O'Hara and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation)

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O'Hara and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) [2023] AATA 402 (2 March 2023)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:          2023/0455

Re:Jason O'Hara

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Postal Corporation

RESPONDENT

Reasons FOR Decision

Tribunal:Senior Member C. J. Furnell

Date:2 March 2023

Date of written reasons:         17 March 2023

Place:Melbourne

Pursuant to a decision made on 2 March 2023, the Tribunal refused the Applicant’s application under s 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) for an extension of time within which to lodge an application for review of a decision of the Respondent dated 19 April 2022. The following are the written reasons for that decision.

.........................[SGD]...............................................

Senior Member C. J. Furnell

Catchwords

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time within which to lodge application for review – principles regarding whether extension should be granted – length of delay – explanation for delay – whether fault of solicitors constitutes an adequate explanation for delay – prejudice to Respondent – merits of underlying application – extension of time application refused

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)

Cases

Antonious v Comcare [2018] AATA 3968

Australian Appaloosa Association Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] AATA 3173

BLD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1400

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority and Taylor (1996) 139 ALR 1

Bristowe v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 690

BVG17 v BVH17 [2019] FCAFC 17

CKT20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 124

Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441

Crick v Prosegur Australia Pty Ltd [2016] AATA 313

Downing v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1684

Englezos v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2023] FCA 31

Franklin v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 18

Frugtniet v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] FCA 1227

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 48 ALR 305

Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 16

Makarov v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 734

Matson v Australian Information Commissioner (No 2) [2021] FCA 690

Matthews v Markos [2019] FCA 1827

Miller v Minister [2022] FCAFC 183

MZZFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1133

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391

Ryan v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2019] FCA 1607

Saad v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2019] AATA 31

Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 150

Social Security, Secretary, Department of Van Dan Boogaart (1995) 37 ALD 619

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

SZUTY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2016] FCA 289

Weber v Carkeek [2023] VSCA 39

Wekerle v Department of Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1300

Zaiter and Comcare (Compensation) [2022] AATA 2353

Zanbergs v…

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Details
Case
[2023] AATA 402
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr O’Hara for an extension of time within which to lodge an application for review of a decision made by the Australian Postal Corporation. The application was heard by C. J. Furnell SM.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether to grant the applicant an extension of time to lodge his application for review. In determining this, the court was required to consider the length of the delay, the explanation provided for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the underlying application.

The court found that the applicant had not provided a good or adequate explanation for the significant delay in lodging the review application. While acknowledging that the fault of solicitors can constitute an adequate explanation for delay, the court noted that this does not absolve the applicant of all responsibility. The court accepted that the respondent would not suffer prejudice of relevance due to the delay, as the evidentiary difficulties alluded to would have been encountered regardless of the timing of the application. The merits of the underlying application were also not a significant consideration.

