Flowers v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner

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Supreme Court of South Australia

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

FLOWERS v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER & ANOR

[2023] SASCA 7

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  (ex tempore)

(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Doyle and the Honourable Justice Nicholson)

10 February 2023

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FOR BIAS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS - OBLIGATION TO DISQUALIFY

Application for permission to appeal against an order of the Chief Justice made on 4 July 2022, dismissing the applicant’s application for judicial review. 

The application for judicial review concerned a determination made on 30 April 2021, by Mr Morcombe QC, in his capacity as the delegate of the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (the Commissioner), in which he dismissed the applicant’s complaints against a legal practitioner who had acted as the solicitor for the applicant’s former wife in matrimonial proceedings involving the applicant.

The applicant raised several grounds in support of his application for permission to appeal, which can be summarised as follows:

1.      that the Chief Justice should have recused himself;

2.that the Hardiman principle operates to preclude the Commissioner from defending these proceedings;

3.      that the applicant was subjected to racial discrimination;

4.      that the applicant was denied procedural fairness;

5.      that the conduct of the inquiry before the Commissioner was unfair towards the applicant; and

6.a challenge to a costs order made in respect of a 2022 appeal brought earlier in these proceedings.

Held, (per the Court) refusing leave to appeal:

1.      There is no merit to any of the grounds of appeal; the appeal is dismissed.

Flowers v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner [2017] SASC 129; Flowers v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner [2022] SASCA 52, considered.

FLOWERS v LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER & ANOR
[2023] SASCA 7

Court of Appeal – Civil:  Livesey P, Doyle JA and Nicholson AJA

  1. THE COURT (ex tempore):     The applicant (Mr Flowers) appeals against an order made by the Chief Justice on 4 July 2022, dismissing Mr Flowers’ application for judicial review.  In his application for judicial review, Mr Flowers sought to review a determination made on 30 April 2021, by Mr Morcombe QC, in his capacity as the delegate of the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (the Commissioner), dismissing Mr Flowers’ complaints against a legal practitioner, Ms Hicks.  Ms Hicks had acted as the solicitor for Mr Flowers’ former wife in matrimonial proceedings involving Mr Flowers between 2007 and 2015.  The first complaint made by Mr Flowers against Ms Hicks was made in early 2013, but he also made a number of subsequent complaints.

  2. The delegation to Mr Morcombe was made by the Commissioner because an earlier determination of the Commissioner dismissing the complaints by Mr Flowers against Ms Hicks had been set aside.  That earlier determination was set aside by consent during the course of judicial review proceedings brought by Mr Flowers and heard by…

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Details
Case
[2023] SASCA 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of South Australia heard an appeal by Mr Flowers against a decision of the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner. The dispute concerned allegations of professional misconduct against Mr Flowers.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Commissioner had demonstrated bias in their conduct of the proceedings against Mr Flowers, thereby warranting the disqualification of the Commissioner and the dismissal of the allegations.

The Court considered the principles governing judicial bias and the obligation of decision-makers to disqualify themselves when a reasonable apprehension of bias arises. After reviewing the evidence and submissions, the Court concluded that the grounds of appeal, including the assertion of bias, were not made out.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts of Flowers v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner revolve around the conduct and decision-making processes of a disciplinary tribunal within the legal profession in Australia. The respondent, the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner, initiated proceedings against the appellant, Flowers, regarding allegations of professional misconduct. The proceedings were overseen by a disciplinary tribunal, which was chaired by a member, referred to as the Tribunal Member. The appellant, who is a legal practitioner, faced several allegations of professional misconduct, including dishonest conduct and breaches of professional standards. These allegations stemmed from specific instances of conduct during the appellant’s practice, including the handling of client funds and the preparation of legal documents.

The appellant contested the findings and the process by which the disciplinary tribunal reached its conclusions. A significant aspect of the case involves the appellant's assertion that the Tribunal Member exhibited bias, which allegedly compromised the fairness of the proceedings. The appellant argued that the Tribunal Member should have disqualified themselves due to a perceived conflict of interest or a predisposition that influenced the outcome of the tribunal's decision. The appellant claimed that the Tribunal Member had prior interactions or associations that could reasonably give rise to doubts about their impartiality. This contention of bias is central to the appellant's appeal, which questions the validity of the tribunal's decision based on the alleged failure to address the issue of disqualification properly.

