2000435 (Refugee)

2000435 (Refugee) [2023] AATA 4161 (1 September 2023)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
REPRESENTATIVE: Ms Rayan Hazim (MARN: 1685918)
CASE NUMBER: 2000435

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE: Lebanon
MEMBER:Mark Bishop
DATE:1 September 2023
PLACE OF DECISION: Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

Statement made on 01 September 2023 at 12:38pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Lebanon – imputed political opinion – opposition to Hezbollah – applicant suspect of spying – religion – Sunni Muslim – physical assault – robbery – fear of killing – condoning of Hezbollah controlled areas – state protection – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2
CASES
GLD18 v MHA [2020] FCAFC 2
MIMA v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

This is an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs on 3 January 2020 to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The applicant who claims to be a citizen of Lebanon applied for the visa on 15 May 2015. The delegate refused to grant the visa on the basis he did not accept that:
·The applicant was mistreated, harmed and threatened by Hezbollah because he was suspect of spying for Sunni Muslims, or for any other reason.
·The applicant was mistreated, harmed and threatened by Sunni Muslims in Tripoli and northern Lebanon because he was suspect of spying Hezbollah, or for any other reason.
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 24 August 2023 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic (Lebanese) and English languages.
The applicant was represented in relation to the review.
CRITERIA FOR A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, he or she is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.
Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee.
A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country: s 5H(1)(a). In the case of a person without a nationality, they are a refugee if they are outside the country of their former habitual residence and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return to that country: s 5H(1)(b).
Under s 5J(1), a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country. Additional requirements relating to a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and circumstances in which a person will be taken not to have such a fear are set out in ss 5J(2)-(6) and ss 5K-LA, which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of the visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’). The meaning of significant harm, and the circumstances in which a person will be taken not to face a real risk of significant harm, are set out in ss 36(2A) and (2B), which are extracted in the attachment to this decision.
Mandatory considerations
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Relevant demographic background data[1]
[Village 1]
[1] In addition see paragraph 25 below
[Village 1][2] is a village in Akkar Governate, Lebanon. The population is predominantly Sunni Muslims[3]. The Akkar Governorate is the northernmost governorate of Lebanon. It comprises the single district of Akkar, which in turn is subdivided into 121 municipalities[4]. It covers an area of 788 km2 (304 sq mi)[5] and is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea to the west, North Governorate to the south, Baalbek-Hermel Governorate to the southeast, and the Syrian governorates of Tartus and Homs to the north and northeast[6]. The distance from [Village 1] to Lebanon’s capital Beirut is approximately [distance] as the crow flies[7]. The distance from [Village 1] to Tripoli is approximately [distance][8]. [Village 1] is approximately [distance] km from the Syrian border governate of Tartus[9].
Dahieh
[2] [Source deleted.]
[3] [Source deleted.]
[4] "Akkar Governorate Profile". UNHCR. June 2015. Retrieved 19 February 2017
[5] "Akkar Governorate Profile". UNHCR. June 2015. Retrieved 19 February 2017
[6] Akkar Governorate - Wikipedia
[7] [Source deleted.]
[8] [Source deleted.]
[9] [Source deleted.]
Dahieh is a predominantly Shia Muslim suburb, located south of Beirut, in the Baabda District of Lebanon[10]. It is composed of several towns and municipalities[11]. It is a residential and commercial area with malls, stores and souks[12]. In 1986 the number of Shia living in Dahieh was estimated to be 800,000[13]. There is also a minority of coexisting Sunni Muslims, Christians, and a Palestinian refugee camp with 20,000 inhabitants. It is located north of the Rafic Hariri International Airport, with the M51 Freeway that links Beirut to the Airport passing through it[14].
[10] Dahieh - Wikipedia
[11] Cobban, Helena (April–May 2005). "Hizbullah's New Face". Boston Review. Archived from the original on 13 June 2010. Retrieved 28 January 2022
[12] Traboulsi, Karim (2017-07-04). "Oppa Dahieh Style: Searching for K-Pop in Hizballah land". english.alaraby.co.uk. Retrieved 2022-01-28.
[13] Tveit, Odd Karsten (2010) Goodbye Lebanon. Israel's First Defeat. Rimal Publication. Translated by Peter Scott-Hansen. ISBN 978-9963-715-03-9 pp.163-164
[14] Dahieh - Wikipedia
Dahieh is the Beirut stronghold of Shia militant group Hezbollah, and it had large auditoria in Haret Hreik, Hadath, Mount Lebanon and Bourj el-Barajneh, where Hezbollah followers gathered during special occasions[15]. [Town 1] is a municipality located in the [suburbs] of Beirut, in Lebanon. [Details deleted.][16].
[15] Cobban, Helena (April–May 2005). "Hizbullah's New Face". Boston Review. Archived from the original on 13 June 2010. Retrieved 28 January 2022
[16] [Source deleted.]
[Town 1], Dahieh is approximately [distance] from Beirut[17]. [Town 1], Dahieh, is approximately [distance] from Tripoli[18]. [Town 1], Dahieh is approximately [distance] from the applicant’s hometown of [Village 1][19].
Beka’a Governate
[17] [Source deleted.]
[18] [Source deleted.]
[19] [Source deleted.]
The Beqaa Governate is located in eastern Lebanon, consisting of three districts: West Beqaa, Rashaya and Zahle[20]. The governate is approximately 41% Christian to 52% Muslim to 7% Druze[21]. In the district (qadaa) of Zahlé (meaning an area much greater than that of the city proper), Christians form a majority of 55% of voters (172555 in total). In the district of West Beqaa-Rashaya (the two are combined as an electoral district), Christians account for 22.22% of voters (140950 in total)[22]. It has an estimated population of 534,342 people[23].
[20] Beqaa Governorate - Wikipedia
[21] Beqaa Governorate - Wikipedia
[22] Beqaa Governorate - Wikipedia
[23] Brinkhoff, Thomas (2 March 2019). "Lebanon: Administrative Division". City Population. Retrieved 17 April 2021.
The Beqaa Valley, also transliterated as Bekaa, Biqâ, and Becaa and known in classical antiquity as Coele-Syria, is a fertile valley in eastern Lebanon. It is Lebanon's most important farming region[24]. Industry also flourishes in Beqaa, especially that related to agriculture.
[24] "Global eye – Spring 2006 – Eye on Lebanon – The Bekaa Valley". Archived from the original on October 11, 2006.
The Beqaa is located about 30 km (19 mi) east of Beirut. The valley is situated between Mount Lebanon to the west and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains to the east. It is the northern continuation of the Jordan Rift Valley, and thus part of the Great Rift Valley, which stretches from Syria to the Red Sea. Beqaa Valley is 120 kilometres (75 mi) long and 16 kilometres (9.9 mi) wide on average[25]. The Beqaa Governate is approximately 53 km from Beirut[26], 121 km from Tripoli[27], and [distance] from the applicant’s hometown of [Village 1][28].
Beirut
[25] Beqaa Valley - Wikipedia
[26] Beqaa Governorate, Lebanon to Beirut, Lebanon - Google Maps
[27] Beqaa Governorate, Lebanon to Tripoli, Lebanon - Google Maps
[28] [Source deleted.]
Beirut is the capital and largest city of Lebanon. As of 2014, Greater Beirut has a population of 2.5 million[29]. No population census has been taken in Lebanon since 1932[30], but estimates of Beirut's population range from as low as 938,940[31] through 1,303,129[32] to as high as 2,200,000 as part of Greater Beirut[33][34].
