Candetti Constructions Pty Ltd v M & I Samaras (No 1) Pty Ltd & Ors

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

CANDETTI CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD v M & I SAMARAS (NO 1) PTY LTD & ORS

[2011] SASC 189

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Blue

1 November 2011

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - BY LEAVE OF COURT - GENERALLY

The original decision of a Master reduced the amount of the statutory demand - on appeal a single judge set aside the statutory demand in its entirety - the applicants sought permission to appeal to the Full Court - whether reasonable minds may differ on issues raised - whether questions of general importance - whether order determines substantive rights of the parties.

Held:  Permission to appeal granted.

Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 288(1)(a)(ii) and r 289(1)(c); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 459E and s 459J, referred to.
Harris Scarfe Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liquidation) v Ernst & Young (No 2) (2005) 240 LSJS 17; Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VR 431; Rouse v IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd (No 5) [1999] SASC 294; Waikerie Murray River Queen Pty Ltd v Loizides [2009] SASC 257, considered.

CANDETTI CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD v M & I SAMARAS (NO 1) PTY LTD & ORS
[2011] SASC 189

Application

  1. BLUE J:                On 4 October 2011, I allowed an appeal by the respondent, Candetti Constructions Pty Ltd (“Candetti”), against a decision by a Master, who had reduced but refused to set aside a statutory demand. I made an order setting aside the statutory demand in its entirety.

  2. On 17 October 2011, the applicants, M & I Samaras (No 1) Pty Ltd, M & I Samaras Pty Ltd (No 2) Pty Ltd and M & I Samaras (No 3) Pty Ltd (“Samaras”), made an oral application for permission to appeal to the Full Court from my judgment.

    Principles as to Permission

  3. Rule 288(1)(a)(ii) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) (“the Rules”) provides that an appeal to the Full Court lies by permission of the Court if the judgment subject to the appeal is a judgment given on appeal from an interlocutory judgment.

  4. It is common ground between the parties that the judgment of the Master was an interlocutory judgment.

  5. Rule 289(1)(c) of the Rules empowers an applicant to seek permission to appeal by making, within 14 days of a judgment, application to the Judge who made the decision in question.

  6. The following general principles have been established as to the criteria for granting permission for appeals against interlocutory judgments where permission is sought from the Judge who made the order from which the applicant seeks to appeal.

    1.The question whether or not permission ought to be granted is discretionary.[1]

    2.A factor to be considered is whether the issue raised is one of general importance, as opposed to simply depending upon the facts of the particular case.[2]

    3.A factor to be considered is whether, viewed objectively, the issue raised is one upon…

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Details
Case
[2011] SASC 189
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Candetti Constructions Pty Ltd v M & I Samaras (No 1) Pty Ltd & Ors, the applicants sought permission to appeal a decision of a single judge who had set aside a statutory demand in its entirety. The original decision of a Master had reduced the amount of the statutory demand. The applicants, Candetti Constructions Pty Ltd, argued that the statutory demand claimed the same amount on a different and independent basis, namely that it was an undissected portion of a debt for $1,457,936.54 which they maintained was owed to them by the respondents, M & I Samaras (No 1) Pty Ltd & Ors. The applicants sought permission to appeal to the Full Court.

The legal issues that the court was required to decide included whether reasonable minds may differ on the issues raised, whether the questions raised were of general importance, and whether the order determined or altered the substantive rights of the parties. The court considered the general principles established for granting permission for appeals against interlocutory judgments. These principles included the discretionary nature of the decision, whether the issue raised was one of general importance, whether the issue raised was one upon which reasonable minds may differ or involved a difficult or complex question of law, and whether the order determined or altered the substantive rights of the parties.

The court found that the issue raised was one upon which reasonable minds may differ or involved a difficult or complex question of law. The court also found that the order determined or altered the substantive rights of the parties. Therefore, the applicants were granted permission to appeal to the Full Court.

