Saadat v Commonwealth - [2025] SASCA 114

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Civil)
SAADAT v COMMONWEALTH
[2025] SASCA 114
Ruling of the Honourable President Livesey (ex tempore)
3 October 2025
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION AND OF PARTIES
In the proceedings below, Mr Saadat, the applicant, sued the Commonwealth, the respondent, in damages. The respondent joined as third parties Australasian Correctional Services Pty Ltd, G4S Australia Pty Ltd, GEO Group Australia Pty Ltd, and G4S Regional Management (UK & I) Ltd by means of third-party claims seeking relief in contract and negligence (the third parties). The respondent contended that each of the third parties were jointly and severally liable to indemnify it in respect of any damages awarded to the applicant and, if applicable, for interest.
After dismissing the applicant’s claim, the primary judge dismissed the respondent’s third-party claims. The applicant has now appealed, serving the respondent with his Notice of Appeal containing more than 30 grounds of appeal.
The question for the Court is whether the applicant or the respondent is obliged to join the third parties to this appeal, pursuant to r 214.2(2) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (the UCR).
Held:
1.Whilst there is an “arguable possibility” that the third parties’ rights and interests may be affected by orders made on an appeal between the applicant and the respondent, their interests are not directly affected where no relief is sought against them.
2.To the extent that the third parties may have at least an indirect interest in the appeal, that could be addressed by their joinder as interested parties so that they can be both heard and bound.
3.Though an order could be made joining the third parties as interested parties, that would not permit relief to be sought against them and the Court is reluctant to make that order pending a decision from the respondent about whether it intends to seek orders and relief against the third parties.
4.Where only the respondent stands to benefit from the joinder of the third parties, the respondent should join them to a new appeal, which can be heard at the same time as the applicant’s appeal.

Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) ss 19B, 27; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 211.1, 214.2, 217.11, referred to.
Barclays Bank v Tom [1923] 1 KB 221; Brougham v Edwards (No 2) [2024] SASCA 129; Chapman v Chapman [1946] SASR 217; Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Young (No 2) (1991) 4 ACSR 355; Edwards v Edwards [1913] VLR 30; Grovenor v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1966) 40 ALJR 329; John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1; Law Society of South Australia v Betro [2025] SASCFC 2; News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League (1996) 64 FCR 410; Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam [1969] MLJ 52; Pera v Pera (2008) 218 FLR 22; Rayney v Aw [2009] WASCA 203; Saadat v Commonwealth & Ors [2025] SASC 59; Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291, considered.

SAADAT v COMMONWEALTH
[2025] SASCA 114
Court of Appeal – Civil
LIVESEY P (ex tempore):
Introduction

In the proceedings below Mr Saadat, the applicant, sued the Commonwealth, the respondent, in damages. The respondent joined as third parties Australasian Correctional Services Pty Ltd, G4S Australia Pty Ltd, GEO Group Australia Pty Ltd, and G4S Regional Management (UK & I) Ltd by means of third party claims seeking relief in contract and negligence (the third parties).
The applicant’s claim was dismissed and he has now appealed, serving the respondent with his Notice of Appeal containing more than 30 grounds of appeal. The case is being managed at callovers, and a tentative hearing date has been set during early May 2026. The question for the Court is whether the applicant or the respondent is obliged to join the third parties to this appellate proceeding, pursuant to r 214.2(2) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (the UCR).
The respondent contends that it is the applicant who is obliged to join the third parties to the appellate proceeding because the third parties were parties at first instance and it cannot be said that they have “no interest” in the appeal.[1] The applicant counters that he is not obliged to join them because the third parties are neither parties nor “interested parties” within the meaning of rr 214.2(2) of the UCR.
[1] Relying on UCR, r 214.2(2)(a).
For the following reasons, where only the respondent stands to benefit from the joinder of the third parties, the respondent should join them to a new appeal, which can be heard at the same time as the applicant’s appeal.
Relevant background
The appeal is against the order of Stanley J (as his Honour then was, the primary judge) dismissing the applicant’s claim against the respondent. The applicant alleged that he had suffered psychiatric harm caused by the conditions in which he was detained by the respondent at the Baxter Immigration Reception and Processing Centre (Baxter), in breach of a duty of care the respondent owed to him.[2] In the alternative, the applicant alleged that, as a result of the respondent’s breach of duty, he suffered psychiatric harm caused by the conditions of his detention at the Curtin Immigration Reception and Processing Centre, aggravated by the conditions of his detention at Baxter.
[2] Saadat v Commonwealth & Ors [2025] SASC 59, [2].
The applicant also alleged that the respondent breached its duty of care by failing to treat his psychiatric injuries whilst he was in detention.[3]
[3] Saadat v Commonwealth & Ors [2025] SASC 59, [2].
