS GENERALLY

On 17 June 2022 the appellant filed an originating application for a taxation of costs as between solicitor and client (‘the underlying action’). An Auxiliary Associate Justice with conduct of that matter declined to accede to the appellant’s request that she recuse herself.  The appellant appeals against that decision.

In the course of the underlying action, the Auxiliary Associate Justice made procedural orders on 27 June 2024 and 10 July 2024 (‘the procedural orders’) concerning the listing of interlocutory applications lodged by both the appellant and the respondent. The appellant made an application during the hearing of the appeal for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal against those orders.

Held, dismissing the appeal and declining to grant an extension of time or leave to appeal in respect of the procedural orders:

1.considered individually and cumulatively, the matters raised by the appellant are not such as might cause a fair minded lay observer reasonably to apprehend that the Auxiliary Associate Justice might not deal with the underlying action by reference to its merits;

2.the various grounds upon which the appellant wishes to challenge the procedural orders lack material prospects of success and it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal against those orders.

At the outset of the hearing of the appeal, the appellant by his litigation guardian made a third application that the Supreme Court Justice hearing the appeal recuse himself. The application was refused with reasons to be given later. This judgment contains those reasons.

Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) sch 3 cl 37; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 50(4)(b); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 288(1)(a)(i); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 12.1(2)(c), 102.2, 214.1, referred to.

Commonwealth v Saadat (2019) 134 SASR 184, applied.

Anderson v National Australia Bank [2007] VSCA 172; Brooks v Brooks [2022] SASC 1; Budd v Kambah Tea Tree Plantations Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 180; Candetti Constructions Pty Ltd v M & I Samaras (No 1) Pty Ltd & Ors [2011] SASC 189; CM v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2021] NSWCA; Glenauchen Pty Ltd v Circuit Finance Pty Ltd [2001] SASC 61; Hanna v Flinders University [2025] SASC 81; Harris Scarfe Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liq) v Ernst & Young (No 2) [2005] SASC 168; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd v Seas Sapfor Forests Pty Ltd (1999) 78 SASR 151; Karbowiak v Mitolo [2024] SASCA 31

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) (No 3) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] SASC 135
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) (No 3), the appellant, Mr Lauro, appealed against the decisions of the primary judge not to recuse herself and other orders made in the course of the proceedings. The primary issues were whether the judge had conducted herself in a manner that justified a conclusion of apprehended bias and whether she had failed to determine the correct identity of the respondent before proceeding with the case. Mr Lauro argued that the judge's conduct and certain procedural decisions raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the judge had mischaracterised his submissions. The appellate court considered these arguments and found that the grounds for appeal were without merit.

The court held that the judge's conduct, including asking Mr Lauro if his comments about avoiding another appeal constituted a threat, did not cause a fair-minded observer to apprehend bias. The court also found that the cumulative effect of the various matters raised by Mr Lauro did not lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that the judge had failed to determine the correct identity of the respondent, holding that the evidence did not support Mr Lauro's claim that the retainer was with the larger national entity rather than the South Australian partnership. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that any appeal on these grounds would be liable to be dismissed on its merits.

