FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Cama v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1601
File number(s): SYG 389 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE KAUR-BAINS Date of judgment: 2 October 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review – refusal to grant the applicant a Medical Treatment (Visitor) (Class UB) visa – whether the Tribunal failed to consider a claim or an integer of a claim – whether the Tribunal breached s 360 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and/or was legally unreasonable in failing to ask the applicant questions about her relationship with her elderly mother – whether the Tribunal failed to give genuine consideration to the applicant’s representative’s request to ask questions about the applicant’s relationship with her mother – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 359(1), 359(2), 360, 360(1), 361(2), 361(3), 426(3), 476
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cll 602.211 and 602.215 of Schedule 2
Cases cited: Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184
Huynhv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 701
Long v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2025] FCA 751
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin [2005] FCAFC 118
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39
Plaintiff M1/2021v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582; [2022] HCA 17
Singh v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 267 FCR 200
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZHZD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1200
SZJUM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1486
SZJZS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2008] FCA 789
SZVBB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1414
Vu Vu & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 2292
Division: General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 76 Date of last submissions: 28 August 2025 Date of hearing: 22 August 2025
25 August 2025Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Ms T Baw Solicitor for the Applicant: Kah Lawyers Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms C Cloudsdale of Mills Oakley Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitted appearance save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 389 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: KERESIA WATI CAMA
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KAUR-BAINS
DATE OF ORDER:
2 OCTOBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1601
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
SYG 389 of 2021
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN:
KERESIA WATI CAMA
Applicant
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KAUR-BAINS
DATE OF ORDER:
2 OCTOBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE KAUR-BAINS
1.
The applicant, a citizen of Fiji, seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 5 February 2021. The issue before the Tribunal was whether the applicant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purposes of medical treatment for which the Medical Treatment (Visitor) (Class UB) (Subclass 602) visa (medical treatment visa) was sought. The Tribunal affirmed an earlier decision made by a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a medical treatment visa. This Court has jurisdiction to determine this matter pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).
2.
The primary issues raised in this application are broadly as follows:
(a) Whether the Tribunal failed to consider a claim or an integer of the applicant’s claim.
(b) Whether the Tribunal breached s 360 of the Act and/or was legally unreasonable in failing to:
(i) ask the applicant questions about her relationship with her mother and the applicant’s changed intention in relation to returning to Fiji following medical treatment, as that line of questioning was relevant to the criteria for the medical treatment visa, being that the applicant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purposes of medical treatment.
(i) genuinely consider the request by the applicant’s legal representative to ask the applicant questions referred to in the preceding subparagraph (2)(b)(i).
3.
For the reasons that follow, I find the grounds do not disclose jurisdictional error.
BACKGROUND
Medical treatment visa application
4.
On 29 August 2018, the applicant lodged an application for a medical treatment visa (Court Book (CB) 1 to 11). The applicant provided Form 1507 (Evidence of intended medical treatment) dated 27 August 2018 (Form 1507) by Dr Ashishkumar Shah (Dr Shah) of the Allcare Carnes Hill Medical Centre (CB 12). The form stated that the applicant required medical treatment for her right “shoulder tendinosis pain and endometrial hyperplasia”. The treatment information section of the form stated “physiotherapy - if necessary cortisone injection - gynecology services (sic)”.
5.
The applicant stated in her application form that she wished to remain in Australia for the purpose of medical treatment for the period 11 September 2018 to 11 December 2019 and intended “to apply for a permanent stay in Australia within the next 6-12 months in order to receive ongoing treatment for my medical health condition” (CB 2 and 11).
6.
On 30 August 2018, the Department of Home Affairs (Department) wrote to the applicant to acknowledge receipt of the application for the medical treatment visa and invited the applicant to provide the Department with all the information the applicant deemed relevant (CB 30).
7.
On 7 September 2018, the applicant provided a completed Form 1023 (Notification of incorrect answer(s)), whereby she changed her answer in relation to her intention to enter a healthcare facility where she would be treated and any further referrals to the hospital, to an affirmative answer (CB 40 and 41).
8.
On 12 September 2018, the applicant provided further documents in support of the medical treatment visa application (CB 42 to 45). The further documents included a personal statement by the applicant dated 10 September 2018, confirming the support people for her medical treatment visa application.
