BZN19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

BZN19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1000

File number(s): SYG 1208 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE KAUR-BAINS
Date of judgment: 2 July 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Protection (Class XA) Visa – whether the Tribunal failed to perform the statutory task imposed on the Tribunal under s 414 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal denied the applicants procedural fairness by not putting the applicants on notice that the Tribunal may form the view the first applicant had “tailored” his evidence – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5J, 65, 414, 430, 430(1) and 476
Cases cited:

CQO23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 97

DVO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 177; [2021] HCA 12

Firme v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 60

Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 196; [2024] HCA 2

Manebona v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 298 FCR 516; [2023] FCAFC 116

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431; [2013] FCAFC 114

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30

SZBELv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63

Wingfoot Australia Partners v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; [2013] HCA 43

Division: General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 85
Date of last submissions: 18 June 2025
Date of hearing: 3 April 2025
21 May 2025
Place: Sydney
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr L Boccabella
Solicitor for the Applicants: Mr P Pahalawela of Parish Patience Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D Hume
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Sharma of HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 1208 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

BZN19

First Applicant

BZO19

Second Applicant

BZP19

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE KAUR-BAINS

DATE OF ORDER:

2 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the First Respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.The name of the Second Respondent is amended to “Administrative Review Tribunal”.

3.The Further Amended Application filed on 10 April 2025 is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1000
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, BZN19, sought a judicial review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) decision to deny their applications for a Protection (Class XA) Visa. The applicants argued that the Tribunal failed to undertake a proper review and denied them procedural fairness. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal's decision contained jurisdictional errors. The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal failed to perform the statutory task imposed on it under s 414 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether the Tribunal denied the applicants procedural fairness by not putting them on notice that it might form the view the first applicant had "tailored" his evidence.