The final orders were that the applicants were granted permission to appeal to the Full Court. The court set aside the statutory demand in its entirety on three alternative grounds: as a matter of construction, the statutory demand relied only on the admitted basis of the debt, and not on the undissected portion of a debt basis; alternatively, as a matter of construction, s 459E did not countenance a demand for an undissected portion of a debt; and alternatively, the failure of Samaras to clearly articulate the nature of their demand as being for an undissected portion of a debt comprised a ground for setting aside the demand pursuant to s 459J(1) and substantial injustice would be caused unless the demand were set aside.

Background

Background to the litigation

Candetti Constructions Pty Ltd (Candetti) and M & I Samaras (No 1) Pty Ltd (Samaras) were involved in a dispute over an amount of $308,151.74 that Candetti had admitted it was liable to pay to Samaras. This amount formed the major component of a statutory demand issued by Samaras against Candetti. The case originated when a Master of the Supreme Court of South Australia reduced the amount of the statutory demand. Subsequently, a single judge of the Supreme Court set aside the statutory demand in its entirety on appeal. Candetti then sought permission to appeal the decision to the Full Court.

Initially, Samaras argued that the statutory demand claimed the same amount on a different basis, namely as an undissected portion of a larger debt for $1,457,936.54, which they maintained was owed by Candetti. However, the court held that the statutory demand should be set aside on three alternative grounds: firstly, the statutory demand relied only on the admitted basis of the debt and not on the undissected portion of a debt basis; secondly, section 459E of the relevant legislation did not countenance a demand for an undissected portion of a debt; and thirdly, the failure of Samaras to clearly articulate the nature of their demand as being for an undissected portion of a debt was a ground for setting aside the demand under section 459J(1) of the legislation, and substantial injustice would be caused unless the demand were set aside. This led to the single judge setting aside the statutory demand in its entirety.