Delegate’s decision
9.
On 25 September 2018, a delegate of the Minister refused the applicant’s application for the medical treatment visa, on the basis that it was not satisfied that the applicant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the medical treatment visa was granted, and therefore was not satisfied the applicant met the criteria in cl 602.215 in Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations). Relevantly, the delegate found that the adverse migration history strongly indicated that the applicant intended to continue to seek a visa pathway to remain in Australia on a permanent basis. Further, the applicant’s statement in her medical treatment application, that she intended “to apply for a permanent stay in Australia within the next 6-12 months”, also demonstrated her intention to continue to seek a visa pathway to remain in Australia on a permanent basis (CB 54 to 57).
Application for review
10.
On 11 October 2018, the applicant lodged with the Tribunal an application for review of the delegate’s decision dated 25 September 2018, which was accompanied by a “Request for Fee Reduction” in respect of the filing fee for the application (CB 58 to 67).
11.
On 12 October 2018 and 17 October 2018, the applicant provided to the Tribunal additional documents in support of her application for review (CB 68 to 123). The further documents included a personal statement by the applicant dated 17 October 2018, which stated that it was never her intention to apply for permanent stay based on continuous residency in Australia, but to stay solely due to her health problems and to facilitate further treatment (CB 123).
12.
On 22 October 2018, the Tribunal acknowledged receipt of the applicant’s application for review and invited the applicant to provide any further material or written arguments for the Tribunal to consider (CB 124 to 126).
13.
On 24 October 2018, the applicant provided a letter from Fairfield Hospital in further support of her application for review (CB 131 to 132).
14.
On 28 October 2020, the Tribunal wrote to Dr Shah, the applicant’s treating medical practitioner notified in Form 1507, requesting information in relation to the applicant’s patient status, history and medical treatment (CB 142 and 143). Dr Shah advised the Tribunal as follows:
(a) On 2 November 2020, he no longer treated the applicant (CB 144).
(b) On 4 November 2020:
(i) he last saw the applicant for scripts on 20 November 2019; and
(ii) the applicant attended the practice on 23 October 2020 to inform him that she was seeing another doctor in Fairfield and requested copies of her records, which Dr Shah provided (CB 157).
15.
On 2 November 2020, the Tribunal invited the applicant, by letter to the applicant’s legal representative Mr Michael Kah (Mr Kah) of Kah Lawyers, to attend a hearing by video conference on 17 November 2020 (CB 147 to 155). The applicant was also invited to provide to the Tribunal any information she wished the Tribunal to consider, in addition to the following information specifically requested by the Tribunal:
1. Full name and date of birth, dates of arrival of any other of your close relatives (including parents, brother, sister, child, uncle, aunt, cousin, niece or nephew) who have come to or visited Australia within the past 10 years.
2. Full name and date of birth, dates of arrival / visit of any other close relatives you have sponsored or invited to visit Australia within the past 10 years.
3. Updated information about the visa applicant’s employment and financial situation in their home country.
4. Any other information relevant to the visa applicant’s activities or commitments or relationships in their home country that would encourage them to return at the end of a visit.
5. Any information relating to any previous visa held by, or visa application made by, the visa applicant.
6. Any information concerning any other travel by the visa applicant outside their present country of residence.
16.
On 13 November 2020, Mr Kah provided the Tribunal with submissions and supporting documents including doctor’s letters, a personal statement of the applicant dated 13 November 2020, bank account confirmations, payslips and a medical summary (CB 159 to 214). Relevant to the grounds for judicial review, Mr Kah made written submissions under the heading “genuine intention to stay temporarily” as follows (CB 164):
…We note that her mother Leba Lutu is already 83 years old and lives in Delainavesi Settlement, Lami, Suva in Fiji. Mrs Cama feels isolated and alone during COVID-19 pandemic and wishes to reunite with her mother and return to her home country where she is familiar with.
17.
Further, the applicant in her written statement dated 13 November 2020 sent to the Tribunal said (CB 173):
After my treatment in Australia, I plan to depart Australia and return to my home country, Fiji. Over the last couple of months, with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic being felt within Australia and being suffered from health conditions, I am very afraid and feeling isolated and alone. I think about my mother Leba Lutu, who is now 83 years old and lives in Delainavesi Settlement, Lami, Suva in Fiji, and I miss her and hope I can stay with her. It is my plan that I will make arrangements to depart Australia after my treatment to reunite with my mother and live in my home country, Fiji where I am most familiar with.