The third parties were engaged by the respondent to operate and manage the detention centres.[4] The respondent contended that each of the third parties were jointly and severally liable to indemnify it in respect of any damages awarded to the applicant and, if applicable, for interest.[5]
[4] Saadat v Commonwealth & Ors [2025] SASC 59, [2700], [2707].
[5] Saadat v Commonwealth & Ors [2025] SASC 59, [2698].
After dismissing the applicant’s claim, the primary judge dismissed the respondent’s third party claims.
The parties’ contentions
The applicant contends that the third parties are neither parties nor “interested parties” within the meaning of r 214.2(2) and r 211.1 of the UCR because the primary judge dismissed the third party proceedings,[6] and by his appeal he does not challenge that order.
[6] See FDN 722, Order 3: “The respondent’s third party claims are dismissed”.
The applicant contends that finality on the third party proceedings has been reached.[7] If the appeal succeeds, the order dismissing the third party claims will remain undisturbed, and only the respondent will be liable to him in damages. The applicant contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to disturb the order dismissing the third party proceedings absent an appeal against that order.[8]
[7] Relying on Chapman v Chapman [1946] SASR 217, 218 (Napier CJ, Reed and Ligertwood JJ).
[8] Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 19B.
The respondent contends that the order dismissing the third party proceedings is a “consequential order” and, where a first instance order is set aside on appeal, consequential orders may also be set aside.[9] The respondent relied on the following passage of the primary judge’s reasons, which it contended demonstrated that the primary judge anticipated that the third party claims may be revived if the applicant succeeded on appeal:[10]
As the applicant’s claim against the Commonwealth must be dismissed, there is no entitlement to an indemnity by ACM or G4S in favour of the Commonwealth given it has no liability to the applicant. In these circumstances the submission was put that I should refrain from considering the issues that arise on the third party claims by the Commonwealth as there was no work for them to do. However, I consider that in case there is a successful appeal from the order dismissing the applicant’s claim against the Commonwealth, where practicable I should address certain issues that arise on the third party claims. Those issues are necessarily limited by the dismissal of the applicant’s claim. They are largely confined to questions of law rather than fact.
[9] Relying on UCR, r 217.11.
[10] Saadat v Commonwealth & Ors [2025] SASC 59, [2697].
The respondent contends that it is wrong to assert that the third parties have no interest in the appeal. The respondent contends that the Notice of Appeal demonstrates that the third parties’ interests have not been “extinguished” because:
1.The applicant seeks, in the alternative, the relief of a re-trial. If a re-trial were ordered, the factual allegations made against the third parties would necessarily re-emerge.
2.Certain grounds of appeal expressly impugn the primary judge’s findings concerning the conduct of the third parties. The respondent points to appeal ground 17, by which the applicant challenges findings that the security measures taken by the respondent and the third parties at Baxter were reasonable and justified.
Joinder of parties and interested parties
Pursuant to r 214.2 of the UCR, it is necessary for the applicant to join any parties to the first instance proceeding unless it can be said that they have “no interest” in the appeal. That, however, does not determine whether their joinder should be made as respondents or as “interested parties”, still less whether it is in the interests of justice to make an order for their joinder.[11]
[11] UCR, r 214.2(2); See Brougham v Edwards (No 2) [2024] SASCA 129, [51] (Livesey P, S Doyle JA and Buss AJA).
Rules 214.2(2) and (3) provide:
(2)The appellant must join as a respondent or interested party in the appellate proceeding
(a) any party to the first instance proceeding unless that party has no interest in the appeal; and
(b) any other person falling within paragraph (b) of the definitions of respondent or interested party in rule 211.1.
(3)The Court may order the addition or removal of a person as a party to an appellate proceeding; however a person cannot be added as an appellant without the person’s consent.
Rule 211.1 defines an “interested party” and a “respondent” as follows:
interested party in an appellate proceeding means a party (whenever joined)—
(a)who was an interested party in the proceeding at first instance unless the party has no interest in the appellate proceeding; or
(b)against whom no relief is sought in and whose interest is not directly and adversely affected by the appellate proceeding but who should be given the opportunity to be heard in relation to the proceeding or who must be joined to be bound by the result;
…
respondent to an appellate proceeding means a party (whenever joined)—
(a)who was an applicant or respondent in the proceeding at first instance, unless the party has no interest in the appellate proceeding; or
(b)against whom orders are sought in, or whose interest may be directly and adversely affected by, the orders sought in the appellate proceeding;
In Victoria v Sutton, McHugh J explained the general law principles of natural justice concerning joinder:[12]
The rules of natural justice require that, before a court makes an order that may affect the rights or interests of a person, that person should be given an opportunity to contest the making of that order. Because that is so, it is the invariable practice of the courts to require such a person to be joined as a party if there is an arguable possibility that he or she may be affected by the making of the order.[13] That practice also assists in avoiding duplication of hearings on the same issues and in avoiding the spectre of inconsistent decisions by courts or the judges of the same court.
