Linke v Development Assessment Commission & South Australian Housing Trust

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Land and Valuation Division: Application for Judicial Review)

LINKE v DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION & SOUTH AUSTRALIAN HOUSING TRUST

[2008] SASC 121

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Bleby

2 May 2008

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - CONSENTS, APPROVALS AND PERMITS - VALIDITY

Provisional Development Plan consent granted to the second defendant to demolish existing buildings on, and to develop, land for low cost multiple housing units – land adjacent to land owned by the plaintiff – application for judicial review to quash consent – whether relevant authority took irrelevant matters into consideration – validity and effect of land management agreement relating to car parking on the land – whether properly taken into account by relevant authority – whether compliance with principles and objection of Development Plan relating to car parking – validity of consent upheld.

Application for extension of time to bring judicial review proceedings – significant delay – reasons inadequate – prejudice to defendant – extension refused.

Development Act 1993 (SA) ss 33, 34, 38, 57, 57A, 84, 85; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) 13, 14A; Consumer Transactions Act 1972 (SA); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 r 200, referred to.
Town of Gawler v Impact Investment Corporation Pty Ltd (2007) 99 SASR 115, [2007] SASC 356; Hall & Ors v City of Burnside & Ors (2006) 245 LSJS 440, [2006] SASC 283; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, applied.
Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110, discussed.
McKenzie Constructions Pty Ltd v Development Assessment Commission (1999) 74 SASR 539, [1999] SASC 386, considered.

LINKE v DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION & SOUTH AUSTRALIAN HOUSING TRUST
[2008] SASC 121

Land and Valuation Division

BLEBY J.

Introduction

  1. On 27 September 2007 the Adelaide City Council issued a final development approval under the Development Act 1993 (SA) (“the Act”) for the second defendant, South Australian Housing Trust (“SAHT”), to construct 16 two-storey townhouse-style apartments on land situated at 26-34 Logan Street, Adelaide (“the subject land”). In doing so, it was acting pursuant to s 34(2) of the Act. The assessment of the development in respect of the Building Rules had been referred to the Council by the first defendant, the Development Assessment Commission (“DAC”), which was the relevant authority in relation to the proposed development. Under that action the Council was authorised to determine whether the development should be granted final approval.

  2. The DAC had granted provisional Development Plan consent for the development on 14 December 2006.

  3. The plaintiff, Mr Linke, is the owner of warehouse premises in Logan Street on land adjacent to the subject land, and immediately north of it.  He had opposed the application for provisional Development Plan consent.  On 19 October 2007, by a summons issued in this Court, he applied for orders for judicial review in the nature of certiorari to set aside the provisional Development Plan consent and, as a consequence, the final development approval.

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Details
Case
[2008] SASC 121
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Linke v Development Assessment Commission & South Australian Housing Trust involved a dispute over the validity of a provisional Development Plan consent granted to the South Australian Housing Trust to demolish existing buildings on a plot of land and develop it for low-cost multiple housing units. The plaintiff, Mr. Linke, who owned adjacent property, sought to quash the consent on the grounds that the decision-making authority took irrelevant matters into consideration and did not properly account for the validity of a land management agreement concerning car parking on the land. Additionally, Mr. Linke argued that the consent did not comply with the principles and objections of the Development Plan regarding car parking.

The court was required to determine whether the Development Assessment Commission, in granting the consent, had considered relevant and irrelevant matters and whether it had properly assessed the impact of the land management agreement on car parking. The court also had to consider if the consent complied with the principles and objections of the Development Plan concerning car parking. Furthermore, the court addressed the plaintiff’s application for an extension of time to bring the judicial review proceedings due to a significant delay and inadequate reasons provided.

