RCLN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

RCLN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCAFC 113

Appeal from: RCLN v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 876
File number: NSD 1082 of 2024
Judgment of: PERRY, SARAH C DERRINGTON AND ABRAHAM JJ
Date of judgment: 26 August 2025
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal decided not to revoke cancellation of appellant’s visa on character grounds – where appellant had been released into the community following the Full Federal Court’s decision in Pearson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 203 – whether Tribunal’s decision was legally unreasonable due to erroneous assumption that the appellant had not been released into the community – appeal dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – request for adjournment of the hearing of the appeal on the basis that the applicant was no longer legally represented dismissed

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37AI

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 501(3A), 501(7)(c), 501CA(4)

Migration Amendment (Aggregate Sentences) Act 2023 (Cth), s 4

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 4.16

Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW), s 77(1)

Cases cited:

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Fang Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1044

Minister for Home Affairs v Ogawa [2019] FCAFC 98; (2019) 269 FCR 536

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323

Pearson v Commonwealth [2024] HCA 46; (2024) 99 ALJR 110

Pearson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 203; (2022) 295 FCR 177

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 77 ALJR 1165

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 34
Date of hearing: 19 August 2025
Counsel for the Appellant  The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent  Ms C Ernst
Solicitor for the First Respondent  HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent  The Second Respondent submitted to any order, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1082 of 2024
BETWEEN:

RCLN

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

PERRY, SARAH C DERRINGTON AND ABRAHAM JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

26 AUGUST 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the First Respondent be changed to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.The appeal is dismissed.

3.The appellant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed save for those costs occasioned by the delay in the commencement of the hearing of the appeal on 19 August 2025. 

Note:   Entry of orders…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCAFC 113
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, an Iranian citizen who had been granted a visa and subsequently detained, sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision not to revoke the cancellation of his visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable due to an erroneous assumption that he had not been released into the community. The Full Federal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Tribunal's decision.

The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable due to an erroneous assumption that the appellant had not been released into the community at the time of the decision. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's reasoning process was flawed because it found that it was more probable than not that the appellant would reoffend if released into the community, despite his actual release. The primary judge, however, found that the Tribunal was clearly aware of the appellant's release and that the Tribunal's reasoning was not made in ignorance of this fact. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not legally unreasonable and dismissed the appeal on this ground.