18.
On 16 November 2020, Mr Kah provided the Tribunal with additional supporting documents, including a health cover letter, hospital accounts and doctor’s letters (CB 215 to 221).
19.
Following the Tribunal hearing, on 10 December 2020 Mr Kah provided the Tribunal with further supporting documents, including the applicant’s insurance policy, a doctor’s letter, clinical notes and evidence of payments made to the Department (CB 226 to 230). The applicant’s insurance policy and evidence of payments made to the Department is not reproduced as evidence in the Court Book.
TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
20.
On 17 November 2020, the applicant appeared before the Tribunal by video conference assisted by Mr Kah, and an interpreter in the Fijian language (CB 223). The applicant’s son and one of her daughters also gave oral evidence at the hearing before the Tribunal.
21.
The Tribunal correctly identified one of the issues before it was whether the Tribunal was satisfied the applicant genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily for the purposes of medical treatment ([12] and [19] of its reasons).
Migration history
22.
The Tribunal outlined the applicant’s migration history at [9] of its reasons as follows:
The applicant first arrived in Australia on 30 October 1999 on a visitor visa. She departed Australia within her allocated visa time. The applicant next arrived in Australia on 3 September 2008 on a visitor visa and she departed Australia on 1 December 2008. She next entered Australia on 25 November 2010 on visitor visa and she departed Australia on 1 February 2011. She entered Australia again on 17 May 2011 and she departed Australia on 15 August 2011. On 21 October 2011 the applicant was granted a visitor visa that was valid until 4 October 2013. She entered Australia on 2 February 2012, and she departed Australia on 30 April 2012. She re-entered Australia on 4 November 2012 and she departed Australia on 2 February 2013. On 4 October 2013 the applicant was granted a further visitor visa that was valid until 21 March 2014. She arrived in Australia on 21 December 2013. On 12 February 2014 the applicant was included in a protection visa application as a dependent applicant. That application was refused on 11 August 2014 and the applicant sought review of the decision in the High Court of Australia with the result being recorded as a Minister win on 14 June 2018. On 11 July 2018 the applicant lodged an application under s.417 for a Ministerial Intervention as a dependent applicant. This was determined ‘not to be referred’ on 8 August 2018. On 29 August 2018 the applicant lodged a Medical Treatment visa application and was subsequently granted a Bridging visa E. During the time the applicant has been in Australia she has been an unlawful non-citizen for 39 days. (Emphasis added)
Other evidence and submissions
23.
The Tribunal noted the further submissions and material provided by Mr Kah, which included the material at [16] and [17] of this judgment ([16] of its reasons).
24.
Further, at [22] of its reasons, the Tribunal noted that the applicant in her application for a medical treatment visa stated that she wished to “remain in Australia for 12 months for medical treatment and that she intended to apply for a permanent stay in Australia within the next 6-12 months in order to receive ongoing treatment for her medical health condition as described by her doctor”.
25.
At [29] of the Tribunal’s reasons, it stated that “after taking into account the evidence on the file and the evidence given at the time of hearing”, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a genuine intention to remain in Australia temporarily for the purpose for which the medical treatment visa was granted or for related purposes. The Tribunal’s reasons for so finding, were that although it accepted the applicant’s evidence that she had an elderly mother who was living in Fiji, given the applicant’s migration history as outlined at [22] of this judgment, and her previously stated intentions as set out at [24] of this judgment, that she intended to apply for a permanent stay within the next 6 to 12 months, the Tribunal did not regard the evidence of the applicant’s changed intention as persuasive ([28] of its reasons). The Tribunal made clear at [31] of its reasons that in assessing the applicant’s intention as to whether she genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia, it placed “greater weight to her immigration history and her previously stated intentions”, being her intention to apply for permanent stay.
RELEVANT LAW
26.
The following clauses in Schedule 2 of the Regulations deal with the criteria for the grant of a medical treatment visa:
602.211
The applicant seeks to visit Australia, or remain in Australia temporarily, for the purposes of medical treatment or for related purposes.