[12] Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291, [77] (McHugh J).
[13] News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League (1996) 64 FCR 410; Grovenor v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1966) 40 ALJR 329. This rule is derived both from the common law and by implication through the power of courts to join parties who are necessary and proper for hearing, for example, New South Wales Supreme Court Rules, Pt 8, r 8, High Court Rules, 0 16, r 4.
Where a Court proposes to make orders directly affecting the rights or liabilities of a non-party, that non-party is a necessary party and ought to be joined.[14] That is to say, whether a person is a necessary party to a proceeding is generally determined by whether that person’s “rights against or liabilities to any party to the action in respect of the subject matter of the action [will] be directly affected by any order which may be made in the action”.[15]
[14] John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1, [131] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ).
[15] Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam [1969] MLJ 52, 55-56 (Diplock LJ), referred to in Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291, [77] (McHugh J).
The rules as to the joinder of necessary parties should, however, be “strictly observed”.[16] It is well established that an “order which directly affects a third person’s rights against or liabilities to a party should not be made unless the person is also joined as a party” and if made, absent joinder, “the order will be set aside”.[17]
[16] Grovenor v Permanent Trustee Co of NSW Ltd (1966) 40 ALJR 329, 330 (Barwick CJ, Kitto, Taylor, Windeyer and Owen JJ).
[17] News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410, 524 (Lockhart, von Doussa and Sackville JJ), cited with approval in Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291, [78] (McHugh J).
These general propositions must, however, be read subject to the Rules of Court, having regard to the relief which can or may be sought, and by which party it may be sought.
Disposition of the issue of joinder
The applicant does not intend to disturb the order dismissing the third party proceedings. That is unsurprising in circumstances where the applicant seeks no relief against the third parties.
Whilst there is an “arguable possibility” that the third parties’ rights and interests may be affected by orders made on an appeal between the applicant and the respondent, their interests are not directly affected where no relief is sought against them.[18]
[18] Victoria v Sutton (1998) 195 CLR 291, [77] (McHugh J).
Though the order dismissing the third party proceedings might loosely be regarded as a form of consequential order, and the dismissal of the third party claims “follows logically or of necessity from” the order dismissing the applicant’s claim against the respondent, it is no part of the applicant’s case to reinstate those claims.[19]
[19] See Rayney v Aw [2009] WASCA 203, [33] (McLure JA, with whom Buss JA and Newnes JA agreed); Pera v Pera (2008) 218 FLR 22, [61] (Coleman, May and Boland JJ); FDN 722, Order 2: “The applicant’s claim in negligence is dismissed”.
Accordingly, though there may be potential consequences for the third parties associated with challenging the dismissal of the applicant’s claim, as well as of pressing a ground of appeal which impugns certain of the primary judge’s findings concerning the conduct of the third parties, their rights are only indirectly affected. Their rights are only potentially affected because it may be that what happens on appeal will in some way be used against them later.
Their rights will only be directly affected if they are joined and relief is sought against them.
In that sense, the potential, indirect interest of the third parties might require that they be given some opportunity to be heard, and it would usually be desirable that they be bound by the outcome of the applicant’s appeal.
When I say desirable, I mean desirable from the perspective of the respondent. Usually, no respondent would wish to assume the burden of having to demonstrate the existence of a liability to an applicant in order to found a basis for third party relief in respect of that liability. Most respondents would want to pursue third party relief with the benefit of a finding that they are liable to the applicant in circumstances where that finding binds the third parties.
In all of these circumstances, there is something to be said for the proposition that the third parties presently have no interest in the appeal. It is, however, not necessary to form any concluded view about that. To the extent that the third parties may have at least a potential, indirect interest in the appeal, that could be addressed by their joinder as interested parties so that they can be both heard and bound, see r 214.2(2)(b) of the UCR.
However, that kind of order would not address what lies at the heart of this application. That is, a contest between the applicant and the respondent as to who should assume the risk and burden of joining the third parties. That contest is, I think, resolved by determining which party will benefit from joining the third parties.
The applicant is not likely to obtain any benefit from joining the third parties. That can be tested in this way. In so far as the applicant seeks, as an alternative to damages, an order for a re-trial that would not affect the interests of the third parties unless and until that order included a re-trial of the third party claims. The applicant does not seek that order and has no interest in seeking that order.