[29] "Questions & Answers: Water Supply Augmentation Project, Lebanon". The World Bank. 30 September 2016. Retrieved 20 March 2016.
[30] "Lebanon State of the Environment Report", Chapter 1". Lebanese Ministry of Environment. 2001. p. 9. Archived from the original on 24 June 2015. Retrieved 8 June 2015.
[31] "Demographic Yearbook 2003" (PDF). United Nations. 2003. p. 53. Archived (PDF) from the original on 9 October 2022. Retrieved 17 January 2010.
[32] "Lebanon State of the Environment Report", Chapter 1". Lebanese Ministry of Environment. 2001. p. 11. Archived from the original on 24 June 2015. Retrieved 8 June 2015.
[33] "Questions & Answers: Water Supply Augmentation Project, Lebanon". The World Bank. 30 September 2014. Retrieved 20 March 2016.
Beirut is one of the most cosmopolitan and religiously diverse cities of Lebanon and all of the Middle East[35]. Before the civil war the neighbourhoods of Beirut were fairly heterogeneous, but they became largely segregated by religion since the conflict[36].
[35] "At Beirut Protest, a Reminder of Religious Diversity". The New York Times. Retrieved 17 November 2007.
[36] Khalaf, Samir (28 May 2012). Lebanon Adrift: From Battleground to Playground. Saqi. ISBN 978-0-86356-834-3.
East Beirut has a mainly Christian population with a small Muslim minority, whilst West Beirut has a Sunni Muslim majority with small minorities of Shia, Christians and Druze[37].
[37] Beirut - Wikipedia
Since the end of the civil war, East and West Beirut have begun to see an increase in Muslims and Christians moving into each half. Christians comprise 35% of Beirut's population, Muslims 63%, Druze 1%, and others 1%[38].
Tripoli[39]
[38] Beirut - Wikipedia
[39] Also known as Trablus or Tarabulus
Tripoli is the largest city in northern Lebanon and the second-largest city in the country. Situated 81 km (50 mi) north of the capital Beirut, it is the capital of the North Governorate and the Tripoli District[40].
[40] Tripoli, Lebanon - Wikipedia
Tripoli has a majority Sunni Muslim population[41]. Lebanon's small Alawite community is concentrated in the Jabal Mohsen neighbourhood. Christians constitute today less than 5 percent of the population of the city.[42][43]
[41] Tripoli, Lebanon - Wikipedia
[42] >
The Tribunal provides this summary of each particular event based upon the Statement of Claim, PV Interview, Post-Interview Submissions, Delegate Decision and Tribunal Submissions. Later in this decision record the Tribunal provides a summary of the applicant’s post hearing written submission[44].
[44] See paragraphs 39 and 40 below of this decision record.
Incident number 1: Occurred mid-2014 (June/July) while working in Danieh at his uncle’s [product 1] shop
Statement of Claim
·In the middle of 2014, I was close to work when 5 unknown men came up to me. They told me I was Sunni Muslim and asked why I was there. They threatened me. They were also cursing at me. They said we hate you because you are Sunni Muslim.
·They threatened me that if they saw me again, they would harm me. I did not see this group of men again.
·Although I had been threatened I was not very scared. It was the first time something like that happened to me, and my work colleague also told me not to worry about what they said.
·They were also only telling me to leave from Dahieh, so I was not that concerned. I continued working in Dahieh for a few months.[45]
[45] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [8]-[11]
PV Interview
·Occurred between June-July 2014
·Some people threatened him to leave
·Did not know them
·When they spoke to him, he wasn’t thinking it was really serious so returned to work[46]
[46] Audio at 25:00
Post Interview Submissions
·The post hearing submissions base the applicant’s well-founded fear of persecuted as being due to his imputed political opinion:
oThe Applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his imputed political opinion as a supporter and member of Hezbollah due to his work in the heartland of Hezbollah territory, namely Dahieh. The Applicant has been accused of being a Hezbollah spy by Sunni Muslims in Tripoli. Additionally, Hezbollah assumed that the applicant was a hostile spy in their territory, and threatened to kill him while he was in Lebanon.
oThe Applicant had a paying job in Dahieh, a factor which raised his profile in the north of Lebanon where unemployment and poverty are widespread and caused him to become subject to attacks around his home area.
oSunni supporters in Tripoli and the north of Lebanon believe that the Applicant is a spy for Hezbollah and provided information and intelligence to them in exchange for a job. The Applicant is considered a traitor.[47]
[47] Post Interview Legal Submissions dated 4 November 2019, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [19]-[21] and repeated in Pre Hearing Submissions to the Tribunal at AAT Case 2000435, Doc ID 11176256 at paragraph [17]-[19]
Departmental Decision Record
·In the middle of 2014, in Dahieh, the five unknown men approached him and verbally abused him because he was Sunni. They told him to go back to his home area. He has not seen the men again. Because this was the first incident of such a nature and his colognes at work told him not to worry he was not concerned and continued working in Dahieh for few more months.[48]
[48] Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number]
Tribunal Submissions
·Received on 15 June 2023 and contains identical content as the one listed above (referenced in footnote 3).
Incident number 2: Occurred while working in Dahieh (a town in Beirut), took place a few weeks after the first incident (June/July/August 2014?)
Statement of Claim
·Another incident occurred one day when I was working. Someone yelled at me. He asked me where I was from. I told him I was from Akkar. He told me to get down on the floor. I asked them who they were, and told me not to talk and give them my phone and my ID. They told me they were Hezbollah.
·He then told me to give him my telephone and move aside. They told me to sit and not move. 3 people stayed with me while he went through my telephone. He asked me who I was, why I was working there and why I had chosen that place specifically. I told him there was no other place to work and that I only work during school holidays.
·He checked my telephone and did not find anything. He asked for my identification. I told him that I did not have my identification with me but that I could get it. They gave me my telephone and I called my work and asked my work colleague to bring my ID. They took my telephone back.
·My work colleague came and brought my identification. After they checked my identification, they stopped me for another 10 minutes. They gave me back my telephone, they cursed at me and told me to leave in a threatening way. I had been stopped for over 3 hours.
·After this incident I continued working as normal because I needed to work so that I could live.[49]
[49] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [12]-[16]
PV interview
·While at work, doing deliveries on the motorbike, someone called me over and asked, what are you doing in this area, get off your bike, show me your id, give me your phone
·Delegate asked, ‘who were these people, why would you obey them?’
·When he called me first, I just thought it was someone who wanted to ask me a question ie about work
·When I mentioned “Akkar”, he told me get off the motorcycle and get on the ground and give me your phone and ID
·Delegate asked if that person identified himself
·He identified himself as Hezbollah and started investigating and checking my phone
·Delegate asked if Hezbollah had a significant presence in that area
·RA said they have significant influence there and in Lebanon
·I think I was under surveillance with them because I’m a stranger in that area
·They questioned me where are you from, what are you doing here, you’re a Sunni Muslim so it’s better you go back to where you are from
·They put a lot of pressure on me for 2-3 hours, asking me questions, looking into my phone
·This happened a few weeks after he started working in Dahieh. He started working in Dahieh around end of April 2014.
·After this incident, I didn’t see them again but there was another incident. Something else happened.
