O'Neill & Anor v Kimhi & Ors

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Land and Valuation Division)

O'NEILL & ANOR v KIMHI & ORS

[2008] SASC 109

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Debelle

24 April 2008

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL

Joinder – application by neighbours to be joined to planning appeal  - whether joinder in the interests of justice – whether neighbours have common interest with the Council – relevant factors – appeal allowed – held, neighbours to be joined as parties.

Development Act 1993 s 38(14), s 86(1)(a), s 86(1)(b), s 88(2)(c); Environment, Resources and Development Court Act 1993 s 16, s 17, referred to.
OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (2005) 92 SASR 67; Pitt v Environment, Resources and Development Court (1995) 66 SASR 274, applied.
Palata Investments Limited v Burt & Sinfield Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 942; Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 196; Technical Team Projects Pty Ltd v Noble Dunn Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 221; Burke v Garsden (10 March 1993, unreported, Supreme Court of SA, Judgment No S3865), considered.

O'NEILL & ANOR v KIMHI & ORS
[2008] SASC 109

Land and Valuation Division

  1. DEBELLE J.        This is an appeal against a decision of a judge of the Environment, Resources and Development Court dismissing an application by neighbours to be joined as parties to an appeal in that court. 

  2. This appeal was heard on 18 April.  I allowed the appeal for reasons to be published.  I made an order joining the appellants to the appeal in the Environment, Resources and Development Court and other incidental orders.  These are the reasons for those orders.

  3. The appeal was lodged out of time.  I extended the time within which to appeal.  It is convenient to consider the merits of the appeal before dealing with the reasons for granting the extension of time. 

    The Kimhis’ Proposal

  4. Mr and Mrs Kimhi (“the Kimhis”) own land at 70 Seaview Road, Tennyson.  Their land is within the area of the City of Charles Sturt (“the Council”).

  5. The appellants, Mr and Mrs O’Neill (“the O’Neills”) own land at 68 Seaview Road, Tennyson.  They reside in a single storey detached dwelling on that land.  Their land abuts the southern boundary of the Kimhis’ land.

  6. On 13 June 2007 the Kimhis applied to the Council for provisional development plan consent to construct two large semi-detached dwellings upon their land at 70 Seaview Road.  It is a large development and covers most of the Kimhis’ land.  Their land has a frontage to both Military Road and Seaview Road and slopes down from Seaview Road to Military Road.  On the Military Road frontage, the building will be three storeys high with a roof deck on top of the third level.  On the Seaview Road frontage it will be two storeys high with a roof deck on top of the second level.  It will be built very close to both side boundaries.  The proposed development is along almost…

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Details
Case
[2008] SASC 109
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of O'Neill & Anor v Kimhi & Ors was heard by the South Australian Environment, Resources and Development Court, where the primary issue was whether the applicants, O'Neill and another, should be joined as parties to an existing planning appeal. The applicants sought to join the appeal on the basis that their interests would be adversely affected by the proposed development, which was being contested in the appeal. The respondents, Kimhi and others, argued against the joinder of the applicants on several grounds, including the lack of a statutory right for third-party joinder under the City of Adelaide Development Control Act 1976 (SA).

The court was required to determine whether the statutory provisions regarding joinder of parties to planning appeals allowed for the applicants to be joined in the interests of justice. The central legal issue was the interpretation of section 88(2)(c) of the relevant legislation, which outlines the criteria for joining a party to an appeal. Specifically, the court needed to decide whether the statutory provisions create a presumption against joinder and, if not, what factors should be considered in determining whether joinder is appropriate.

In its decision, the court clarified that section 88(2)(c) does not presume against joinder for Category 1 or 2 developments; instead, it requires an applicant for joinder to demonstrate either a special interest in the subject matter of the appeal or that the interests of justice necessitate their inclusion. The court noted that the applicants need not satisfy both criteria but only one of them. The reasoning of the court was influenced by previous decisions, including Pitt v Environment, Resources and Development Court and OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority, which emphasised the importance of the genuine interest of the applicant and the potential impact of the proposed development on neighbouring properties. The court held that the applicants' interests were sufficiently significant and that their participation in the appeal would not unduly prolong the proceedings. Therefore, the court allowed the appeal and ordered that the applicants be joined as parties to the appeal.

The final orders of the court mandated that O'Neill and the other applicant be joined as parties to the existing planning appeal, thereby allowing them to participate in the proceedings and present their case regarding the proposed development's impact on their properties.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