The court held that the primary judge's findings were correct and that the Tribunal's decision was not legally unreasonable. The court found that the Tribunal was clearly aware of the appellant's release into the community and that the Tribunal's reasoning process did not overlook this fact. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the court ordered the appellant to pay the Minister's costs as agreed or assessed, except for those costs occasioned by the delay in the commencement of the hearing of the appeal on 19 August 2025.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the First Respondent be changed to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. The appellant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed save for those costs occasioned by the delay in the commencement of the hearing of the appeal on 19 August 2025.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal should be dismissed and, subject to one caveat explained later in these reasons, an order for costs should be made in favour of the Minister,. 2. BACKGROUND The appellant is a citizen of Iran who arrived in Australia in 1990 at the age of 18. On 7 October 2016, the appellant was granted a Return (Residence) (Class BB) Five Year Resident Return (subclass 155) visa. On 21 July 2021, the appellant’s visa was mandatorily cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act (cancellation decision), after the appellant was convicted of domestic violence and other offences for which he had been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 16 months: J[2]. Following the cancellation of his visa, the appellant was detained at Villawood Immigration Detention Centre from 1 November 2021. On 15 November 2022, a delegate of the Minister made a decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act not to revoke the cancellation decision (non-revocation decision): J[3]. On 22 December 2022, the Full Federal Court held that an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for 12 months or more imposed for multiple offences did not constitute a “sentence[] to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more” for the purposes of s 501(7)(c) of the Migration Act and thus did not engage the duty to cancel a person’s visa imposed by s 501(3A): Pearson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 203; (2022) 295 FCR 177 (Pearson (FCAFC)). On 20 January 2023, applying the decision of the Full Court in Pearson (FCAFC), the Tribunal found that the cancellation decision was not legally effective: RCLN and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2023] AATA 35. Following the Pearson (FCAFC) decision the appellant was released into the community in January 2023: J[21]. On 17 February 2023, the Migration Amendment (Aggregate Sentences) Act 2023 (Cth) came into effect. Section 4 of the Aggregate Sentences Act purported to retrospectively validate certain “thing[s] done” based on aggregate sentences being taken into account, including the cancellation decision in respect of the appellant. On 21 February 2023, the appellant reapplied for review of the non-revocation decision. On 8 May 2023, the Tribunal held a hearing at which the appellant was legally represented and gave evidence via Microsoft Teams. On 26 May 2023, the Tribunal affirmed the non-revocation decision: RCLN and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2023] AATA 1335 (AAT Decision). The appellant sought judicial review of the AAT Decision in the Federal Court on various bases, including legal unreasonableness, denial of procedural fairness, failure to consider the impact of the decision on victims, a misunderstanding of the law, and double counting the appellant’s criminal offending: J[7]. On 7 August 2024, the primary judge handed down reasons for dismissing each ground of review. On 4 December 2024, the High Court held that the construction of s 501(7)(c) adopted in Pearson (FCAFC) which excluded aggregate sentences of 12 months or more from its scope, was incorrect: Pearson v Commonwealth [2024] HCA 46; (2024) 99 ALJR 110 (Pearson (HCA)). Consequently, the High Court found it unnecessary to determine the validity of the Aggregate Sentences Act, as its provisions were not engaged (at [63]).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The effect of the High Court’s judgment in Pearson (HCA) is that the cancellation decision, the non-revocation decision, and the AAT Decision were not invalid by reason of aggregate sentences having been taken into account. This is the same footing on which the primary judge approached the matter, albeit that the primary judge assumed (prior to the decision in Pearson (HCA)) that the retrospective validity provisions in the Aggregate Sentences Act applied.3. NO ERROR IS ESTABLISHED IN THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION 3.1 The issues The appellant, by his then pro bono counsel, contended before the primary judge that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error on five alternative grounds and was therefore invalid. The only ground pressed by the appellant in his notice of appeal is the first of these grounds, namely: the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal’s reasoning process was legally unreasonable, illogical or irrational insofar as it found that it was more probable than not that the appellant would reoffend “if he is released into the community”, in circumstances where he had been released from immigration detention and was in the community at the time of the Tribunal’s decision: J[7(1)]. The alleged error relates to the Tribunal’s reasons at [244] of the AAT Decision under the heading “Likelihood of engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct”, which the Tribunal is required to take into account under paragraph 8.1.2 of “Direction No. 99: Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501CA” as part of its consideration of the need to protect the Australian community (Primary Consideration 1). Paragraph 8.1.2(2)(b)(ii) relevantly provided that “in assessing the risk that may be posed by the non-citizen to the Australian community, decision-makers must have regard to … evidence of rehabilitation achieved by the time of the decision, giving weight to time spent in the community since their most recent offence”. At [244], the Tribunal found that:Based on the Applicant’s history and the factors set out above I consider that it is more probable than not, that the Applicant will reoffend if he is released into the community. It is likely, based on his history, that he may also return to drug use. This would further elevate his prospects of reoffending significantly. (Emphasis added.) However, having concluded that the Tribunal clearly understood that the appellant was in the Australian community, the primary judge was not prepared to infer that the Tribunal had overlooked this fact at [244] of its reasons, despite referring to the appellant’s release into the community in hypothetical terms at this point of its reasoning. Rather, the primary judge held that “on a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons as a whole, the Tribunal was clearly cognisant of the fact that the applicant was in the community at the time of its decision”, and that it was “not open to treat the finding at para [244] of the [AAT Decision] as having been made in ignorance of the applicant’s situation”: J[40].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established