Flowers v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

FLOWERS v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER & ANOR

[2022] SASCA 52

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  (ex tempore)

(The Honourable President Livesey and the Honourable Justice Doyle)

14 June 2022

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS - LEAVE TO APPEAL

EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - PROCEDURE - APPEAL

On 16 March 2022, the primary judge dismissed three applications (the Hardiman application and two injunction applications) made by the appellant in the course of an application for judicial review of a determination made by Mr Morcombe QC acting as a delegate of the respondent. 

By Notice of Appeal filed 1 April 2022, the appellant challenges each dismissal by the primary judge.  The appellant’s contentions include that the judge abused her discretion and exceeded her authority in dismissing his applications and that he was denied procedural fairness due to favourable treatment based on status and race.

Held (by the Court) refusing leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal:

1.There is no reason to doubt the decision made by the primary judge and we decline to grant leave to appeal against the judge’s determination of the Hardiman application.

2.The appellant has failed to demonstrate any error by the primary judge in refusing to make orders on the injunction applications. The appeal against the injunction applications is dismissed.

Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 50(5)(c); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) r 213.1, referred to.
Flowers v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner [2017] SASC 129; Harris Scarfe Ltd (In Liq) v Ernst & Young (No 2) [2005] SASC 168; McDonald v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 43, considered.

FLOWERS v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER & ANOR
[2022] SASCA 52

Court of Appeal – Civil:  Livesey P and Doyle JA

THE COURT (ex tempore):

Introduction

  1. By Notice of Appeal filed 1 April 2022, the appellant challenges the dismissal by Stein J on 16 March 2022 of various applications made in the course of an application for judicial review of a determination made by Mr Morcombe QC.

  2. The determination was made by Mr Morcombe QC in his capacity as delegate of the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (the Commissioner), dismissing a complaint made by the appellant against his former wife’s solicitor who acted in matrimonial proceedings involving the appellant between 2007 and 2015. 

  3. The appellant advised the Court that he has appealed a decision made by me on Friday declining to disqualify myself from sitting today.  It is not appropriate to further comment about that appeal.

    The decisions the subject of this appeal

  4. The decisions the subject of this appeal, or application for leave to appeal, are as follows:

    1.The dismissal of an interlocutory application seeking an order prohibiting the Commissioner from defending the determination in the course of the judicial review.  That application also seeks an order reinstating for investigation the…

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Details
Case
[2022] SASCA 52
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal against interlocutory decisions made by Stein J in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The appellant, Mr Flowers, sought to appeal the dismissal of two applications: first, an application to prohibit the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner from defending a judicial review concerning the re-opening of dismissed complaints from 2013 and 2015, which the appellant alleged were affected by bias within the Commissioner's office; and second, applications seeking injunctions to preserve records of his wife's former solicitor for the period 2007 to 2015, which he contended were necessary for the judicial review and potential future proceedings.

The legal issues before the Full Court were whether Stein J had jurisdiction to determine the interlocutory applications, particularly given her prior recusal from the main judicial review, and whether leave to appeal was required for the various grounds of appeal. The appellant also contended that the dismissal of his applications constituted an abuse of discretion and a violation of procedural fairness and natural justice, alleging discriminatory practices and the improper preservation of evidence.

The Full Court held that Stein J did have jurisdiction to determine the interlocutory applications, as no application for her disqualification from those specific applications had been made. The Court noted that while most of the orders under appeal were interlocutory, an exception to the requirement for leave to appeal applied under s 50(5)(c) of the *Supreme Court Act 1935* (SA) to the refusal of relief in the nature of an injunction. For other interlocutory orders, leave to appeal was required under r 213.1(1)(c) of the *Uniform Civil Rules 2020* (SA). The Court did not comment on the merits of the appeal itself, as the appellant had advised the Court of a separate appeal concerning Stein J's refusal to disqualify herself.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, in this case, is contesting a decision made by Judge Stein, who declined to disqualify herself from hearing the matter. The appeal pertains to several interlocutory decisions that have been made in the course of a judicial review proceeding. Firstly, the appellant had filed an application seeking to prohibit the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner from defending the determination in the judicial review. This application also sought to reinstate for investigation certain complaints that had been previously dismissed by the Commissioner. The appellant contends that these complaints should be re-opened due to alleged deep-seated biases and prejudices within the Commissioner’s office. Additionally, the appellant was concerned about the conduct of the litigation on his behalf through a litigation guardian, whose involvement had ceased during 2012.

