FDC20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

FDC20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1110

File number: SYG 2832 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE MCCABE
Date of judgment: 17 July 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision made by Administrative Appeals Tribunal – protection visa – whether the Tribunal should consider a claim that was not properly articulated – jurisdictional error established.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Appellant S395/2002 vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 41
Date of hearing: 30 June 2025
Place: Sydney
Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the first respondent: Mr J O’Connell (HWL Ebsworth Lawyers)
Second respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 2832 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

FDC20

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE MCCABE

DATE OF ORDER:

17 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari be issued directed to the second respondent quashing its decision dated 10 November 2020.

2.A writ of mandamus be issued directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal (the successor body to the second respondent) requiring it to determine the applicant's application for review according to law.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE MCCABE:

  1. A delegate of the first respondent (the minister) refused Ms FDC20's application for a Protection (subclass 866) (class XA) visa. Ms FDC20 - a citizen of Malaysia - sought review of that decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. She was unsuccessful. In her application to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Ms FDC20 contended the Tribunal made several jurisdictional errors. At the hearing before me, she did not press some of those grounds of review but focused on one concern in particular: she said the Tribunal did not properly engage with her claim that she would not enjoy religious freedom if she returned to Malaysia because she was raised as a Buddhist but converted to the Islamic faith in order to marry a Muslim man that she subsequently divorced. The claim with respect to religious freedom was not included in Ms FDC20's initial application for a protection visa;…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1110
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of FDC20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involves Ms FDC20, a Malaysian citizen who has been living in Australia on a bridging visa. Ms FDC20 applied for a protection visa on the basis that she feared for her safety if she returned to Malaysia, due to her history of domestic violence at the hands of her former husband, who was a drug addict. The delegate of the minister refused her application, finding that she did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Malaysia. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) reviewed the delegate’s decision but did not address the claim that Ms FDC20 made about the denial of her religious freedom in Malaysia.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the Tribunal should have considered the claim that was not properly articulated by Ms FDC20, specifically the claim about the denial of her religious freedom. The Tribunal did not consider this claim because it was not raised by the applicant at the time of the hearing. The court needed to determine if the Tribunal’s failure to consider this claim constituted a material jurisdictional error. The High Court’s decision in LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs established that a material jurisdictional error occurs when there is a realistic possibility that the decision could have been different if the error had not occurred.

The court found that the Tribunal's handling of the religious freedom claim constituted a material jurisdictional error. The court reasoned that since the Tribunal did not consider this claim, there is a realistic possibility that the outcome of the decision could have been different if the error had not occurred. The court referred to the High Court’s decision in LPDT to support its finding. As a result, the court concluded that the Tribunal’s decision was infected by a material jurisdictional error.

The court ordered that a writ of certiorari should be issued to quash the Tribunal’s decision. Additionally, a writ of mandamus should be directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal’s successor) requiring it to remake the decision according to law. This means that the Tribunal must reconsider Ms FDC20’s application for a protection visa, taking into account the claim about the denial of her religious freedom in Malaysia.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms FDC20 says the Tribunal's handling of her religious freedom claim in particular amounts to a material jurisdictional error. The minister disagrees. BACKGROUND Ms FDC20 is a citizen of Malaysia. She was raised as a Buddhist, and she is of Chinese ethnicity. In 1997, she married a Muslim man. She converted to Islam for that purpose. The couple had two children but it appears the relationship was unhappy. Ms FDC20 claimed in her application for a protection visa (reproduced in exhibit one, the court book, at pp 37ff) that her former husband was a violent drug addict who would regularly disappear before returning to harass the family. She said he was often the victim of assaults as a result of failing to repay loan payments and he borrowed and stole money that she felt obliged to repay. She also recalled his threats and bad behaviour. She said she feared for her safety. Ms FDC20 filed for divorce from her husband in 2006. It appears that divorce was granted in 2008. Ms FDC20 lived separately from her former husband until 2014 - although she said she occasionally had contact with him, and that he continued to harass her. In 2014, Ms FDC20 travelled to Australia on a visitors' visa. She thereafter obtained a student visa that entitled her to remain until the end of 2016. Just before the student visa was due to expire, she applied for a protection visa. While that visa was refused by a delegate of the minister on 3 May 2017, Ms FDC20 has remained in Australia on a bridging visa. The delegate's decision is reproduced at pp 56ff of the court book. In her reasons for decision, the delegate referred at length to the relevant country information report published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The delegate also referred to other credible international reporting on the status and treatment of women. The delegate also referred to material discussing law enforcement and human rights generally in Malaysia, and to material dealing with discrimination against persons of Chinese ethnicity in Malaysia. After considering that material and the (limited) evidence provided by the applicant, the delegate concluded (at p 76):Having regard to the above country information and lack of evidence, I am satisfied that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Malaysia, either on account of being a member of a particular social group, namely "women who are victims of domestic violence in Malaysia" or on the basis of her Chinese ethnicity. The delegate did not deal with any claim about a potential denial of religious freedom because the applicant did not make any claim to that effect at the time. That was to come later. THE TRIBUNAL'S REVIEW The applicant commenced review proceedings in the Tribunal. She was invited to attend a hearing on 4 November 2020. She provided some additional material in support of her claim in advance of the listed event, including police records that relate to her husband, and a copy of an 'Islamic Divorce Declaration' filed in divorce proceedings in a Malaysian court in 2006. That document is in the form of a statement of claims petitioning for a divorce. It was prepared by the applicant. The statement of claims recorded the history of the marriage and its demise. Copies of the documents were included in the court book at pp 108 to127.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I am satisfied the decision is infected by a material jurisdictional error in the sense discussed by the High Court in LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12 where “there is a realistic possibility that the decision that was made in fact could have been different if the error had not occurred”: at [7] per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ.CONCLUSION A writ of certiorari should be issued quashing the Tribunal’s decision, and a writ of mandamus should be directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal’s successor) requiring that it remake the decision according to law.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established