Emg17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2022] FedCFamC2G 36
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
EMG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 36
File number(s): MLG 2194 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE GIVEN Date of judgment: 1 February 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – the Tribunal dismissed proceedings as the applicant did not appear before it – subsequent decision of the Tribunal confirmed the dismissal – application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.425, 426A, 441A, 476
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.4.35DCases cited: AYT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 252
AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 244 FCR 144
BYF16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 2023
EBS17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 187
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 236 FCR 393
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 56 Date of hearing: 1 February 2022 The Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms M Richardson of Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
MLG 2194 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: EMG17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GIVEN
DATE OF ORDER:
1 FEBRUARY 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs”.
2.The application filed on 12 October 2017 is dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application, fixed in the amount of $5,000.
4.Pursuant to r 17.02 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), Orders 2 and 3 above not be entered until the date of the publication of written reasons for judgment (revised from transcript) which, for the avoidance of doubt, and for the purposes of r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), will also be taken to be the date upon which the judgment was pronounced.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from Transcript)JUDGE GIVEN:
By an application to show cause filed with this Court on 12 October 2017, the applicant seeks review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 22 September 2017. That decision dismissed the proceedings before the Tribunal on the basis that the applicant did not appear before it. A subsequent decision confirming the dismissal decision was made on 9 October 2017, and that confirmed the earlier decision to dismiss the review pursuant to s 426A(1A)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).
The application before me seeks only review of the earlier decision, being the dismissal decision, but the Minister properly submits that the Court should have regard to and consider both the dismissal decision and the confirmation decision as part of this review, and I will do so.
BACKGROUND
On 28 December 2015, the applicant, a citizen of Malaysia arrived in Australia (Court Book (CB) 40).
On 21 March 2016, she applied for a Protection (Subclass 866) visa (visa) (CB 1- 11) in which she claimed that she failed in business and has a lot of debt, that she had to pay back all the loans she had, and the lenders took action to collect the debt.
The applicant claimed that it was difficult to get employment, business opportunities and loans in Malaysia, and the economy was not stable. She claimed that she had no future there, she was jobless, and she liked the atmosphere in Australia (CB 30).
On 22 June 2016, a delegate of the Minister (delegate) refused to grant the visa (CB 40-53). The delegate found that the applicant’s claims lacked detail and that there was effective state protection that could be accessed by her in relation to any threats from money lenders (CB 52-53).
On 7 June 2016, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision (CB 54-59) and provided this information in the “correspondence details” section of the form (CB 55) the email address [applicant’s email]@yahoo.com (nominated email address) and a particular mobile telephone number (nominated telephone number).
On 15 August 2017 the applicant was invited to attend a hearing by telephone on 22 September 2017 (CB 64-65). The invitation was sent to the nominated email address (CB 63). The invitation:
(a)informed the applicant what to do if she could not attend the hearing; and
(b)advised that, in the event that she failed to attend the scheduled hearing, the Tribunal may dismiss the application without any further consideration of the application or the information before it (CB 65).
On 15 September 2017, being five business days before the hearing, the Tribunal sent SMS hearing reminders to the nominated telephone number and referred the applicant to the hearing invitation for further details (CB 66).
On 20 September 2017, the applicant telephoned the Tribunal Registry and requested a copy of the hearing invitation, noting that she had just received an SMS message reminding her of the hearing. The applicant confirmed that her nominated email address as being current and later the same day, the Tribunal again sent the applicant a copy of the hearing invitation to the nominated email address (CB 67).
On 21 September 2017, being one day before the scheduled hearing the Tribunal sent an SMS hearing reminder to the applicant stating the date of the hearing and referring the applicant to the hearing invitation for details (CB 66).
The applicant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on 22 September 2017 (CB 68). On the same day, the Tribunal decided to dismiss the applicant’s application under s 426A(1A)(b) of the Act without any further consideration of the application or the information before the Tribunal pursuant (non-appearance decision) (CB 72-72). The Tribunal notified the applicant of the non-appearance decision by email sent to the nominated email address on the day the decision was made (CB 69). The covering letter informed the applicant that she had until 6 October 2017 to apply for reinstatement, and that the Tribunal would be required to confirm the non-appearance decision if no reinstatement application was lodged by that date (CB 70).
The applicant did not apply for reinstatement (CB 76, [4]). On 9 October 2017, the Tribunal confirmed the non-appearance decision (confirmation decision) (CB 75-76).