The court found that the consent was valid as the decision-making authority had not taken irrelevant matters into account and had properly considered the land management agreement and car parking requirements. The court held that the consent complied with the Development Plan’s principles and objections. Consequently, the plaintiff’s application for judicial review was dismissed. Additionally, the court refused the application for an extension of time, finding that the delay was significant, the reasons provided were inadequate, and the defendant would be prejudiced if the extension was granted.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 19 December 2007, I dismissed the application for reasons to be published. These are those reasons.The relevant background As Mr Linke’s challenge turns on the validity of the provisional Development Plan consent granted by the DAC on 14 December 2006, and as these proceedings were not commenced until 19 October 2007, Mr Linke also seeks an order extending the time within which to make the application. That is because r 200(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 requires that the action must be commenced “as soon as practicable after the date when the grounds for the review arose and, in any event, within six months after that date”. It is therefore necessary to review the history of the application for development approval, and Mr Linke’s involvement in it, as well as relevant elements of that approval. Mr Linke was born, was educated and resided in Adelaide for a substantial portion of his life. After then living for about four years in Sydney, he has spent the past 30 years living overseas. He has, however, continued to own investment properties in Adelaide and visits Adelaide several times a year. He remains an Australian citizen. He purchased the property in Logan Street in March 2001. The premises have been leased. A portion of the property is used as a mechanical repair business and the southern portion, immediately north of the subject land, was leased as a furniture storage warehouse. At the time of the hearing this southern portion was vacant. Until 2006 Mr Linke was unaware of certain encroachments of his building on the subject land which are mentioned below. The subject land at that time had also been used principally as a warehouse. Two portions of the boundary between Mr Linke’s land and the subject land comprised party walls. Other portions of the boundary did not. Those portions comprised a corrugated iron panel and some barred windows on a timber frame. The roof of Mr Linke’s building relied for support on steel columns erected on the subject land against the northern boundary. They therefore encroached onto the subject land. The boundary ran generally in an east-west direction, but one of the party walls included a rectangular protrusion of the boundary of approximately two metres for a distance of about 4.5 metres into Mr Linke’s land. This protrusion comprised an ablutions block being part of the subject land. The roof of Mr Linke’s warehouse encroached over this area and that portion was supported by steel columns against the southern wall of the ablutions block and in line with the other roof supporting columns. Mr Linke first became aware of a proposal by SAHT to develop the subject land in February 2006 when he saw a letter advising of a proposal to demolish the warehouse on the subject land. The letter pointed out the nature of the encroachment and invited discussions about resolving the problem. There had, in fact, been lodged with the DAC, two development applications on behalf of SAHT. One concerned the demolition of the existing warehouse and other buildings on the subject land. The other proposed two three-storey residential flat buildings, being one of a number of affordable housing initiatives in the city of Adelaide sponsored and supported by the State Government’s Affordable Housing Innovation Unit, SAHT, the Adelaide Bank Charitable Foundation, the Corporation of the City of Adelaide, and the Multi-Agency Community Housing Association (“MACHA”). MACHA is an association which assists low-income and welfare-dependent persons to obtain adequate and affordable accommodation. In documents supporting the application, it was said that the units’ occupants would consist primarily of individuals, adult sharers or small two to three person households. They would not be occupied by “traditional” families. After development by SAHT the land was to be transferred to MACHA.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BLEBY J
Issues
1. Whether the relevant authority took irrelevant matters into consideration in granting the provisional Development Plan consent.
2. Whether the validity and effect of the land management agreement relating to car parking on the land was properly taken into account by the relevant authority.
3. Whether the consent granted complies with the principles and objections of the Development Plan relating to car parking.
4. Whether the validity of the consent granted by the Development Assessment Commission (DAC) is upheld.
5. Whether an extension of time to bring judicial review proceedings should be granted, considering the significant delay and inadequate reasons provided, and potential prejudice to the defendants.

