Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCAFC 129  

Appeal from: Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs (No 3) [2020] FCA 1655
File number: NSD 5 of 2021
Judgment of: LOGAN, BANKS-SMITH AND ANDERSON JJ
Date of judgment: 28 July 2021
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appellant emigrated from Ukraine to Australia, applied for Australian citizenship, and became an Australian citizen – appellant arrested and imprisoned in late 2004 – relevant Minister exercised power in s 34(2) of the Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) to revoke appellant’s Australian citizenship – appellant sought judicial review of that decision – primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – appellant contends that primary judge erred in finding appellant had not given evidence to the effect that he was never asked to provide information about the status of Ukrainian citizenship or evidence that appellant had never been asked as to whether he had applied to renounce his citizenship – Minister accepts that this statement by primary judge was erroneous – no relevant error – erroneous statement about the absence of evidence had no bearing upon primary judge’s assessment of the substantive grounds or the way in which the primary judge exercised discretion to refuse relief

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – alleged error in exercise of discretion – appellant contends primary judge erred in assessing the appellant’s explanation for delay in seeking judicial review of the relevant decision – appellant contends primary judge failed to adequately take into account relevant matters – appellant contends primary judge misunderstood or did not adequately consider appellant’s evidence – no error of principle in primary judge’s exercise of discretion

EVIDENCE – alleged error in exercise of discretion – appellant alleges that the primary judge erred in making an order under s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) limiting use of two expert reports addressing Ukrainian law – appellant contends primary judge failed to be properly satisfied of or consider relevant matters in s 136 – appellant contends there is an injustice in permitting Minister to adduce evidence regarding appellant’s Ukrainian citizenship status while preventing appellant from doing so – primary judge did not err in making an order under s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – respondents’ notice of contention – respondents challenge primary judge’s finding that relevant Minister did not give active intellectual consideration to appellant’s prospective statelessness – in light of material before Minister, relevant Minister engaged in active intellectual consideration of whether revoking the appellant’s Australian citizenship would render the appellant stateless – respondents’ notice of contention upheld

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 25D

Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), ss 34(2), 34(3), 47(3), 47(5)

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 136

Judiciary Act1903 (Cth), s 39B

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), Division 23.2

Cases cited:

Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353

AXT19 v Minister For Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 32

Bryant, in the matter of…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCAFC 129
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal, brought by Victor Makarov, challenges the decision of the primary judge to dismiss his application for judicial review of the Minister for Home Affairs’ decision to revoke his Australian citizenship under section 34(2) of the Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth). Makarov argued that the primary judge erred in several respects, including in assessing his explanation for the delay in seeking judicial review and in limiting the use of expert reports on Ukrainian citizenship law. The Minister, in turn, contended that Makarov did not give active intellectual consideration to the possibility of Makarov becoming stateless if his Australian citizenship was revoked.

The court dismissed Makarov's appeal, finding no error in the primary judge's assessment of the delay or in the exercise of discretion. Firstly, the court found that the primary judge's erroneous statement that Makarov did not claim he was never asked about his Ukrainian citizenship status did not affect her reasoning or outcome, as she proceeded on the basis that he was not asked. Secondly, regarding the delay in seeking judicial review, the court held that the primary judge did not err in principle, considering factors such as the length of delay, prejudice to the Minister and the public interest, and Makarov's explanation for the delay. The primary judge preferred the Minister's evidence that Ukraine recognised Makarov as a citizen, and the court found no error in this assessment.

Furthermore, the court found no error in the primary judge's order under section 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which limited the use of expert reports on Ukrainian law. The court concluded that the primary judge exercised the appropriate level of care in making this order. Finally, the court upheld the Minister's notice of contention that the primary judge erred in finding that the Minister did not give active intellectual consideration to the possibility of Makarov becoming stateless. The court found that, based on the material before the Minister, he had engaged in such consideration.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, the Minister's notice of contention was upheld, and Makarov was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The respondents’ notice of contention is upheld.