As noted above, the non-appearance decision was made on 22 September 2017 when the applicant failed to attend her scheduled hearing and the Tribunal considered whether, pursuant to s 441A(5) of the Act, she had been properly invited to a hearing under s 425 of the Act.
Finding itself so satisfied, having detailed the various ways in which reminders had been sent to the review applicant, and given there had been no reasons provided by the applicant for her inability or her failure to attend, the Tribunal dismissed the application for review without further consideration of it pursuant to s 426A(1A)(b) of the Act.
When the applicant had failed to seek reinstatement of her Tribunal proceeding within time, the Tribunal was required to confirm the non-appearance decision, which it did.
APPLICATION TO THIS COURT
The application to this Court the applicant is taken to seek judicial review of (both) the Tribunal’s decisions under s 476 of the Act and raises four grounds:
1.The Tribunal failed to consider many vital integers of my case;
2.The Tribunal failed to consider many vital evidence that are relevant to my case;
3.The Tribunal deprived me of procedural fairness;
4.The Member has failed to do his duty
On 13 June 2018 a Registrar of this Court made orders, by consent, which included that the applicant file and serve any amended application with proper particulars of the grounds of the application within 28 days before the final hearing date. No such amended application has been filed in time in accordance with those orders, or at all.
The applicant appeared before me this afternoon using the Microsoft Teams platform (due to ongoing COVID-19 restrictions) with the assistance of a Malay interpreter. The first respondent was represented by a solicitor. In the times that the connection was live, it appeared to be clear and without any technical difficulties and the parties and the interpreter did not have any difficulty in understanding one another or engaging with the Court. At one moment, when the meeting ceased to operate properly from the Court’s end, I adjourned briefly in order to relocate courtrooms, following which the hearing proceeded again with no technical difficulties until its conclusion.
RELEVANT LEGISTLATION
The following parts of the Act are relevant to the determination of this application:
425 Tribunal must invite applicant to appear
(1) The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if:
(a) the Tribunal considers that it should decide the review in the applicant’s favour on the basis of the material before it; or
(b) the applicant consents to the Tribunal deciding the review without the applicant appearing before it; or
(c) subsection 424C(1) or (2) applies to the applicant.
(3) If any of the paragraphs in subsection (2) of this section apply, the applicant is not entitled to appear before the Tribunal.
426A Failure of applicant to appear before Tribunal
Scope
(1) This section applies if the applicant:
(a) is invited under section 425 to appear before the Tribunal; but
(b) does not appear before the Tribunal on the day on which, or at the time and place at which, the applicant is scheduled to appear.
Tribunal may make a decision on the review or dismiss proceedings
(1A) The Tribunal may:
(a) by written statement under section 430, make a decision on the review without taking any further action to allow or enable the applicant to appear before it; or
(b) by written statement under section 426B, dismiss the application without any further consideration of the application or information before the Tribunal.
Note 1: Under section 430A, the Tribunal must notify the applicant of a decision on the review.
Note 2: Under section 426B, the Tribunal must notify the applicant of a decision to dismiss the application.
Reinstatement of application or confirmation of dismissal
(1B) If the Tribunal dismisses the application, the applicant may, within 14 days after receiving notice of the decision under section 426B, apply to the Tribunal for reinstatement of the application.
Note: Section 441C sets out when a person (other than the Secretary) is taken to have received a document from the Tribunal for the purposes of this Part.
(1C) On application for reinstatement in accordance with subsection (1B), the Tribunal must:
(a) if it considers it appropriate to do so—reinstate the application, and give such directions as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, by written statement under section 426B; or
(b) confirm the decision to dismiss the application, by written statement under section 430.
Note 1: Under section 426B, the Tribunal must notify the applicant of a decision to reinstate the application.
Note 2: Under section 430A, the Tribunal must notify the applicant of a decision to confirm the dismissal of the application.
(1D) If the Tribunal reinstates the application:
(a) the application is taken never to have been dismissed; and
(b) the Tribunal must conduct (or continue to conduct) the review accordingly.
(1E) If the applicant fails to apply for reinstatement within the 14-day period mentioned in subsection (1B), the Tribunal must confirm the decision to dismiss the application, by written statement under section 430.
Note: Under section 430A, the Tribunal must notify the applicant of a decision to confirm the dismissal of the application.
(1F) If the Tribunal confirms the decision to dismiss the application, the decision under review is taken to be affirmed.
(1G) To avoid doubt, the Tribunal cannot give a decision orally under subsection (1A), (1C) or (1E).