·Work address: [Dahieh], near [a landmark]. Could not recall exact details. If I remember, I will mention it later.
oAt 52:52, he spontaneously stated that he remembered the area where he used to work. It was in “[Town 1]”
·Everyone in that area is Hezbollah. Delegate asked him to comment on the fact that in that area, there are pockets of Maronite, Sunni, etc. Applicant said, “that’s correct.”[50]
[50] Audio at 28:00
Post Interview Submissions
·On a separate occasion, the Applicant was yelled at by a man, hostilely asking where he was from, and forced to the floor and stripped of his phone, identifying themselves as “Hezbollah” and communicating their suspicions about the Applicant’s decision to work in Dahieh. The Applicant was only released when a work colleague was contacted and told to bring the Applicant’s identification documents. He had been held over three hours, and threatened about what would be done to him should he refused to leave.[51]
[51] Post Interview Legal Submissions dated 4 November 2019, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraph [35] and repeated in Pre Hearing Submissions to the Tribunal at AAT Case 2000435, Doc ID 11176256 at paragraph [38]
Departmental Decision Record
·Shortly afterwards the applicant was apprehended by four men strong Hezbollah patrol. They questioned him for over three hours about his origin and reason for his stay in Dahieh. He told them that he was from Akkar, and he was working in Dahieh because work opportunities were scarce in his area. They checked his phone and let him go, ten minutes after his colleague from work brought him his identity document (ID). They were swearing at him and told him to leave the area.[52]
[52] Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number]
Tribunal Submissions
·Received on 15 June 2023 and contains identical content as the one listed above (referenced in footnote 3).
Incident number 3: Occurred in Bab al-Tabbaneh, Tripoli about 1 week after second incident, said to have occurred around July/August 2014
Statement of Claim
·About a week later after the incident with Hezbollah, I was going through Tripoli. I was in Tabbaneh. 6 or 7 people came up to me and attacked me. I did not recognise who they were. 1 of the guys took out a knife and another guy took out a wooden object.
·They called me a "jasoos" which means spy in Arabic. They asked me where I was going and what I was doing. They told me I was giving secret information to Hezbollah. I felt they were suspicious of me. They threatened me that they were going to kill me.
·They hit me on my head and I fell on the ground and was unconscious. I then woke up and found myself in hospital. I received a scar from my head because of this incident.
·When I woke up in hospital they asked me who had hit me and I said I did not know. I called my father and he came. I told my father what had happened. We went to the police to make a report. When I went to the police, they said they were going to investigate what happened but they never did.
·I stayed in hospital for around 2 days. I started to stay at home for a few days because I was very scared.
·The men who attacked me were most likely Sunni Muslims, as I was in Tripoli which is predominantly Sunni.
·I believe certain people noticed that I was going and coming between the north and Dahieh. The Sunni Muslims may have thought that I was going to Dahieh and giving Hezbollah secret information. They did not know that Hezbollah were questioning me about why I was in Dahieh as well.
·After the attack I realised that I had to leave Lebanon because my life was in danger. I told my father that I needed to leave Lebanon because it was no longer safe for me to stay.[53]
[53] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [17]-[24]
PV Interview
·There is an area with grocery shops, like a market – Bab al-Tabbaneh in Tripoli
·Area has bit of conflict between Shia and Sunni
·People came to me and stopped me, thinking I was a spy, tipping off Hezbollah
·Those people who stopped me are equipped with knives, machetes, and some automatic weapons as well
·They started beating me and dropped me to the ground
·I was hit on the head and passed out. I woke up in the hospital.
·This incident happened about a week after the earlier incident with Hezbollah
·I didn’t live there. I used to go to buy stuff. I was not known to those people there. My [relative] lives in Tripoli but it’s a bit far away from Bab al-Tabbaneh
·At the police, they just took the name. There was no official report prepared like here. No reference number was provided.
·Delegate asked, “what was the outcome of the investigation?”. They didn’t care about what happened, they haven’t even mentioned it afterwards.
·I think once I walked out of the police station, they forgot about it right away.
·Delegate said “you mentioned in your statement, these people were Sunni Muslims. Why did they attack you?”
·Because they don’t know me and they think I’m Shia
·Those people, especially Tabbaneh people, come close to him, they just shoot him
·Delegate asked: if this area has such a bad reputation, why would you go there to do your shopping? Couldn’t you go somewhere else?
oThere are other places where I go, but it was a coincidence I went there[54]
[54] Audio at 39:34
Post Interview Submissions
·On a further occasion, when passing through Tabbaneh, the Applicant was attacked by 6-7 men, one of whom wielded a knife, and another bearing a wooden object to be used as a weapon. They accused the Applicant of being a “jasoos” or a “spy” and the Applicant was beaten, only awakening once in hospital. The Applicant was hospitalised for two days as a result of this incident. The Applicant is in the process of obtaining confirmation of his hospital stay;[55]
[55] Post Interview Legal Submissions dated 4 November 2019, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraph [35] and repeated in Pre Hearing Submissions to the Tribunal at AAT Case 2000435, Doc ID 11176256 at paragraph [38]
In the cover email accompanying the post-interview submissions, the Representative states: “Please note that the Applicant is in the process of contacting the relevant hospital in Lebanon where he was treated after injuries sustained during an attack on him. Due to the current circumstances and political tension throughout Lebanon, the Applicant’s father, who is assisting the Applicant to obtain the document in question, has instructed that the process is taking some time. We therefore request three weeks in which to supply this evidence, if it comes to hand. In the event that the material is not received by the new deadline, we consent to a decision being reached on the application”.
Note: There is nothing further on the Department or Tribunal file to confirm hospital stay or treatment. In evidence[56] to the Tribunal the applicant advised he could not provide any documentation relating to this incident.
[56] See paragraph 34 below.
Departmental Decision Record
·About a week later after the incident with Hezbollah, a group of seven armed men attacked him in Bab al-Tabbaneh in Tripoli. He did not know the people. They accused him of giving secret information to Hezbollah, and they threatened to kill him. They hit him on his head, and he became unconscious. When he woke up, he was in the hospital where he stayed for about two days.
·The applicant and his father went to the police and made a report. The police promised they would investigate what happened, but they never did. The men who attacked him were most likely Sunni Muslims, as he was in Tripoli which is predominantly Sunni.
·The applicant believes that certain people noticed that he was travelling between the north and Dahieh in Beirut. The Sunni Muslims may have thought that he was going to Dahieh and giving Hezbollah secret information. They did not know that Hezbollah was questioning him about why he was in Dahieh as well. After the attack, he realised that he had to leave Lebanon because his life was in danger.[57]
[57] Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number]
Tribunal Submissions
·Received on 15 June 2023 and contains identical content as the one listed above (referenced in footnote 11).
Incident number 4: Occurred in Dahieh (town in Beirut), a few days after the incident in Tripoli. Said to be around July/August 2014
Statement of Claim
·I had to return to work in Dahieh because I had no money. I worked for 3 or 4 days.
·When I was working I day, a group of men came and threatened that they would kill me if I did not leave. They threatened me that I had 1 day to leave.
