SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
SAADAT v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA & ORS (No 2)
[2019] SASC 75
Reasons for the Order of The Honourable Justice Stanley
17 May 2019
PROCEDURE - COSTS - INTERLOCUTORY PROCEEDINGS - ADJOURNMENT AND AMENDMENT
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS
The trial of this matter was listed to commence on 11 February 2019 for a period of 12 weeks. On 4 February 2019, the Court made orders granting permission to the plaintiff to amend his statement of claim and to rely at trial on a report of Dr Craig Raeside but refusing leave to rely at trial on a report of Dr Patrick Flynn. The Court made further orders vacating the trial date and reserved the question of costs.
The defendant and the third parties sought orders in relation to the costs of the applications to amend and for leave to rely upon the reports of Dr Raeside and Dr Flynn, the costs of the application for an adjournment of the trial and for the costs thrown away by the vacation of the trial date. The defendant further sought an order that these costs be payable by the plaintiff’s solicitors personally. The first and third third parties joined in this application. The second and fourth third parties did not.
The plaintiff opposed the Court determining the application for costs at this juncture. He submitted that the Court should not determine the question of costs of these matters until the conclusion of the trial.
On 29 April 2019, the Court ordered that the question of costs be reserved to the conclusion of the trial. These are its reasons for doing so.
Supreme Court (Civil) Rules 1987 (SA) Rule 101.06, referred to.
Filmlab Systems International Ltd & Anor v Pennington & Ors [1994] 4 All ER 673; Redowood Pty Ltd v Goldstein Technology Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 515; Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205, applied.
Brown v Guss (No. 2) [2015] VSC 57; Interior Projects Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (unreported, Lander J delivered 19 June 1997); Orchard v South Eastern Electricity Board [1987] 1 All ER 95; Pier (WA) Pty Ltd as trustee for Isandi Trust v Jean Maurice Pty Ltd (In Liq) [No. 7] [2018] WASC 355, discussed.
Flinn v Flinn [1999] VSCA 134; Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; Medcalf v Mardell & Ors [2003] 1 AC 120, considered.
SAADAT v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA & ORS (No 2)
[2019] SASC 75Civil.
STANLEY J:
Introduction
This is a claim for damages for psychiatric injuries alleged to be suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the conditions of his detention by the Commonwealth at the Baxter Immigration Detention Facility (the Facility). The Commonwealth has issued third party claims against the entities it contracted with to manage the Facility.
The trial of the matter was listed to commence on 11 February 2019. The trial was set down for…
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- Case
- [2019] SASC 75
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles established in previous case law and the rules governing costs in civil proceedings. The court acknowledged that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the preferred course of action was to decide the costs issue at the conclusion of the trial. This approach aimed to avoid potential conflicts of interest between the plaintiff and his legal representatives, which could arise if the court ruled on the costs issue during the trial. The court also noted that questions of default, which could influence the exercise of the costs discretion, might be clearer at the end of the trial. Furthermore, the court recognised that there was no immediate need to hear and determine the application for costs at the interlocutory stage, as the Commonwealth and third parties did not face any real prejudice from the reservation of their applications to the conclusion of the trial.
Ultimately, the court decided to reserve the costs of the applications to amend the statement of claim, to rely on further expert reports, to adjourn the trial and the costs thrown away, until the conclusion of the trial. This decision aimed to prevent the disruption to the trial and to avoid placing the plaintiff and his solicitors in a potential conflict of interest. The court also considered the risk that the plaintiff's solicitors might cease to act for him, which could result in the plaintiff being deprived of their representation. Additionally, the court recognised that the plaintiff could potentially have to find new solicitors to act on his behalf, which could be detrimental to the proceedings. The court did not find any pressing necessity for the application for costs to be heard and determined at the interlocutory stage, as there was no real prejudice to the Commonwealth or the third parties, and no impecuniosity on their part.
This decision highlights the importance of avoiding potential conflicts of interest and preserving the trust and confidence between a plaintiff and their legal representatives, particularly in complex cases involving multiple parties and significant costs. The court's approach to reserving the costs issue until the conclusion of the trial demonstrates a cautious and balanced approach to the exercise of its discretion in such matters.
Background
Background to the litigation
The central issue in this case revolved around the timing of the application for costs. The Commonwealth and third parties sought to have the application for costs heard and determined before the trial concluded. They argued that such an order was necessary to avoid potential conflicts of interest between Mr Saadat and his solicitors, who might otherwise be placed in a position of opposing their own client's interests. Mr Saadat and his solicitors, however, opposed the early determination of the costs application, arguing that it was more appropriate to reserve the decision on the costs until after the trial. They contended that the questions of default and the overall context in which the costs were incurred would be clearer at the conclusion of the trial, thereby allowing for a more informed exercise of the court’s discretion.