Held
1. Whether the relevant authority took irrelevant matters into consideration in granting the provisional Development Plan consent.
The court concluded that the relevant authority did not take irrelevant matters into consideration. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

2. Whether the validity and effect of the land management agreement relating to car parking on the land was properly taken into account by the relevant authority.
The court concluded that the validity and effect of the land management agreement was properly taken into account. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

3. Whether the consent granted complies with the principles and objections of the Development Plan relating to car parking.
The court concluded that the consent granted does comply with the principles and objections of the Development Plan. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

4. Whether the validity of the consent granted by the Development Assessment Commission (DAC) is upheld.
The court concluded that the validity of the consent granted by the DAC is upheld. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

5. Whether an extension of time to bring judicial review proceedings should be granted, considering the significant delay and inadequate reasons provided, and potential prejudice to the defendants.
The court concluded that an extension of time should not be granted. The application for an extension of time was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BLEBY J

The central issue in this case was the validity of the provisional Development Plan consent granted by the Development Assessment Commission (DAC) to the South Australian Housing Trust (SAHT) for the development of the subject land. The primary focus of the court's reasoning was on whether the DAC had considered relevant matters in granting the consent, particularly regarding the encroachments of the plaintiff's building onto the subject land and the validity and effect of the land management agreement concerning car parking. The court also examined whether the consent complied with the principles and objections of the Development Plan and if the consent granted by the DAC was valid.

The court first examined whether the DAC took irrelevant matters into consideration when granting the provisional Development Plan consent. The plaintiff argued that the DAC should have considered the encroachments of his building onto the subject land. However, the court found that the DAC had considered the encroachments and determined that they were not relevant to the approval of the development consent. The court relied on the principle that the DAC's decision should be based on relevant considerations and that irrelevant matters should not influence the decision-making process. The court concluded that the DAC had not taken irrelevant matters into account in granting the consent.

The court then turned to the issue of whether the validity and effect of the land management agreement relating to car parking on the land was properly taken into account by the DAC. The plaintiff argued that the DAC should have considered the land management agreement, which restricted the number of cars that could be parked on the subject land. The court found that the DAC had considered the land management agreement and had taken its validity and effect into account in granting the consent. The court held that the DAC had properly considered the land management agreement and that it was a relevant matter for consideration in the approval process.

Next, the court examined whether the consent granted complied with the principles and objections of the Development Plan relating to car parking. The plaintiff argued that the consent did not comply with the Development Plan, which required a certain number of car parking spaces for the proposed development. The court found that the consent complied with the principles and objections of the Development Plan and that the DAC had properly considered the car parking requirements in granting the consent. The court held that the consent granted was in accordance with the Development Plan and that there was no non-compliance with the car parking requirements.

The court also addressed the issue of whether the validity of the consent granted by the DAC was upheld. The plaintiff argued that the consent was invalid due to procedural errors and that the DAC had not followed the proper process in granting the consent. The court found that the DAC had followed the proper process in granting the consent and that there were no procedural errors that would render the consent invalid. The court held that the consent granted by the DAC was valid and that there were no grounds to quash the consent.

Finally, the court considered whether an extension of time to bring judicial review proceedings should be granted, considering the significant delay and inadequate reasons provided, and potential prejudice to the defendants. The plaintiff sought an extension of time to bring the judicial review proceedings, arguing that the significant delay and inadequate reasons provided justified the extension. However, the court found that the plaintiff had not provided adequate reasons for the delay and that the extension would cause prejudice to the defendants. The court held that the application for an extension of time should be refused and that the plaintiff's application for judicial review was time-barred.

In summary, the court's reasoning in this case focused on whether the DAC had considered relevant matters in granting the provisional Development Plan consent, whether the validity and effect of the land management agreement relating to car parking on the land was properly taken into account, whether the consent granted complied with the principles and objections of the Development Plan, whether the consent granted by the DAC was valid, and whether an extension of time to bring judicial review proceedings should be granted. The court found that the DAC had considered relevant matters in granting the consent, that the validity and effect of the land management agreement had been properly taken into account, that the consent granted complied with the Development Plan, that the consent granted by the DAC was valid, and that an extension of time to bring judicial review proceedings should be refused. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the DAC must consider relevant matters in granting a provisional Development Plan consent, that the validity and effect of land management agreements must be taken into account, that the consent granted must comply with the principles and objections of the Development Plan, and that an extension of time to bring judicial review proceedings may be refused if the delay and inadequate reasons cause prejudice to the defendants.