Background

Background to the litigation

Following the hearing, on 30 May 2024, Mr Lauro wrote to Mr Doecke of the respondent in these terms.Pursuant to Order 1 of the Orders made by the honourable Auxiliary Judge Flourentzou on 16 May 2024, I am writing to you concerning the preliminary issues of the correct Respondent being named in the subject proceedings and the parties named in the relevant retainer. By way of background A. When the law firm of Minter Ellison in Adelaide was first approached to provide legal services to my father (the Applicant), representations were made to him and me by Grant Mitchell (a purported partner of the said law firm), to the effect that Minter Ellison was the national law firm with relevant expertise to assist. B. The correspondence that ensured (being exhibit EL1 to my Affidavit affirmed on 17 May 2022 (FDN 2)), referred: (i) in the cover letters dated 31 May 2011 to Minter Ellison Group and associated offices; (ii) in the 'Terms of engagement' dated January 2011 (which were attached to the letters referred to in subparagraph B(i) herein), the Minter Ellison Legal Group. C. At no time was any partnership or licensed body referred to in the above documents. D. At no time did my father engage or contract with any partnership or licensed body for the provision of legal services to him. E. The legal costs, fees and disbursements the subject of taxation are all those that have been invoiced (or billed) since about June 2011. At all times, payments of the majority of invoices made up to about April 2012 were made subject to review and without prejudice to my father’s rights under Division 8 of the Legal Practitioners Act SA 1981 (SA) as it stood at that time. This was also the case in relation to the invoices issued after April 2012, which invoices were also expressly disputed and are the subject of taxation. F. In or about February 2015, Grant Mitchell gave evidence that the unpaid invoices had been ‘written off’. G. In or about June 2018, it was made public to the effect that the Minter Ellison Group and/or Minter Ellison Legal Group had taken over the South Australian partnership which, as mentioned above, was not the party which my father engaged to provide legal professional services. Identification of the correct Respondent Having regard to the above facts, I would be grateful if you could please disclose and produce to me the following class of documents for the purposes of confirming the correct Respondent in the subject proceedings: 1. All documents recording the business names and/or legal entities of the South Australian partnership and the Minter Ellison Legal Group and/or Minter Ellison Legal Group. 2. All documents in relation to and connection with the take over of the South Australian partnership by the Minter Ellison Group and/or Minter Ellison Legal Group. 3. all documents in relation to and connection with, and which evidence, the amounts of unpaid invoices having been ‘written off’ as mentioned in paragraph F. herein. I look forward to receiving your reply including the documents requested above within 7 days of receipt of this email in accordance with Order 2 of the aforementioned Orders.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Had an extension of time and leave to appeal been granted in respect of these grounds, I would have dismissed the grounds.The challenge to the judge’s decision not to recuse herself Whilst it will be necessary to consider the matters relied upon by the appellant in combination, it is convenient to address the particular matters upon which Mr Lauro relied in contending that the judge conducted herself in a way that justifies a conclusion of apprehended bias.Hearing on 16 May 2024 First, the appellant points to the judge having asked Mr Lauro during the hearing on 16 May 2024 whether his expression of a desire to avoid another appeal being necessary was a threat.[39] Mr Lauro contends that this exchange alone or in combination with other matters has led to the actuality or appearance of an irreparable ‘contest’ between the appellant and the judge. [39] Appeal grounds [3]. In my view, that contention cannot be accepted. Mr Lauro responded to the judge’s question whether his submission was a threat in the negative and the hearing proceeded in an unremarkable fashion. It is difficult to see the basis upon which the posing of the question might lead a fair minded lay observer to conclude that the judge had formed or was forming some predisposition against Mr Lauro that might cause her to decide any contest between his father and the respondent other than by reference to the merits. On the appeal the respondent submitted that the submission of Mr Lauro which prompted the judge’s question was an inappropriate in terrorem reference to an appeal. It was submitted the fair minded lay observer would form an adverse view not of the judge’s neutrality but of Mr Lauro’s conduct. Mr Lauro’s explanation on appeal for what he was seeking to convey by the submission was:The point was that as had happened before Judge Dart, the issue of standing was being overlooked. It was not being taken as being fundamental, as I said on that occasion, so, my reference to not wanting to be in a situation where another appeal may be necessary was exactly on the point of this issue as being in existence. It’s not a new issue and it needs to be addressed in some way, and basically, I didn’t want the judge to fall into error by overlooking that point, which might have resulted in another appeal. As that submission suggests, the appellant had earlier appealed against a decision by Associate Justice Dart not to recuse himself in this matter.[40] Amongst the complaints advanced on appeal was that the judge had made timetabling orders in relation to the time question in parallel with his consideration of the application for recusal, but had not progressed a preliminary issue that Mr Lauro considered to be an important threshold issue, namely, the identity of the proper respondent.[41] Whilst McDonald J upheld the appeal, her reasons did not turn upon accepting that the judge’s failure to determine particular issues in a particular sequence might give rise to a perception of bias.[40] Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) [2024] SASC 48.[41] Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) [2024] SASC 48 at [20] (fn 7) (McDonald J).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