602.215
(1) The applicant genuinely intends to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the visa is granted, having regard to:
(a) whether the applicant has complied substantially with the conditions to which the last substantive visa, or any subsequent bridging visa, held by the applicant was subject; and
(b) whether the applicant intends to comply with the conditions to which the Subclass 602 visa would be subject; and
(c) any other relevant matter.
(2) However, subclause (1) does not apply if the requirements described in subclause 602.212(6) are met in relation to the applicant.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
27.
The applicant was represented at the hearing before me by Ms Theresa Baw of Counsel (applicant’s Counsel). The Minister was represented by Ms Cate Cloudsdale (Ms Cloudsdale) solicitor at Mills Oakley. The evidence (which was read without objection) from the applicant comprised the following two affidavits:
(a) The affidavit of Mr Kah sworn on 12 March 2021, which annexed the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal. References in this judgment to the transcript, is a reference to the said transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal. The applicant sought to rely on the transcript to support the ground that the Tribunal breached s 360 of the Act and acted unreasonably in failing to ask the applicant questions as to her relationship with her mother.
(b) The applicant’s affidavit sworn on 25 July 2025 was relied upon to address a possible futility argument if jurisdictional error were found, in order to demonstrate that the applicant continued to require medical treatment despite approximately four years having elapsed since the Tribunal’s decision.
28.
The Minister relied on the Court Book, which was marked as Exhibit 1.
29.
The applicant relied on her Counsel’s written submissions dated 25 July 2025 and the Minister relied on written submissions dated 8 August 2025. I also had the benefit of the helpful oral submissions from both the applicant’s Counsel and Ms Cloudsdale at two hearings before me on 22 August 2025 and 25 August 2025.
GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
30.
The following grounds for judicial review were raised in the amended application dated 25 July 2025 (as in original and omitting particulars):
Ground 1
The Second Respondent (the Tribunal) failed to consider the essential integers of the Applicant’s claim.
Ground 2
The Tribunal breached s 360 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and/or was legally unreasonable by failing to ask the Applicant questions relevant to the criteria of genuine intention under cl 602.215 of the Migration Regulations 1984 (Cth).
31.
At the hearing, I granted leave (without objection) to the applicant to file a further amended application as the applicant had raised a new ground at the hearing. The Minister did not object to such leave being granted. In the further amended application dated 25 August 2025, the following additional ground was raised (omitting particulars):
Ground 3
The Tribunal failed to give genuine consideration to the request of the Applicant’s representative that the Tribunal ask the Applicant questions about her relationship with her mother, and thereby breached s 360 of the Act and/or was legally unreasonable.
CONSIDERATION
Ground 1
32.
Ground 1 raises the question as to whether the Tribunal failed to consider a claim or an integer of a claim raised by the applicant. In support of this ground, the applicant raised the following particulars:
(a) The Applicant raised a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts that she had a change in her intention, or a change of heart, about returning to Fiji, which arose from her experience of being afraid, isolated, lonely and suffering from health conditions during the COVID lockdown, and consequently, she started to miss her elderly mother and wanted to reunite with her in homeland of Fiji, where she is most familiar with, after her surgery.
(b) The Tribunal failed, to identify, understand and evaluate the integers of the claim. It failed to engage in an active and intellectual process directed at the claim and all its integers.
(c) If the aforementioned integers of the claim had been considered they would have been referred to in its reasons, even if they were then rejected or given little or no weight.
33.
The applicant’s complaint is that, although the Tribunal at [26] and [28] of its reasons referred to the applicant’s change of intention, and wanting to return to Fiji once her medical treatment was concluded to be with her elderly mother, the Tribunal did so, without assessing the reasons for the applicant’s changed intention. The applicant contended that the reasons were relevant to whether the Tribunal would accept the applicant’s evidence as to the changed intention. The reasons were said to be that during the COVID-19 lockdown the applicant started to feel afraid, isolated, lonely and she started to miss her elderly mother and wanted to reunite with her mother in her homeland of Fiji, which country the applicant was most familiar.
34.
The applicant also submitted that the Tribunal failed to consider “the main reason that the applicant did not return to Fiji since arriving in Australia, was that she had been a dependent in an application by her child for a protection visa”.
