Weber v Carkeek
[2023] VSCA 39
•3 March 2023
| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCI 2022 0093 |
| PAUL WEBER | Applicant |
| v | |
| EWAN CARKEEK AND OTHERS ACCORDING TO THE ATTACHED SCHEDULE | Respondents |
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| JUDGES: | WALKER JA and J FORREST AJA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 17 February 2023 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 3 March 2023 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2023] VSCA 39 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2020] VSC 366 (Richards J) |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for leave to appeal – Where leave to appeal granted but appeal dismissed under s 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 – Application for extension of time under r 64.08 of Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (‘Rules’) – Application for security for costs under r 64.38(2) of the Rules – Whether delay in bringing application for extension of time – Whether reasons for delay sufficient – Whether granting extension of time would prejudice respondents – Application for extension of time dismissed – Costs – Application for security for costs dismissed.
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 ss 117, 148; Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 rr 64.08, 64.38(2); Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 s 21.
Leeworthy v Registrar of the Licencing Appeals Tribunal [2017] VSCA 353, applied; Winter-Cooke v Winter-Cooke (2022) VSCA 264, discussed.
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| Counsel | |||
| Applicant: | The applicant appeared in person | ||
| Respondents: | Mr M Lapirow | ||
Solicitors | |||
| Applicant: | The applicant was not represented | ||
| Respondents: | Davies Moloney | ||
WALKER JA
J FORREST AJA:
Introduction
The applicant, Mark Weber, has for a number of years been engaged in a bitter dispute with Ewan and Lorraine Carkeek (the ‘Carkeeks’). They are the respondents to Mr Weber’s application to extend the time in which to bring an application for leave to appeal a decision of a judge of the trial division of this Court.[1]
[1]Mrs Alison Carkeek was joined by Mr Weber to his VCAT claim before the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. That part of the claim was dismissed. Mrs Carkeek has also been joined in this application but has taken no active part in it.
The dispute stems from arrangements entered into between Mr Weber and the Carkeeks in respect of the use of the Carkeeks’ property at Berringama in the high country of northern Victoria, relatively close to Corryong in the Shire of Towong.
In August 2018, their respective claims ended up at the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘VCAT’). These centred on the Carkeeks endeavouring to regain possession of their property and a miscellany of money claims by both parties covering rent, loans, agistment of cattle and the provision of consultancy services.
A Senior Member of VCAT made orders in both parties’ favour but most of Mr Weber’s claims were dismissed.[2]
[2]Weber v Carkeek (Civil Claims) [2018] VCAT 1944.
Mr Weber filed an application for leave to appeal the VCAT decision to the Trial Division of this Court pursuant to s 148 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (‘VCAT Act’).
His application was heard on 17 April 2020 by a judge of this Court. It was dismissed on 22 June 2020.[3]
[3]Weber v Carkeek [2020] VSC 366 (‘Reasons’).
On 10 October 2022, Mr Weber filed an application for leave to appeal the decision of the judge. He also applied for an extension of time in which to bring an application for leave to appeal to this Court pursuant to r 64.08 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (the ‘Rules’). The application for leave to appeal was filed about 26 months out of time.
On 8 December 2022, the Carkeeks filed an application seeking security for their costs of the proceeding in this Court pursuant to r 64.38(2) of the Rules.
The application for an extension of time was heard on 17 February 2023.
Having read the parties’ written cases and listened to their oral submissions, we determined not to grant an extension of time in which to bring the application for leave to appeal the orders of the judge. We advised both Mr Weber and the Carkeeks in Court that we would provide written reasons and make formal orders accordingly. These are our reasons for refusing the application.
Factual background
To delve into the detail of the dispute between Mr Weber and the Carkeeks on an application such as this would be unnecessary. It suffices to adopt the following summary of the judge:[4]
[4]Reasons, [1]–[8] (emphasis omitted).