If the basis for the complaint is simply the conduct which, by these reasons, I have found would not cause a fair minded observer to form any concern about the judge’s neutrality, to treat the making of the complaint as grounds for recusal (without more) would be to entitle a litigant to ‘veto judges at will’.[54][54] CM v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2021] NSWCA 244 at [8] (Macfarlan, Brereton and McCallum JJA).Consideration of matters in combination In these reasons I have addressed the main matters relied upon in the notice of appeal, written submissions and oral submissions of the appellant.[55][55] To the extent that there are some aspects of the grounds of appeal I have not explicitly addressed, such as Appeal grounds [10.2], I indicate that I have considered and rejected the grounds as insubstantial and unconvincing. It is important not to be dismissive of the possibility that the cumulative effect of a number of occasions would be to raise a reasonable apprehension of bias even though, considered in isolation, each matter would not justify that conclusion. I do not consider that the various matters raised by Mr Lauro might, in combination, cause a fair minded observer reasonably to apprehend that the judge will deviate from her assessment of the merits in progressing the proceeding to a hearing or conclusion.Disposition There is a question about whether, notwithstanding that the judge granted Mr Lauro leave to appeal against her decisions on 29 January 2025 and 4 March 2025 not to recuse herself, those decisions are capable of appeal.[56] I need not resolve that question because I am satisfied that any appeal on those grounds is liable to be dismissed on its merits.[56] Hanna v Flinders University [2025] SASC 81 at [77]-[81]. In respect of the other challenged orders, for the reasons I have earlier given, because the grounds upon which they are sought to be challenged lack sufficient merit to warrant a grant of leave to appeal, I would refuse leave and an extension of time within which to appeal against those orders. The result is that the appellate proceeding will be dismissed. ANNEXUREGrounds of appeal in Notice of Appeal – Revision 2IError in failing to recuse herself for apprehended bias1. The learned Judicial Officer erred in finding that a fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend that she might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the determination of the issues in the originating proceedings.2. The learned Judicial Officer failed to consider that the Appellant’s concerns about bias were exacerbated by the learned Judicial Officer’s judicial conduct in, and case management of, the originating proceedings including, but not limited to: 2.1 not considering relevant matters; 2.2 considering and giving weight to irrelevant matters; 2.3 prejudging matters that have not been argued; 2.4 inferring at [1] of her judgment delivered on 29 January 2025 that the Appellant is infirm by reason of his age, without basis; 2.5 failing to take action with respect to Respondent’s obligation and failure to serve filed documents, as raised by the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian at the hearing on 4 March 2025; 2.6 failing to adequately address or explain the rationale for procedural decisions that gave rise to reasonable apprehension of bias, including orders made without the presence or participation of the Appellant or his Litigation Guardian. 3.The learned Judicial Officer failed to give weight to the reasonable apprehension of bias arising from her remarks during hearings, including her indication that the Appellant’s reference to an appeal was a “threat,” which displayed a pre-judgment of the issues. 4.The learned Judicial Officer failed to: 4.1 properly apply the principles in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 (“Ebner”) by, among other things, not adequately identifying and addressing the logical connection between the impugned conduct and the apprehension of bias; 4.2 apply the cumulative approach to assessing apprehended bias, ignoring the totality of circumstances which would lead a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend bias. II.Failure to determine the correct identity of the Respondent before proceeding 5.The learned Judicial Officer erred by failing to first hear and determine, as a preliminary threshold issue, the argument on whether the correct Respondent was properly named and was appearing or duly represented in the originating proceedings, and by failing to order that the Respondent provide information consistent with the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) regarding the identity of the relevant legal entity/ies associated with the retainer.6.The learned Judicial Officer mischaracterised and prejudged the Appellant’s argument by agreeing with the Respondent that the retainer was with “Minter Ellison (South Australian Partnership)” when documentary evidence including the underlying retainer, indicated that the retainer was with the larger national entity. 