The court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The applicants argued that the Tribunal's reasons did not identify a proper pathway of reasoning, but the court found that the Tribunal's reasons were sufficient to demonstrate its reasoning process. The applicants also argued that the Tribunal misunderstood the term "relevant consideration" when it considered the first applicant's time spent outside Bangladesh. However, the court found that the Tribunal's use of the term was not a misunderstanding of its statutory function. The applicants further contended that the Tribunal failed to acknowledge the difficulties of assessing evidence given through an interpreter, but the court found that the Tribunal's reasons demonstrated an appreciation of these difficulties. Finally, the applicants argued that the Tribunal failed to properly accord them procedural fairness, but the court found that the applicants were given an opportunity to respond to the Tribunal's concerns about their evidence.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The applicants' arguments did not demonstrate that the Tribunal failed to perform its statutory task or denied them procedural fairness. The court found that the Tribunal's reasons were sufficient to demonstrate its reasoning process and that the applicants were given an opportunity to respond to the Tribunal's concerns about their evidence. The court's decision was based on a detailed analysis of the Tribunal's reasons and the applicants' arguments, and the court found no merit in the applicants' grounds for judicial review. The application for judicial review was dismissed, and the Tribunal's decision stood.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants contended at [3] and [5] of their post-hearing submissions dated 10 June 2025 as follows (as per original):[3] The applicant’s case is that a proper review is not done if the AAT’s decision does not ‘explain the actual pathway of reasoning’ the AAT adopted in the record of its decision. That is, if the AAT cannot demonstrate how it came to its conclusions, then there is no proper review under s414……..[5] In the seminal Full Federal Court judgment on migration law, Re Minister of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Dhillon [1990] FCA 144 Their Honours Northrop, Wilcox and French JJ stated that a decision maker did not conduct a proper process of decision making if the decision is based on ‘suspicions or conflicts of evidence’. This passage below has stood the test of time and so eloquently and in a commonsense manner, describes what must be done in order to fulfill the function of making a proper decision:10. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that a primary responsibility of a statutory decision maker is to reach firm conclusions about those facts which are relevant to his or her decision. If the decision maker is subsequently called upon to state his or her findings, he or she should do so in clear and unambiguous terms; not being reticent in expressing findings adverse to particular people, if in fact they were the actual findings reached at the time of the decision. Contrary to the submission put by counsel for the Minister, it is not correct to discount a factor favourable to an applicant by reference to conflicting evidence or doubts. A person affected by a statutory decision is entitled to have the case determined by reference to found facts, not suspicions or conflicts of evidence. Only if this is done is it possible for the affected person to understand precisely the reason why the decision went as it did. Only if this is done it is possible for a judicial reviewer to determine whether there was evidence before the decision maker to support the finding. [emphasis added] The applicants submitted that the Tribunal’s reasons did not identify a proper pathway of reasoning for the following reasons:(a)The Tribunal’s reasons were “replete with points of concern”, which in the end were of little value to any pathway of reasoning, as no area of concern is a finding of a material question of fact”. (b)The Tribunal’s use of the term “vague” in its reasons, did not disclose a pathway of reasoning. (c)The Tribunal’s decision disclosed only “broad conclusions and assertions”. (Hearing Date 21 May 2025 Tp 7.7 and Tp 8.44). The applicants’ written submissions drew my attention to specific transcript references of the hearing before the Tribunal.Misunderstood the term “relevant consideration” The applicants also argued that the Tribunal at [30] of its reasons, stated in relation to the first applicant spending a large amount of time outside Bangladesh, the following: The Tribunal considers that the applicant has indeed shown a strong desire to live abroad, over a period of almost 35 years (at the time of this decision). While this does not preclude that he is also a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations, it is in the Tribunal's view a relevant consideration when assessing his circumstances as a whole. (emphasis added)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicants relied upon four sets of submissions, which were accepted for filing on 18 March 2025, 2 April 2025, 15 May 2025 and 10 June 2025, as well as the oral submissions of Mr Boccabella at the two hearings before this Court on 3 April 2025 and 21 May 2025. Evidence sought to be read by the applicants The applicants sought to read into evidence the affidavit of Prasad Pahalawela, solicitor, affirmed on 16 January 2025, annexing a copy of the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal. That affidavit was read without objection and formed part of the evidence before this Court. I made clear to the parties that I would not be analysing the transcript to assess the evidence given before the Tribunal, unless the parties specifically took me to parts of the transcript to make a particular point, which went to a jurisdictional error ground. The applicants also sought to read the affidavit of Mr Pahalawela affirmed on 1 April 2025, which stated the following:2.On this occasion, at the direction of Mr Boccabella of counsel, on 31 March 2025 I caused a review of the web address (URL address omitted) which contains the Australian Government directory listing the names of appointed members to the Administrative Review Tribunal in which Mr James Silva's name is not listed as a current member of the Administrative Review Tribunal. 3.At the direction of Mr Boccabella of counsel, on 31 March 2025 I caused a Google search using the phrase ‘James Silva Administrative Appeals Tribunal’. It brought up a LinkedIn entry which shows that Mr James Silva’s entry has that his qualifications are MBA. Mr Boccabella sought to rely on the evidence noted in the preceding paragraph to support an argument that the Tribunal’s reasons were discursive, used generalities and did not meet the requirements that the Tribunal properly consider and give reasons. Mr Boccabella submitted that the member's non-legal background might be helpful for the Court in explaining the shortcomings in the Tribunal’s reasons (Hearing Date 3 April 2025 Tp 13.21-24, Applicant’s submissions dated 18 March 2025 at [33] to [38]). I rejected the admission of the affidavit affirmed on 1 April 2025 (referred to at [15] of this judgment), on the basis that whether or not the member of the Tribunal was a lawyer was irrelevant to my analysis of the Tribunal's reasons and assessment of whether there was jurisdictional error. Minister’s written submissions The Minister relied upon his three sets of written submissions, which were accepted for filing on 19 March 2025, 1 May 2025 and 18 June 2025, as well as the oral submissions of Mr Hume. The Minister also tendered the Court Book, which consisted of two volumes and were marked “Exhibit R1”. GROUNDS 1 AND 2 Grounds 1 and 2 in the application for judicial review, seek to impugn the Tribunal’s decision on the basis that there was a “failure to undertake a proper review”, being properly characterised as a failure to perform the statutory task imposed on the Tribunal to review under s 414 of the Act to form for itself, on the material before it, the requisite state of satisfaction under s 65 of the Act (Applicants’ post-hearing submissions dated 10 June 2025 at [2], Applicants’ further submissions in reply dated 15 May 2025).

