AAA18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AAA18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1045

Appeal from: AAA18 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3091
File number: VID 1472 of 2018
Judge: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 8 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – fast track applicant – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the “IAA”) – whether the IAA erred by failing to obtain and/or consider new information – whether there was a failure to exercise or consider exercising a discretion – whether alleged failure was legally unreasonable – whether the IAA failed to consider a claim – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5AA, 35A, 36, Pt 7AA, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD
Cases cited:

AAA18 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 3091

ARM Constructions Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1986) 10 FCR 197

ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38

Bat Advocacy NSW Inc v Minister for Environment Protection, Heritage and the Arts (2011) 180 LGERA 99

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352

CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641

DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 12

DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 2039

East Melbourne Group Inc v Minister for Planning (2008) 23 VR 605

Faulkner v Conwell (1989) 21 FCR 41

Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600

Repatriation Commission v O’Brien (1985) 155 CLR 422

Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (2012) 207 FCR 277

Stambe v Minister for Health (2019) 364 ALR 513

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008) 176 FCR 153

Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451

Date of hearing: 17 May 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 59
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A. Aleksov
Solicitor for the Appellant: WLW Migration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T. B. Goodwin
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1472 of 2018
BETWEEN:

AAA18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

SNADEN J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the costs of the…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1045
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In AAA18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a fast track applicant, sought judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirming the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant a protection visa. The IAA found that the appellant’s fears of persecution upon returning to the Kurram agency in Pakistan were unreasonable as they could be avoided by relocating to Islamabad, Rawalpindi, or Lahore. The appellant claimed his family and tribal community would kill him due to his criminal record in Australia for sexual offences involving grooming and procuring on social media. However, the IAA doubted the appellant’s claims, considering them exaggerated and unsupported by country information.

The court was required to determine whether the IAA erred in failing to obtain and consider new information, whether there was a failure to exercise or consider exercising a discretion, and whether any such failure was legally unreasonable. Additionally, the court had to assess whether the IAA failed to consider the appellant's claims. The court found that the IAA's decision was reasonable and dismissed the appeal. The appellant’s claims regarding his family's reaction to his criminal record were deemed speculative, and there was no evidence to support the assertion that his family would kill him or cause him serious harm.

The court concluded that the IAA did not err in its assessment and that the appellant's appeal was without merit. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed. This decision underscores the importance of substantiating claims of persecution with credible evidence, particularly when cultural and factual considerations may mitigate the perceived risks.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On 27 November 2017, the IAA affirmed the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant’s Visa Application (that decision is referred to, hereafter, as the “IAA Decision”). It accepted that any fear that the appellant had of being subjected to relevant persecution upon returning to what was then known as Pakistan’s Kurram agency could reasonably be avoided if he relocated to Islamabad, Rawalpindi or Lahore. With respect to the threat that the appellant attributed to his family and tribal community, the IAA observed:11.The [appellant] states that he served a fourteen month prison term after he was convicted in Australia of sexual offences which he indicated involved “grooming” and “procuring” on social media. He stated that because of this “adultery” he has brought shame on his family who have stopped speaking to him and may kill him on return.12.In the SHEV application the [appellant] stated that he spoke to his mother every two weeks. He claimed at the SHEV interview a few months later that he had no contact with his family. Given that he made claims based on the problems with his family in his SHEV application, it appears that his mother must have known about the offences at that time, and it appears odd, if the [appellant’s] claims about his family’s reaction were true, that he would continue to have regular contact with his mother even after she, and the family at large, became aware of the offence. This leads me to think that the [appellant] has exaggerated the extent of his family’s concern about his criminal record, as does the claim that the “whole tribe” had stopped talking to him. The [appellant] has provided no evidence of specific threats by his family, or as to the basis of his belief that they would kill him. The claim does not appear to be supported by country information.13.… Given the cultural propensity to hold women responsible for sexual crimes, as evidenced in the information that was before the delegate, and given the particular nature of the crimes committed by the [appellant], where it is not clear whether he had any actual physical contact with the victim, I have serious doubts that the [appellant] would be viewed as having brought dishonour on his family, certainly to the extent that they would kill him. In so finding I have taken into account the recent figures indicating that the number of men killed in honour crimes is very small. I am willing to accept that if the fact that the [appellant] has committed a crime and served a prison sentence is indeed known to his family this may be a matter of shame and embarrassment. However, I do not accept that there is a real chance that he would be killed by members of his family or extended tribe. Nor am I satisfied that the family would take any other measures against him that would amount to serious harm. I consider that the possibility that they would refuse even to have contact with him on return is purely speculative. In the light of these findings it is not necessary to determine whether the harm inflicted by the [appellant’s] family would be done for any of the reasons in s.5.1(1)(a).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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