292 Rundle Street Pty Ltd v Pelligra Group Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 24 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeal to a Single Judge)

292 RUNDLE STREET PTY LTD v PELLIGRA GROUP PTY LTD & ANOR

[2024] SASC 100

Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hughes  

12 August 2024

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION AND OF PARTIES

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - COURTS AND TRIBUNALS WITH ENVIRONMENT JURISDICTION - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - SUPREME COURT - RIGHT OF APPEAL

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - COURTS AND TRIBUNALS WITH ENVIRONMENT JURISDICTION - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - ENVIRONMENT, RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT COURT AND ITS PREDECESSORS - PROCEDURE

This is an appeal of an interlocutory decision by the Environment, Resources and Development Court (ERD Court) not to join the appellant to an appeal against a refusal to grant planning approval to the first respondent.

The first respondent is the landowner of a parcel of land.  It has appealed a decision of the State Planning Commission to refuse to grant planning approval to aa proposed development on the land. The appellant owns land adjacent to that of the first respondent and made an interlocutory application to be joined to the appeal. The appellant raised several grounds for joinder. These included the proximity and orientation of the proposed development, the setback from a boundary line, and the impact on the appellant’s ability to develop its own land in the future.  These impacts were referred to as “Boundary Interface Issues” by the ERD Court.

The ERD Court determined that the appellant had a special interest in the appeal, but was not satisfied that the joinder application was in the interests of justice. The ERD Court considered that the issues raised were planning issues and that the appellant could not provide any greater insight into the issues than the parties as of right would address in the appeal. The application for joinder was refused.

The appellant alleges three errors on appeal:

1.    That the Boundary Interface Issues would be adequately addressed on the appeal without the appellant’s contribution;

2.    The ERD Court erred by holding that the appellant would not be able to make a contribution to a proper resolution of the Boundary Interface Issues was not an acceptable reason for joinder; and

3. The ERD Court erred in holding that the interests of justice contemplated by s 205(2)(c)(ii) of the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016 did not require the appellant to be joined.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

1.    A conclusion about the likely course of proceedings reached on an interlocutory application is not usually, and not in this case, to be approached as a factual finding amenable to error.   Permission is refused.

2.    The appellant did not demonstrate error by the ERD Court in its application of the factors set out in Pitt v Environment Resources and Development Court to the circumstances of the present case.

3.    It was open to the ERD Court to make an assessment that the issues and evidence likely to be put by the appellant to the Court on…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read 292 Rundle Street Pty Ltd v Pelligra Group Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] SASC 100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of 292 Rundle Street Pty Ltd v Pelligra Group Pty Ltd, the appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Environment, Resources and Development Court (ERD Court) to refuse to join it to the ERD Court appeal. The dispute centred on the interpretation and application of planning laws in relation to a proposed development project. The South Australian Supreme Court was tasked with reviewing the ERD Court's decision on joinder and the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the ERD Court had exercised its discretion appropriately in refusing to join the appellant as a party to the appeal, and whether the ERD Court had erred in its handling of the interlocutory applications and in its findings regarding the consideration of certain planning issues. The court had to determine if the ERD Court's decision to not join the appellant was based on a proper application of the relevant statutory provisions and principles governing discretionary decisions.

The Supreme Court found that the ERD Court's decision to refuse to join the appellant was an exercise of discretion, and as such, the appellant needed to demonstrate an error in the exercise of that discretion. The court held that the ERD Court's determination regarding the likelihood of the Boundary Interface Issues being addressed by the relevant planning experts was a prediction based on the court's experience and the submissions made during the hearing, rather than a factual finding. The court further held that statements about future events and the likely course of proceedings are not factual findings and do not lend themselves to being reviewed for error by an appellate court. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the ERD Court's decision.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed, and that the appellant pay the respondents' costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

292 Rundle Street Pty Ltd sought to join an appeal initiated by Pelligra Group Pty Ltd concerning a development authorisation under the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016. The primary dispute centred on the potential impacts of a proposed development on 292 Rundle Street Pty Ltd's adjacent land. Initially, Pelligra Group Pty Ltd had applied for a development authorisation which was refused by a relevant authority. Subsequently, Pelligra Group Pty Ltd appealed this refusal to the Environment, Resources and Development (ERD) Court. In response, 292 Rundle Street Pty Ltd sought to join the appeal, asserting that it had a special interest in the subject matter due to the proximity and intensity of the proposed development. The ERD Court declined to join 292 Rundle Street Pty Ltd as a party to the appeal, prompting the latter to appeal the ERD Court's decision.

The grounds of appeal advanced by 292 Rundle Street Pty Ltd included the argument that the ERD Court erred in finding that the Boundary Interface Issues would be adequately addressed by the existing parties. Specifically, 292 Rundle Street Pty Ltd contended that there was insufficient evidence to support the ERD Court's confidence that the State Planning Commission would call an expert witness and that this expert would address the Boundary Interface Issues. Furthermore, 292 Rundle Street Pty Ltd argued that the ERD Court should not have relied on predictions about the likely course of the proceedings, as these were not factual findings but rather evaluative judgments. The appellant submitted that the ERD Court's reasoning was flawed as it was based on statements made by counsel rather than concrete evidence. Pelligra Group Pty Ltd, on the other hand, maintained that the ERD Court's decision was correct, as the state of satisfaction required for joinder did not necessitate findings of fact but rather an evaluative judgment based on the submissions and the ERD Court's experience.