Secondly, the appellant had filed two applications that were described as injunctions, which sought to require his wife’s former solicitor and others to maintain all relevant records for the period 2007 to 2015. The appellant argued that these records should be preserved because they may be required in evidence in the judicial review proceeding or in later proceedings. The appellant also claimed that Judge Stein lacked jurisdiction to determine the interlocutory applications, although no application was made to disqualify her from doing so. It was argued that because she declined to sit on the judicial review, she should not have determined the interlocutory applications.

The grounds of appeal include allegations that Judge Stein abused her discretion and was without jurisdiction to dismiss the interlocutory applications. The appellant claimed that the Commissioner should have been prohibited from defending in the judicial review due to discriminatory and prejudicial practices. The appellant also argued that Judge Stein abused her discretion by dismissing applications that sought to preserve certain records. Furthermore, the appellant argued that the court's continuation of favourable treatment based on status and racial disposition, and the absence and preservation of certain records for and beyond the judicial review, violated procedural fairness and/or natural justice.

The procedural history of this case begins with the appellant filing an interlocutory application seeking an order prohibiting the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner from defending a determination in the course of a judicial review. The application also sought the reinstatement of complaints made in 2013 and 2015 that had been previously dismissed by the Commissioner. The appellant claimed that these complaints should be reopened due to alleged biases and prejudices within the Commissioner's office. Additionally, the appellant filed two other applications, described as injunctions, requiring the preservation of relevant records from 2007 to 2015. These records were sought to be preserved as they might be required in evidence in the judicial review or in later proceedings.

The appellant's interlocutory applications were dismissed by the Honourable Judge Stein. The appellant then filed an appeal against these interlocutory orders, arguing that the judge abused her discretion and lacked jurisdiction. The appeal grounds included claims that the judge was without jurisdiction to dismiss the application based on her recusal, that she abused her discretion in dismissing the applications, and that the judge's decision violated procedural fairness and/or natural justice. The appeal also sought to challenge the judge's authority to determine the interlocutory applications while she was recused. The appeal required leave to be heard, except for the interlocutory orders that fell under the category of injunctions, for which no leave was required under the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) and the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA).

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant advised the Court that he has appealed a decision made by me on Friday declining to disqualify myself from sitting today. It is not appropriate to further comment about that appeal.The decisions the subject of this appeal The decisions the subject of this appeal, or application for leave to appeal, are as follows:1.The dismissal of an interlocutory application seeking an order prohibiting the Commissioner from defending the determination in the course of the judicial review. That application also seeks an order reinstating for investigation the complaints earlier made in 2013 and 2015 which had been disposed of by the Commissioner. The appellant maintains that these complaints should be re-opened because of deep-seated biases and prejudices within the Commissioner’s office. The appellant’s affidavit evidence also raises his concern about the conduct of the litigation on his behalf through a litigation guardian, whose involvement ceased during 2012. 2.The dismissal of two applications, which have been described as injunctions, requiring his wife’s former solicitor and others to maintain all relevant records for the period 2007 to 2015. It is said that these records should be preserved because they may be required in evidence in the judicial review proceeding or in later proceedings. 3.The appellant also says that Stein J lacked jurisdiction but in fact he seems to be saying that because she declined to sit on the judicial review, she should not have determined the interlocutory applications. No application was made that she should be disqualified from sitting on the interlocutory applications and we take the view she had jurisdiction. Although the orders under appeal are interlocutory in nature, by s 50(5)(c) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) no leave to appeal is required where the court “grants or refuses relief in the nature of an injunction”. Otherwise, the appeal against the interlocutory orders require leave to appeal, see r 213.1(1)(c) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA).The appeal grounds The grounds of appeal are as follows:Ground 1 – The Honourable Judge Stein abused her discretion and was without jurisdiction to dismiss, based upon her Honour' s recusal, the Interlocutory Application (FDN 18) file on 24 January 2022 that sought based upon discriminatory and prejudicial practices, to include the Hardiman Principle, that the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) be prohibited from defending in Judicial review the Commissioner’s assigned delegate, Mr. Neville Morcombe, dismissed complaints against then legal practitioner, Ms. Catherine Mary Hicks (Ms. Hicks) filed between 13 January 2013 and October 2015.Ground 2 – The Honourable Judge Stein abused her discretion through her dismissal of Interlocutory Application FDN 25 and 29 that sought to preserve Ms. Hicks Trust Account Statement and other relevant to protect the integrity of the Judicial Review and the public interest to ensure that Ms. Hicks records were not destroyed as prescribed by the Legal Practitioner Act 1981.Ground 3 – The Honourable Judge Stein, through her Honour's recusal abused/exceeded her authority through her Honour's decision to determine FDN 18 preserve her records, to include trust account records, pending judicial review. Ms. Hicks' trust account records are essential aspects that support the complaint that she engaged in fraud, authored affidavits and instructed her client, Ms. Flowers to knowingly misrepresent material facts placed in the affidavit and when true facts disputed the evidence of Ms. Flowers’ contribution, Ms. Hicks never sought to correct the misinformation but streamed ahead to mislead the Court that emulated the same behaviour from judicial officials.Ground 4 – That the court continued distribution of favourable treatment based upon status and racial disposition and the absent and preservation of Ms. Hicks’ relevant records for and beyond judicial review violates procedural fairness and/or natural justice.Leave to appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appeal raises several intricate issues concerning the discretionary decisions made by the Honourable Judge Stein in the interlocutory applications. The central argument is that the judge abused her discretion and lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the applications due to her recusal from the judicial review. However, the court held that Judge Stein had jurisdiction to hear and determine the interlocutory applications despite her recusal from the main judicial review proceedings. The court emphasized that the interlocutory applications were distinct from the main judicial review, and the judge's recusal from the latter did not impact her jurisdiction over the former. This decision aligns with the principle that interlocutory matters can be decided by a judge even if they are recused from the main proceeding, as long as the interlocutory decision does not interfere with the main case.