·I gathered my belongings, took my money from work and quickly fled back to [Village 1].[58]
[58] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [25]-[27]
PV Interview
·After the incident happened in Tripoli, I went back home to rest and get back to normal
·I decided I had to return to work because I had to make a living
·I couldn’t find any work so that pushed me to go back to Dahieh
·Even if I’m a qualified person with a degree or certificate (I don’t have them), I would not be able to secure any job in Lebanon
·So the same guys, they saw me again when I went back to Dahieh
·I’m not sure whether they are the same people, it is people who belong to the same groups
·Again they come to me and asked me these questions. What are you doing here, it’s better for you to go back to your place, otherwise we are going to hit me. Going to kill me. One of them pulled a gun.
·Over there, they don’t care much. They are going to shoot if they want to shoot.
·The area surrounding his workplace is [Town 1]
·This was the last time I visited Dahieh, was a few days after the incident in Tripoli
·After this, I decided to take all my money from work and go back home
·Delegate asked: when did you have to go back to school? After summer holidays – 3 months.
·Not unusual to be moving from Akkar to Beirut for work. Limited options for employment such as army. Majority of people go to Beirut because they can’t go anywhere else for work.[59]
[59] Audio at 57:55
Post Interview Submissions
·The Applicant was subjected to another incident when he was forced to return to work in order to survive, he had been back at work for a single day before being approached by a group of men who threatened to kill him if he did not leave. This prompted the Applicant to flee his work permanently.[60]
[60] Post Interview Legal Submissions dated 4 November 2019, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraph [35] and repeated in Pre Hearing Submissions to the Tribunal at AAT Case 2000435, Doc ID 11176256 at paragraph [38]
Departmental Decision Record
·In Akkar, while he was driving with his three friends, their car was stopped by unknown armed men. They damaged his car, took all of his money and his telephone. The applicant was scared that if he did not give them what they asked for they would have killed him. He did not go to the police because the authorities would not be able to help him.
·The applicant’s father helped him to apply for a tourist visa and to come to Australia. He arrived in Australia [in] February 2015 and applied for Protection because his life was in danger in Lebanon.[61]
[61] Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number]
Tribunal Submissions
·Received on 15 June 2023 and contains identical content as the one listed above (referenced in footnote 15).
Incident number 5: Occurred about [distance] from his home in [Village 1] (town in Akkar) after an evening out with friends (attack and robbery)
Statement of Claim
·After being threatened at work I was driving about [distance] from home. I had been out late with friends. There were 3 people in another car. I did not know who they were, and it was the first time I saw them. They pointed weapons at me and asked me for money and my telephone.
·They damaged my car. They took all of my money and my telephone. They left me and fled. I was scared that if I did not give them what they asked for they would have killed me. I did not go to the police because they would not have helped me. I had been to the police when I was attacked in Tripoli but the police did not do anything.[62]
[62] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [30]-[31]
PV Interview
·I was driving my car with my mates, just taking a drive together in an area nearby
·We were stopped by another car with men equipped with weapons. They put the weapons in our faces and asked us to give them everything we had. They smashed all the windows of the car, damaged the car.
·They had masks on their faces. They took everything from all of us and they ran away.
·We went back home.
·Looking at all these circumstances I passed through, I was really scared to go out and leave home and go anywhere. If I go to work, Hezbollah tries to scare me, if I go to try to walk down the street, that happens to me and if I go for fun with my friends, this happens to me too. Gives me impression to be really scared.
·This attack happened after I abandoned my work, about 1 month after that.
·I didn’t report it because the police they can hardly protect themselves so they wouldn’t do anything. I don’t know if my friends reported it, but I don’t think so. There were 3 friends in the car.[63]
[63] Audio at 58:24
Post Interview Submissions
·The Applicant suspected that he was being monitored in Tripoli, and on another occasion, he was robbed and attacked by a group of men, around [distance] from home.[64]
Departmental Decision Record
·In Akkar, while he was driving with his three friends, their car was stopped by unknown armed men. They damaged his car, took all of his money and his telephone. The applicant was scared that if he did not give them what they asked for they would have killed him. He did not go to the police because the authorities would not be able to help him.
·The applicant’s father helped him to apply for a tourist visa and to come to Australia. He arrived in Australia [in] February 2015 and applied for Protection because his life was in danger in Lebanon.[65]
Tribunal Submissions
·Received on 15 June 2023 and contains identical content as the one listed above (referenced in footnote 19).
[64] Post Interview Legal Submissions dated 4 November 2019, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraph [34] and repeated in Pre Hearing Submissions to the Tribunal at AAT Case 2000435, Doc ID 11176256 at paragraph [38]
[65] Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number]
Incident number 6: Final incident: beginning of 2014, asked to fight in Syria
Statement of Claim
·At the beginning of 2014 a few people I had become friends with told me that I should go and fight in Syria but I refused.[66]
[66] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] paragraph [35]
PV Interview
·Occurred in 2014, with guys that I’m not close friends but we know each other
·They told me to go to Syria, to fight with ISIS
·I said don’t bring to me, this is nothing to do with me
·Akkar is an area which is really affected by Syria and it is close by
·Never been involved with any political groups in Lebanon[67]
[67] Audio at 1:10:29
Post Interview Submissions
·Not mentioned
Departmental Decision Record
·At the beginning of 2014, a few friends told him that they should join Islamic State (IS) forces in Syria, but he refused. His area is very close to Syria, and the applicant fears that the conflict may spill to Lebanon.
…
·The people who were calling him to join them to fight for IS in Syria were not closed to him. They were just people he happened to know, but he had never been involved with any militant groups in Lebanon.
Tribunal Submissions
- Not mentioned

Tribunal research show the following in terms of a suburb/municipality overview as referred to in the various submissions of the applicant. This document contains information on the following locales:
·[Village 1] – the applicant’s home village. It is about [distance] from the Syrian border.[68]
[68] [Source deleted.]
·[Town 1], Dahieh, Beirut – where applicant was employed mid 2014
·Bab El-Tabbaneh Tripoli – location of one of the incidents mentioned by the applicant in his claims
[Village 1] - Applicant’s home – Location of 5th incident
·[Village 1] (aka [Village 1 variants]) is a village in Akkar Governorate
·[Village 1] is situated nearby to the villages [named].
·It is approximately [distance from] Beirut.
·Majority of population is Sunni Muslims
[Town 1], Dahieh, Beirut – Applicant’s place of employment – Location of 1st, 2nd and 4th incident
·The applicant provided evidence of employment in Lebanon at his uncle’s [product 1] shop as per letter issued by “[Business 1]” dated 12 October 2019 which states:
o“This is to certify that [the applicant], his mother: [name], date of birth: [date], civil record [in Village 1], was employed in our company during the year 2014 holding the position of [occupation 1] in the branch of [Town 1 and others] dealing in the [product 1] trading.”[69]
[69] Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number]
·[Town 1] is a neighbourhood in the southern suburbs of Dahieh, Beirut in the Baabda District
·Also known as [Town 1 variant]. Lies between [named landmarks].