3. The appellant will pay the respondents’ costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

By notice of contention, the Respondents challenged the primary judge’s conclusion that the Minister erred by not giving proper consideration to the question of whether the Appellant remained a Ukrainian citizen.BACKGROUND FACTS It was common ground on the hearing of the appeal that the factual background to the proceedings were conveniently summarised by the primary judge at [13]-[42] of the Reasons, save for the challenge which the Appellant makes in this appeal to the findings made at [24] of the Reasons. At [13]-[42] of the Reasons, the primary judge stated:13 Mr Makarov was born in the former USSR in 1953. When he was three years old his family moved to the Ukraine and he lived there until 1998 when he emigrated with his family in order to take up a position at the Australian Institute of Music.14 It was common ground that, at the time Mr Makarov emigrated from the Ukraine to Australia he was a Ukrainian national, that he applied for Australian citizenship, and that he became an Australian citizen on 8 February 2001. The respondents did not suggest, and there is no evidence to indicate, that at the time the Minister revoked his Australian citizenship he might have been a citizen of any other country.15 Mr Makarov was arrested and imprisoned in late 2004. The circumstances of his imprisonment are discussed below. He was tried on nine charges and convicted of eight: three charges of aggravated indecent assault; two charges of sexual intercourse with a person under authority aged between 10 and 16; and three charges of homosexual intercourse by a teacher of a pupil between the ages of 10 and 16. The following year he was convicted of multiple sexual offences of a similar nature following another two trials. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years.16 Each of the three trials involved different complainants, all students: Application of Victor Makarov pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) [2013] NSWSC 1468.17 Mr Makarov appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The appeals from the convictions entered after the first and second trials were dismissed in consecutive decisions in 2008. The appeal from the convictions entered after the third trial were quashed and new, separate trials were ordered. Mr Makarov was acquitted in both those trials.18 Before the appeals were heard, the Minister began investigating revocation of Mr Makarov’s Australian citizenship.19 On 4 April 2007, apparently in response to an inquiry from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship to the Ukrainian Embassy, the Ukrainian Vice Consul, Natalia Lopatina, informed the Department that:Ukrainian citizens who acquired foreign citizenship do not lose Ukrainian citizenship automatically. To lose Ukrainian citizenship, one has to apply accordingly.20 The recipient of the email, Emma Knapp, acknowledged the response but queried whether the law had changed since 2001 when Article 19.1 of The Law of Ukraine On Citizenship of 18 January 2001 reportedly provided that:The citizenship of Ukraine is lost if a citizen of Ukraine has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of another state after attaining his/her majority.21 Ms Knapp explained that the reason for the query was that the Department had a case in which a Ukrainian citizen had obtained Australian citizenship in February 2001. Mr Makarov’s name was not mentioned in the email or in any of the later emails passing between her and the Vice Consul. But it is obvious that the case in question concerned him.22 Ms Lopatina replied:It is the same law. The only thing is that translation does not report the nuance saying that the person can be eligible for the loss of the citizenship but does not lose it automatically.23 Ms Knapp then asked the Vice Consul whether, if she were to give her the name and details of an individual, Ms Lopatina would be able to ascertain whether the individual was still a Ukrainian citizen. Ms Lopatina said she would but that she would also need information regarding the person’s last known address in the Ukraine.24 The email chain ends abruptly at this point. Before Mr Makarov’s citizenship was revoked, it appears that the Department did not supply any such information to the Ukrainian Embassy and Mr Makarov was not asked for the information. Nor was he asked for “evidence or document” to indicate whether or not he remained a citizen of the Ukraine or whether he had applied to renounce his citizenship. In neither of his affidavits, however, did Mr Makarov say that he was never asked to provide information about any of these matters.25 On 28 May 2007 a letter was sent to Mr Makarov by the Director of the Citizenship Services Section of the Department which put him on notice of the possible deprivation of his Australian citizenship and asked him to provide reasons as to why that action should not be taken.26 On 14 June 2007 Mr Makarov provided a two-page response. In the letter he proclaimed his innocence, his good reputation, and lofty status within the music community, both in Australia and overseas. He declared his intention to appeal against his convictions. He claimed he had ongoing support from family, friends, teachers, former students, and colleagues. He urged the Minister not to make