Other measures to deal with failure of applicant to appear
(2) This section does not prevent the Tribunal from rescheduling the applicant’s appearance before it, or from delaying its decision on the review in order to enable the applicant’s appearance before it as rescheduled.
441A Methods by which Tribunal gives documents to a person other than the Secretary
Coverage of section
(1) For the purposes of provisions of this Part or the regulations that:
(a) require or permit the Tribunal to give a document to a person (the recipient); and
(b) state that the Tribunal must do so by one of the methods specified in this section;
the methods are as follows.
…
Transmission by fax, email or other electronic means
(5) Another method consists of a member or an officer of the Tribunal transmitting the document by:
(a) fax; or
(b) email; or
(c) other electronic means;
to:
(d) the last fax number, email address or other electronic address, as the case may be, provided to the Tribunal by the recipient in connection with the review; or
(e) if the recipient is a minor—the last fax number, email address or other electronic address, as the case may be, for a carer of the minor that is known by the member or officer.
In addition reg 4.35D(1) and (3) of Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) relevantly provide:
4.35D Prescribed periods—notice to appear before Tribunal
(1) For subsection 425A(3) of the Act, this regulation sets out the prescribed period of notice of the day on which, and the time and place at which, an applicant is scheduled to appear before the Tribunal in response to an invitation.
…
(3) If the invitation relates to any other application for review of a decision, the period of notice:
(a) commences when the person receives notice of the invitation to appear before the Tribunal; and
(b) ends at the end of:
(i) 14 days after the day the person receives notice of the invitation to appear before the Tribunal; or
(ii) if the person agrees, in writing, to a shorter period of not less than 1 working day—the shorter period.
Note 1: If the Tribunal gives a person a document by a method specified in section 441A of the Act, the person is taken to have received the document at the time specified in section 441C of the Act in respect of the method.
Note 2: A document given to a person in immigration detention is given in the manner specified in regulation 5.02.
GROUNDS
Grounds 1, 2 and 4
In relation to the grounds of review, it is convenient to deal with grounds 1, 2 and 4 together, as each of them generally alleges a failure on the part of the Tribunal member to undertake the review. When asked to speak to each of the grounds, which were interpreted for her individually, the applicant made a variety of submissions.
In relation to ground 1, the applicant made submissions pertaining to her non-appearance. However, I will deal with these under the heading of ground 3 which alleges a denial of procedural fairness, and it seems that those submissions more naturally speak to that issue.
Otherwise, in relation to ground 1 the applicant made submissions that at the time the visa was refused she had tried to make an application for a new visa, that she didn’t know the time limits for judicial review in the Court and she didn’t know what steps she needed to take in order to obtain a visa. The applicant also made submissions which generally went to the merits of the visa for which she applied, and otherwise the submissions made in respect of ground 1 largely overlapped with the submissions that were made in respect of grounds 2 and 4.
In relation to ground 2, the applicant said that she needed a visa to stay here in Australia, and in relation to ground 4 that the Tribunal had failed to give her an opportunity to testify in her case, even though she did not have much evidence. The first respondent’s submissions in this regard say that the applicant erroneously proceeds on a basis that the Tribunal ought to have assessed her claims in a substantive way, notwithstanding the fact that she failed to attend. In addition, the first respondent says that the submissions in substance seek impermissible merits review and fail to identify a jurisdictional error.
The first respondent is correct in saying that where the applicant failed to appear at the hearing before the Tribunal and thereafter also failed to apply for reinstatement of the application, the Tribunal was not obliged to consider the merits of any of the claims within the visa application and was, in fact, entitled to dismiss the application under s 426A(1A)(b) without further consideration of the application simply on all the information before it: see BYF16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 2023 at [21] per Beach J.
Accordingly, there is no basis to assert that the Tribunal failed to consider the integers of the applicant’s case (vital or otherwise) because it was simply not required to do so. There is also nothing before me in the context of the matter having been dismissed for non-appearance to otherwise make good the very bare assertion that the Tribunal failed to do its duty.
In my view, there is no jurisdictional error alleged by any or each of grounds 1, 2 or 4 and, accordingly, they should fail.
Ground 3
However, ground 3 alleges a denial of procedural fairness on the part of the Tribunal and having regard to the matters addressed in relation to the other three grounds of review this ground can really only be interpreted in the context of whether the Tribunal properly followed the requisite processes in inviting the applicant to a hearing, such that when she failed to attend the power in s 426A was enlivened and further, that to the extent that the power in s 426A to dismiss for non-appearance is discretionary, that the discretion was exercised reasonably.