Mark Weber met Ewan Carkeek in April 2016, during a horse riding event near Corryong, at a time when Mr Weber was looking to move to the high country. Mr Carkeek was looking for someone to work on a farming property that he owns with his wife, Lorraine Carkeek, at Berringama in the Upper Murray region. Mr Weber and Mr Carkeek agreed that Mr Weber would live in a house on the property in exchange for doing work on the farm, and they negotiated the details of the arrangement. Shortly afterwards, Mr Weber moved to the property.
While Mr Weber was living and working at Berringama, he made several loans to Mr Carkeek. The first loan was in May 2016 for $50,000. In June and July 2017, Mr Weber lent a further $50,000 to Mr Carkeek.
On 28 June 2017, over dinner at the Carkeeks’ house, Mr Weber discussed with them his business plan for a beef cattle enterprise. Following that discussion, Mr Weber purchased some cattle, which he agisted on the Carkeeks’ property. He also provided some business advice to Mr Carkeek.
Unfortunately, the relationship between Mr Weber and Mr and Mrs Carkeek soured. Mr Weber stopped working on the property in December 2017, although he remained living there until October 2018, and also kept his cattle agisted on the property. In January 2018, he asked for repayment of the loans, and claimed to be owed $36,150 for management fees. During May 2018, Mr Weber became concerned about the condition of the cattle and claimed that Mr Carkeek had deliberately starved them by keeping them in the same paddock for over three months. There was ongoing conflict about the agistment of Mr Weber’s cattle, until he sold the last of them on 1 October 2018.
In May 2018, Mr Weber made an application to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, seeking orders against Mr and Mrs Carkeek under the Australian Consumer LawandFair Trading Act 2012 (Vic). He sought payment of around $750,000 in respect of the loans that had not been repaid, for management consultancy services provided, and for breach of the agistment agreement. In July 2018, Mr Weber joined Mr Carkeek’s mother, Alison Carkeek, as the third respondent, on the basis that she had been in partnership with Mr and Mrs Carkeek until sometime in 2017.
The Carkeeks disputed the claims made by Mr Weber and counterclaimed for rent and agistment fees. They also applied to the Tribunal for a possession order under the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (Vic). In August 2018, [VCAT] made an order requiring Mr Weber to vacate the house on the property by 28 October 2018.
The proceedings brought under the Fair Trading Act were heard by [VCAT], constituted by [a] Senior Member … over six days in October and November 2018. By that time, the amounts claimed by Mr Weber exceeded $2 million, including over $1.5 million for loss of future opportunity due to the termination of the agistment agreement. Mr Weber appeared for himself throughout the hearing, while the Carkeeks were represented by a solicitor.
On 7 December 2018, [VCAT] made the following orders:
1.The claims against the third respondent [Alison Carkeek] are dismissed.
2.Mark Weber must pay Ewan Carkeek and Lorraine Carkeek the sum of $84,014.35.
3.Ewan Carkeek and Lorraine Carkeek must pay Mark Weber the sum of $10,000.
4.Ewan Carkeek must pay Mark Weber the sum of $125,142.42.
The reasons of the Senior Member were delivered on 7 December 2018.[5]
[5]Weber v Carkeek (Civil Claims) [2018] VCAT 1944.
Subsequently, the Carkeeks obtained a warrant of seizure and sale for the debt arising out of the costs order of the judge, which was executed upon Mr Weber on 8 April 2022.
If any further detail is necessary to demonstrate the ongoing nature and extent of the dispute between the parties, it can be found in the decision of Irving AsJ of 26 August 2022.[6]
The appeal to the judge
[6] Weber v Carkeek & Ors [2022] VSC 498.
Mr Weber sought leave to appeal the VCAT orders to the Trial Division of this Court pursuant to s 148 of the VCAT Act. He also sought an extension of time within which to apply for leave, as the notice of appeal was filed three days after the expiry of the prescribed time limit.
His notice of appeal raised four questions of law, summarised as follows in her Honour’s judgment:
(a)Was there a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the senior member, in circumstances where Mr Weber had made a complaint about her during the interlocutory stage of the [VCAT] proceeding?
(b)Did [VCAT] fail to give Mr Weber a fair hearing, due to the manner in which the hearing was conducted?
(c)Did [VCAT] fail to apply the provisions of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) to the determination of Mr Weber's claims?