a decision on the question at that stage since he had not exhausted all avenues of appeal or review. A little over two weeks later the letter was resubmitted, this time accompanied by over 80 letters of support.27 The letter said nothing about the status of his Ukrainian citizenship. Mr Makarov made no submission to the effect that depriving him of his Australian citizenship would render him stateless.28 On 22 August 2007 a lawyer acting for Mr Makarov wrote to the Department noting that Mr Makarov was currently “in the process of” appealing his convictions and obtaining legal advice from the Ukraine about “the current status of his Ukrainian nationality”. The lawyer, Katie Malyon, said she would advise the Department when further details were available.29 On 28 August 2007, six days after Ms Malyon’s letter, the Department wrote to the Minister recommending that he revoke Mr Makarov’s Australian citizenship. The full Departmental submission was annexed to Ms Watson’s first affidavit. The Department advised the Minister of the relevant terms of the Citizenship Act and the facts concerning Mr Makarov’s conferral of Australian citizenship and his criminal convictions and sentence. It noted that the convictions brought Mr Makarov “within the scope of the revocation provisions”. It proceeded to state:[2] On 10 April 2007, the Department was advised by the Ukrainian Consul, Canberra, that according to Article 19.1 of The Law of Ukraine on The Citizenship of Ukraine (2001), “Ukrainian citizens who acquire foreign citizenship do not lose Ukrainian citizenship; one has to apply accordingly.” Therefore, Mr Makarov would not have automatically lost his Ukrainian citizenship upon obtaining Australian citizenship.[3] On 28 May 2007, the Department contacted Mr Makarov concerning his liability for deprivation of his Australian citizenship (as it was referred to under the previous Australian Citizenship Act 1948) and asked him to present reasons as to why he should not be deprived of his citizenship. The reply, dated 14 June 2007 and at Attachment B, refers to Mr Makarov’s proclamation of his innocence; his upstanding reputation and status within the music community (both in Australia and internationally); ongoing support from family, friends and former students; and his intentions to appeal against his convictions resulting to his third trial. On 2 July 2007, the Department received another copy of Mr Makarov’s earlier correspondence, accompanied by approximately 80 letters which had been presented to the court. The letters were from former students, colleagues, friends and parents of former students attesting his capabilities as an excellent musician and piano teacher. Also included was a video entitled, Young Piano Stars. Professor Victor Makarov.[4] Applicants for Australian citizenship are required to be “of good character”. Policy states that the seriousness of any offences committed should be considered in the context of ordinary community standards. Crimes including those of sexual abuse, crimes against children, offences committed as part of an ongoing pattern of behaviour, and crimes that incurred a prison sentence totalling 12 months or more, are ordinarily considered to be serious and should be given due weight in an assessment. Had the Department been aware of Mr Makarov’s offences, his citizenship application would have been refused on the grounds that he was not of good character.[5] To revoke Mr Makarov’s Australian citizenship, you would need to be satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest for him to remain an Australian citizen. The term “public interest” (Paragraph 34(2)(c) above refers), is not defined in the Act or in policy and judicial interpretation in this context is limited. In Bijai Prasad v The Minister Assisting the Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), Deputy President I. R. Thompson referred to the Supreme Court of Victoria as aptly describing “the public interest” in the Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith (1991) as follows:‘(It) is a term embracing matters, among others, of standards of human conduct and of the functioning of government and government instrumentalities tacitly accepted and acknowledged to be for the good order of society and for the well being of its members.’(Original emphasis.)30 The submissions went on to provide more detail about the offences and Mr Makarov’s protestations of innocence. They also referred to some of the remarks of the sentencing judges, including the absence of evidence of “possible rehabilitation” and the prospect of reoffending, and evidence given by one of the complainants.31 At [8]–[11] the submissions stated:[8] Revoking Mr Makarov’s Australian citizenship would send a strong message to the community that people who commit serious offences, prior to becoming Australian citizens will not be allowed to continue to enjoy the benefits that status entails.[9] The advantages to the Australian community in revoking Mr Makarov’s Australian citizenship should be balanced against the disadvantages and hardship likely to be caused to Mr Makarov as a result of his revocation. Revocation would remove Australian citizenship status from Mr Makarov, who was convicted of serious offences, thus depriving him of the benefits citizenship bestows.