·Dahieh is an “extremely poor” area.[70] Population is mainly Lebanese Shia Muslims as well as a minority of coexisting Sunni Muslims, Christians and a Palestinian refugee camp
[70] BTI 2022 Country Report - Lebanon, 23 February 2022
·Distance between [Village 1] and [Town 1], Dahieh in Beirut is approximately [distance] km
·Geographic Composition of Dahieh (Dahiya)
oThe population of Dahiya is estimated to be between 750,000 and 1 million.[71]
[71] Hanin Ghaddar, Hezbollahland: Mapping Dahiya and Lebanon’s Shia Community, March 2022 at page 8
oThere are 5 main districts in Dayiha which go by the names of Ghobeiry, Burj Al-Barajneh ([details deleted]), Haret Hreik, Hay Al-Sellom and Ouzai
- Dahiya is described as the “capital of Beirut’s Shia community”[72] and also as a “Hezbollah stronghold”[73]
- “It is common knowledge in Lebanon that government security authorities never enter Dahiya unless they coordinate with Hezbollah officials.”[74]
Tabbaneh, Tripoli – Location of 3rd incident
·Bab El-Tabbaneh (Tabbaneh) neighbourhood is located in the eastern part of Tripoli City
·According to a residential survey conducted in March 2017, the resident count is 20,449 with approximately 83% Lebanese. The largest non-Lebanese cohort are made up of Syrians.[75]
·“Tabbaneh is Tripoli’s most densely populated area and one of Lebanon’s poorest neighbourhoods”[76]
·Tabanneh is described as a “Sunni stronghold”[77]
·Distance between the applicant’s home in [Village 1] and Tabbaneh, Tripoli is approx. [distance]
[72] Hanin Ghaddar, Hezbollahland: Mapping Dahiya and Lebanon’s Shia Community, March 2022 at page 1
[73] Lebanon's Hezbollah chief claims militant group has 100,000 'trained' fighters (france24.com), 18 October 2021
[74] Hanin Ghaddar, Hezbollahland: Mapping Dahiya and Lebanon’s Shia Community, March 2022 at page 76
[75] UN-Habitat and UNICEF Lebanon (2018), Tabbaneh Neighbourhood Profile, Tripoli Lebanon Beirut: UN-Habitat Lebanon
[76] The conflict context in Tripoli: Chronic neglect, increased poverty & leadership crisis (2016) Lebanon Support
[77] Tripoli: the conflict - Peace in Progress magazine (icip.cat)
Tribunal Summary of Chronology and Demographic Information
As the above information is quite detailed and in some respects complex the Tribunal provides the following summary:
·The applicant claims that during school holidays he worked in his uncle’s [product 1] shop in Dahieh as there was no work where he was living in Northern Lebanon[78]. His uncle’s [product 1] shop was located in [Town 1][79], which is approximately [distance] from the applicant’s hometown of [Village 1]. [Town 1] is a municipality located in the [suburbs] of Beirut, located approximately [distance] from the capital, and part of the wider suburb of Dahieh. Dahieh (or Dahiya) is a predominantly Shia Muslim area, with a minority of coexisting Sunni Muslims, Christians, and a Palestinian refugee camp[80]. Dahieh has been described as the Beirut stronghold of the Shia militant group Hezbollah[81], and Country Information indicates that Dahieh is considered the “capital of Beirut’s Shia community[82]”.
·The applicant claims that on three occasions during mid 2014 he was threatened by persons in Dahieh, including once by Hezbollah[83], but he continued to return because he couldn’t find work elsewhere and he needed money to make a living[84]. During the first incident, the applicant claims that when he was close to his uncle’s shop, five unknown men came up to him and asked why he was there because he was a Sunni Muslim, and threatened him that if they saw him again, they would harm him[85]. The applicant claims he was not very scared, and his work colleague told him not to worry about what was said[86].
·During the second incident, which the applicant claims happened a few weeks after the first incident, the applicant was working at his uncle’s shop when he was approached and questioned by men who claimed to be from Hezbollah, and asked the applicant who he was, why he was working there and why he had chosen that place specifically[87]. The applicant told them that there was no other place to work and that he only worked during the school holidays[88]. The applicant claims he was forced to the floor and stripped of his phone, and only released when a work colleague was contacted and told to bring the applicant’s identification documents[89]. Once these documents were provided, the applicant claims that the men cursed at him and told him to leave in a threatening way before giving him back his phone. The applicant states that he continued working as normal because he needed to work to live[90].
·In around June or July 2014, about a week after the second incident in Dahieh occurred, the applicant claims that he travelled to the neighbourhood of Bab El-Tabbaneh (Tabbaneh) in the city of Tripoli. Tabbaneh is a predominantly Sunni Muslims area and is described as a “Sunni Stronghold”[91]. Tabbaneh is approximately [distance] from the applicant’s hometown of [Village 1]. The applicant claims that he was passing through Tabbaneh and used to buy things at the market there[92]. On this occasion, the applicant claims that he was stopped and beaten by persons who believed he was a spy tipping off Hezbollah, as the area had some conflict between the Shia and Sunni Muslim communities, and that those persons may have believed he was Shia[93]. The applicant was hospitalised for two days as a result of this incident. The applicant claims that he attended at a police station but they just took his name and no official report was prepared[94].
·Approximately one week after the incident in Tabbaneh, the applicant claims that he returned to Dahieh to work because he had to make a living, when a fourth incident occurred[95]. He claims that a group of men approached him and threatened to kill him if he did not leave Dahieh. The applicant claims that one of the men pulled out a gun[96]. It was this incident that prompted the applicant to flee his work in Dahieh permanently, and return to his home in [Village 1][97].
·The applicant claims a fifth incident occurred about a month after the final incident in Dahieh, and around [distance] from his home in [Village 1] when he was driving his car with friends. The applicant claims that they were stopped by another car with men equipped with weapons, who pointed the weapons at them and asked for money and their phones and damaged his car before fleeing[98]. The applicant claims that he was scared that if he did not give them what they asked for, they would have killed him[99]. He did not report this incident to the police because the police did nothing after he was attacked in Tripoli[100].
[78] Statutory Declaration of [the applicant] dated 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM reference [File number]
[79] [Source deleted.]
[80] Dahieh - Wikipedia
[81] Lebanon's Hezbollah chief claims militant group has 100,000 'trained' fighters (france24.com), 18 October 2021
[82] Hanin Ghaddar, Hezbollahland: Mapping Dahiya and Lebanon’s Shia Community, March 2022 at page 1
[83] Statutory Declaration of [the applicant] dated 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM reference [File number]
[84] Protection Visa Interview audio at 49:00, Department File [File number], TRIM reference [Number]
[85] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [8]-[11]
[86] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [8]-[11]
[87] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [12]-[16]
[88] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [12]-[16]
[89] Post Interview Legal Submissions dated 4 November 2019, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraph [35] and repeated in Pre Hearing Submissions to the Tribunal at AAT Case 2000435, Doc ID 11176256 at paragraph [38]
[90] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [12]-[16]
[91] Tripoli: the conflict - Peace in Progress magazine (icip.cat)
[92] Protection Visa Interview audio at 39:34, Department File [File number], TRIM reference [Number]
[93] Protection Visa Interview audio at 39:34, Department File [File number], TRIM reference [Number]
[94] Protection Visa Interview audio at 39:34, Department File [File number], TRIM reference [Number]
[95] Protection Visa Interview audio at 49:00, Department File [File number], TRIM reference [Number]
[96]Protection Visa Interview audio at 49:00, Department File [File number], TRIM reference [Number]
[97] Post Interview Legal Submissions dated 4 November 2019, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraph [35] and repeated in Pre Hearing Submissions to the Tribunal at AAT Case 2000435, Doc ID 11176256 at paragraph [38
[98] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [30]-[31]
[99]Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [30]-[31]
[100] Statutory Declaration declared 15 May 2015, Department File [File number], TRIM Reference [File number] at paragraphs [30]-[31]
Country Information (CI) Lebanon
This section of the decision record deals with state protection, dialogue between elders/religious leaders to resolve disputes and checkpoints or barriers in the critical Shia area of Dahiyeh
State Protection
The latest DFAT Country Information Report for Lebanon[101] and other sources identified by the Tribunal outline the following:
[101] DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon (26 June 2023)
Paragraph 5.1: The ability of authorities to provide state protection depends to a large degree on geographic area: several areas of Lebanon are not under the complete control of the state. Government forces are less able to enforce the law in areas where Hezbollah operates (southern suburbs of Beirut, parts of the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon), and they do not typically enter Palestinian refugee camps (see Palestinians). However, it is not possible to say State security agencies are unable, in all circumstances, to enforce the law in these areas. Civilian authorities maintain effective control over the armed forces and other security forces.
