Murden v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd as trustee of the AMP Super Fund
[2025] FCA 148
•4 February 2025
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Murden v NM Superannuation Pty Ltd as trustee of the AMP Super Fund [2025] FCA 148
File number: QUD 113 of 2023 Judgment of: DERRINGTON J Date of judgment: 4 February 2025 Date of publication of reasons: 13 March 2025 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to amend statement of claim – matter set down for hearing within a few weeks – amendments important to applicant’s case – no explanation for failure to plead case earlier – significant unexplained delay after applicant advised to amend – applicant had sufficient opportunity to plead – application refused Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175
Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries (2014) 253 CLR 560
Cauldron Energy Ltd v Beijing Joseph Investment Co Ltd (2016) 110 ACSR 576
Commonwealth v Saadat (2019) 134 SASR 184
Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Dallas Development Corporation Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 98
Diakou Nominees Pty Ltd v Gouger Street Pty Ltd; Gouger Street Pty Ltd v Diakou Nominees Pty Ltd [2020] SASC 124
GSA Industries Pty Ltd v NT Gas Ltd (1990) 24 NSWLR 710
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AAM17 (2021) 272 CLR 329
PPG Development Pty Ltd v Capitanio (2016) 126 SASR 307
Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 190 CLR 146
Saadat v Commonwealth [2019] SASC 28
Soia v Bennett [2011] WASC 59
Spencer v Bamber [2012] NSWCA 274
Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm), Re Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) [2015] FCA 1098
WGKS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 10
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Number of paragraphs: 48 Date of hearing: 4 February 2025 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Nolan Solicitor for the Applicant: Shine Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A Thangarajah Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr S Walsh Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Moray & Agnew ORDERS
QUD 113 of 2023 BETWEEN: ANDREW ROBERT MURDEN
Applicant
AND: NM SUPERANNUATION PTY LTD (ABN 31 008 428 322) AS TRUSTEE OF THE AMP SUPER FUND (ABN 78 421 957 449)
First Respondent
METLIFE INSURANCE LTD (ABN 75 004 274 882)
Second Respondent
AND BETWEEN: METLIFE INSURANCE LTD (ABN 75 004 274 882)
Cross-Claimant
AND: ANDREW ROBERT MURDEN
Cross-Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
DERRINGTON J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 FEBRUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s application filed on 29 January 2025 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the application filed on 29 January 2025, to be taxed unless otherwise agreed.
3.The date in Order 4 of the orders made by Justice Derrington on 9 September 2024 (the Earlier Orders) be extended to 4:30 pm AEST on 10 February 2025.
4.The date in Order 5 of the Earlier Orders be extended to 4:30 pm AEST on 13 February 2025.
5.The applicant file electronic and physical copies of a Court Book by 4:30 pm AEST on 10 February 2025.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DERRINGTON J:
Introduction
These are the amended and revised reasons for judgment given on 4 February 2025, in respect of an application for certain interlocutory orders relating to the hearing of a five-day trial listed to commence on 17 February 2025. Whilst these reasons refine and develop those delivered ex tempore, the substance of what was said on 4 February has not been changed: see Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v AAM17 (2021) 272 CLR 329, 344 – 345 [30] – [31]; see also Spencer v Bamber [2012] NSWCA 274, [137].
The application before the Court seeks orders for leave pursuant to r 16.53 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules) to make certain amendments to the applicant’s statement of claim; the proposed amendments are not insubstantial and, indeed, some strike at the very foundation of the currently pleaded causes of action. Leave is also sought to amend a defence to a statement of cross-claim, as well as replies to the defences of the respondents, and, ultimately, to adjourn the trial under r 34.135 of the Rules. Although the amendments differ in their effect, the impact upon the hearing in respect of any of the amendments should not be understated.