(d)Were [VCAT’s] reasons adequate?[7]
[7]Reasons, [10] (emphasis omitted).
The judge reached the following conclusions:
(1)Was there a reasonable apprehension of bias?
The judge observed that the test for reasonable apprehension of bias by a judicial officer applied equally to members of VCAT, ‘who exercise judicial power and are bound by the rules of natural justice’.[8] Her Honour dismissed Mr Weber’s claim that the Senior Member was biased towards him, finding that neither Mr Weber’s complaints during the course of the hearing nor the surrounding circumstances could have created a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Senior Member, who had in fact demonstrated impartiality.[9]
(2)Did VCAT fail to give Mr Weber a fair hearing?
Mr Weber argued that the Senior Member unduly intervened when he was cross-examining witnesses. The judge determined that there was nothing unfair about the Senior Member’s conduct.[10] Her Honour also dismissed Mr Weber’s claim that the Senior Member was not competent because she did not understand the applicable law, noting that it was Mr Weber — and not the Senior Member — who did not understand VCAT’s jurisdiction with respect to the Australian Consumer Law and Fair Trading Act 2012 (the ‘ACL’).[11] The judge rejected Mr Weber’s claim that he had been denied procedural fairness in the course of the hearing.[12] Her Honour was satisfied that Mr Weber was ‘given more than a reasonable opportunity to put his case’.[13]
(3)Did VCAT misapply the ACL?
Her Honour could not discern anything in the transcript of the VCAT hearing that demonstrated that the Senior Member did not understand the ACL (and specifically s 21 of the ACL, which related to Mr Weber’s unconscionability claim).[14] Instead, her Honour considered that Mr Weber’s dissatisfaction with the determination of his claim stemmed from an imperfect understanding of the legal concept of unconscionability under the ACL.
(4)Were VCAT’s reasons adequate?
VCAT’s reasons were summarised by the judge.[15] Her Honour observed that s 117 of the VCAT Act imposes on VCAT the obligation to provide reasons. She also described the standard of reasons required.[16] Ultimately, her Honour could detect no problem with the Senior Member’s path of reasoning or the basis on which the decision had been reached. Accordingly, the judge dismissed this claim, finding that the reasons met the standard required by s 117.[17]
[8]Reasons, [61].
[9]Reasons, [63].
[10]Reasons, [76]–[80].
[11]Reasons, [81]. The ACL is Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).
[12]Reasons, [107].
[13]Ibid.
[14]Reasons, [121]–[123].
[15]Reasons, [13]–[44]. For VCAT’s summary of its findings, see: Weber v Carkeek (Civil Claims) [2018] VCAT 1944, [120]–[122].
[16]Reasons, [125].
[17]Reasons, [129].
The judge granted Mr Weber leave to appeal and extended the time by which he was to apply for leave to appeal. However, the appeal was dismissed and Mr Weber was ordered to pay the Carkeeks’ costs on the standard basis.[18]
[18]Reasons, [130]–[133].
Proposed grounds of appeal to this Court
Mr Weber filed an application to extend the time by which he could seek leave to appeal the decision and orders of the judge on 10 October 2022, together with his application for leave to appeal.
Mr Weber’s proposed grounds of appeal are as follows:
(1)The learned trial judge erred in law in failing to interpret statute law (as being applied in this case) and fell into error by applying the wrong principles relevant to that interpretation.
(2)The learned trial judge erred in law in finding that a cause of action brought to the VCAT as an ACL application was not mutually exclusive.
(3)The learned trial judge erred in law by adopting a court of record approach to the manner in which VCAT held and determined a proceeding, and this denied [Mr Weber] a Fair Hearing.
(4)The learned trial judge erred in law in not giving weight to the ACL provisions where the whole of the conduct of [the Carkeeks] was required to be identified to bring a cause of action for unconscionable, misleading and deceptive conduct.