In the matter of Candetti Constructions Pty Ltd v M & I Samaras (No 1) Pty Ltd & Ors, the case came before the South Australian Supreme Court as an appeal from an earlier decision of a Master. The original decision of the Master had involved reducing the amount of a statutory demand, which was subsequently appealed by a single judge who set aside the statutory demand in its entirety. The applicants, Candetti Constructions Pty Ltd, then sought permission to appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court. The primary focus of the appeal was on the criteria for granting permission to appeal against interlocutory judgments. The applicants argued that reasonable minds could differ on the issues raised, that the questions involved were of general importance, and that the order had the effect of determining the substantive rights of the parties. The court had to consider whether the matter warranted an appeal based on the established principles that the decision on granting leave to appeal is discretionary, the issue raised is one of general importance, whether reasonable minds may differ on the issue, and whether the order impacts the substantive rights of the parties. The substantive decision involved a statutory demand where a significant component of $308,151.74, initially admitted by Candetti Constructions as owing to M & I Samaras, was negated by Candetti. The court concluded that the statutory demand should be set aside on multiple grounds, including construction issues and the failure of M & I Samaras to clearly articulate the basis of their demand.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The following general principles have been established as to the criteria for granting permission for appeals against interlocutory judgments where permission is sought from the Judge who made the order from which the applicant seeks to appeal.1.The question whether or not permission ought to be granted is discretionary.[1]2.A factor to be considered is whether the issue raised is one of general importance, as opposed to simply depending upon the facts of the particular case.[2]3.A factor to be considered is whether, viewed objectively, the issue raised is one upon which reasonable minds may differ or involves a difficult or complex question of law (going to whether the decision is attended by sufficient doubt).[3]4.A factor to be considered is whether the order has the effect of determining or altering the substantive rights of the parties, as opposed to a matter of practice or procedure.[4][1] Rouse v IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd (No 5) [1999] SASC 294 at [43] per Lander J; Waikerie Murray River Queen Pty Ltd v Loizides [2009] SASC 257 at [22] per Doyle CJ, Sulan and Kelly JJ.[2] Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VR 431 at 441 per Murphy J; Harris Scarfe Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liq) v Ernst & Young (No 2) [2005] SASC 168; (2005) 240 LSJS 17 at [12] and [17] per Bleby J.[3] Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VR 431 at 441 per Murphy J; Harris Scarfe Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liq) v Ernst & Young (No 2) (2005) 240 LSJS 17 at [12] and [16] per Bleby J.[4] Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VR 431 at 441 per Murphy J; Rouse v IOOF Australia Trustees Ltd (No 5) [1999] SASC 294 at [44] per Lander J; Harris Scarfe Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) (In Liq) v Ernst & Young (No 2) (2005) 240 LSJS 17 at [12] and [14] per Bleby J.The Substantive Decision The major component of the statutory demand was a sum of $308,151.74 which was said to be the amount which Candetti had admitted it was liable to pay to Samaras. When the Master held that this basis of the claimed debt had been negated by Candetti, Samaras argued that the statutory demand claimed the same amount on a different and independent basis, namely that it was an undissected portion of a debt for $1,457,936.54 which Samaras maintained was owed to them by Candetti. Ultimately, I decided that, in respect of this component of $308,151.74, the statutory demand should be set aside on three alternative grounds:1.as a matter of construction, the statutory demand relied only on the admitted basis of the debt, and not on the undissected portion of a debt basis;2.alternatively, as a matter of construction, s 459E does not countenance a demand for an undissected portion of a debt;3.alternatively, the failure of Samaras to clearly articulate the nature of their demand as being for an undissected portion of a debt comprised a ground for setting aside the demand pursuant to s 459J(1) and substantial injustice would be caused unless the demand were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The decision in Candetti Constructions Pty Ltd v M & I Samaras (No 1) Pty Ltd & Ors revolves around the granting of permission to appeal a decision concerning statutory demands. The central issue was whether the applicants should be granted leave to appeal to the Full Court, focusing on the criteria established by the court for granting such permission. The court considered whether the issues raised were of general importance, whether reasonable minds could differ on the matter, whether the order would alter the substantive rights of the parties, and whether the statutory demand could be based on an undissected portion of a debt.

The court first acknowledged that the decision to grant permission for an appeal is discretionary. The court applied the established criteria for granting such permission, which include whether the issue raised is one of general importance rather than one dependent on the facts of the particular case. The court also considered whether the issue involves a difficult or complex question of law that would cause sufficient doubt about the decision. Additionally, the court weighed whether the order determining the appeal would alter the substantive rights of the parties or merely concern a matter of practice or procedure.

The court found that the issue raised had elements of general importance, as it concerned the interpretation of statutory demands and the potential for these demands to be based on an undissected portion of a debt. This interpretation could have broader implications for similar cases. The court also determined that reasonable minds could indeed differ on the interpretation of the statutory demand, which was seen as a difficult or complex question of law. The order in question had the effect of altering the substantive rights of the parties, as it involved the setting aside of a statutory demand which could lead to significant consequences for the applicant.

The statutory demand in question relied on an admitted basis of debt amounting to $308,151.74, but the respondents argued it could also be based on an undissected portion of a larger debt. The court examined whether s 459E of the relevant legislation allows for such a demand. The court concluded that the statutory demand could not rely on an undissected portion of a debt as a matter of construction and that s 459E does not support such a demand. Furthermore, the failure to clearly articulate the nature of the demand as being for an undissected portion of a debt was considered a ground for setting aside the demand under s 459J(1), especially if substantial injustice would result from not setting aside the demand.

In distinguishing prior authority, the court clarified that the statutory demand's reliance on an undissected portion of a debt was not permissible under the legislation. This departure from prior interpretations emphasized the need for clear articulation of the basis of a statutory demand. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that statutory demands cannot be based on an undissected portion of a debt and must be clearly articulated to avoid being set aside if substantial injustice would result. This principle ensures clarity and fairness in the enforcement of debts through statutory demands.