Necessarily, the consequence of granting leave to make the amendments sought would be the adducing of additional evidence by the applicant. That would involve the preparation and filing of evidence in written form, being either affidavits or reports. In turn, the respondents would also be required to prepare and file amended defences to respond to the new allegations made in the proposed amended statement of claim. The inevitable consequence of this is that the hearing of this matter would have to be adjourned to some future date and, given the additional work that would be required to be undertaken, that is unlikely to be anytime soon.
The nature of the pleaded claims
There is no need on this application to traverse, in detail, the nature of the applicant’s claim as currently agitated. In short, Mr Murden seeks a determination as to his rights under a Group Life Death and Total and Permanent Disablement (TPD) Policy (the TPD Policy) that was taken out by NM Superannuation Pty Ltd (NM Superannuation), as trustee of the AMP Super Fund (the Fund), with MetLife Insurance Limited (MetLife) for the benefit of fund members. The TPD Policy has two components: (a) a default cover amount, which the applicant became entitled to upon joining the Fund on 15 July 2016; and (b) an additional cover amount, which was subject to an application process and assessment in July 2017 and commenced from 11 August 2017. Whether Mr Murden is entitled to the additional cover lies at the heart of his claim against the respondents.
As pleaded in his statement of claim, it is Mr Murden’s position that, since July 2019, he has been totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the TPD Policy as a consequence of “an accident causing a vertebral disc bulge at L4-5 and sequalae psychiatric illness”.
A significant aspect of the proposed amendments is the recasting of Mr Murden’s pleading so that, in effect, his claim for total and permanent disablement could alternatively be based upon either of those conditions. At first blush, that may appear relatively trivial. However, it is not so in the present context where the respondents have previously declined additional TPD cover based on allegations that Mr Murden, in July 2017, failed to comply with the duty of disclosure imposed by s 21 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) in relation to his mental health and pre-inception lower-back condition. It has prepared the evidence of its witnesses on that basis and the effect that that non-disclosure (and concomitant misrepresentation) would have on the claim for indemnity as currently made; that is, it has not adduced evidence that grapples with the factual question of whether Mr Murden was TPD by reason of his psychiatric injury alone.
MetLife has also initiated a cross-claim against Mr Murden in relation to the payment of default cover under the TPD Policy. In short, it paid Mr Murden the sum of $935,880.50 in December 2021 in respect of his claimed total and permanent disablement. That amount was calculated as a multiple of Mr Murden’s salary at the relevant time; however, MetLife now claims he was overpaid by reason of an error as to the quantum of his actual income. It claims some $300,000 by way of restitution.
Some of the proposed amendments in respect of which leave is sought go to defending that cross-claim and, in particular, Mr Murden now seeks to raise a defence of “change of position” in respect of the receipt of the payment made to him. It should be observed that some legitimate criticism was made of the proposed pleading in relation to that proposed defence, especially that it was bereft of sufficient particularisation which resulted in it being somewhat opaque.
A brief background
The history of the proceedings is not deserving of lengthy exposition.
On or about 15 March 2021, Mr Murden sought cover under the policy of insurance attached to his superannuation fund by way of an application for payment under the TPD Policy.
The respondents denied the claim in respect of the additional TPD cover in or about April 2022.
Mr Murden filed a statement of claim in March 2023. The crux of his claim was that MetLife and NM Superannuation had wrongfully denied his claim for additional cover.
On 21 August 2023, MetLife filed a defence in the action, as well as both a notice and statement of cross-claim that were directed toward the claimed overpayment of the default cover.
The first respondent, NM Superannuation, filed its defence on 25 August 2023.
A flurry of activity followed shortly thereafter, including the filing of a number of requests for subpoenas, as well as amended defences and replies to the respondents’ defences. Relevantly, Mr Murden file his defence to the cross-claim on 18 September 2023.