When asked to elaborate on the issue of procedural fairness, albeit the applicant addressed this largely in relation to ground 1, the applicant provided something of an explanation for why it says that she failed to attend the Tribunal hearing.
It will be observed as part of the background which has been set out earlier that the chronology of the matter makes plain that the applicant had telephoned the Tribunal on 20 September 2017, which was two days before she was scheduled to appear before the Tribunal, and the case note records as follows:
ID. 20368993 20/09/2017 03:13:00 PM Enquiry By Phone Arlene Zhu
On 20/9/17 the PRA called requesting a copy of hearing invitation for HD on 22/9/17 as she just received SM message on her phone reminding her on that date she has a hearing; and she confirmed her last known email address is still: [applicant’s email]@yahoo.com; and she also requested a Malay interpreter for the hearing and I told her I would email a copy of hearing invitation shortly.
Next it is important to observe that throughout all relevant times of the Tribunal’s review, including as at the time of her application, the applicant’s nominated email address remained the same, and the Tribunal sent all correspondence to that email address.
I will note, due to a submission that the applicant made later in the hearing, that when she commenced the proceedings in this Court the applicant used a different email address, namely, a Gmail address, for the purposes of these proceedings. However, on 13 January 2022 the applicant filed a Notice of Change of Address for Service with the Court which again provided the same Yahoo email address (defined above as being the nominated email address) which had been used by the Tribunal throughout the review.
In relation to the applicant’s explanation for why she did not appear, while seeming to acknowledge in exchanges with me that she had telephoned the Tribunal to obtain a new copy of the hearing invitation, the applicant said that she had appointed a lawyer and that the lawyer had said that there was no need to attend the hearing because he would attend. Later the applicant also suggested that it was her friends had told her that there was absolutely no need to attend the hearing.
There is no evidence before the Court that a lawyer was ever retained by the applicant in connection with the Tribunal review and, moreover, there was certainly nothing put before the Tribunal to suggest that the applicant was represented by a lawyer. At all times in the documents and addresses that were provided to the Tribunal by the applicant, she gave her own residential and the nominated email address which did not change throughout the proceedings.
In relation to the chronology of the matter I am satisfied from the material in the Court Book, which I set out earlier, that the applicant was properly invited to a hearing by the Tribunal in accordance with the requirements of s 425 of the Act.
I am also satisfied, having reviewed the invitation letter which appears in the Court Book, that it:
(a)gave the applicant notice of the day, time and place at which she was scheduled to appear, thereby complying with s 425A(1) of the Act;
(b)provided the applicant with ample notice of the impending hearing. The prescribed period in reg 4.35D of the Regulations is 14 days. The period of notice given to the applicant was 37 days by reference to the date on which she was deemed to have received the invitation from the Tribunal (being the same date as it was sent pursuant to s 441C(5) of the Act);
(c)was sent to the applicant’s nominated email address, being a permissible method of transmission pursuant to s 441A(5)(b) of the Act; and
(d)contained a statement to the effect of s 426A of the Act, namely, the consequences which may flow from the applicant’s failure to attend.
Having therefore complied with each of ss 425 and 425A of the Act, when the applicant failed to appear on 22 September 2017 the Tribunal was permitted to dismiss the application (by a written statement under s 426B of the Act) without any further consideration of the application or the information before the tribunal and it did so pursuant to s 426(1A)(b).
Proceeding in that way was discretionary, as I have already noted, and that discretion was required to be exercised reasonably: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541 at [3]-[4] per Kiefel CJ.
In one sense, the applicant’s non-appearance before the Tribunal was somewhat surprising.
The relevant case note (see [31] above), demonstrates that only two days before the scheduled hearing the applicant telephoned the Tribunal in response to one of its SMS reminders which she had received and that, as part of that discussion, the Tribunal records the applicant as requesting that a Malay interpreter be provided for the purpose of the hearing and also confirming her nominated email address.
At the very least, the request for the provision of an interpreter might be seen as evincing an intention to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments and to otherwise be able to engage with and participate in the hearing. The hearing information record which is found at page 68 of the Court Book shows that the hearing was due to commence at 9.30 am on 22 September 2017, but that as at 10:00 am that date was said to have been cancelled due to the applicant’s non-appearance.