[10] If Mr Makarov’s Australian citizenship is revoked, he would automatically become the holder of an ex-citizen visa, a permanent visa which allows the holder to remain in Australia, but not re-enter. The principal disadvantage to Mr Makarov and his family is that revocation would cause him, and perhaps his wife and daughter, personal sadness and disappointment and possibly hardship.[11] Having balanced the advantages to Australian society, against the disadvantages likely to be caused to Mr Makarov and his family, the Department is of the view that the advantages to Australian society outweigh any disadvantages to Mr Makarov and his family.32 The submissions included the recommendations of the author that Mr Makarov’s citizenship be revoked by signing the attached notice of revocation and that reasons be provided. Underneath the recommendation the following appears:33 Three documents were attached to the submissions: a list of convictions; Mr Makarov’s letter of 14 June 2007; and a notice of revocation. Evidently, neither the video nor the 80 odd testimonials to which the Department referred in its submissions were provided to the Minister. Nor did the Department provide the Minister with Ms Malyon’s letter or apprise him of its contents. In each case, the Department’s conduct is inexplicable.34 On 24 September 2007 the Department wrote to Mr Makarov’s lawyer notifying him of the Minister’s decision, attaching a copy of the notice signed by the Minister and dated, presumably in his hand, 13 September 2007. The notice reads:I, KEVIN ANDREWS, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, having determined that Mr Victor MAKAROV, born on 13 September 1953, is a person to whom subparagraph 34(2)(b)(ii)(c) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (the Act) applies, and being satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest for Mr MAKAROV to continue to be an Australian citizen, have, by this order, exercised my discretion under subsection 34(2) of the Act and deprived Mr MAKAROV of Australian citizenship.35 In the covering letter the Department advised Mr Makarov that, by s 35(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), he was taken to have been granted an ex-citizen visa and explained that that was a permanent visa which allows the holder to remain in, but not re-enter, Australia. At the same time, however, the Department also advised him that, in view of his convictions, the ex-citizen visa could be considered for cancellation on character grounds under s 501 of the Migration Act, that in that event he would not be eligible to reapply for a grant of Australian citizenship for 12 months, and that any new application would be considered against the then applicable criteria, including any character requirements. The letter concluded by informing Mr Makarov of his right to seek review of the decision in the AAT, providing him with the AAT’s address and phone number, and directing him to the AAT’s website for information on how to apply.36 On 13 October 2007 the Department received a representation from a member of the public pleading that the Minister reconsider his decision. The Department replied on 26 October 2007 on behalf of the Minister pointing out that Mr Makarov had been advised of his eligibility to seek a review of the decision in the AAT. But no application for review was filed at this time.37 On 26 October 2015 Mr Makarov received a notice informing him that a decision had been made on 12 October 2015 to cancel his ex-citizen visa under s 501CA of the Migration Act, inviting him to make representations to the responsible Minister to revoke the cancellation decision. He made representations but the Minister was unmoved. On 1 May 2018, Mr Makarov was informed that the Minister would not revoke the cancellation decision.38 Mr Makarov served the full term of his prison sentence. He was released in late 2018 and immediately taken into immigration detention. He then began to search for pro bono legal assistance.39 In May 2019 his present solicitors agreed to act for him and he instructed them to gather information and prepare a case to challenge the Minister’s decision to revoke his Australian citizenship.40 On 8 August 2019 Ms Battinson wrote to the Department of Home Affairs requesting written reasons for the Minister’s decision. That request was rejected.41 In about September and October 2019 Mr Makarov became aware of the opinions of two Ukrainian lawyers and, based on those opinions, formed the view that he had lost his Ukrainian citizenship when he acquired Australian citizenship.42 On 11 November 2019, armed with the material gathered by his lawyers, Mr Makarov applied to the AAT for the Minister’s decision to be reviewed on its merits and shortly thereafter he filed the application in this Court. As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, the application for merits review was dismissed by the AAT and the appeal from the AAT’s decision was also dismissed.GROUND 1 – ALLEGED ERROR IN ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Appellant by ground 3 points to two alleged errors in the primary judge’s exercise of discretion. First, it is said that the primary judge erred in assessing the Appellant’s explanation for the delay in seeking judicial review of the Decision pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act. Second, the Appellant alleges that the primary judge erred in