Statute-Compulsory acquisition of dried fruits-Whether interference with inter-State trade and commerce-Validity of State Act-The Constitution (63 MELBOURNE,

64 Vict. c. 12), sec. 92-Dried Fruits Acts 1924-1927 (S.A.) (No. 1657-No. 1835), secs. 28, 29. June 18-20,

Held, by Knox C.J., Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ. (Isaacs J. dissenting), that Sept. 3-5,

sec. 28 of the Dried Fruits Acts 1924-1927 (S.A.) authorizes the compulsory acquisition of "any dried fruits in South Australia grown and dried in Australia," and does not violate the provisions of sec. 92 of the Constitution as being an interference with the freedom of "trade, commerce, and intercourse Feb. 27-28,

among the States." Mar. 3, 21.

State of New South Wales v. The Commonwealth (The Wheat Case), (1915) 20 Knox C.J.,

C.L.R. 54, applied.

Decision of Starke J. affirmed.

APPEAL from Starke J.

The appellant, Frederick Alexander James, brought an action in the Supreme Court of South Australia against the respondents, The Hon. John Cowan, the Minister of Agriculture for South Australia, who was the Minister administering the Dried Fruits Acts 1924-1927 (S.A.), Gerald Albert William Pope, the deputy-chairman of the Dried Fruits Board of South Australia, Leslie Nattle Salter,

43 CLR 387

chairman of the Board, William Newman Twiss, secretary of the Board, Alfred George Carne and William Lennox Forsyth, officers of the Board, and the McCulloch Carrying Co., a carrying company employed by the Board to take possession of and remove the plaintiff's fruit. The action was brought for seizing the dried fruits of the appellant. The seizure was admitted, and justified under secs. 28 and 29 of the Dried Fruits Acts 1924-1927 of South Australia. All the formal steps required by-secs. 28 and 29 of the Dried Fruits Act for the compulsory acquisition of the appellant's dried fruit were taken, and the two questions that emerged for determination were (1) whether the acquisitions were for the purposes of the Act, and, if so, (2) whether the acquisitions and seizures in any way contra- vened the provisions of sec. 92 of the Constitution.

From the statement of claim it appeared that the appellant resided at Berri in South Australia, where he carried on the business of a fruit-grower, fruit-packer and fruit-dealer, and in the conduct of such business he dried large quantities of fruit grown by him, and purchased large quantities of other dried fruits from other growers at Berri and the surrounding districts and processed and packed ready for sale such dried fruit grown and acquired by him into commercial dried fruit and sold the same in Victoria, New South Wales, Western Australia and Queensland and also in South Australia, in England and in markets for dried fruit in other parts of the world. The appellant also alleged that between December 1926 and May 1927 he had made divers contracts in writing for the sale and delivery from the State of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading James v Cowan

Details

AGLC: James v Cowan [1930] HCA 48
Case: [1930] HCA 48
Decision Date: 21 March 1930

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Frederick Alexander James, a fruit-grower and dealer in South Australia, brought an action against the respondents, including the Minister of Agriculture for South Australia, concerning the seizure of his dried fruits. The seizure was justified under sections 28 and 29 of the Dried Fruits Acts 1924-1927 (S.A.), which provided for the compulsory acquisition of dried fruits for the purposes of the Act. The case was removed to the High Court of Australia, where it was heard by Starke J.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the compulsory acquisitions of the appellant's dried fruits were made for the purposes of the Dried Fruits Act, and, if so, whether these acquisitions and seizures contravened section 92 of the Australian Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of inter-State trade, commerce, and intercourse. The appellant contended that the acquisitions were not for the genuine purposes of the Act but were intended to interfere with his inter-State sales and to coerce him into complying with invalid determinations of the Dried Fruits Board.

Starke J., in his judgment, affirmed the validity of the acquisitions. He reasoned that the Dried Fruits Act aimed to regulate and control the marketing of dried fruits to preserve the industry, and the compulsory acquisition powers under sections 28 and 29 were a legitimate means to achieve these ends. He drew an analogy to the decision in *State of New South Wales v. The Commonwealth* (The Wheat Case), where the compulsory acquisition of wheat was held not to violate section 92 of the Constitution. Starke J. concluded that the State had regulated and changed the ownership of the appellant's dried fruits for the purpose of controlling their marketing, without conditioning this action on inter-State trade. He found that the acquisitions were duly and lawfully made under the Act.

The High Court, comprising Knox C.J., Gavan Duffy, and Rich JJ., dismissed the appeal, agreeing with Starke J.'s reasoning and conclusion. Isaacs J. dissented, finding that the Act, on its proper construction, did not grant the Minister the authority to expropriate property for the asserted purpose, and that such an exercise of power would indeed contravene section 92 of the Constitution. However, the majority upheld the decision of Starke J., affirming that the compulsory acquisition of the dried fruits was a lawful exercise of power under the South Australian Act and did not infringe upon the freedom of inter-State trade guaranteed by the Constitution.

Orders