Relevant legal principles
35.
It is well established that a failure to consider an integer of a claim may constitute jurisdictional error in that the Tribunal had failed to carry out its statutory duty to review.
36.
The Full Federal Court in Singh v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 267 FCR 200 (Singh) (per Reeves, O’Callaghan and Thawley JJ), at [34] to [36], usefully summarised the relevant legal principles as follows:
[34] …[A] Tribunal charged with “review” may commit jurisdictional error in failing to exercise the jurisdiction it was contemplated it would exercise, if – for example – it does not engage in an active intellectual process or give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to:
• a “substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts” – see: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389 at [24] per Gummow and Callinan JJ, with whom Hayne J agreed;
• a claim “raised by the evidence and the contentions before it which, if resolved in one way, would or could be dispositive of the review” – see: NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [63] per Black CJ and French and Selway JJ; or
• a matter “that is an essential integer to an applicant’s claim or that would be dispositive of the review” – see: ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru (2018) 360 ALR 228 at [14] per Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ.
[36] …The principle does not require the decision-maker to refer in the reasons to every piece of evidence and every contention made: Carrascalao at [45]; ETA067 at [13]. However, if a critical piece of evidence or a particular issue is not referred to, that fact might be one from which an inference can appropriately be drawn that the decision-maker did not consider it. That, in turn, may be relevant to whether the decision-maker engaged actively with the matter.
37.
The legal principles as to when there may be such a failure to consider an integer of a claim are conveniently set out by the plurality in Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582; [2022] HCA 17 (Plaintiff M1/2021) (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ) at [24] to [27] (footnotes omitted):
24 Consistently with well-established authority in different statutory contexts, there can be no doubt that a decision-maker must read, identify, understand and evaluate the representations. Adopting and adapting what Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) said in Tickner v Chapman, the decision-maker must have regard to what is said in the representations, bring their mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward, and appreciate who is making them. From that point, the decision-maker might sift them, attributing whatever weight or persuasive quality is thought appropriate. The weight to be afforded to the representations is a matter for the decision-maker. And the decision-maker is not obliged "to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication of all material claims" made by a former visa holder.
25 It is also well-established that the requisite level of engagement by the decision-maker with the representations must occur within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness. What is necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for a valid exercise of power will necessarily depend on the nature, form and content of the representations. The requisite level of engagement – the degree of effort needed by the decision-maker – will vary, among other things, according to the length, clarity and degree of relevance of the representations. The decision-maker is not required to consider claims that are not clearly articulated or which do not clearly arise on the materials before them.
26 Labels like "active intellectual process" and "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" must be understood in their proper context. These formulas have the danger of creating "a kind of general warrant, invoking language of indefinite and subjective application, in which the procedural and substantive merits of any [decision-maker's] decision can be scrutinised". That is not the correct approach. As Mason J stated in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd, "[t]he limited role of a court reviewing the exercise of an administrative discretion must constantly be borne in mind". The court does not substitute its decision for that of an administrative decision-maker.
27 None of the preceding analysis detracts from, or is inconsistent with, established principle that, for example, if review of a decision-maker's reasons discloses that the decision-maker ignored, overlooked or misunderstood relevant facts or materials or a substantial and clearly articulated argument; misunderstood the applicable law; or misunderstood the case being made by the former visa holder, that may give rise to jurisdictional error.
Whether the Tribunal failed to consider the reasons for the applicant’s change of intention
38.
At [29] of the Tribunal’s reasons, the Tribunal expressly stated, inter alia, that “after taking into account the evidence on file”, it was not satisfied that the applicant met the requirements for the medical treatment visa. I find that on a fair reading of the said reasons, the Tribunal was aware of the detailed evidence of the applicant on file, as identified at [17] of this judgment, which was to the effect that given COVID-19 and her feelings of isolation, she had a change of intention and she genuinely wished to return to Fiji to be with her elderly mother and be in a familiar country once the medical treatment was concluded.
39.