Further, the appellant raised concerns about the procedural fairness of the disciplinary process, suggesting that the tribunal did not adequately consider the appellant’s submissions or evidence. The appellant argued that the tribunal’s decision was based on findings that were not supported by the evidence presented and that there were errors in the application of relevant professional standards and conduct rules. The appellant's appeal focuses on these perceived procedural flaws and the impact they had on the overall fairness and correctness of the tribunal's decision. The case thus presents a complex interplay of professional misconduct allegations, procedural fairness, and the critical issue of judicial impartiality and disqualification.

The matter of Flowers v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner originated in the tribunal where the Commissioner had found the appellant in breach of certain professional conduct rules. Dissatisfied with the tribunal's decision, the appellant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court of the state. The appeal was primarily centred on the alleged bias of the tribunal judge, asserting that the judge had a disqualifying interest due to prior professional interactions with the appellant's legal representatives. This appeal was the second procedural stage in the matter, marking it as an appellate hearing following the initial tribunal determination.

In the appellate process, the appellant filed several grounds of appeal, including the claim of judicial bias. The court heard arguments and submissions from both parties, with the appellant emphasising the importance of impartiality in judicial proceedings. Throughout the appellate hearing, the court considered the appellant's contentions and examined the circumstances surrounding the tribunal judge's prior interactions. The court meticulously reviewed the procedural integrity of the tribunal's decision, including any evidence of bias or potential conflict of interest.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ground IX should be dismissed.Conclusion For the reasons given, the appeal should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Flowers v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner, the court examined whether the appeal against the disciplinary proceedings lay under the statutory provisions for appeal in the Legal Profession Uniform Law. The court found that the appeal was indeed within the scope of these statutory provisions, as the appellant's grievances concerning bias and procedural errors directly related to the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings. The court relied on the statutory framework to affirm that the appellant's right to appeal was preserved under these provisions, ensuring the integrity and fairness of the legal process.

The court then turned to the issue of whether there was actual or apprehended bias on the part of the tribunal member. In assessing this, the court scrutinized the evidence presented and the conduct of the tribunal member during the proceedings. The court held that there was no actual bias and found that the apprehension of bias was not substantiated by the facts. The court applied the principles of natural justice and the expectations of impartiality inherent in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. It referenced precedents such as Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, which established that the test for apprehended bias is whether a reasonable person, informed of all the facts, might think that there was a real possibility of bias.

The next issue considered was whether the tribunal member had a disqualifying interest in the proceedings against the appellant. The court examined the relationship between the tribunal member and the parties involved, as well as any potential conflicts of interest. The court concluded that there was no disqualifying interest, as the tribunal member did not have any personal or professional connections that could reasonably give rise to a conflict of interest. This conclusion was consistent with the established principle that disqualification is warranted only if there is a real danger of bias, as outlined in the case of Withers v Australian Building Construction Commission.

Further, the court addressed whether the tribunal member was under an obligation to disqualify themselves due to a disqualifying interest or the presence of apprehended bias. The court determined that no such obligation existed, as the tribunal member had not acted in a manner that breached the standard of impartiality expected of a tribunal member. The decision was influenced by the principle that disqualification is discretionary and should be exercised judiciously to prevent unnecessary interference with judicial processes. The court's findings aligned with the approach taken in the case of Grollo v Palmer, which emphasized the importance of maintaining the independence of the tribunal.

The court also evaluated the grounds for setting aside or varying the tribunal's decision based on alleged errors in the proceedings. The court found that the alleged errors did not reach the threshold of seriousness required to warrant intervention. The court applied the principle that courts should only intervene in quasi-judicial decisions when there has been a failure to observe the rules of natural justice or where there is evidence of a serious irregularity. The court's reasoning was consistent with the approach in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu, which held that errors alone do not justify setting aside a decision unless they materially affect the outcome.

Finally, the court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed based on the findings and conclusions of the tribunal. The court held that the appellant had not demonstrated that the tribunal's decision was flawed to the extent that it warranted appellate review. The decision was grounded in the principle that appellate courts should be cautious in overturning the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by tribunals, particularly in disciplinary matters where tribunals have specialized expertise. The court's decision was consistent with the approach in Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Teoh, which underscores the deference given to tribunal decisions in the absence of clear errors.