FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 734
Appeal from: Makarov and Minister for Home Affairs (Citizenship) [2019] AATA 5161 File number: NSD 2183 of 2019 Judge: KATZMANN J Date of judgment: 29 May 2020 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — appeal from decision to refuse to extend time to apply to Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review decision of Minister to cancel Australian citizenship — where application made more than 12 years after decision was made — whether Tribunal misconstrued s 29(7) of Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1976 (Cth) or ignored or incorrectly applied relevant principles Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 29, 44
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 33.12(2)(b)
Cases cited: ActewAGL Distribution v Australian Energy Regulator (2011) 195 FCR 142
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; 75 ALJR 470; 177 ALR 491
Vella v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 42; 90 ALJR 89; 326 ALR 391
Date of hearing: 22 May 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 47 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Bersten Solicitor for the Applicant: Human Rights for All Pty Ltd Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Knowles Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 2183 of 2019 BETWEEN: VICTOR MAKAROV
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 MAY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KATZMANN J:
Victor Makarov was born in the Soviet Union and later lived in the Ukraine where he acquired Ukrainian citizenship. Sometime after arriving in this country, he was granted Australian citizenship. Thereafter he was convicted of multiple child sex offences and his citizenship was revoked. The decision to revoke his citizenship (cancellation decision) was made by the then Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the Hon Kevin Andrews MP, under paras 34(2)(b)(ii) and (c) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), which relevantly entitled the Minister to revoke a person’s citizenship if “the person has, at any time after making the application to become an Australian citizen, been convicted of a serious offence within the meaning of subsection (5)” and “the Minister is satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest for the person to remain an Australian citizen”.
Mr Makarov contends that the Minister erred in making the decision and wanted to challenge it in the Tribunal. The primary basis for his contention is that para 34(3)(b) of the Citizenship Act provides that the Minister must not revoke…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 734
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the AAT misapplied the relevant statutory provisions and principles in denying Makarov an extension of time. The court noted that an applicant for an extension of time does not need to establish “truly exceptional circumstances” and that the Tribunal can grant an extension if it is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so. The court also noted that the AAT considered relevant factors such as the explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the substantive application. The court found that the AAT applied the correct approach and that there was no error in the AAT’s decision.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs. The court held that the AAT did not misconstrue the relevant statutory provisions or principles in denying Makarov an extension of time, and that the AAT’s decision was reasonable in all the circumstances. The court found that the delay in making the application for review was significant and that Makarov had not provided an acceptable explanation for the delay. The court also noted that the delay had caused prejudice to the respondent and that there were public considerations that militated against the grant of an extension.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For the following reasons, the notion that the Tribunal applied the wrong test was misconceived and the appeal must be dismissed.Consideration The period in which a review may be brought is prescribed by s 29 of the AAT Act. Section 29(7) provides:Tribunal may extend time for making application The Tribunal may, upon application in writing by a person, extend the time for the making by that person of an application to the Tribunal for a review of a decision (including a decision made before the commencement of this section) if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so. There is no doubt that, as a matter of law, an applicant for an extension of time does not need to establish “truly exceptional circumstances”. No such condition appears in s 29(7) and it would be wrong to interpret it in that way. The Minister did not argue otherwise. Mr Makarov submitted that the correct approach was for the Tribunal to weigh up the relevant factors referred to in Hunter Valley Developments and summarised in ActewAGL Distribution v Australian Energy Regulator (2011) 195 FCR 142 at [88]. In ActewAGL, at [88], I said that the general principles which Wilcox J drew from the case law were these:(a)There is no need to show special circumstances but the Court cannot ignore the statutory period. The starting point is that the legislature has prescribed a period. An extension of time will not be granted unless the Court is “positively satisfied that it is proper to do so”. Any applicant for an extension must provide an acceptable explanation for the delay and establish that it is “fair and equitable in the circumstances” to extend time.(b)Any action the applicant has taken apart from the proceedings is relevant to the question of whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished. A distinction is to be made between the case of a person who, by non-curial means, has continued to make the decision-maker aware that she or he contests the finality of the decision (that she or he has not “rested on his [sic] rights”) and a case where the decision-maker was allowed to believe that the matter was finally concluded. The reasons for this distinction are not only the “need for finality in disputes” but also the “fading from memory” problem referred to in Wedesweiller v Cole (1983) 71 FLR 256; 47 ALR 528.(c)Any prejudice to the respondent, including any prejudice in defending the proceedings occasioned by the delay, is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension.(d)Still, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension. In this context, public considerations often intrude. A delay which may result, if the application is successful, in the unsettling of other people or of established practices is likely to prove fatal to the application.(e)It is proper to take into account the merits of the substantive application.(f)Considerations of fairness as between the applicants and other persons otherwise in a similar position are relevant to the way in which the discretion should be exercised …(g)Decisions affecting only the immediate parties are to be distinguished from those involving public administration, where the public interest may well dictate refusal of an extension, even after only a short delay.