SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeal to a Single Judge)
LAURO v MINTER ELLISON (A FIRM)
[2024] SASC 48
Judgment of the Honourable Justice McDonald
4 April 2024
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENT - APPEAL, REVIEW OR REFERENCE - OTHER MATTERS
COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS - REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS GENERALLY
This is an appeal concerning the dismissal of an application by a Supreme Court Master to recuse himself from the further hearing of a taxation of costs dispute, on the grounds of apprehended bias.
On 17 June 2022, the appellant filed an originating application for the taxation of costs. The appellant made two applications for the Master to recuse himself. Each application was refused.
Held: Allowing the appeal but dismissing the appellant’s application for costs:
1. The Master be recused from presiding over the application for taxation of costs.
Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342; Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 26 NSWLR 411; Harradine v Chief Executive of the Department for Education [2021] SASCA 139; Contract Mining Services Pty Ltd v Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd [2020] SASC 69; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 419, applied.
Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) (Supreme Court of South Australia, Judge Bochner, 18 October 2022); Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) (Supreme Court of South Australia, Judge Dart, 7 February 2023); Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) (No 2) (Supreme Court of South Australia, Judge Dart, 30 March 2023); Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427; Kumaragamage v Rallis (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 710; Girgis v Oueik [2018] NSWCA 314, discussed.
LAURO v MINTER ELLISON (A FIRM)
[2024] SASC 48
Appeal to a Single Judge
McDONALD J.
On 17 June 2022, the appellant[1] filed an originating application for the taxation of costs. The matter was initially listed before Judge Bochner who, on the application of the appellant, recused herself from dealing with the action on the basis of apprehended bias. The matter was then listed before Judge Dart. The appellant made two applications for Judge Dart to recuse himself. Each application was refused. Those are the decisions that the appellant challenges.
[1] Mr Lauro has been appointed as his father’s litigation guardian. Mr Lauro senior is elderly and infirm and has been so for a number of years. Over that time, Mr Lauro has acted for his father in various proceedings. To avoid confusion, and for ease of reference, I will refer to Mr Lauro and his father collectively as “the appellant” unless it is necessary to differentiate between them.
The background to the application for recusal
Between about May 2011 and early 2013, Minter Ellison represented the appellant in a number…
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- Case
- [2024] SASC 48
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to consider the principles of judicial impartiality and the reasonable apprehension of bias. The appellant argued that Judge Dart should have recused himself because he had previously been involved in litigation between the appellant and a third party, Marble House. The appellant also claimed that Judge Dart had made adverse findings against him in an earlier appeal. The court examined whether these past interactions created a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a reasonable observer. The appellant further argued that Judge Dart’s refusal to recuse himself demonstrated a lack of impartiality. The court needed to determine whether the appellant's concerns were justified and whether the refusal to recuse was an error of law.
The court held that Judge Dart's decision to not recuse himself was not in error. The court found that there was no sufficient basis to conclude that Judge Dart had a bias or that a reasonable observer might apprehend bias. The court emphasised that the mere fact that a judge had previous dealings with a party does not automatically lead to a finding of bias. The court concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated a real possibility of bias that would undermine the fairness of the proceedings. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld Judge Dart's decision.
The court's final order was that the appeal against the refusals to recuse Judge Dart be dismissed. The court further ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
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