Ultimately, on 9 September 2024, the matter was listed for a five-day hearing commencing on 17 February 2025. Pausing there, one might rather naturally assume that, at the time the matter was set down, the pleadings would have been finalised, all relevant reports obtained, counsel retained for the hearing and, particularly, the applicant would have been aware of the evidence it intended to adduce. That was not the case. Indeed, on or about 9 September 2024, the applicant’s solicitors advised their counterparts that the counsel then-engaged to appear on behalf of their client was no longer available, he having ceased to practice at the Bar.
Quite appropriately, the applicant’s solicitors thereupon set about retaining new counsel for the hearing and, sometime in late September 2024, secured the services of Mr P Nolan of counsel.
Relevantly, a conference was held on 7 November 2024 between Ms O’Neill, the applicant’s solicitor, and Mr Nolan, where a number of topics were discussed. Amongst other things, Mr Nolan gave an opinion that (a) the applicant’s pleadings were in need of amendment; (b) further medico-legal assessments should be obtained; and (c) the applicant should file updated medical reports and a supplementary affidavit. Unsurprisingly, Mr Nolan gave further advice that, as a consequence of the several matters which he considered required attention, it would be prudent for an application to be made to adjourn the trial to enable the applicant to attend to them.
Unfortunately, that latter nugget of advice seems to have fallen by the way and there is a glaring absence of any explanation in the material filed as to why the necessary application was not made promptly after Ms O’Neill’s conference with Mr Nolan on 7 November 2024, but instead only made very recently. Indeed, it is a point that assumes great significance in this case that there is no explanation as to why no application to amend the pleadings was made in November or December 2024, nor why nothing occurred in this respect until late January 2025.
But this is not an isolated incident. It appears that in or about early December 2024, Mr Nolan also advised Ms O’Neill that he was no longer available to appear on behalf of the applicant at the hearing of 17 February 2025. However, it was not until 30 January 2025 that the applicant’s solicitors sought to secure the services of alternative counsel. That delay is significant and, again, left unexplained. Further, this issue was only brought to the attention of the respondents on 20 January 2025, when the applicant sought their “consent to request an adjournment of the trial dates, for that reason”. Not only is there an absence of any explanation as to why MetLife and NM Superannuation were kept in the dark about Mr Nolan’s unavailability for so long, but it is also flummoxing that, in requesting the respondent’s consent to the proposed adjournment, Ms O’Neill made no reference to the desire of her client to make the substantive amendments now sought and which, if granted, will necessarily result in an adjournment of the hearing.
Should the applicant be given leave to amend his statement of claim?
MetLife and NM Superannuation oppose the application for leave to amend and any subsequent orders for the adjournment of the trial. They do so on the basis that the circumstances are not such as to warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretion in the applicant’s favour or, at least, he has failed to discharge the onus of establishing that they are.
The principles to be applied
The second respondent relied upon and drew the Court’s attention to the language of s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (Federal Court Act). That section provides:
37M The overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure provisions
(1) The overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes:
(a) according to law; and
(b) as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.
(2)Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the overarching purpose includes the following objectives:
(a) the just determination of all proceedings before the Court;
(b)the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the purposes of the Court;
(c) the efficient disposal of the Court’s overall caseload;
(d) the disposal of all proceedings in a timely manner;
(e) the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.
It is also relevant to refer to s 37N of the Federal Court Act which provides:
37N Parties to act consistently with the overarching purpose
(1) The parties to a civil proceeding before the Court must conduct the proceeding (including negotiations for settlement of the dispute to which the proceeding relates) in a way that is consistent with the overarching purpose.
Reference was also made to the High Court’s observations in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 (Aon), which identified both that (a) in the granting of leave to amend or the granting of an adjournment, inefficiencies in the use of Courts’ time arising from the adjournment of proceedings must be taken into account, as well as the need to maintain public confidence in the judicial system: 182 [5]; and, (b) the process of case management requires that close consideration be afforded to the public interest, which includes the particular interests of the parties as well as public confidence in the administration of justice: see, eg, 192 [30], 194 – 194 [35].