(5)The learned trial judge, having examined [Mr Weber’s] Further Amended Points of Claim which contained a heads of claim for breaches of conduct under the ACL, that included deceptive and misleading, egregious, vicarious and that falls below the standards of behaviour established by law for the protection of the applicant against unreasonable risk of harm, erred in failing to examine all of the above conduct but limited the scope of her judgement to only examining conduct that amounted to unconscionable conduct.
(6)The learned trial judge erred in law and failed to determine [Mr Weber] was at any special disadvantage and did not consider the evidence contrary to the VCAT determination.
Material in support of the application to extend time
Mr Weber swore an affidavit on 4 October 2022 in support of this application and filed this with his written case on 10 October 2022.
In the affidavit of support, he states as follows:
On 21 October 2018, I was removing all my cattle from Mr Carkeek’s property. I was mustering my cattle on a public road outside Mr Carkeek’s property using a quad bike. For reasons that I do not know, Mr Carkeek confronted me while he was also riding a quad bike. At great speed, he attempted to ram my quad bike which caused me to hit a concrete fence post at high speed.
This caused a reasonably serious injury to my left knee, aggravating an already previously injured knee. I was left in much pain and attended hospital.
I attended police on 22 October 2018 and they made out a report …
I made a Transport Accident claim for the injury which was accepted …
I had an MRI done on my left knee which revealed significant damage to an existing injury. The results showed it had caused major damage and reaggravated the arthritis in this knee. I was left in severe pain, and since this accident I am in constant pain requiring daily pain medication …
My ongoing pain medication leaves me drowsy and I find it hard to concentrate. The pain is ongoing and debilitating at times. I find it difficult to stay seated with my leg bent, because this agitates the arthritis.
On 1 December 2019, I had a serious horse riding [injury] where I broke eight ribs, five of them double broken (Flailed). I also suffered a punctured lung and bleeding close to my heart. I was airlifted from the Echuca Base hospital and flown to the Royal Melbourne Hospital and admitted on 2 December 2019. I had emergency surgery …
Whilst the ribs have healed, the damage to the soft tissue and spine remains. I constantly suffer from back pain, and on pain medications to assist with the pain. The ongoing pain causes great discomfort to the extent I spent much of my time reclined or laying down and find it difficult to sit in a chair, or for that matter in front of computer. Even though it occurred in December 2019, I still suffer acute pain from this injury …
In or about early August 2020, my long term partner decided to leave the relationship because of the ongoing issues I was having. This meant that I had to pack up any and all of my possessions I had at that time and find a new place to move to and then relocate. I moved in late October 2020. This was a very stressful and only has added to my anxiety.
I sought professional advice and was diagnosed on 29 September 2020 with ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and comorbid Major Depressive Disorder. Anxiety in the form of generalised anxiety and OCD tendencies, with a degree of personality decompensation due to severe distress’. The diagnosis explains in detail the issues I have, that it is long term and difficult to treat, noting the report states ‘… that treatment is likely to be quite challenging and that the treatment is likely to be arduous with many reversals …’
In his affidavit, Mr Weber also stated that his post-traumatic stress disorder made it difficult to carry out daily tasks and it was hard to concentrate. He also referred to the execution of the Carkeeks’ warrant in relation to the costs order made by the judge and that ‘this placed an urgency for the appeal to be completed and filed’.
A report from a clinical and forensic psychologist, Dr Susette Sowden, dated 29 September 2020 (and addressed to his general practitioner) was exhibited to his affidavit. Her conclusion as to Mr Weber’s condition was as follows:
Mr Weber is presenting with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and comorbid Major Depressive Disorder. Of concern also is his probable Alcohol Use Disorder. His anxiety is also manifesting in the form of generalised anxiety and OCD tendencies. He is also experiencing a degree of personality decompensation due to the severe distress he has been experiencing.
In his written submissions, Mr Weber developed what was essentially an ‘ill-health’ contention, arguing that the various problems associated with his mental and physical conditions impaired his ability to file his appeal to this Court. In addition to these difficulties, Mr Weber maintained that there were real prospects of success on the appeal as her Honour’s path of reasoning was flawed and there were inconsistencies with her Honour’s consideration of the relevant statutes.