Paragraph 5.2: Lebanon’s economic crisis has meant that members of the security forces have suffered the same slump in real income as have other civil servants, affecting their ability to support themselves and their families. Security forces have been ‘struggling to manage the consequences of compounding crises…
Internal Security Forces (ISF)
Paragraph 5.6: The ISF (also known as the ‘darak’) is Lebanon’s police and security body, tasked with maintaining public order and countering terrorism. It has approximately 40,000 active personnel. While nominally a non-sectarian organisation, the ISF is headed by a Sunni, as part of Lebanon’s confessional system. According to an academic researcher, each of Lebanon’s major sects supports a portion of the ISF, which it guards intensely and seldom shares with other groups. International observers have reported concerns that the ISF has threatened and mistreated drug users, persons involved in prostitution, and LGBTI persons in their custody. The economic crisis has caused serious difficulties for the ISF and its personnel.
Municipal Police
Paragraph 5.7: The UNDP reports that Lebanon’s Municipal Police, who answer to local mayors, are ‘known to be the weakest link among Lebanon’s security agencies, and to command little authority and respect. They are considered to play a minimal role in ensuring security in cities, towns or municipalities.’ Municipal police are expected to ask for the support of the ISF ‘in the event of any crime or any disturbance of the public security’. They have been hit especially hard by the economic crisis. Municipalities’ sources of income are tax collection (which has been reduced significantly by the crisis), and central government funding (which, as of July 2022, had not been paid for two years). Sources report that, as at July 2022, most municipal police had not been paid for a year. Many municipalities have laid off police and sources report that their role has, to some degree, been replaced by vigilantism.
Non-state actors, often with political affiliations, are taking an increasingly prominent role in local security. The International Crisis Group (ICG) notes that a ‘mosaic of local security arrangements is forming as municipal police and political party activists join with commercial providers and resident volunteers to keep neighbourhoods and villages safe.[102]’
For many years, town protectors have operated in communities across Lebanon. While each group's precise structure varies, town protectors are typically young, local men charged with being the municipality's “eyes and ears". Under this mandate, they are meant to spot potential crimes and alert the authorities, who can then make arrests.[103]
[102] 'Human Rights Watch World Report 2023', Human Rights Watch (HRW), 12 January 2023, p.380, . See also: 'As Lebanon unravels, Beirut neighborhood takes security into its own hands', Al Monitor, 17 December 2022,
[103] '‘We do the police’s job’: Protecting Lebanon’s most lawless towns', Aljazeera, 19 December 2021
Lebanon's ongoing economic, political and social demise has paralysed much of the state infrastructure and has brought poverty levels to numbers unseen since the country's 1975-90 civil war.
The decline is forcing residents to take security into their own hands, with neighborhood groups emerging to fill in where state security has lapsed.[104]
[104] 'As Lebanon unravels, Beirut neighborhood takes security into its own hands', Al Monitor, 17 December 2022,
Dialogue between elders/religious leaders to resolve disputes
The latest DFAT Country Information Report for Lebanon and other sources identified by the Tribunal outline the following:
Paragraph 3.22: Human rights observers report that relationships between religious groups in Lebanon are generally peaceful. Interreligious dialogue between religious leaders and communities occurs. Religious leaders have regularly condemned extremism and violence perpetrated in the name of religion following terrorist attacks in the region against religious targets. Violent clashes with religious overtones have been less common in Lebanon in recent years. Where violence has occurred between communal groups (such as between Alawites and Sunnis in Tripoli, or Shi’a and Sunni or Christian groups in Beirut), it has generally been relatively low-level and localised in nature, with political rather than religious motivations (see Security Situation). Lebanese authorities are generally committed to preventing violence between religious communities.
Religious leaders stated that relationships among individual members of different religious groups remained amicable.[105] Christian and Muslim religious leaders from the major denominations continued to participate in interfaith dialogues throughout the year and to call for unity against extremism. At a February 26 conference in Vienna, the highest leaders of some of the country’s major religious communities, including Maronite Patriarch Bechara Rai, Grand Mufti of the Republic Abdel Latif Deryan, and Armenian Orthodox Catholicos Aram I Keshishian, joined 23 high-ranking Arab Muslim and Christian authorities to commit to work together to rebuild and protect their communities from the effects of religiously motivated violent extremist rhetoric and actions.[106]
Religious figures and political strongmen who act as representatives of sectarian or communal interests are the main mediators between the state, communities, and the individual, based on clientelistic calculations. They are supplemented by tightly woven social networks at the grassroots level (e.g. neighborhood associations, family leagues, parishes, charities and schools), which provide the main interface between clientelistic structures and individuals. Groups, such as Hezbollah, constitute a key node for citizens accessing health care, education or social security services. These groups act as a surrogate state, and establish an even stronger bond between people and political organizations.[107]
On January 27, Christian and Muslim religious leaders launched a joint appeal for the salvation of Lebanon in the face of an escalation of political, economic, social, and health crises. They called on political leaders to “stop toying with the destiny of the nation,” in addition to “an immediate formation of a government of national resolve without any personal or sectarian calculations.”
On July 1, Christian religious leaders gathered with Pope Francis in the Vatican for a Day of Prayer and Reflection for Lebanon.
On December 20, religious leaders representing the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Sunni, Shia, and Druze communities met with United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres during his visit to the country. In a joint statement with Guterres, the leaders confirmed their commitment to openness, tolerance, and coexistence, saying that these values are at the core of faith, especially during the country’s ongoing economic crisis.[108]
[105] 'International Religious Freedom Report for 2018 - Lebanon', United States Department of State, 21 June 2019,
[106] 'International Religious Freedom Report for 2018 - Lebanon', United States Department of State, 21 June 2019
[107] 'BTI 2018 Country Report - Lebanon', Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018,
[108] '2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Lebanon', US Department of State, 02 June 2022,
Check points or Barriers in critical areas visited by the applicant
The latest DFAT Country Information Report for Lebanon and other sources identified by the Tribunal outline the following:
[Details deleted.] Dahieh (Dahiya), Beirut – where the applicant was employed mid 2014 Dahiya is described as the “capital of Beirut’s Shia community” and also as a “Hezbollah stronghold”[109]
There is a high level of securitization in Beirut City. The state and other institutions limit access and use fortification as a security measure. Notably, a large portion of the downtown area of Beirut City has effectively been closed-off to the public since the October 2019 civil uprising. Only those with official business can enter through the guarded entry points and access the buildings located there. Extra-state security by local groups can be seen in different neighbourhoods in the city. In the densely populated Dahiya, for example, Hezbollah maintains its own security forces and control.[110]
The Jordanian political economist and long-time commentator on the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue Riad Al Khouri who was interviewed for this report in October 2022 considered that checkpoints “may have been a problem in the past but are no longer a major problem”:
“Now, to clarify, we are talking about two distinct kinds of checkpoints here. One would be an official checkpoint of the Lebanese army or the Lebanese police. And there are few problems or restrictions in this regard, including arbitrary arrest. I do not think this is a real problem. The other checkpoints are informal. Lebanon is full of militias. These are not government bodies, they are private. They may, in a certain area, be representative of people. In other words, they are not just criminal gangs, they are somehow politically or socially based, and they may from time to time have checkpoints. But again, talking about the present, this is not a major problem. It was a major problem in the past going back to the 1970s in ‘80s, it would be possible to hold people or even imprison or even kill at these checkpoints, including Palestinian refugees. But this was 40 years ago. We are talking about the present. This is no longer a major problem.” (Source: Riad Al Khouri, interview record, 7 October 2022).[111]
[109] Lebanon's Hezbollah chief claims militant group has 100,000 'trained' fighters (france24.com), 18 October 2021
[110] 'Beirut City Profile 2021', United Nations Habitat, 03 September 2021, Monroe, The Insecure City: Space, Power, and Mobility in Beirut.