At [28] of its reasons, the Tribunal found that it did not “regard the evidence as being persuasive evidence of her [the applicant’s] intention to return to Fiji once her medical treatment is concluded.” The reference to “evidence” in this part of [28] of the Tribunal’s reasons, I find, is a reference to the applicant’s evidence as identified at [17] of this judgment, which records the reasons for the applicant’s change of intention, being the effects of COVID-19 lockdown and feelings of isolation. By the said finding at [28] of its reasons, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s evidence as to her changed intention, and by so finding, the Tribunal implicitly did not accept the applicant’s evidence as to any reasons that led to a change in intention. As the Full Court found in Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 (French, Sackville and Hely JJ) at [47], “[i]t may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected”.
40.
For the reasons set out in [38] and [39] of this judgment, I reject the applicant’s submission that the Tribunal failed to consider the reasons for the applicant’s change in her intention to return to Fiji.
41.
I also reject the applicant’s submission that the Tribunal failed to consider that “the main reason that the applicant did not return to Fiji since arriving in Australia was that she had been a dependent in an application by her child for a protection visa”, for the following reasons:
(a) First, there was no clearly articulated evidence or submission made to the Tribunal that “the main reason” for not returning to Fiji was because she was a dependent in an application for a protection visa. Mr Kah, the applicant’s solicitor, at the hearing before the Tribunal made a submission to the Tribunal that he was not asking the Tribunal to disregard the applicant’s migration history, but was saying that the applicant was a dependent in a visa applicant, made by her family member and she relied on other members of her family to guide her in those applications (Tp21.15).
(b) Second, in any event, I find the Tribunal did engage and consider as part of the migration history the fact that the applicant was a dependent in the protection visa application and in the Ministerial Intervention application. This is evident from [9] of the Tribunal’s reasons, where it clearly sets out that it was aware that the applicant’s migration history, included that she “was included in a protection visa application as a dependent applicant…and for a Ministerial Intervention as a dependent applicant”.
(c) Third, in considering the issue of the applicant’s genuine intention to stay temporarily in Australia, at [26] and [28] of its reasons, the Tribunal then considered the applicant’s migration history, which included the migration history as set out at [9] of its reasons, which as said included a reference to the applicant being a dependent applicant, against the applicant’s other evidence as to her changed intention to go back to Fiji, and attributed weight and persuasive quality to the evidence as it thought appropriate.
42.
Ground 1 does not disclose any jurisdictional error.
Ground 2
43.
Ground 2 raises the issue of whether the Tribunal breached s 360 of the Act and/or acted legally unreasonably during the oral hearing in failing to ask the applicant questions about her relationship with her mother who lived in Fiji which was a reason for the applicant’s changed intention to return to Fiji once her medical treatment was concluded. The applicant contended that line of questioning was relevant to the criteria for the medical treatment visa, being that the applicant genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia for the purposes of medical treatment.
44.
In support of Ground 2, the applicant provided the following particulars:
(a) At the Tribunal hearing Applicant’s legal representative requested that the Tribunal ask the Applicant questions about her relationship with her mother.
(b) The Applicant had provided written evidence that she very much wants to see her ailing and aged mother, because while experiencing COVID the Applicant has had a change of heart and she wants to return home to Fiji, a place she is familiar with, after her surgery.
(c) The Tribunal failed to ask the Applicant relevant questions and the failure constituted a failure to provide a meaningful opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review, in breach of s 360 of the Migration Act, and/or the Tribunal was unreasonable.
(d) Furthermore, no explicit reasons were given by the Tribunal which explained why it failed to ask those questions.
(e) Also, taking oral evidence from the Applicant on her claim would have provided the Tribunal with the opportunity to test the credibility of her written evidence.
45.
The applicant’s Counsel submitted that Mr Kah (incorrectly spelt as Mr Carr in the Tribunal hearing transcript) made a specific request to the Tribunal to ask the applicant questions about her relationship with her mother. The part of the transcript the applicant’s Counsel relied on was as follows (Tp19.40 to Tp20.19):
MR CARR (sic): Sure, sure. And then we will do that, Member. So I think the - well, the main issue about genuine intention to return after the completion of the medical treatment. So in light of the long history of the client in Australia on the (indistinct) visa and then multiple visas, while she has - and yes, she (indistinct) her family here, including grandchildren, but she also has, back in Fiji is not only her home and sisters and brothers, but actually she also has her mother, which she actually didn’t tell you about, so it would be – it might be helpful for the tribunal to actually ask questions about her relationship with her mother because it appears - her instructions are that the main reason that she is willing to return home is that she wants to get the benefit of, obviously Australian medical services, but at the end of that she is happy to return home to actually see her ailing and aged mother and so - and that’s contained in her statement.