Aon also identified four significant matters which should be taken into account by the Court in assessing any application for adjournment, being:
(a)the provision of an adequate explanation for the adjournment sought;
(b)a consideration of the detriment to other parties;
(c)a consideration of the detriment to other litigants in the court; and
(d)consideration of the parties’ choices to date in the litigation as to the claims to be made and how they have been framed.
In a similar vein, see also Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A Firm), Re Tamaya Resources Ltd (in liq) [2015] FCA 1098, [127] – [128].
When one considers the observations of the High Court in Aon in the context of the earlier, but not that much earlier, decision in Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 190 CLR 146, the essence of Aon is that emphasis should now be placed upon ascertaining whether a party has had a sufficient opportunity to present their case: Aon, 214 – 215 [102], 217 [112]. A party who fails to take advantage of that opportunity, without reason or reasonable cause, cannot then complain that they have been denied the procedural fairness that the court process offers: Cauldron Energy Ltd v Beijing Joseph Investment Co Ltd (2016) 110 ACSR 576, 595 – 596 [137].
Further, the High Court in Aon indicated that, when considering a request for an adjournment, a holistic approach should be taken to the consideration of the position of the parties in litigation. In effect, that requires an assessment of the impact any adjournment would have on the court processes as a whole, including the impact on other parties to litigation. In that context, the mere fact that expenses wasted or thrown away by reason of an adjournment may be ameliorated by a costs order is perhaps now recognised as somewhat irrelevant: GSA Industries Pty Ltd v NT Gas Ltd (1990) 24 NSWLR 710, 715 – 716.
Application of the principles
No explanation for applicant’s delay in pleading the claim now sought to be made
A significant, and indeed insurmountable, difficulty in the present case is the absence of any explanation as to why the applicant did not earlier plead, or seek to plead, the claim now sought to be made. That was particularly significant in the present circumstances where, as noted by Mr Walsh for MetLife, the material on which Mr Murden now relies for the purposes of repleading has been in his possession for some time. That material includes, amongst other things, a report of Dr Elsa Yeung, a psychiatrist, dated 25 January 2021. In it, Dr Yeung gave the opinion that, due to the chronicity and severity of Mr Murden’s psychiatric condition, there was no real prospect he would ever be able to resume work or obtain any gainful professional occupation for which he is reasonably qualified by education and training or experience.
That is a significant piece of evidence on which the statement of claim of 29 March 2023 could very well have been founded, having been in Ms O’Neill’s possession since January 2021. In that context, it can reasonably be assumed that the newly proposed claim was not included in the original pleading because of a forensic decision about its veracity, no doubt, informed by an assessment of the evidence then available to the applicant’s legal representatives. Of course, that is only a presumption; there is, however, no evidence which might militate against it.
Indeed, the presumption might be thought to be stronger in the present case where Mr Murden’s statement of claim was filed in early 2023 and the action has progressed on that footing ever since. The absence of any explanation as to why the amendments were not made earlier and in the course of the proceedings is also significant and supports the presumption that the omission to plead it was the result of a conscious decision. In this context, it is relevant that the defence raising the applicant’s alleged non-disclosure, being the defence which the applicant seeks to overcome or circumvent by the proposed amendment, was filed on 21 August 2023. Whilst there may be some rationale for the absence of an amendment prior to that point in time, the point nevertheless remains good for the period thereafter.
It was submitted that the Court could assume the reason for the delay in pleading the claim now sought to be advanced was that new counsel had taken over the matter and that a fresh pair of eyes had identified the paucity in the original pleading. That may very well be true. However, with respect, it is an insufficient explanation for the delays which have occurred: see Soia v Bennett [2011] WASC 59, [70] – [71]; PPG Development Pty Ltd v Capitanio (2016) 126 SASR 307, 325 – 326 [69] – [70].