7.The learned Judicial Officer failed to give proper weight to the Appellant’s affidavit evidence on this point, and her refusal to first hear and determine this preliminary threshold issue prejudiced the fairness of the proceedings. III. Denial of procedural fairness in Directions Hearings 8.At the hearing on 27 June 2024, the learned Judicial Officer erred, thereby denying the Appellant procedural fairness, by: 8.1 commencing the hearing in violation of the “15-minute” rule, which violation allowed the purported representative for the Respondent to make unopposed substantive submissions and/or to influence the learned Judicial Officer in the absence of any representative for the Appellant; 8.2 failing to duly acknowledge that the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian had vacated the Courtroom due to safety concerns and had requested an adjournment, thereby denying the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian the opportunity to present the case and respond to the proposed Orders, which were subsequently made adverse to the Applicant’s interests. 9.At the hearing on 10 July 2024, the learned Judicial Officer erred, thereby denying the Appellant procedural fairness, by failing to address the concerns raised by the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian regarding the Orders made on 27 June 2024, despite those Orders expressly providing for the opportunity to do so. 10. At the hearing on 4 March 2025, the learned Judicial Officer: 10.1 erred, thereby denying the Appellant procedural fairness, by dismissing in its entirety the urgent Application filed by the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian (FDN 66) without hearing argument on all the Orders sought or giving reasons for refusing the renewed recusal request; 10.2 failed to provide adequate reasons for dismissal of the recusal application, or to order that voice recordings of the proceedings be provided at first instance, contrary to principles of transparency and procedural fairness and to mitigate the prejudice suffered by the Appellant’s Litigation Guardian. IV.Prejudgment of the issues and failure to properly consider the Appellant’s submissions and evidence 11.At the hearing on 10 July 2024, the learned Judicial Officer erred in storming out of the Courtroom, thereby failing to address the Appellant’s submissions, including specific objections to references to the Minter Ellison (South Australian Partnership)’s challenged default judgment in other proceedings and concerns about the 27 June 2024 orders, notwithstanding that those Orders purported to provide an opportunity to vary them. 12.The learned Judicial Officer erred in pre-judging key issues, including the proper identity of the respondent and the basis for taxation of costs, without properly engaging with the Appellant’s submissions. 13.The learned Judicial Officer failed to properly consider the Appellant’s affidavit of facts, which raised concerns about the management of the proceedings, procedural fairness and irregularities arising therefrom. V.Misapplication of the Law on recusal and apprehended bias 14.The learned Judicial Officer erred in failing to correctly apply the three-step test for apprehended bias in Ebner. 15.The learned Judicial Officer erred in failing to consider the cumulative effect of the procedural irregularities, judicial remarks and other conduct on a fair-minded lay observer’s perception of impartiality. 16.The learned Judicial Officer failed to properly consider the High Court’s guidance in Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 regarding the appearance of justice being done. 17.The learned Judicial Officer erred in failing to apply the principle that procedural fairness requires a judicial officer to engage meaningfully with all submissions and Affidavit evidence before making case management decisions. VI.Challenge to the Orders made on 27 June and 10 July 2024 18.The learned Judicial Officer erred in law and/or acted unreasonably in the exercise of her discretion by: 18.1 failing to first hear and determine the issue of the Respondent's standing as a threshold issue. 18.2 refusing, on 10 July 2024, to hear and determine the Appellant's request to vary the procedural timetable set on 27 June 2024, in circumstances where the learned Judicial Officer had permitted the Appellant to notify the Court by close of business on 5 July 2024 if the relevant timetable was unsuitable to the Appellant, and the Appellant duly did so.