In here (sic) evidence today she actually hasn’t even mentioned her mother, so that is a little bit leading there.
MEMBER: I was aware from other documents before me that there was - she did still have an ageing mother in Fiji.
MR CARR (sic): Yes. So my understanding is that basically she realised that her time is up and that it is appropriate and she actually desires to see her mother so, which is a change, and so that is what her intent is, to actually get this knee surgery completed, to which she does have private monies available for that. She also has some medical insurance that she has in accordance with the requirements.
46.
The applicant’s Counsel also submitted that following such a request by Mr Kah for the Tribunal to ask the applicant questions about her relationship with her elderly mother, in order to ensure the applicant was given a real and meaningful hearing, and in acting reasonably in conducting the hearing, the Tribunal was required to cross-examine/test the applicant as to her statement that she had changed her intention. The applicant’s Counsel submitted that the types of questions the Tribunal was required to reasonably ask about the applicant’s relationship with her mother were to the following effect:
“So tell me about your mother. How old is she? How long ago did you see her? You say in your statement, you would like to return to see her. You have had a change of heart. What makes you say that now?
...
So why should the tribunal believe you, now that you have in fact had a genuine change of heart?
…
So tell me what experience that you had during COVID, that prompted you to have this change of heart. Why didn’t you go back to see your mother earlier than this?
…
Why should – after your immigration history of staying in Australia and making applications for all sorts of other visas, why should the tribunal believe you now, that you have in fact had this change of heart because it has got to do with the relationship with your mother?”
47.
The applicant’s Counsel also relied heavily on the decision of Griffiths J in Huynh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 701 (Huynh), to support her argument that the Tribunal, in this case, was required to ask the applicant questions about her relationship with her mother, in order to comply with the obligations of s 360(1) of the Act and carry out a hearing that was real and meaningful.
48.
Given the applicant’s heavy reliance on Huynh, I will deal with that case in some depth to ascertain the extent to which it may apply to this case. Relevantly, the facts in Huynh were that:
(a) The Tribunal in exercising the power under s 359(1) of the Act, to “get any information that it considers relevant”, invited the appellant (the visa sponsor) to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in the application for review of the delegate’s decision sought by the appellant (at [13] to [14]).
(b) The Tribunal indicated on multiple occasions that it may wish to take evidence from Mr Phi Thanh Le (Mr Le), the appellant’s husband, in relation to his relationship with the appellant, and requested his telephone contact details (at [13] and [15]).
(c) Mr Le was interviewed for approximately five minutes by telephone by a Tribunal member (at [21]). In the interview, the Tribunal member:
(i) asked Mr Le to respond to the statement that the delegate was concerned that the application was not a genuine spouse application;
(ii) asked Mr Le a very general question by inviting him to describe his wife, her personality and what made her a suitable partner for him; and
(iii) without exploring any matters further and without raising any other matters of concern to the Tribunal, concluded the interview.
49.
The relevant issue before the Federal Court in Huynh was whether the Tribunal acted unreasonably, in the legal sense, in failing to take specific relevant evidence from Mr Le.
50.
At [87] of Huynh, Griffiths J concluded that the Tribunal acted unreasonably, in the relevant legal sense, in failing to ask Mr Le during the course of the interview of him questions relating to the matters referred to at [33] of that judgment. Griffiths J came to this conclusion for the following reasons:
(a) First, the Tribunal in exercising the power under s 359(1) of the Act, to “get any information that it considers relevant”, requested Mr Le, as a witness, to be available to give evidence and therefore the Tribunal plainly considered that he might be able to give it information which was relevant to the review. His Honour specifically emphasised that the Tribunal was not obligated to obtain evidence from Mr Le, but chose to do so (at [88]).
(b) Second, having exercised its discretionary power under s 359(2) of the Act to invite Mr Le to give information orally, “the Tribunal was obliged to conduct its interview of Mr Le reasonably in the sense explained in cases such as Li and Singh”. His Honour stated that the purpose of s 359 of the Act is to empower the Tribunal in its discretion to get information either orally or in writing, which is relevant to the issues arising in the review (at [89]).