[111] 'Lebanon: Stateless Palestinians', Asylos, March 2023

This section of the decision record deals with the Religious Demographics and Hezbollah within Lebanon
Religious Demographics – Shias and Sunnis
Shias
·An estimated 31 percent of Lebanon’s population is Shia.[112]
[112] 'Religious Freedom in the World Report 2021 - Lebanon', Aid to the Church in Need (ACN), 20 April 2021
·Concentrated in southern Lebanon, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and the northern half of the Beka’a governate.[113]
[113] DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon (26 June 2023) at [3.19]
·There is a large degree of loyalty to and support for Hezbollah among Lebanese Shia, who see the group as instrumental in helping the Shia community’s fortunes in Lebanon.[114]
[114] Beirut’s Shiites Like the Idea of Change, but Like Hezbollah More New York Times, The, 14 August 2020
Sunnis
·An estimated 32 percent of Lebanon’s population is Sunni.[115]
[115]'2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Lebanon', US Department of State, 02 June 2022, p.2,
·Concentrated in North Lebanon Governorate and West Beirut. There are also Sunni populations in South Lebanon Governorate, Beka’a Governorate, and Nabatiyeh Governorate[116].
[116] Ibid
Hezbollah – General Information
1. What is Hezbollah?
Backgrounder: What Is Hezbollah? Council on Foreign Relations, 25 May 2022 (direct quotes)
- Hezbollah is a Shiite Muslim political party and militant group based in Lebanon, where its extensive security apparatus, political organization, and social services network fostered its reputation as “a state within a state.” Founded in the chaos of the fifteen-year Lebanese Civil War, the Iran-backed group is driven by its opposition to Israel and its resistance to Western influence in the Middle East.
- Hezbollah controls much of Lebanon’s Shiite-majority areas, including parts of Beirut, southern Lebanon, and the eastern Bekaa Valley region.
2. The extent of its presence in Lebanon?
Backgrounder: What Is Hezbollah? Council on Foreign Relations, 25 May 2022 (direct quotes)
- Hezbollah has been a fixture of the Lebanese government since 1992, when eight of its members were elected to Parliament, and the party has held cabinet positions since 2005.
- The party marked its integration into mainstream politics in 2009 with an updated manifesto that was less Islamist than its predecessor and called for “true democracy.”
- The most recent national elections, in 2022, saw Hezbollah maintain its 13 seats in Lebanon’s 128-member Parliament, though the party and its allies lost their majority.
- At the same time, Hezbollah maintains its military arm. Under the 1989 Taif Agreement, which was brokered by Saudi Arabia and Syria and ended Lebanon’s civil war, Hezbollah was the only militia allowed to keep its arms.
3. What is its purpose in Lebanon?
Hezbollah Influence in Lebanon_061722.pdf (counterextremism.com) Counter Extremism Project, June 2022 (direct quotes)
·Hezbollah has used its political leverage and military capabilities to subvert Lebanon’s sovereignty, incorporating itself into virtually every major sector of Lebanese society through its political wing and the creation of its own parallel institutions. (p40)
Lebanese Hezbollah United States. Congressional Research Service. 11 January 2023 (direct quotes)
- For nearly two decades, Hezbollah’s stated objective was to drive IDF forces from southern Lebanon, through a range of attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets. Since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah has used Israel’s remaining presence in the Sheb’a Farms and other disputed areas in the Lebanon-Syria-Israel tri-border region to justify its ongoing conflict with Israel—and its persistence as an armed militia alongside the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Hezbollah also bolsters Iranian objectives; the State Department’s 2021 Country Reports on Terrorism states that Iran provides Hezbollah with “most of its funding, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid.”
- Hezbollah operates a global criminal-financial network, with reported hubs in Europe, Africa, and Latin America.
- In addition to military and criminal objectives, Hezbollah also seeks influence in Lebanon’s political system, likely in part to prevent the government from targeting the group’s weapons stockpiles or private telecommunications network
Lebanon: The Shiite Dimension | Wilson Center, Nicholas Blanford, 13 July 2022
On other religions:
- “Hezbollah recognizes Lebanon’s diverse religious landscape and has open channels of dialogue with all other sects. Hezbollah champions unity between the Shiite and Sunni sects on grounds that resistance against Israel takes precedence over doctrinal differences. Hezbollah counts Sunni Islamists among its allies, despite sporadic Shiite-Sunni tensions and the strains caused by its military intervention in Syria’s civil war. Hezbollah opened a dialogue with the Maronite church for the first time in 1992, and a party representative regularly meets with religious leaders of various Christian denominations.”
4. Is it an internally disciplined organisation?
Lebanese Hezbollah United States. Congressional Research Service. 11 January 2023 (direct quotes)
- Hassan Nasrallah has served as Secretary-General of Hezbollah since the assassination of his predecessor by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in 1992.
- According to the U.S. government, the External Security Organization (ESO), the military arm of Hezbollah responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of terrorist attacks, is headed by Talal Hamiyah. The ESO is also known as the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) or Unit 910. Some countries and the European Union separate Hezbollah’s military and political wings—designating the former for sanctions while maintaining dialogue with the latter. U.S. officials describe this division as a “false distinction,” and one not made by Hezbollah itself.
- Definitive numbers on Hezbollah’s total size are not publicly available; the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ 2022 Military Balance estimates that the group may have “up to 20,000 active personnel.”
What does democracy look like inside Hezbollah?, L’Orient le Jour (L’Orient Today), 28 March 2023,
- Hezbollah’s detractors, however, argue that the party’s democratic front is merely a façade. “Internal debates between the different councils are merely variations on the same theme. They are all on the same side and share the same ideology,” said a Shiite opponent on condition of anonymity, given the sensitivity of the issue.
- Sherif Sleiman, a lawyer affiliated with the October 2019 protest movement who is familiar with Hezbollah circles, confirmed that personal freedom of speech diminishes as soon as a party member is in the company of his peers. “When face-to-face with a party member, a party member expresses themselves freely without restraint. But when in a group, censorship and group influence take over,” Sleiman said.
- According to Hage Ali, Hezbollah is just as democratic as other Lebanese political parties that operate based on political lineage and offer limited opportunities for advancement or mobility. The researcher explained that the party has created opportunities for workers and individuals at the lower rungs of the social hierarchy to progress within the party.