The case of 292 Rundle Street Pty Ltd v Pelligra Group Pty Ltd involved an appeal to the South Australian Supreme Court regarding the Environment, Resources and Development (ERD) Court's refusal to join the appellant to an appeal. The matter originated in the ERD Court where the appellant sought to be joined as a party to an existing appeal concerning a development authorisation. The ERD Court declined the appellant's application to join, a decision which was subsequently the subject of the present appeal to the Supreme Court. The ERD Court’s refusal was based on its assessment that the appellant's interest did not warrant joinder under the criteria set out in Section 205 of the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016.

Procedurally, the matter first traversed the ERD Court where the appellant filed an application to be joined as a party to an ongoing appeal concerning a development authorisation. The ERD Court denied this application, prompting the appellant to lodge an appeal to the Supreme Court against the ERD Court's decision. The Supreme Court was tasked with reviewing the ERD Court’s exercise of discretion in declining to join the appellant, a task requiring a careful examination of whether any error was made in exercising that discretion. During the course of the appeal, several grounds were advanced by the appellant, though not all were ultimately pursued. The Supreme Court considered the appellant’s contentions, particularly focusing on the ERD Court's findings regarding the handling of boundary interface issues and whether these warranted a different procedural outcome.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The ERD Court’s decision to refuse to join the appellant to the ERD Court appeal was an exercise of discretion, such that the appellant must establish an error in the nature of that described in House v King:[1]The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.[2][1] (1936) 55 CLR 499.[2] Ibid, 504-505 (per Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ).The basis for a decision to join, or refuse to join, a party Section 205 of the Planning, Development and Infrastructure Act 2016 (“PDI Act”) regulates the powers of the ERD Court in determining any matter that comes before it, and directs the Court as to the manner in which it must exercise those powers. Section 205(2) provides:(2) The following provisions apply in connection with the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction in any proceedings under this Act:(a) subject to paragraph (b), the Court should only seek to deal with and resolve those issues in dispute between the parties and should not, unless the Court considers it to be necessary or appropriate to do so, consider any aspect of the decision, assessment, consent, approval, direction, act, order or determination that is not being challenged;(b)if—(i)a person who has applied for a development authorisation is appealing against a refusal to grant the authorisation; or(ii)a third party is appealing against a decision to grant a development authorisation,the Court may (if the Court thinks fit) proceed to consider the matter de novo (adopting such processes and procedures as it thinks fit and taking into account any material that was before the relevant authority when it refused to grant the authorisation and such other evidence or material as the Court thinks fit);(c) the Court may, in dealing with an application from a person to be joined as a party to the proceedings (other than the Crown, a relevant authority applying under section 122, or a person who was entitled to be given notice of a decision in prescribed circumstances (if relevant)), determine not to grant the application—(i)on the ground that the Court is not satisfied that the person has a special interest in the subject‑matter of the application; or(ii)on the ground that, whatever the interest of the person may be, the Court is not satisfied that the interests of justice require that the person be joined as a party; or(iii)on any other ground determined to be appropriate by the Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The ERD Court was satisfied, therefore, that the lack of planning consent for a particular development was not a barrier to joinder, and that the appellant’s concerns were genuine, and that the proposed development on the Subject Land that is contemplated is sufficiently proximate and intense to justify a classification of the appellant’s interest as “special”.Consideration of the grounds of appeal Several originally asserted grounds were not pursued. It is convenient to deal with the pressed grounds in sequence.Ground 3 Ground 3 asserts that the ERD Court erred in a finding of fact or alternatively, of mixed fact and law, that there was no reason to conclude that the Boundary Interface Issues, would not be given due consideration by the relevant planning experts to be called before the ERD Court in the appeal, and ultimately, by the ERD Court itself.[12] [12] Ibid, [32]. This complained-of approach was also reflected by the ERD Court’s statement that the parties could and would address the issue, and that the appellant could not provide “any greater insight or assistance” than the existing parties.[13] [13] Ibid, [44]. The relevant words giving rise to the alleged error were:While I do not doubt that 292 Rundle is genuinely concerned about the potential impacts of the Proposed Development on its land, the Boundary Interface Issues are planning issues which can and will be addressed by the parties that are already before the Court as of right. As the second component of the statement, being the assistance that could be required, is repeated in Ground 4 and it will be dealt with under that heading. The appellant argued that permission should be granted in respect of Ground 3 because although it entails disturbing a finding of fact, the Court on appeal is not required to revisit factual finding processes that would occupy substantial time or involve considerations of credit. The finding of facts challenged are that the Commission would call a planning expert and that the planning expert would address the Boundary Interface Issues. The appellant argued that there was no, or insufficient, evidence before the ERD Court to enable the ERD Court to have been confident that (a) the State Planning Commission would call an expert, or that (b) the Boundary Interface Issues would be properly aired, because there were various scenarios on which the expert may not be called to give evidence, even if retained. Further, there was no basis for finding that the Commission’s expert would address the issues that were of “genuine concern” to the appellant. The first respondent argued that the appellant had mischaracterised the issue and that a state of satisfaction such as was required by the ERD Court did not require findings of fact but was, rather, an evaluative judgement.Consideration It is not desirable to approach the ERD Court’s determination of interlocutory applications entailing evaluative assessments of the likely course of the proceedings as ones that entail factual findings. Strictly speaking, statements about future events are not factual findings, but in any event such statements do not lend themselves to being characterised as matters about which an appeal court can or should make a determination of error. The ERD Court’s statements as to how the proceedings were likely to proceed was necessarily merely a prediction based on the ERD Court’s experience and the submissions that had been made during the hearing. That the ERD Court reasoned on the basis of statements made by counsel from the bar table was an ordinary incident of the case management process that is required of an interlocutory hearing.