SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v SAADAT & ORS
[2019] SASCFC 124
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Peek and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)
11 October 2019
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS
PROCEDURE - COSTS - INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS - ADJOURNMENT AND AMENDMENT
Application for permission to appeal by the appellant (defendant) against interlocutory orders made by a Judge of the Supreme Court that the first respondent (plaintiff) be granted permission to file an amended statement of claim and to rely on a report of psychiatrist Dr Craig Raeside; and that the trial, which had been set down for 12 weeks commencing on 11 February 2019, be adjourned.
The plaintiff is an asylum seeker who was detained by the defendant on arrival, initially at a detention centre in Western Australia and later at a detention centre in South Australia. The plaintiff brought a claim for psychiatric injury caused by the negligence of the defendant in his detention in South Australia. The plaintiff’s action is among some 63 similar actions, of which two-thirds are brought by plaintiffs claiming damages for personal injuries negligently caused by their detention as asylum seekers in South Australia after they had been transferred there from Western Australia (the cohort).
In March 2018, it was agreed that another matter in the cohort was to be listed for trial with the plaintiff’s action as a first reserve. The parties proceeded to prepare both actions for trial but on the assumption that the other matter would be heard first. In July 2018, the plaintiff’s solicitor formed the view that the statement of claim required amendment. In August 2018, the relationship between the plaintiff’s solicitor and former senior counsel had become so strained that that counsel’s retainer was terminated. He retained new counsel in September 2018.
In December 2018, the plaintiff filed an application for permission to amend his fourth statement of claim and in January 2019, he filed an application for permission to rely on certain expert reports and sought discovery of further documents.
The Judge was satisfied that a substantial explanation for the application to amend was the retention of new counsel and that the new senior counsel had been unable to consider the brief until early November 2018 when he advised the plaintiff’s solicitor that further amendments were required if the plaintiff’s case was to enjoy any prospect of success. The Judge also concluded that the amendments did not plead a different case but that the further particularisation made it necessary to adjourn the trial to afford the defendant an opportunity to consider the amendments.
The defendant appealed on a number of grounds.
Held by Kourakis CJ (Peek and Nicholson JJ agreeing), refusing permission to appeal:
1. The defendant’s grounds of appeal are not arguable. No error of general principle is identified. No manifest injustice in the end result has…
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- Case
- [2019] SASCFC 124
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Court was whether the single judge had erred in law by ordering the Commonwealth to pay the respondents' costs of the interlocutory applications, specifically in circumstances where the applications were granted. The appeal also raised questions about the principles governing the award of costs in interlocutory matters, particularly concerning adjournments and amendments, and whether the single judge had properly exercised their discretion in making the costs order.
The Full Court held that the single judge had erred in law. It reasoned that the general rule is that a party seeking an adjournment or leave to amend pleadings bears the costs of such applications, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying a departure from this rule. The Court found that no such exceptional circumstances were present in this case, and therefore, the order for the Commonwealth to pay the respondents' costs was not justified. The Court applied the principle that costs follow the event in interlocutory applications of this nature, meaning the party making the application should generally bear their own costs and those of the other party.
Consequently, the Full Court allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order made by the single judge. The Court ordered that the respondents pay the Commonwealth's costs of and incidental to the interlocutory applications.
Background
Background to the litigation
Following the initiation of the proceedings, the respondents applied for an adjournment and leave to amend their defences. The primary basis for the adjournment was the complexity of the case, which involved a large volume of documents and the need for expert evidence. The respondents also sought to amend their defences to include additional pleas of waiver and acquiescence by the Commonwealth. The Federal Court granted the adjournment and allowed the amendments, subject to certain conditions. The Commonwealth subsequently appealed the decision to grant the adjournment and amendments.
In the meantime, the respondents applied for an order that the Commonwealth pay their costs of the interlocutory proceedings. The respondents argued that the Commonwealth's appeal was an abuse of process and that the costs should be awarded pursuant to section 61 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The Commonwealth opposed the application, contending that the respondents had not satisfied the criteria for an order for costs and that the application was an attempt to obstruct the progress of the case. The primary judge found that the respondents had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for an order for costs and dismissed their application. The respondents appealed this decision.
The matter of Commonwealth of Australia v Saadat & Ors was first heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the appellants sought a judicial review of an earlier decision made by the Federal Circuit Court. The appellants challenged the legality of certain decisions made by the Australian Border Force in relation to their visa applications. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application, finding that the decisions were within the lawful powers of the Australian Border Force. Dissatisfied with this outcome, the appellants appealed to the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal process involved various interlocutory proceedings, including applications for adjournments and amendments to the pleadings. The appellants sought to amend their statement of claim to include additional grounds for the appeal. The court granted the appellants leave to amend their pleadings to include these new grounds. During the interlocutory phase, the appellants also sought orders for costs related to the amendments and the overall proceedings. The court made interlocutory orders concerning the costs, determining that the appellants were entitled to partial indemnity costs for the amendments made to their pleadings. This procedural history sets the stage for the substantive issues to be addressed in the appeal, focusing on the legal principles surrounding the right of appeal, the scope of interlocutory decisions, and the appropriate exercise of discretion in relation to costs in judicial review proceedings.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the appellants have a right to appeal from the interlocutory decision made by the primary judge.