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons which follow, I find the applicants have not demonstrated jurisdictional error.TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The applicants attended two tribunal hearings assisted by their legal representative, Ms Rina Szmej of Sharah Henville Lawyers, and a Bengali interpreter.Protection claims The Tribunal at [7] and [8] of its reasons noted the applicants’ claims for protection visas as follows:[7]The first-named applicant ….claims to fear harm arising from his support for the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and his active membership. He claims that his business partner is a supporter of the ruling Awami League (AL) who illegally seized his share of a business; and AL cadres have threatened him and his family. He also claims that the police arrested, detained and injured him during various protests, and they have now brought politically motivated criminal charges against him. He fears that the Bangladesh authorities, acting on behalf of the AL, will arrest, imprison, mistreat and perhaps kill him on his return to Bangladesh. He also fears that AL cadres will abduct, mistreat and possibly kill him, with impunity. They will do so because of his past profile and his ongoing political activities, including with a BNP group in Australia.[8]The second- and third-named applicants, the applicant's wife and young son, claim to have faced threats and harassment because of their association with the applicant. They claim to fear persecution on the basis of an imputed political opinion; and/or to be at risk of significant harm. For the reasons set out in its decision, the Tribunal did not accept that if the first applicant returned to Bangladesh, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, there was a real chance he would face serious harm amounting to persecution for reasons of his political opinion if he decided to invest in or establish a business, or for any other reasons set out in s 5J(1) of the Act ([141] and [142] of the Tribunal’s reasons). The Tribunal noted that the first applicant’s wife and child essentially relied on the membership of the same family unit as the first applicant. However, the Tribunal noted the second and third applicants also claimed protection based on imputed political opinion arising from their relationship with the first applicant. The Tribunal noted the applicants’ representative’s submissions dated 17 October 2018, that in Bangladesh “a wife has to live with the consequences of her husband’s conduct and political beliefs at a personal cost to the wife or their children” ([143] of the Tribunal’s reasons). The Tribunal concluded there was no real chance of persecution for the second and third applicants based on its findings regarding the first applicant's claim ([144] of the Tribunal’s reasons). I have analysed the Tribunal’s decision in greater detail below, having regard to the applicants’ grounds for judicial review. GROUNDS IN THE APPLICATION The applicants rely on the following three grounds of judicial review raised in the application headed “Further Amended Application” accepted for filing on 10 April 2025 (as per original): Ground 1 The AAT decision did not meet the standards set out in paragraphs [24],[25] and [27] in Plaintiff MI v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17Ground 2 The AAT failed to conduct a proper reviewGround 3 The AAT failed to properly accord the applicant procedural fairnessPROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicants also argued that the Tribunal at [30] of its reasons, stated in relation to the first applicant spending a large amount of time outside Bangladesh, the following: The Tribunal considers that the applicant has indeed shown a strong desire to live abroad, over a period of almost 35 years (at the time of this decision). While this does not preclude that he is also a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations, it is in the Tribunal's view a relevant consideration when assessing his circumstances as a whole. (emphasis added) The applicants contended that the use of the phrase “relevant consideration” disclosed an error on the part of the Tribunal, because the amount of time the applicants spent outside of Bangladesh, was not a “relevant consideration” that the Tribunal member as a decision-maker was bound to take into account, based on the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act, which disclosed a misunderstanding on the part of the Tribunal in exercising its statutory function (Hearing Date 21 May 2025 Tp 7.26-8.6). The applicants referred the Court to the decision of Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40 (Peko-Wallsend) at [39] to [42].Interpreter issue The applicants also pointed out that the hearing was conducted over the telephone with the assistance of an interpreter and in those cases it created an inherent difficulty for a decision-maker to assess a person based upon matters of demeanour and impression, and how the medium of an interpreter could affect assessment of demeanour of the person giving evidence (Second Hearing 21 May 2025, Tp 5.5-15). The applicants referred me to the decision of DVO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 177; [2021] HCA 12 (DVO16) at [54], which warned of the dangers of making credibility assessment when the evidence was given through an interpreter, as well as CQO23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 97 at [72]. The applicants at [12] and [13] of their post-hearing submissions dated 10 June 2025, contended that the Tribunal’s reasons did not acknowledge it had appreciated the difficulties of the evidence received through an interpreter. The applicants further submitted that the Tribunal needed to grapple with the difficulties of evidence received through an interpreter, in assessing evidence and determining issues of credit. The applicants also contended at [14] of the applicants’ post-hearing submissions dated 10 June 2025 the following:[14]Further the AAT appears to have taken no cognisance of the fundamental principle in migration law as set out by McHugh J in the seminal decision of Chan v Minister for Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 that an applicant “may have a well-founded fear of persecution even though there is only a 10 per cent chance that he will be…or otherwise persecuted”, (at 429):The decisions in Sivakumaran and Cardoza-Fonseca also establish that a fear may be well-founded for the purpose of the Convention and Protocol even though persecution is unlikely to occur. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Cardoza-Fonseca an applicant for refugee status may have a well-founded fear of persecution even though there is only a 10 per cent chance that he will be shot, tortured or otherwise persecuted. Obviously, a farfetched possibility of persecution must be excluded. But if there is a real chance that the applicant will be persecuted, his or her fear should be characterized as "well-founded" for the purpose of the Convention and Protocol. Consideration