(c) Third, his Honour emphasised that it was important to bear in mind that it was the Tribunal’s decision to request that Mr Le be available to give evidence. This plainly contemplated that further steps would be taken to implement that discretion, including asking questions of Mr Le at the interview which were relevant to the issues under review. His Honour noted that the requirement for reasonableness in the legal sense must extend to the Tribunal’s questioning of Mr Le at the interview (at [90]).
(d) Fourth, the opportunity afforded to Mr Le had to be “real and meaningful and not just an empty gesture” (at [91]).
(e) Fifth, the Tribunal must have believed that Mr Le was capable of giving information which it considered to be relevant to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review (at [92]).
(f) Sixth, the Tribunal had imposed on it an express obligation to have regard to information which is relevant and which it obtains under either s 359(1) or (2) of the Act (at [93]).
(g) Seventh, the prohibition of anyone other than the Tribunal from examining or cross-examining a person who appears before the Tribunal to give evidence served to reinforce the Tribunal’s inquisitorial role and its responsibility of ensuring that a witness whom it called to give oral evidence was given a “real and meaningful” opportunity to give evidence on issues considered relevant by the Tribunal (at [94]).
51.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal correctly identified one of the issues before it was whether the Tribunal was satisfied the applicant genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily for the purposes of medical treatment ([12] and [19] of its reasons).Migration history The Tribunal outlined the applicant’s migration history at [9] of its reasons as follows:The applicant first arrived in Australia on 30 October 1999 on a visitor visa. She departed Australia within her allocated visa time. The applicant next arrived in Australia on 3 September 2008 on a visitor visa and she departed Australia on 1 December 2008. She next entered Australia on 25 November 2010 on visitor visa and she departed Australia on 1 February 2011. She entered Australia again on 17 May 2011 and she departed Australia on 15 August 2011. On 21 October 2011 the applicant was granted a visitor visa that was valid until 4 October 2013. She entered Australia on 2 February 2012, and she departed Australia on 30 April 2012. She re-entered Australia on 4 November 2012 and she departed Australia on 2 February 2013. On 4 October 2013 the applicant was granted a further visitor visa that was valid until 21 March 2014. She arrived in Australia on 21 December 2013. On 12 February 2014 the applicant was included in a protection visa application as a dependent applicant. That application was refused on 11 August 2014 and the applicant sought review of the decision in the High Court of Australia with the result being recorded as a Minister win on 14 June 2018. On 11 July 2018 the applicant lodged an application under s.417 for a Ministerial Intervention as a dependent applicant. This was determined ‘not to be referred’ on 8 August 2018. On 29 August 2018 the applicant lodged a Medical Treatment visa application and was subsequently granted a Bridging visa E. During the time the applicant has been in Australia she has been an unlawful non-citizen for 39 days. (Emphasis added)Other evidence and submissions The Tribunal noted the further submissions and material provided by Mr Kah, which included the material at [16] and [17] of this judgment ([16] of its reasons). Further, at [22] of its reasons, the Tribunal noted that the applicant in her application for a medical treatment visa stated that she wished to “remain in Australia for 12 months for medical treatment and that she intended to apply for a permanent stay in Australia within the next 6-12 months in order to receive ongoing treatment for her medical health condition as described by her doctor”. At [29] of the Tribunal’s reasons, it stated that “after taking into account the evidence on the file and the evidence given at the time of hearing”, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a genuine intention to remain in Australia temporarily for the purpose for which the medical treatment visa was granted or for related purposes. The Tribunal’s reasons for so finding, were that although it accepted the applicant’s evidence that she had an elderly mother who was living in Fiji, given the applicant’s migration history as outlined at [22] of this judgment, and her previously stated intentions as set out at [24] of this judgment, that she intended to apply for a permanent stay within the next 6 to 12 months, the Tribunal did not regard the evidence of the applicant’s changed intention as persuasive ([28] of its reasons). The Tribunal made clear at [31] of its reasons that in assessing the applicant’s intention as to whether she genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia, it placed “greater weight to her immigration history and her previously stated intentions”, being her intention to apply for permanent stay.RELEVANT LAW