In Saadat v Commonwealth [2019] SASC 28, Stanley J said (at [37]) in relation to an attempt to explain the lateness of application to amend by reference to the briefing of new Counsel:
I have referred to the explanation for the application to amend and its timing. I found that the explanation for the application to amend and its timing was the fresh advice from new senior counsel retained by the plaintiff. Again, as Doyle J explains in PPG Development this is not an entirely satisfactory explanation. While courts are reluctant to visit parties with the consequences of oversight by the legal representatives, the Court should not be too willing to permit amendments simply because they are the product of further or more detailed consideration being given to an issue by a party's legal representative or the product of a fresh set of eyes. The retention of new counsel should not operate to re-set the litigation clock or otherwise give the party in question a licence to amend. To do so would be to undermine the approach required by Aon.
(Emphasis added).
Though the appeal from that decision was unsuccessful, the status of his Honour’s conclusion was left unclear, despite it being plainly correct: Commonwealth v Saadat (2019) 134 SASR 184, 205 – 206 [84] – [85]; WGKS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 10, [20]; but see Diakou Nominees Pty Ltd v Gouger Street Pty Ltd; Gouger Street Pty Ltd v Diakou Nominees Pty Ltd [2020] SASC 124, [75].
As indicated, in the usual course of events, the engagement of a new counsel might provide a rationale reason for a desire to amend the pleading, but it does not, of itself, explain the delay in bringing the new case forward. Even if it did, it does not overcome the problem in the present case where there is an absence of any explanation for not making an application to amend the pleadings shortly after Mr Murden’s solicitor was advised on 7 November 2024 that it would be prudent to do so and, indeed, that it would be important to seek an adjournment as a consequence. Had an application been made on or around that time, the chances of it being successful would have been greatly increased, as any disruption it may have caused the respondents would have been substantially reduced. In this context, it is passing credulity that Mr Murden’s solicitors did not venture an attempt to explain the omission in any affidavit.
As has been mentioned, the respondents were not informed about the applicant’s intention to apply for an amendment until 20 January 2025, and the omission by the solicitors for the applicant to do so was also left unexplained. There is really no excuse for that conduct.
No explanation for failure to communicate
In relation to the applicant’s conduct generally vis-à-vis the lateness of the application, it is generally possible to infer the existence of circumstances that might be causative of some delay, such as the pressures of practice, especially that a solicitor’s other matters might have needed attention. In this case, it might also be inferred that the interposition of the Christmas vacation period meant that attention was not given to the steps which needed to be undertaken. Whilst these matters may be assumed to have had some impact, they are far from sufficient to explain the lengthy delays and serious omissions to which reference has been made.
That is particularly so in relation to the omission to inform the respondents of the applicant’s intention to amend the pleading as soon as that issue arose on 7 November 2024. It is one thing for the applicant’s legal representatives not to be able to produce a new pleading by engaging counsel to prepare it in a short period of time, but it is entirely another not to advise the opposing parties of the likelihood of that happening, especially in circumstances where the date set for a hearing is rapidly approaching. Had the respondents been so informed on 7 November 2024 or shortly thereafter, no doubt, the outcome of the present application could have been substantially different.
Magnitude of proposed changes and associated detriment
The factors required to be considered on an application of this kind include the magnitude of the intended changes to the pleading or proposed amendments: see Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Dallas Development Corporation Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 98, [114]. Here, they are far from insignificant and are more appropriately described as “quite substantial”. They would necessitate the adjournment of the trial so that the respondents could consider them, as well as a new round of pleadings, additional evidence, and the acquisition of further expert medical evidence. In addition, the character of the case would metamorphose from one concerning the determination of insurance issues, to one concerning the determination of the nature and degree of the applicant’s personal injuries. Such a substantive change to the complexion of the case at such a late stage necessarily means that a convincing explanation for the previous omission to plead the case is required. As has been said, none was forthcoming.