DEBELLE J
The terms of s 88(2)(c) do not create a presumption against joinder in the case of developments that are Categories 1 or 2. Instead, they state that an applicant for joinder will not succeed if he fails to establish a special interest or fails to persuade the court that the interests of justice require that he be joined. In a particular case, it might be sufficient if he satisfies the court of only one of those factors.Prior Decisions Before s 88(2)(c) came into operation, two decisions of this court had considered the grounds on which it was appropriate to join a party to an appeal in the Environment Court. In Pitt v Environment, Resources and Development Court (1995) 66 SASR 274 the issue was considered by the Full Court. Doyle CJ held (at 276) that an applicant for joinder had to satisfy the court that he had a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the appeal and that in all the circumstances it was appropriate that he be joined. Duggan J, with whom Nyland J agreed, held (at 281) that the applicant had to have a genuine interest in the subject matter of the appeal. He added that such an interest would arise if an order could be made on the appeal that would prejudicially effect the interests of the applicant. It was held in that case that the proposed development had a potential to effect the amenity of the applicants to a significant degree and may well diminish the value of their neighbouring residential properties. The Full Court allowed the applicant’s appeal against an order refusing joinder. In OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (2005) 92 SASR 67 I followed and applied the decision in Pitt:20The reasoning of the Full Court in Pitt v Environment, Resources and Development Court provides some guidance to the criteria to be applied when considering whether to order joinder under s 17. In that case a group of residents in North Adelaide were opposing extensions to a hospital. The residents resided in close proximity to that hospital. The hospital had applied for development consent from the City of Adelaide to make the extensions. The City of Adelaide had received submissions from the residents which included reports of independent consultants. The Council refused to grant development consent. The hospital appealed to the Environment Court. The residents applied to be joined as parties to the appeal pursuant to s 17. The Environment Court refused to join them. That order was reversed by the Full Court on appeal. The Full Court held that the residents should be joined because of their genuine interest in the appeal, the fact that they would be prejudiced by the proposed development, the extent of their involvement in the development application, the nature of the issues they would raise on the appeal and the fact that it was unlikely that their participation would unduly prolong the appeal. In his reasons Doyle CJ made the following observations on the grounds for joinder:The power to make an order for joinder under s 17 involves making a judgment in the light of the facts of the case before the ERD Court. Important factors in any such case will be the nature and strength of the interest of the applicant for joinder in the decision under appeal, the contribution which the applicant for joinder is likely to be able to make to a proper resolution of the issues before the ERD Court and whether the interest which the applicant for joinder represents and the material to be advanced by that person will be adequately dealt with by the parties already before the ERD Court. It will also be appropriate for the ERD Court to consider the impact upon the proceedings of the joinder. The Court can and should consider the interests of the parties before it as of right and the public interest in the prompt and efficient dispatch of proceedings. In addition, of course, there will in each case be other factors particular to the case.In the present case the law applicable to the resolution of the substantive dispute is the City of Adelaide Development Control Act 1976 (SA). That Act gave the appellants before us no right of appeal and there was no power to join them as party to an appeal. An order for joinder in favour of the appellants necessarily has an effect on proceedings before the ERD Court. The interests represented in the proceedings are no longer confined to the applicant for planning approval and the planning authority. But that is the inevitable consequence of any order for joinder. The potential for such a change in the nature of the proceedings is a necessary consequence of the conferral of the power to join.In my opinion the impact of an order for joinder upon the proceedings is not a reason for taking a narrow view of the circumstances in which an order for joinder can be made. The test which an applicant for joinder must pass necessarily embraces both the establishment of a sufficient interest and the establishment of factors which make it appropriate to make an order for joinder in the particular case. On this approach, the making of an order for joinder does not mean that a legislative scheme conferring no third party rights for appeal has been converted into a scheme in which such rights are available. The true position is that a third party still cannot institute an appeal, and can be joined only if in the particular circumstances of the case there are factors making it appropriate to do so. Joinder will never be made as of course.In particular, in my opinion, it is not correct to reason that because an order for joinder permits an involvement in the proceedings which under the City of Adelaide Development Control Act was not permitted, a restrictive approach should be taken to the making of an order for joinder.I consider that his Honour did take an unduly restrictive approach to the scope of the power which he had. In my opinion his statement that the right to participate must “be limited to special circumstances”, and what he said in explanation of that approach, indicates too narrow an approach to the power. In my opinion his Honour appears to have placed too much emphasis upon the fact that the City of Adelaide Development Control Act did not provide for rights of appeal for third parties or for rights of joinder. It appears to me that his Honour envisaged joinder only in exceptional cases. For the reasons which I have indicated, that is not the correct approach. As I have already explained, it would be equally wrong to make an order for joinder simply on the basis of an interest which would give standing for judicial review or an interest which would pass the test for standing approved by the High Court in Australian Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth (1979) 146 CLR 493.Three aspects of those reasons require emphasis. The first is that an order for joinder should not be made simply on the basis of an interest sufficient to give standing for judicial review. Secondly, regard will be had to the nature and strength of the interest in the decision under appeal and to the contribution which the applicant for joinder is likely to make to a proper resolution of the issues. The third is a reflection of the second. It is whether the interest which the applicant for joinder represents and the material to be advanced by that person will be adequately dealt with by the persons already before the court. It is not enough for the party seeking to be joined to say it is able to call evidence. It must be demonstrated that the evidence is the kind of evidence which cannot be adduced by the parties already before the court and that the evidence is relevant to the issues before the court. At the same time, the court should not take an unduly restrictive approach to the question of joinder. The issue should not be approached in a rigid or inflexible manner. It is necessary to note some other factors which bear on the question whether a person should be joined.I later emphasised at [25] that regard will be had to the interests of justice and the due administration of justice and at [27] that regard must be had to the statutory scheme and the manner in which the appeal came to the Environment Court. In the result, it was the statutory scheme in that case as well as the fact that OneSteel held a licence that caused me to uphold the appeal against an order joining an interest group as a party to the appeal in the Environment Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DEBELLE J

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