FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BZN19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1000
File number(s): SYG 1208 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE KAUR-BAINS Date of judgment: 2 July 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Protection (Class XA) Visa – whether the Tribunal failed to perform the statutory task imposed on the Tribunal under s 414 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal denied the applicants procedural fairness by not putting the applicants on notice that the Tribunal may form the view the first applicant had “tailored” his evidence – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5J, 65, 414, 430, 430(1) and 476 Cases cited: CQO23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 97
DVO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 177; [2021] HCA 12
Firme v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 60
Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 98 ALJR 196; [2024] HCA 2
Manebona v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 298 FCR 516; [2023] FCAFC 116
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431; [2013] FCAFC 114
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30
SZBELv Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63
Wingfoot Australia Partners v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; [2013] HCA 43
Division: General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 85 Date of last submissions: 18 June 2025 Date of hearing: 3 April 2025
21 May 2025Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicants: Mr L Boccabella Solicitor for the Applicants: Mr P Pahalawela of Parish Patience Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D Hume Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr A Sharma of HWL Ebsworth Lawyers Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 1208 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BZN19
First Applicant
BZO19
Second Applicant
BZP19
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KAUR-BAINS
DATE OF ORDER:
2 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the First Respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2.The name of the Second Respondent is amended to “Administrative Review Tribunal”.
3.The Further Amended Application filed on 10 April 2025 is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1000
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The applicants argued that the Tribunal's reasons did not identify a proper pathway of reasoning, but the court found that the Tribunal's reasons were sufficient to demonstrate its reasoning process. The applicants also argued that the Tribunal misunderstood the term "relevant consideration" when it considered the first applicant's time spent outside Bangladesh. However, the court found that the Tribunal's use of the term was not a misunderstanding of its statutory function. The applicants further contended that the Tribunal failed to acknowledge the difficulties of assessing evidence given through an interpreter, but the court found that the Tribunal's reasons demonstrated an appreciation of these difficulties. Finally, the applicants argued that the Tribunal failed to properly accord them procedural fairness, but the court found that the applicants were given an opportunity to respond to the Tribunal's concerns about their evidence.
The court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The applicants' arguments did not demonstrate that the Tribunal failed to perform its statutory task or denied them procedural fairness. The court found that the Tribunal's reasons were sufficient to demonstrate its reasoning process and that the applicants were given an opportunity to respond to the Tribunal's concerns about their evidence. The court's decision was based on a detailed analysis of the Tribunal's reasons and the applicants' arguments, and the court found no merit in the applicants' grounds for judicial review. The application for judicial review was dismissed, and the Tribunal's decision stood.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicants also argued that the Tribunal at [30] of its reasons, stated in relation to the first applicant spending a large amount of time outside Bangladesh, the following: The Tribunal considers that the applicant has indeed shown a strong desire to live abroad, over a period of almost 35 years (at the time of this decision). While this does not preclude that he is also a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations, it is in the Tribunal's view a relevant consideration when assessing his circumstances as a whole. (emphasis added) The applicants contended that the use of the phrase “relevant consideration” disclosed an error on the part of the Tribunal, because the amount of time the applicants spent outside of Bangladesh, was not a “relevant consideration” that the Tribunal member as a decision-maker was bound to take into account, based on the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act, which disclosed a misunderstanding on the part of the Tribunal in exercising its statutory function (Hearing Date 21 May 2025 Tp 7.26-8.6). The applicants referred the Court to the decision of Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40 (Peko-Wallsend) at [39] to [42].Interpreter issue The applicants also pointed out that the hearing was conducted over the telephone with the assistance of an interpreter and in those cases it created an inherent difficulty for a decision-maker to assess a person based upon matters of demeanour and impression, and how the medium of an interpreter could affect assessment of demeanour of the person giving evidence (Second Hearing 21 May 2025, Tp 5.5-15). The applicants referred me to the decision of DVO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 177; [2021] HCA 12 (DVO16) at [54], which warned of the dangers of making credibility assessment when the evidence was given through an interpreter, as well as CQO23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 97 at [72]. The applicants at [12] and [13] of their post-hearing submissions dated 10 June 2025, contended that the Tribunal’s reasons did not acknowledge it had appreciated the difficulties of the evidence received through an interpreter. The applicants further submitted that the Tribunal needed to grapple with the difficulties of evidence received through an interpreter, in assessing evidence and determining issues of credit. The applicants also contended at [14] of the applicants’ post-hearing submissions dated 10 June 2025 the following:[14]Further the AAT appears to have taken no cognisance of the fundamental principle in migration law as set out by McHugh J in the seminal decision of Chan v Minister for Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 that an applicant “may have a well-founded fear of persecution even though there is only a 10 per cent chance that he will be…or otherwise persecuted”, (at 429):The decisions in Sivakumaran and Cardoza-Fonseca also establish that a fear may be well-founded for the purpose of the Convention and Protocol even though persecution is unlikely to occur. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Cardoza-Fonseca an applicant for refugee status may have a well-founded fear of persecution even though there is only a 10 per cent chance that he will be shot, tortured or otherwise persecuted. Obviously, a farfetched possibility of persecution must be excluded. But if there is a real chance that the applicant will be persecuted, his or her fear should be characterized as "well-founded" for the purpose of the Convention and Protocol. Consideration