If Mr Murden is permitted to amend his claim, he could, and one would expect, would, advance a case that it was only his psychiatric condition that caused his total and permanent disablement and, in that scenario, the non-disclosure of his prior lumbar condition would be of no relevance. On any view, the proposed amendment is a significant alteration to the applicant’s case and one designed to undermine MetLife’s existing defence. Had this claim been raised at an earlier time, it may very well have provided a pathway to success in the litigation for the applicant. Unfortunately, it was not and to allow it now would undermine the basis on which the case has hitherto progressed.
It is also appropriate to refer to the amendments that Mr Murden proposes to make to his defence to MetLife’s cross-claim. As indicated above, he seeks to raise, amongst other things, a defence of change of position in respect of the receipt of an overpayment. The amount in question is approximately $300,000 which is, on any view, a substantial amount for any person and, in particular, the applicant. Again, the proposed amendment is of tangible significance.
However, as Mr Walsh submits, that change of position case, if fully articulated, would have or could well have the consequence of requiring further and substantially new evidence about the applicant’s then-position and what he did in reliance upon the receipt of the monies or as a consequence of it: see Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries (2014) 253 CLR 560, 625 – 626 [157] – [158]. If the amendment were to be allowed, it would require substantial further evidence from both parties, including subpoenaing of documents from third parties and the like, and that would, by itself, necessitate the adjourning of the forthcoming hearing.
Conclusion
The impact of allowing Mr Murden to amend in the manner in which he now seeks would result in the adjournment of the five-day trial which is due to commence in two weeks. The days reserved for that trial have been set aside now for some significant time and it is undoubted that other matters that might have been heard in that time have been delayed. Further, if the trial is adjourned to some other date, other matters which require a hearing will be denied the opportunity to be heard sooner than they might. These matters, being the impact on other litigants and the court’s resources, were identified in Aon as being relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion as to whether leave to amend should be granted. Given that the trial sought to be adjourned is of a not insignificant length, they assume some greater importance than might otherwise be the case in relation to shorter matters.
On the other hand, such matters must be kept in perspective. This Court is not in the position whereby parties are required to wait significant periods of time for a hearing of most matters. As a result of modern and refined methods of case management, hearing dates in the not-too-distant future are, in the ordinary course, usually available to most litigants. Certainly, the current circumstances are far from the days where, if a trial were adjourned, the matter would go back to the call-over list and necessarily wait for many months to be allocated new hearing dates. In this sense, the factor of the wastage of court resources and the impediments to other litigants may now weigh less in the evaluative task than it might have in other times.
Nevertheless, though the proposed amendments are significant and critical to the applicant, he has had more than sufficient time to plead the case which best advances his claims. Moreover, there is a startling absence of any explanation for his failure to bring forward the claim he now seeks to make, and that weighs heavily against the exercise of the discretion. That absence of any explanation relates to the omission to make the claims in the initial statement of claim, and to the particular delay from September 2024 when the matter was set down and, then to the delay from November when his solicitors were first warned of the need to amend. These two factors, alone or by themselves, are sufficient to weigh against the exercise of the discretion to grant leave to amend or to adjourn the hearing in the present case.
When those factors are taken together with other factors such as the waste of court resources and the adverse impact upon the Court’s calendar, there is really nothing on which the applicant can rely to support the exercise of the discretion in his favour. Indeed, were his application for leave to amend to be granted and the necessary adjournment of the trial to occur, it is possible that there may be some loss of confidence in the administration of justice.
It follows that the applicant has not discharged the onus of establishing that the discretion to grant leave to amend should be exercised in his favour.
The application should be dismissed with costs.
Postscript
On 14 February 2025, the parties advised that they had “resolved the proceedings” and sought orders vacating the trial that was listed to commence some three days later. The Court acceded to that request. Whilst the Court is yet to be furnished with a deed of settlement, there has been no suggestion to date that the claims instituted by Mr Murden (and MetLife) remain in dispute.
I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Derrington. Associate:
Dated: 13 March 2025
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