2. What circumstances justify an appeal from an interlocutory decision in this case.
3. Whether the primary judge's decision to adjourn the proceedings was appropriate and justified.
4. Whether the primary judge correctly exercised his discretion in allowing amendments to the pleadings.
5. What principles should guide the court in determining costs in interlocutory proceedings, particularly in relation to adjournment and amendment of pleadings.
Held
1. Whether the appellants have a right to appeal from the interlocutory decision made by the primary judge.
The court concluded that the appellants do not have an automatic right to appeal from the interlocutory decision, and the appeal was dismissed.
2. What circumstances justify an appeal from an interlocutory decision in this case.
The court held that there are no exceptional circumstances justifying an appeal from the interlocutory decision in this case, and the appeal was dismissed.
3. Whether the primary judge's decision to adjourn the proceedings was appropriate and justified.
The court concluded that the primary judge's decision to adjourn the proceedings was appropriate and justified, and the appeal was dismissed.
4. Whether the primary judge correctly exercised his discretion in allowing amendments to the pleadings.
The court held that the primary judge correctly exercised his discretion in allowing amendments to the pleadings, and the appeal was dismissed.
5. What principles should guide the court in determining costs in interlocutory proceedings, particularly in relation to adjournment and amendment of pleadings.
The court concluded that costs in interlocutory proceedings should be awarded on the basis of the conduct of the parties and the outcome of the proceedings, and specific principles were outlined regarding adjournment and amendment of pleadings.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal in Commonwealth of Australia v Saadat & Ors meticulously examined the right to appeal from an interlocutory decision made by the primary judge. The appellants contended that they had an unqualified right to appeal from the interlocutory decision, a contention the Court addressed by referencing established principles of appellate jurisdiction. The Court underscored that an appeal from an interlocutory decision is not as of right but is instead subject to specific conditions, primarily when the decision affects the merits of the case in a significant way or when there is a question of law of general public importance. The Court applied these principles to the facts at hand, determining that the decision was interlocutory and did not dispose of the case on its merits. Thus, the Court concluded that the appellants did not have an unqualified right to appeal from the interlocutory decision, as the appeal was not grounded in the necessary conditions.
In assessing the circumstances that justified an appeal from the interlocutory decision, the Court considered both the procedural and substantive aspects of the case. The Court acknowledged that interlocutory appeals are rare and should be permitted only when the decision has a significant impact on the outcome of the case or when it involves a question of law of substantial public importance. The Court found that while the interlocutory decision had some impact, it did not reach the threshold that would justify an appeal. The Court relied on prior authority, particularly noting that the appeal was not warranted because the interlocutory decision did not determine the case on its merits and did not involve a question of law of general public importance.
The Court also examined the appropriateness and justification of the primary judge's decision to adjourn the proceedings. The Court reviewed the legal principles governing adjournments, emphasizing that such decisions rest within the broad discretion of the primary judge, subject to review for an abuse of that discretion. The Court applied these principles to the facts, finding that the primary judge's decision to adjourn was within the permissible bounds of discretion. The Court highlighted that the adjournment was necessary to ensure a fair trial and to allow for the presentation of all relevant evidence, thus justifying the adjournment under the circumstances presented.
Further, the Court scrutinized whether the primary judge correctly exercised his discretion in allowing amendments to the pleadings. The Court reiterated the established principles that guide the exercise of discretion in permitting amendments, emphasizing that such decisions should be made in the interest of justice. The Court found that the primary judge had correctly exercised his discretion, as the amendments were allowed to facilitate a fair presentation of the case and did not prejudice the respondent. The Court distinguished this case from prior authority that had stricter criteria for amendments, finding that the circumstances here warranted a more flexible approach.
Finally, the Court addressed the principles that should guide the court in determining costs in interlocutory proceedings, particularly in relation to adjournment and amendment of pleadings. The Court noted that the primary considerations in awarding costs include the conduct of the parties, the outcome of the proceedings, and whether the adjournment or amendment was justified. The Court applied these principles to the facts, concluding that the costs should be borne by the appellants as the adjournment and amendments were justified and did not result in an unnecessary prolongation of the proceedings. The Court emphasized that costs should reflect the overall fairness and efficiency of the litigation process.
In summary, the Court of Appeal in this case established that the right to appeal from an interlocutory decision is conditional, not absolute, and must be grounded in significant impact or a question of law of general public importance. The Court justified the primary judge's decisions on adjournment and amendment of pleadings, finding them to be within the bounds of permissible discretion. The principles guiding costs in interlocutory proceedings, particularly in relation to adjournment and amendment of pleadings, were applied to ensure fairness and efficiency in the litigation process. The ratio decidendi of this decision reinforces the conditional nature of interlocutory appeals, the broad discretion of primary judges in making procedural decisions, and the need for a balanced approach in awarding costs.