In his oral submissions, much of Mr Weber’s time was taken up with an attack on the Carkeeks, their solicitors and counsel. We remain mystified as to how these attacks (which were lengthy and highly personal at times) had any relevance to this application.
Of more immediate relevance was Mr Weber’s statement in Court that the true basis for bringing this application was a ‘crystallising moment’ which occurred after the Carkeeks’ warrant was served in April last year. This, he said, motivated him to pursue the application for leave to appeal out of time:
But it’s fair to say that it wasn’t until after the warrant was served and to finalise putting in the appeal document this — or last year, that I finally found what the core issue was that would be overwhelmingly convincing of this Court. And that was that there was a statutory obligation on the VCAT that they can only award damages from a statutory source, and that was found in the decision of Tucci. And it was there that I realised — that was the crystallising moment —that the appeal under all the circumstances would have to be successful, because that was undisputable.
And I found that VCAT had awarded damages that were in excess of their statutory authority. That made the continuance and the viability of the appeal and to continue with it my motivating factor, because that was the crystallising factor. All the other issues before it — the written case, I’ve probably written four or five times over and changed it, because of finding additional evidence. But it wasn’t until that particular point that I found — there it is. That’s what I’m looking for.[19]
[19]The reference to ‘Tucci’ is to the decision of Tucci v Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (2010) 33 VAR 206 (‘Tucci’).
Applicable principles
The principles were not in issue and are set out succinctly in the decision of this Court in Leeworthy v Registrar of the Licencing Appeals Tribunal in which Tate and McLeish JJA said as follows:
In deciding the applicant’s application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal, it is necessary to take account of several factors, including:
(a) the length of the delay;
(b) the reasons for that delay; and
(c)the extent of any prejudice suffered by the respondent or any third party if the extension were to be granted.
It is well established that an extension of time will not be granted if the proposed appeal is ‘so devoid of merit that it would be futile to do so’.[20]
[20][2017] VSCA 353, [20] (Tate and McLeish JJA), quoting Kambouris v Kiatos [2016] VSCA 266, [23] (McLeish JA and Riordan AJA). See also Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516, 519–24 (Brennan CJ and McHugh J); Muto v Secretary, Department of Planning and Community Development (2013) 38 VR 293, 296 [13] (Nettle AP and Neave JA).
Consideration and disposition
Length of and reasons for delay
The length of the delay is significant, with Mr Weber’s application for leave to appeal having been filed approximately 26 months out of time.
Mr Weber’s explanations are both inconsistent and unpersuasive in relation to the cause of the delay. On the one hand, he asserts that because of his psychological state he was unable to attend to bringing the application for leave to appeal for over two years, and on the other, that its initiation was the product of a ‘crystallising moment’ in mid last year.
The ill-health contention is unimpressive. It can be accepted that Mr Weber suffered from a mental health condition as reported by Ms Sowden on 29 September 2020. However, a report from a psychologist in 2020 hardly meets the standard of persuasion that Mr Weber has an ongoing psychological disability that prevented him from filing his application for an extension of time for a further two years. There is no contemporaneous evidence from a medical practitioner or health professional that supports the argument that Mr Weber’s mental state precluded him from filing his application at a far earlier point of time.
Moreover, the real genesis of this application appears to be the Carkeeks’ warrant of seizure executed in April of this year, combined with the ‘crystallising moment’ of his discovery of the Tucci point.[21] Accepting that Mr Weber is self-represented and, at times, has suffered from mental health issues, he is, nonetheless, clearly intelligent and has considerable experience with court processes.
[21]See above, at [27].
Simply put, we are not persuaded that there is proper explanation for the significant delay.
Prejudice
No specific prejudice was alleged by the Carkeeks. However, this case and the ensuing litigious war between Mr Weber and the Carkeeks demonstrates the need for finality in litigation.