making an order under s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act) limiting the use of two expert reports addressing Ukrainian law. It should be noted that ground 3(b) of the amended notice of appeal has been expressly abandoned. The Appellant’s written and oral submissions also do not advance any submission in support of grounds 3(l) and (m). The Appellant’s submissions identified a number of factors which were identified in the primary judge’s Reasons which pointed against the grant of relief:(a)the first factor was the length of delay of 12 years: Reasons at [125] and [126];(b)the second factor was the prejudice to the Minister and the public interest. As to the public interest, the Appellant contended that the primary judge considered that it was met by the desirability of finality in administrative decisions: Reasons at [127] and [128];(c)third, the primary judge held that, whilst the Appellant had provided an explanation for the delay, he did not explain all of the delay: Reasons at [129]-[132];(d)fourth, the primary judge preferred the Minister’s evidence that the government of Ukraine recognised the Appellant as a citizen of that country: Reasons at [134]. The Appellant made the following submissions in respect to the third and fourth of these reasons, which are the matters that are the subject of this appeal.Explanation for delay The primary judge’s analysis of the explanation for delay is at Reasons [129] to [132].Appellant’s submissions The Appellant submits that a review of the whole of the primary judge’s Reasons reveal that, notwithstanding the use of the word “all” in [129] of the Reasons, the primary judge was concerned with the principle of “unwarrantable” delay. The Appellant submitted to the primary judge that he could never explain every day of the 12 year delay period. The Appellant submitted that whether a delay is “unwarrantable” depends on the specific circumstances of the case. The Appellant submitted that he merely needed to provide a reasonable explanation for the period of time that had elapsed. The Appellant points to the primary judge’s finding that it was the Appellant’s choice not to initially pursue judicial review of the Minister’s decision. The primary judge stated at [131] of the Reasons:Mr Makarov could have pursued both the legal battles over his convictions and judicial review of the Minister’s decision. They were not mutually exclusive. It was Mr Makarov’s choice not to challenge the Minister’s decision. The Appellant submits that, in reaching that finding, the primary judge failed to take into account, either adequately or at all, the limitations placed on the Appellant’s realistic ability to initiate an application for judicial review. The Appellant advanced at least six reasons why his ability to do that was hampered or affected:(a)First, an initial limitation on his abilities by reason of simply being in prison between 2004 and 2018 and then in immigration detention.(b)Second, further limitations on his abilities during his stay in prison as a result of being placed in a segregation unit for four and a half years. He deposed that he did not have access to internet and that he had limited access to telephone and visitors.(c)Third, the trauma associated with three assaults which he sustained whilst in prison.(d)Fourth, his pre-occupation with, and participation in, his criminal trials, appeals and reviews.(e)Fifth, that the appellant laboured under the misconception that his ex-citizen visa meant he could remain in Australia.(f)Sixth, he had exhausted his and his family’s financial resources and searched for legal representation.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Prior to the hearing of the Appellant’s substantive application, the primary judge heard the matter on a separate question: Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2020] FCA 1275 (August 2020 Judgment). At that hearing, the Court was asked to determine whether the fact that the Appellant would become a “person who is not a national or citizen of any country” for the purposes of s 34 of the Citizenship Act was a jurisdictional fact so that the Court could receive evidence on that fact. The Court answered the separate question in the negative: August 2020 Judgment, [25]. The effect of this determination was that the Appellant could not adduce evidence to prove that he had, in fact, been rendered stateless by the Minister’s decision. Before the primary judge, the Appellant sought to read into evidence three affidavits. The Minister sought to challenge one of those affidavits, being an affidavit made and filed by the Appellant on 21 October 2020. The Appellant submitted that the evidence went to the issue of delay. The Minister challenged two reports exhibited to that affidavit, being ‘Annexure 2’ and ‘Annexure 3’. The reports contained opinions from two Ukrainian legal academics on the effect of the attainment of Australian citizenship in 2001 on the Appellant’s Ukrainian citizenship. The Minister objected to the reports being tendered into evidence on the basis of hearsay, relevance and that it was contrary to the August 2020 Judgment. At the Minister’s request, the Court made an order pursuant to s 136 of the Evidence Act that the evidence at [10] of the affidavit be limited to proving that the Appellant received the reports and became aware of their contents