There is no evidence before me that anyone sought to telephone the applicant from the Tribunal, despite having her mobile number to which multiple hearing reminders had been sent. I raised with the solicitor for the first respondent the decisions of AZAFB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 244 FCR 144 per North ACJ and Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 236 FCR 393 per Mortimer J and sought the Minister’s response.
The solicitor for the first respondent noted that, unlike those cases, the applicant had not provided significant material to the Tribunal other than a request at page 66 of the Court Book for a Medicare letter which was made by telephone, and that the applicant was on notice that she was required to attend, and also the consequences of that, and that she did not at any time contact the Tribunal after 20 September 2017 to indicate that she would not attend. The solicitor for the first respondent also says that the Tribunal is not required under any part of the Act to contact the applicant by phone.
Having regard to the principles that were set out in AZAFB and Kaur, it is important to note that these decisions are of somewhat limited analogous value as each of them does predate the amendment of the Act which introduced the reinstatement power which is contained within s 426A(1B). While on one view the applicant’s non-appearance was somewhat at odds with her conduct and her requests only two days earlier, the Tribunal was entitled to proceed as it did and dismiss the matter given that s 426A(1) had been enlivened.
The application to this Court is not a reinstatement application per se, and therefore the only relevance of the circumstances of the applicant’s non-attendance, which is this case is explained by the applicant alleging that she had retained a lawyer and that she anticipated that the lawyer would appear at the Tribunal in her stead, would be if they intersected with the Tribunal’s exercise of discretion to dismiss.
In relation to the explanation pertaining to the lawyer, not only is there no evidence before the Court that a lawyer has ever been retained by the applicant the relevant question is whether or not that was something which was known to the Tribunal, such that it somehow either ignored the fact or failed to engage with said solicitor in circumstances where it was required to do so.
The applicant had at no time submitted any forms to the Tribunal to indicate she had appointed a representative and the addresses for service, including the nominated email address remained her own personal email address, which she continues to use even in these proceedings.
Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal was on notice at all that the applicant was represented by a lawyer, even assuming that is true, and again I note there is no evidence before me to suggest that it is. It also does not sit with well with the explanation that the applicant had retained a lawyer – that she continued to correspondence with the Tribunal on her own behalf (as reflected in the Tribunal’s case notes in the Court Book), nor that she continued to confirm the use of her own personal email address as the nominated email address.
With all of those matters taken into account, given that the instant applicant, unlike the applicants in AZAFB and Kaur, had the benefit of the reinstatement process, had some legitimate misadventure befallen the applicant on the day of the hearing which prevented her attendance, she had the opportunity to place that evidence before the Tribunal.
Further, the applicant was notified of the Tribunal’s dismissal of her matter on the same date that the dismissal took place and, accordingly, had she had some expectation that a lawyer that she had appointed was supposed to attend the hearing in her place, she was on notice on the same day that this had not occurred. Based on the evidence before me, the applicant did not seek to re-contact the Tribunal, nor did she not avail herself of the reinstatement process which was available to her and of which the Tribunal informed her.
Accordingly, in my view, the dismissal subject to the prospect of reinstatement was a course that was “plainly within the range of possible acceptable outcomes that are defensible in respect of the circumstances of this case”: see EBS17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 187 at [19] to [23] per Lee J.
In relation to the confirmation decision, under s 441C(5) of the Act the applicant was taken to have received the non-appearance decision at the end of the day on which it was transmitted, being 22 September 2017 because, again, it was transmitted by email to her nominated email address. Pursuant to s 426A(1B) the applicant had 14 days after receiving notice of the non-appearance decision to apply to the Tribunal for reinstatement of the application.
Having failed to seek reinstatement, the Tribunal was required to confirm the decision to dismiss the application pursuant to s 426A(1E) of the Act: see also AYT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 252 at [10] per Perram J. There is nothing in the material before me which leads me to conclude that the applicant was denied procedural fairness in the manner in which the Tribunal proceeded to dismiss her application consequent upon her non-appearance at the hearing on 22 September 2017. Accordingly, there is no jurisdictional error established by ground 3 in respect of either of those decisions.
As a result and having already found that none of grounds 1, 2 or 4 also gives rise to a jurisdictional error in respect of either of the non-appearance decisions or the confirmation decisions, I am of the view that the application should be dismissed, and I so order.
In doing so, I explained to the applicant both prior to commencing my reasons and again at the conclusion of the hearing that I would make an order which prevented time running for any appeal from my judgment and orders, until such time as the applicant has received the published reasons for judgment.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given. Associate:
Dated: 16 February 2022
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