The court was tasked with balancing the need for procedural fairness and efficiency with the potential for conflict of interest and the preservation of the solicitor-client relationship. It acknowledged that while the rules and case law did not preclude the making of wasted costs orders before the finalisation of a trial, the preferred course of action was to decide such applications at the conclusion of the trial unless there were exceptional circumstances. The court considered that the potential for conflict of interest and the risk of disrupting the trial outweighed the arguments for an immediate determination of the costs application. Consequently, the court decided to reserve the costs application until the conclusion of the trial, ensuring that Mr Saadat's solicitors could continue to act in his best interests without the risk of a conflict arising at a critical stage of the proceedings.
The matter of Saadat v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) came before the court as an interlocutory application concerning the costs incurred due to the plaintiff’s applications to amend the statement of claim, to rely on further expert reports, to adjourn the trial, and the costs thrown away. The application was brought by the Commonwealth and the third parties, seeking to have the plaintiff and his solicitors held liable for the costs incurred due to these applications. The court reserved the decision on the costs until the conclusion of the trial, acknowledging that the preferred course is to decide such applications at the end of the trial to avoid potential conflicts of interest and disruptions. The court was particularly mindful of the risk that determining the application at that juncture could have led to a conflict between the plaintiff and his solicitors, potentially resulting in the solicitors ceasing to act for the plaintiff and the plaintiff being left to find new representation. Furthermore, the court recognised that questions of default, which could inform the exercise of the costs discretion, might be clearer at the conclusion of the trial. The Commonwealth and the third parties did not demonstrate any pressing necessity for the application to be heard and determined at that stage, and there was no real prejudice to them in reserving the decision until the end of the trial.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court can make an order for wasted costs in interlocutory proceedings in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
2. Whether the court should decide applications for wasted costs at the conclusion of the trial to avoid potential conflicts of interest between the plaintiff and their solicitors.
3. Whether the court should reserve applications for wasted costs until the conclusion of the trial to allow for a clearer understanding of any questions of default.
4. Whether there is a pressing necessity for the application for wasted costs to be heard and determined at an interlocutory stage.
Held
1. Whether the court can make an order for wasted costs in interlocutory proceedings in the absence of exceptional circumstances: The court concluded that while it is not precluded from making such orders, it is generally preferred to decide such applications at the conclusion of the trial.
2. Whether the court should decide applications for wasted costs at the conclusion of the trial to avoid potential conflicts of interest between the plaintiff and their solicitors: The court held that it is preferable to decide such applications at the conclusion of the trial to avoid potential conflicts of interest.
3. Whether the court should reserve applications for wasted costs until the conclusion of the trial to allow for a clearer understanding of any questions of default: The court held that it may be preferable to reserve such applications until the conclusion of the trial to allow for a clearer understanding of any questions of default.
4. Whether there is a pressing necessity for the application for wasted costs to be heard and determined at an interlocutory stage: The court concluded that there is no pressing necessity for such applications to be heard and determined at an interlocutory stage.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I accept that the rules and the body of law that has developed in relation to the making of wasted costs orders do not preclude the making of such orders before the finalisation of a trial. However, in the absence of exceptional circumstances the preferred course where an application of this kind is made is for it to be decided at the conclusion of the trial for the reasons identified in the authorities set out above. Interior Projects does not stand as an authority contrary to this principle. It is important to understand that in Interior Projects the solicitors against whom the wasted costs order was sought consented to the making of the order.Consideration I reserved the costs of the applications to amend the statement of claim, to rely on further expert reports, to adjourn the trial and the costs thrown away, until the conclusion of the trial to avoid the disruption to the trial that would result from placing the plaintiff and his solicitors in a potential conflict of interest if I was now to hear and determine the application that the plaintiff’s solicitors pay those costs. If the solicitors opposed an order that they be held liable to pay those costs, or the plaintiff was to support an application that they be liable for the costs or liable to indemnify him if he was found liable for those costs, a conflict would arise between the plaintiff and his solicitors resulting in the real risk that the solicitors would cease to act for the plaintiff at this juncture. That consequence would be disastrous at this stage of the proceedings. The solicitors have acted for the plaintiff since the proceedings were instituted. To have permitted the Commonwealth and the first and third third parties now to pursue a claim for costs against the plaintiff’s solicitors exposed the risk that the plaintiff’s solicitors would look to their own interests in relation to that application in a way which had the real potential to conflict with the interests of the plaintiff and thereby risk a loss of trust and confidence on the part of the plaintiff in his solicitors before the trial of the action has concluded or, in fact, commenced. It may also have resulted in the plaintiff being deprived of the representation of his solicitors who have had the conduct of the claim on his behalf until now. The plaintiff could have been placed in a position of potentially having to find new solicitors to act for him. I also accept the submission of the plaintiff that questions of default which may inform the exercise of the costs discretion might be clearer at the conclusion of the trial than they are now. On the other hand, there is no pressing necessity for the application for costs in relation to these matters to be heard and determined at this stage. The Commonwealth and the third parties cannot point to any real prejudice from the reservation of their applications to the conclusion of the trial. There is no question of impecuniosity on the part of the Commonwealth or the third parties. Of course, there is no real challenge to the Commonwealth’s submission that the plaintiff is impecunious. There is no suggestion the solicitors are impecunious. That is the present position.