at or around September and/or October 2019 and that the reports contained the opinions that are set out in them. The effect of the limitation was that the evidence could not be used to prove the status of the Appellant’s Ukrainian citizenship and the importance of that fact towards the exercise of the discretion. Before the primary judge, the Minister sought to admit two affidavits into evidence made by a lawyer from the Australian Government Solicitor. The Appellant objected to the second of those affidavits which was made and filed by Dale Watson on 27 October 2020, specifically exhibits “DW-9” and “DW-10”, which contained representations by the Ukrainian Embassy that they considered the Appellant to still have Ukrainian citizenship. The Appellant’s objection was primarily on the basis of relevance in that the evidence sought to prove the truth of his Ukrainian citizenship.Appellant’s submissions In this appeal, the Appellant asserts that the primary judge’s error is twofold. First, in making the s 136 limitation on the use of the Appellant’s evidence, the Appellant submits that the primary judge failed to satisfy herself of, or even consider, the relevant matters in s 136. The Appellant submits that neither the Reasons nor the transcript reveal that the primary judge considered that the evidence “might” be either “unfairly prejudicial” or “misleading or confusing”. The Appellant further submits that the primary judge did not consider whether or not there was a “danger” of the evidence having those effects. The Appellant submits that “considerable care” is needed before making a s 136 limitation order and that the primary judge did not exercise “considerable care” nor take into account the relevant requirements of the section: Seven Network Limited v News Limited (No 8) [2005] FCA 1348; 224 ALR 317 per Sackville J at [16] and [21].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For these reasons, the Minister submits that the error in the primary judge’s Reasons at [24] had no bearing upon the primary judge’s assessment of the substantive grounds or the exercise of the discretion to refuse relief.CONSIDERATION OF GROUND 1 To recall, the entirety of [24] of the Reasons reads as follows: The email chain ends abruptly at this point. Before Mr Makarov’s citizenship was revoked, it appears that the Department did not supply any such information to the Ukrainian Embassy and Mr Makarov was not asked for the information. Nor was he asked for “evidence or document” to indicate whether or not he remained a citizen of the Ukraine or whether he had applied to renounce his citizenship. In neither of his affidavits, however, did Mr Makarov say that he was never asked to provide information about any of these matters. The error in the primary judge’s Reasons at [24] was the statement that “[i]n neither of his affidavits … did Mr Makarov say that he was never asked to provide information about any of these matters”, when the facts were that the Appellant was not asked to provide information about his Ukrainian citizenship nor was he asked whether he had renounced his citizenship or for his last address in Ukraine. However, the erroneous statement about the absence of evidence had no bearing upon the primary judge’s assessment of the substantive grounds or the way in which the primary judge exercised the primary judge’s discretion to refuse relief. That is because the reasoning of the primary judge proceeds on the basis that the Appellant was not asked to provide that information. The primary judge’s Reasons were therefore based on findings that were correct. For this reason, ground 1 must be rejected as the erroneous statement about the Appellant’s affidavit had no bearing on her Honour’s reasoning and the outcome.GROUND 3 – ALLEGED ERROR IN THE EXERCISE OF THE DISCRETION The Appellant by ground 3 points to two alleged errors in the primary judge’s exercise of discretion. First, it is said that the primary judge erred in assessing the Appellant’s explanation for the delay in seeking judicial review of the Decision pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act. Second, the Appellant alleges that the primary judge erred in making an order under s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act) limiting the use of two expert reports addressing Ukrainian law. It should be noted that ground 3(b) of the amended notice of appeal has been expressly abandoned. The Appellant’s written and oral submissions also do not advance any submission in support of grounds 3(l) and (m). The Appellant’s submissions identified a number of factors which were identified in the primary judge’s Reasons which pointed against the grant of relief:(a)the first factor was the length of delay of 12 years: Reasons at [125] and [126];(b)the second factor was the prejudice to the Minister and the public interest. As to the public interest, the Appellant contended that the primary judge considered that it was met by the desirability of finality in administrative decisions: Reasons at [127] and [128];(c)third, the primary judge held that, whilst the Appellant had provided an explanation for the delay, he did not explain all of the delay: Reasons at [129]-[132];(d)fourth, the primary judge preferred the Minister’s evidence that the government of Ukraine recognised the Appellant as a citizen of that country: Reasons at [134].