Recently in Winter-Cooke v Winter-Cooke,[22] this Court, drawing upon the statement of principle of McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor,[23] said as follows:
The first observation is that there is a general public interest in ensuring that litigation is brought, prosecuted and resolved in a timely manner. A statutory limitation period represents the legislature’s judgment that the welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within that period, notwithstanding that the enactment of that period may result in a good cause of action being defeated. The discretion to grant an extension of time should be seen as requiring the person applying for it to show that his or her case is a justifiable exception to the rule that the welfare of society is best served by the limitation period in question. Statutory limitation periods advance the administration of justice because they ensure that members of the public are able to order their personal and business affairs on the basis that, once a limitation period has expired, their rights and interests are no longer at risk of litigation. This is particularly so where parties to a dispute who are aware of their legal rights have negotiated a settlement and can reasonably consider that the dispute has been laid to rest.[24]
[22][2022] VSCA 264 (‘Winter-Cooke’).
[23](1996) 186 CLR 541, 552–3.
[24]Winter-Cooke [2022] VSCA 264, [89] (Kyrou and Macaulay JJA, J Forrest AJA) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In the context of the war being fought between Mr Weber and the Carkeeks, finality of litigation (at least in the sense of resolving for all time individual battles between the parties) is important. Although, of course, the justice of the situation will always be the paramount consideration in any such application, there is a genuine public interest in bringing an end to this piece of litigation, particularly where a party has missed a time limit by a long shot.
Prospects of success
On an application such as this it is preferable not to make any detailed observations of the judgment below. However, at a general level, we would make the following observations.
First, as the judge observed, the VCAT proceeding was heard over six days in October and November 2018.[25] The Senior Member subsequently provided detailed and comprehensive reasons in what was a difficult and complex case. The judge could detect no error in those reasons.
[25]Reasons, [7].
Second, her Honour’s reasons deal, in commendable detail and clarity, with each of Mr Weber’s grounds of appeal. In a 130-paragraph judgment, the judge analyses each of these arguments comprehensively and, at least at this level of examination, we can detect no apparent error.
We have not lost sight of Mr Weber’s ‘crystallising’ point which goes to the question of whether VCAT had the jurisdiction to make orders under the ACL and/or the Fair Trading Act 2012. Her Honour was alive to the implications of the decision in Tucci and any limitation on the ability of a litigant to bring a claim in VCAT under those statutes.[26] As her Honour noted:
This contention was based on a misunderstanding of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the Fair Trading Act. The interaction between the Fair Trading Act and the ACL is not straightforward, and Mr Weber can be forgiven for having difficulty with it.[27]
[26]Reasons, [116]–[117], quoting Tucci (2010) 33 VAR 206, [41].
[27]Reasons, [110].
Her Honour reviewed in some detail the extent of VCAT’s jurisdiction in the context of the two relevant pieces of legislation.[28] She concluded as follows:
The way in which the Tribunal applied the law in this case was correct. The senior member was right when she told Mr Weber that the same set of facts can give rise to a number of different causes of action. There was no error in determining the dispute by applying both contract law and s 21 of the ACL. That was the basis on which Mr Weber’s claim was made to the Tribunal and presented during the hearing.[29]
[28]Reasons, [115]–[122].
[29]Reasons, [119].
Whilst it might not be to Mr Weber’s satisfaction, this point was dealt with and resolved by her Honour.
Synthesis
When each of these factors are considered collectively, the result is that Mr Weber has not persuaded us that it is appropriate to extend the time for bringing this application for leave to appeal.
As a result of this determination, it is not necessary to consider the Carkeeks’ security for costs application. That application will be dismissed.
Orders
Orders to the following effect should be made:
(1)Mr Weber’s application for an extension of time in which to bring an application for leave to appeal made on 10 October 2022 pursuant to r 64.08 of the Rules is dismissed.
(2)Mr Weber pay the Carkeeks’ costs of the extension of time application on the standard basis.
(3)The Carkeeks’ application for security for costs made on 8 December 2022 pursuant to r 64.38(2) of the Rules is dismissed.
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SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
| PAUL WEBER | APPLICANT |
| AND | |
| EWAN AUBREY CARKEEK | FIRST RESPONDENT |
| LORRAINE KATHLEEN CARKEEK | SECOND RESPONDENT |
| ALISON DOROTHEA CARKEEK | THIRD RESPONDENT |
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