Even if the applicant were to join the third parties as parties to his appeal, that would provide no opportunity for the applicant to secure any relief from them. Indeed, no orders could be made against the third parties, whether at the suit of the applicant or of the respondent, on the present terms of the Notice of Appeal.
In fact, only the respondent would ever be interested in seeking that order. That is because only the respondent would want indemnity or contribution from the third parties, and the respondent could not obtain that relief without first taking the step of appealing the dismissal of the third party claims. Only that would open up the opportunity to obtain orders against the third parties, together with any re‑trial of the third party claims.
In order to do that, the respondent would first have to join the third parties as respondents to its own appeal.
Addressing the means of obtaining third party relief tends to expose the artificiality of the respondent’s position. The respondent wants the applicant to join the third parties and have them brought into the appeal. That is not through altruism. The respondent wants the third parties before the Court because, if the applicant succeeds, the respondent will want to obtain indemnity or contribution from the third parties.
Accordingly, whether the third parties’ rights are directly or indirectly affected by the applicant’s appeal, and even if they should be given an opportunity to be heard in relation to it, their joinder by the applicant would have little practical utility.[20] Sooner or later, the respondent would have to face up to the need to join the third parties as respondents to a new appeal if it is to have any prospect of obtaining relief on its third party claims.
[20] See UCR, r 211.1.
So, if the respondent has no intention of seeking relief from the third parties, it is difficult to see why they should be joined at all. If it is only possible that the respondent will seek relief from the third parties, their joinder as interested parties provides them with procedural fairness and will ensure that they are bound by the outcome. That, however, would not necessarily permit the third parties to take any active role on the appeal, separate and distinct from the role of the respondent, [21] and, of course, no relief at all could be sought against them in the appellate proceedings as presently configured.
[21] Cf Law Society of South Australia v Betro [2025] SASCFC 2, [37]-[42] (Bleby, Stein and B Doyle JJ).

If, however, the respondent really does propose to seek relief from the third parties in connection with the hearing in May 2026, then the “stand-off” should now stop. Otherwise, significant time and costs could be wasted should it later become necessary to commence a new, separate appeal against the third parties. That may jeopardise the hearing in May 2026.
Accordingly, though an order could be made joining the third parties as interested parties, I am reluctant to make that order pending a decision from the respondent about whether it intends to seek orders and relief against the third parties.
If it does, that step should now be taken. There is no point waiting until the fate of the applicant’s appeal is known. That is consistent with the object of the third party procedure, which is “to avoid an undesirable multiplicity of proceedings and to prevent similar, intertwined issues from being determined separately with possible inconsistent results”.[22] As s 27 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) provides:
[22] Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Young (No 2) (1991) 4 ACSR 355, 405 (Olsson J), referring to Edwards v Edwards [1913] VLR 30; Barclays Bank v Tom [1923] 1 KB 221.
27—Court to do complete justice in cause so as to avoid multiplicity of suits
The court in every cause or matter pending before it shall have power to grant, and shall grant, either absolutely or on such reasonable terms and conditions as it deems just, all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of every legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them respectively, in such cause or matter, so that, as far as possible, all matters so in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of such matters avoided.
A multiplicity of appeals should likewise be avoided.
Conclusion
The applicant is not obliged to join the third parties pursuant to r 214.2(2) of the UCR as interested parties to this appellate proceeding pending a decision by the respondent about the course it intends to take.
After granting the respondent a short adjournment, it has indicated that it seeks leave to file a Notice of Appeal, joining the third parties. I will give leave to the respondent to do that in seven days.
After hearing from the parties and the third parties about the joint trials on related issues which will commence before O’Sullivan J in the Federal Court on 4 May 2026, with an anticipated listing of around 12 weeks, I will make the following orders:
1.The respondent is granted leave to file a Notice of Appeal against the third parties in seven days.
2.The matter is listed for hearing before the Court of Appeal on Monday, 27 April 2026 at 10.15am, with five days set aside.
3.The appellant is to file and serve written submissions and a list of authorities by 4.00pm on Friday, 19 December 2025.
4.The respondent is to file and serve written submissions and a list of authorities by 4.00pm on Tuesday, 17 February 2026.
5.The proposed third parties are to file and serve their written submissions and lists of authorities by 4.00pm on Friday, 13 March 2026.
6. The appellant may file and serve any reply by 4.00pm on Friday, 20 March 2026.
7.The parties have liberty to apply.
8.The matter will be called over on Friday, 20 February 2026 at 9.15am. On that occasion I expect the parties to have conferred and fairly allocated a division of issues and time for the hearing, ensuring that there is no repetition of issues where any common interest can be identified.