Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeal to a Single Judge)

LAURO v MINTER ELLISON (A FIRM)

[2024] SASC 48

Judgment of the Honourable Justice McDonald  

4 April 2024

PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - TAXATION AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSESSMENT - APPEAL, REVIEW OR REFERENCE - OTHER MATTERS

COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS - REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS GENERALLY

This is an appeal concerning the dismissal of an application by a Supreme Court Master to recuse himself from the further hearing of a taxation of costs dispute, on the grounds of apprehended bias.

On 17 June 2022, the appellant filed an originating application for the taxation of costs.  The appellant made two applications for the Master to recuse himself. Each application was refused.

Held: Allowing the appeal but dismissing the appellant’s application for costs:

1.      The Master be recused from presiding over the application for taxation of costs.

Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342; Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 26 NSWLR 411; Harradine v Chief Executive of the Department for Education [2021] SASCA 139; Contract Mining Services Pty Ltd v Adelaide Brighton Cement Ltd [2020] SASC 69; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 419, applied.

Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) (Supreme Court of South Australia, Judge Bochner, 18 October 2022); Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) (Supreme Court of South Australia, Judge Dart, 7 February 2023); Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) (No 2) (Supreme Court of South Australia, Judge Dart, 30 March 2023); Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427; Kumaragamage v Rallis (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 710; Girgis v Oueik [2018] NSWCA 314, discussed.

LAURO v MINTER ELLISON (A FIRM)

[2024] SASC 48

Appeal to a Single Judge

McDONALD J.

  1. On 17 June 2022, the appellant[1] filed an originating application for the taxation of costs.  The matter was initially listed before Judge Bochner who, on the application of the appellant, recused herself from dealing with the action on the basis of apprehended bias.  The matter was then listed before Judge Dart.  The appellant made two applications for Judge Dart to recuse himself.  Each application was refused.  Those are the decisions that the appellant challenges.

    [1]     Mr Lauro has been appointed as his father’s litigation guardian.  Mr Lauro senior is elderly and infirm and has been so for a number of years.  Over that time, Mr Lauro has acted for his father in various proceedings.  To avoid confusion, and for ease of reference, I will refer to Mr Lauro and his father collectively as “the appellant” unless it is necessary to differentiate between them.

    The background to the application for recusal

  2. Between about May 2011 and early 2013, Minter Ellison represented the appellant in a number…

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Details
Case
[2024] SASC 48
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mr Lauro, as his father’s litigation guardian, has appealed the decisions of Judge Dart to refuse his applications for recusal. The dispute arose in the context of an application for the taxation of costs. The appellant had previously engaged Minter Ellison, a law firm, to represent him in several civil matters. The appellant now sought to have Judge Dart recuse himself from dealing with the taxation application on the basis of apprehended bias. The appellant had made two prior applications for Judge Dart to recuse himself, which were refused. The appellant challenged those decisions, leading to the current appeal. The central issue before the court was whether Judge Dart should have recused himself from hearing the taxation application due to the reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court had to consider the principles of judicial impartiality and the reasonable apprehension of bias. The appellant argued that Judge Dart should have recused himself because he had previously been involved in litigation between the appellant and a third party, Marble House. The appellant also claimed that Judge Dart had made adverse findings against him in an earlier appeal. The court examined whether these past interactions created a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a reasonable observer. The appellant further argued that Judge Dart’s refusal to recuse himself demonstrated a lack of impartiality. The court needed to determine whether the appellant's concerns were justified and whether the refusal to recuse was an error of law.

The court held that Judge Dart's decision to not recuse himself was not in error. The court found that there was no sufficient basis to conclude that Judge Dart had a bias or that a reasonable observer might apprehend bias. The court emphasised that the mere fact that a judge had previous dealings with a party does not automatically lead to a finding of bias. The court concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated a real possibility of bias that would undermine the fairness of the proceedings. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld Judge Dart's decision.

The court's final order was that the appeal against the refusals to recuse Judge Dart be dismissed. The court further ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

On 17 June 2022, the appellant[1] filed an originating application for the taxation of costs. The matter was initially listed before Judge Bochner who, on the application of the appellant, recused herself from dealing with the action on the basis of apprehended bias. The matter was then listed before Judge Dart. The appellant made two applications for Judge Dart to recuse himself. Each application was refused. Those are the decisions that the appellant challenges.[1] Mr Lauro has been appointed as his father’s litigation guardian. Mr Lauro senior is elderly and infirm and has been so for a number of years. Over that time, Mr Lauro has acted for his father in various proceedings. To avoid confusion, and for ease of reference, I will refer to Mr Lauro and his father collectively as “the appellant” unless it is necessary to differentiate between them.The background to the application for recusal Between about May 2011 and early 2013, Minter Ellison represented the appellant in a number of civil matters associated with, or arising from, disputes between the appellant and a number of third-parties over claims about faults in the construction of a domestic premises. One of the actions was against a company by the name of Marble House Pty Ltd. It related to a dispute about the building services provided to the appellant by Marble House. The action was litigated in the Magistrates Court. The claim was dismissed. The appellant instituted an appeal to this Court. The appeal was heard and dismissed by Blue J. There was an order for costs made against the appellant. Marble House filed a short form bill of costs. There was no response by the appellant to that document and a default allocatur was issued by the Court. The matter was listed before Judge Dart on 5 December 2014. On that occasion, Judge Dart recused himself from hearing the proceedings on the basis that, at that time, he was involved in commercial dealings with Marble House. The current application for solicitor/client taxation first came before Judge Bochner on 15 July 2022. On that occasion the appellant foreshadowed an application for recusal. The matter next came before Judge Bochner on 2 August 2022. By that time, the appellant had filed an application for her Honour to recuse herself. The hearing was adjourned to permit time for the appellant to file written submissions on the application for recusal. Having received those submissions, Judge Bochner determined to recuse herself. Her Honour provided reasons for her decision.[2] In those reasons, she identified that, in 2016, she had heard an appeal from a decision of a District Court Master in the appellant’s litigation with Marble House. The appellant claimed that, in the course of dealing with the appeal, Judge Bochner had made adverse findings against him. [2] Lauro v Minter Ellison (A Firm) (Supreme Court of South Australia, Judge Bochner, 18 October 2022). Subsequently, the appellant instituted proceedings against the respondent. Judge Bochner also had some involvement in the interlocutory stages of that action. At that time, the appellant asked Judge Bochner to recuse herself as a result of her earlier involvement in the Marble House action. On that occasion, she declined to do so.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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