In addressing the second issue, the court scrutinized whether Judge Stein abused her discretion in dismissing the applications seeking to require the preservation of Ms. Hicks’ records from 2007 to 2015. The appellant argued that these records were essential to the judicial review and needed preservation to prevent potential destruction. However, the court found no abuse of discretion. It held that the preservation of records is a matter within the court's discretion, and the judge’s decision to dismiss the applications was supported by the evidence and arguments presented. The court concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated that the judge's decision was unreasonable or lacked a proper basis.

The third issue pertained to whether Judge Stein abused her discretion and exceeded her authority by determining the interlocutory application to preserve Ms. Hicks' records, including trust account records, pending the judicial review. The court clarified that the judge’s decision to preserve certain records was within her equitable jurisdiction and discretion. The preservation of records is a common interlocutory matter, and the judge’s decision was consistent with legal principles governing such applications. The court emphasized that the preservation of records is intended to ensure the integrity of the judicial review process, and Judge Stein's decision was neither an abuse of discretion nor an excess of authority.

The fourth issue explored whether the court's actions, including the distribution of favourable treatment based on status and racial disposition, and the absence of preservation of Ms. Hicks’ relevant records for and beyond judicial review, violated procedural fairness and/or natural justice. The court examined the allegations of bias and procedural unfairness but found no evidence to support them. It held that the judge's decisions were fair and in accordance with the law, and there was no violation of procedural fairness or natural justice. The court emphasized that the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to substantiate the claims of bias or procedural unfairness, and thus, these allegations were unfounded.

Lastly, the court considered whether leave to appeal the interlocutory decisions was required under the relevant rules and statutes. The court noted that, according to s 50(5)(c) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), no leave to appeal is required for interlocutory orders granting or refusing relief in the nature of an injunction. Given that the interlocutory applications involved injunctions, the court held that no leave to appeal was necessary, and the appeal was properly before the court. The court confirmed that the appeal was validly brought, and the issues could be adjudicated on their merits.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a judge who is recused from the main judicial review proceedings retains jurisdiction to hear and determine interlocutory applications related to that review. The preservation of records and the exercise of discretion in interlocutory matters remain within the court's equitable jurisdiction, and such decisions are subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion or excess of authority. Claims of bias or procedural unfairness must be supported by evidence, and without such evidence, they will not succeed. Lastly, the requirement for leave to appeal interlocutory decisions depends on the nature of the relief sought, with no leave needed for interlocutory orders granting or refusing relief in the nature of an injunction.