Ultimately, the court was not satisfied that the applicant had provided an adequate explanation for the delay, nor that the delay had prejudiced the respondent. Given the significance of the delay and the lack of a satisfactory explanation, the court refused to grant the extension of time sought by the applicant.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The opportunity afforded by that letter was not taken up. Instead, the applicant’s lawyers stated (with my emphasis) that, since that 15 June 2022 letter, they had:“…been in ongoing communications with Australia Post to obtain determinations for Mr O’Hara’s ongoing incapacity payments… Amidst the ongoing discussions with Australia Post, we had decided to put off lodging this decision until we had a clearer understanding of the incapacity issue and relevant periods. While awaiting further determinations, due to our oversight we had missed the 60 day time frame to lodge this particular reviewable decision.”[22][22] Application for an extension of time of 18 January 2023. The second aspect of that statement concerning “our oversight” reflected what was the primary focus of the applicant’s submissions at the hearing of the extension application. Put shortly, it was submitted that the delay in lodgement of the review application was the fault of the applicant’s solicitors and that their fault ought not be sheeted home to the applicant. I accept that the fault of a person’s solicitors can constitute an adequate explanation for delay caused by that fault. In Comcare v A’Hearn,[23] the Court considered a tribunal decision in which it was said that the “inexcusable delay” of a person’s solicitors could not constitute an acceptable explanation for the person’s delay. The Court’s conclusion was that “this approach cannot stand”.[23] Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441 at [11]-[13]. Since A’Hearn, there have been a number of Tribunal and Court decisions in which it was accepted that delay caused by a person’s solicitors ought not be sheeted home to the person.[24] That acceptance does not, however, mean that a person avoids all responsibility for delay causally connected to the conduct of the person’s solicitors.[24] See, for example, Matthews v Markos [2019] FCA 1827 at [92]; Ryan v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2019] FCA 1607 at [37]; BLD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1400 at [6]. In Zaiter,[25] an explanation for delay was considered adequate in circumstances where the relevant delay was said to reveal administrative incompetence of the applicant’s representatives, but no direct failure of the applicant concerned.[26] Indeed, there, the applicant claimed to have instructed her solicitors to proceed to appeal a decision but they had simply failed to do so.[27][25] Zaiter and Comcare (Compensation) [2022] AATA 2353. [26] Ibid at [29].[27] Ibid at [22]. In Zanbergs,[28] SM Toohey also implicitly found that delay was adequately explained by the failure of the applicant’s legal representatives. Importantly, however, the Senior Member accepted that “…an applicant who, for example, does little or nothing to pursue an application…cannot be said to have an acceptable explanation for delay merely because her solicitors also delayed matters.”[29] In that case, the applicant was found to have had “…sought to have the decision reviewed at every step. She sought reconsideration within time when that was available to her.”[30][28] Zanbergs v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2014] AATA 866.[29] Ibid at [27].[30] Ibid at [29].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As stated earlier, I am not satisfied that the applicant has a good or adequate explanation for the delay. This, together with the significance of the delay, weighs heavily against granting the extension sought by the applicant. Other considerations Other considerations normally taken into account in deciding whether to be satisfied that it is proper to grant an extension include prejudice to the respondent occasioned by the delay and the merits of the underlying application. Neither of those considerations is of significance in this proceeding. As for prejudice, the applicant submitted that the respondent would not suffer any prejudice of relevance. I accept the gist of that submission. In order to be satisfied that a respondent would suffer specific prejudice as a result of granting an extension application, it would normally be expected that the respondent put on evidence showing its nature and extent.[38] In this proceeding, no such evidence was before the Tribunal.[38] Zizza v Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 37. The respondent nevertheless submitted that it would suffer prejudice should the applicant’s extension application be granted. In this regard, to some extent, prejudice might be inferred from the mere passage of time. Such prejudice does not require evidence “…beyond the inferences flowing from the passage of time and the common knowledge that memory may fade with time and that making inquiries to test facts which are asserted may become increasingly difficult over time…”.[39][39] Frugtniet v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] FCA 1227 at [18]. The respondent alluded to an evidentiary difficulty if the proceeding were to go ahead. Apparently, issues concerning the applicant’s capacity to work overtime since around 2012 would need to be considered. That may be true. As noted on behalf of the applicant, however, the prejudice of relevance in this proceeding is that occasioned by the delay in lodging the review application. The evidentiary difficulty the respondent would have encountered in responding to the applicant’s proceeding is not prejudice of that type. Were the applicant to have made a timely review application, it is a difficulty which the respondent would need to have confronted. It is not a difficulty occasioned by the applicant’s seven-month delay. While I am not satisfied that the applicant’s delay in lodging his application for review has prejudiced the respondent, the absence of any finding that the respondent would be so prejudiced is not enough to justify the grant of an extension.[40][40] BVG17 v BVH17 (2019) 268 FCR 448 at [134]; Franklin v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 18 at [25]. As for the merits of the underlying application, this entails an examination at an impressionistic level of an applicant’s grounds of review to see whether they are “…’reasonably arguable’, ‘sufficiently arguable’ or have ‘reasonable prospects of success’.”[41][41] MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 at [63]; Englezos v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2023] FCA 31 at [53].