- “It’s similar to international corporations where employees are promised opportunities to grow alongside the organization,” Hage Ali added. Elections serve as a means to reward loyalty and promote individuals within the party.
5. Hezbollah relationship with Lebanese Armed Forces
Hezbollah Influence in Lebanon_061722.pdf (counterextremism.com) Counter Extremism Project, June 2022 (direct quotes)
· According to Lebanese Hezbollah media reports, there is “almost daily” coordination between the LAF and Hezbollah against Syrian rebel groups. (p25)
· According to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah and the LAF form a multilateral defense of Lebanon. (p25)
In evidence the applicant advised the Tribunal as follows:
Family circumstances Australia
·He has been resident in Australia since February 2015. He married an Australian citizen [in] January 2023. He has no children. He applied for a partner visa approximately 3 months ago. He was employed but now owns his own [business] and has a gross income of up to $60,000 per annum.
·His wife is an Australian citizen as are her parents. His wife works as [an occupation 2] and earns approximately $40,000 per annum net.
Family circumstances Lebanon
·He was born, raised and educated in [Village 1] in the north of Lebanon. [This] village has a population of 3,000 to 4,000 persons. It is exclusively Sunni Muslim. He attends mosque in Australia on occasion and is not strictly observant.
·Both of his parents live in his home village. Neither of his parents are strictly observant. His family have lived in the same village for at least 4 generations. His father is [a local official] (now retired) and was and is regarded as a senior respected civic leader in the village. To date his siblings have not followed their father in pursuing a civic position.
·He has [specified family members] [Details deleted.] Most of his married siblings continue to live in the home village or a nearby village. He advised the Tribunal he had a continuing large extended family living in his home village. His siblings are all Sunni Muslim. There are no Shia Muslims or persons of other religious faith living in his village.
·He remained in school until [grade] and did not complete [grade] as he had relocated to Australia during [that year].
Political activities
·He was never involved in any political activities, a political party or political organisation in Lebanon. He did not give evidence of any political engagement within the Lebanese community in Australia.
Dahieh
·He relocated to Dahieh for a period of 3 months seeking work in his [uncle’s] [product 1] shop. His uncle is a Sunni Muslim with an enterprise in a set of suburbs almost exclusively Shia Muslim and largely, if not exclusively controlled by Hezbollah. He uncle has owned and run the shop for a number of years. He is not aware of how his uncle came to be permitted by Hezbollah or the wider Shia community to run an enterprise. He is not aware if his uncle pays any taxes or levies to Hezbollah for protection. Whilst living in Dahieh he worked as [an occupation 1] in the shop and delivery driver in the wider suburbs. He is aware these suburbs are essentially Shia Muslim. He generally worked 7am to 9pm 7 days per week as the shop needed to be continually open. He lived in an apartment on the second floor of the building and shared this accommodation with a fellow worker who was an Alawite from Syria. He spent a lot of time in delivery duties.
·His evidence as to the incidents that caused him to leave Lebanon was largely consistent with the summary provided by the Tribunal above at paragraph 24 above.
·He was not able to provide any doctor’s certificate, admission statement, medical report, medical opinion or receipts for payment of medical costs relating to his alleged admission to hospital arising from an incident in Bab Al Tabbanah (incident number 3 in paragraph 24 above). He was aware that Bab Al Tabbanah was predominantly Sunni Muslim.
·He maintained his belief it was his right to travel into and around Dahieh for reasons unrelated to his employment as Lebanon was his country and Hezbollah or Shia Muslim actions in preventing, delaying or stopping his entry was unacceptable and their approaches were threatening, intimidating and of great concern.
In some detail the Tribunal explained to the applicant the sources and uses of Country Information. The Tribunal explained and referred to CI sources that addressed state security, civilian control of the armed forces and security forces, localised police and security arrangements that had developed throughout Lebanon in the last decade, dialogue between religious leaders of different faiths in Lebanon, check points and barriers to entry in Dahieh. The Tribunal asked the applicant to comment on these matters. In response the applicant advised he saw things differently, he had felt like a targeted person, the incidents were not limited and he felt targeted because he was a Sunni Muslim.
The applicant advised his knowledge of the situation in Lebanon was based upon what he saw in the news, what he was told by people recently returned from Lebanon, a majority of Lebanese people wanted to leave Lebanon and live elsewhere because Lebanon is a mess and there is no hope going into the future. He referred to the high unemployment, inflation and now deflation, low value of the currency and the explosion in Beirut as reasons for leaving Lebanon or alternately as reasons for not returning to Lebanon or his home village. In Australia he had a life, a wife and family, a business, friends and relationships. These matters were important to him and he had nothing to look forward to if he returned to Lebanon. If he had to live in his home village it was an area surrounded by war and conflict. He could not have the life in Lebanon he had in Australia.
The Tribunal put to the applicant that a possible alternate characterisation or explanation of the incidents outlined in paragraph 24 above was simply loutish, hood like or criminal activity unrelated, isolated and not part of any continuum of discriminatory or harassment type activities based around his supposed religious identification. In the alternative the Tribunal put to the applicant that it was entirely a proper part of a legitimate security process to check the bona fides and identity of a stranger to a particular area and this was an established and recognised role of political organisations like Hezbollah engaged in the protection of Lebanese citizens in areas controlled by Hezbollah. The applicant demurred from these possible alternate characterisations and advised the Tribunal the incidents outlined in paragraph 24 above created conflict within himself. The current situation in Lebanon was bad. His experiences of living away from his home village had challenged his assumptions and beliefs as to what was Lebanon and he no longer believed he could live in his own country.
At the conclusion of the hearing the Tribunal advised the solicitor for the applicant it would receive additional written submissions that addressed the evidence of the applicant and the matters outlined above in paragraphs 35 to 37. The Tribunal advised the written submissions should be provided by close of business Wednesday 30 August 2023. The solicitor for the applicant advised she would comply with the request of the Tribunal.
As requested on 30 August 2023 the applicant provided further written submissions[117] as follows:
·Whether or not the string of incidents that the Applicant was subjected to were “unconnected isolated activities of an unwelcome criminal nature,” or whether the “activities of a Sunni Muslim going into an exclusively Shia neighbourhood necessarily invites investigation and the checking of bona fides,” in light of Lebanon’s instability;
·The reasons as to why the Applicant cannot return to [Village 1], his home village, or surrounding villages in Akkar or other parts of Lebanon where there is no Shia community, such as near the border of Syria;
·The local security situation in Lebanon, with members of the community taking it upon themselves to “protect the people;”
·The significance of a lack of employment opportunity in an economy which is widely depressed.[118]
[117] Doc ID number 11460462
[118] Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 3.
As part of the submissions set out in paragraph 39 above the applicant addressed the following:
The Motivational requirement
·The string of incidents[119] to which the applicant was subjected were motivated by the applicant’s religion and implied membership of a particular social group (PSG) namely men travelling between Akkar and Dahieh and being targeted on such basis.
[119] For full detail of these incidents see paragraph 24 above.
·Persecution involves an element of motivation for the infliction of harm.
·The Convention requires the decision-maker to ascertain the motivation for the allegedly persecutory conduct which an applicant for refugee status fears.[120]
[120] MIMA v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1 at [102] as cited in Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 5.
·In the context of art 1A(2), the relevant nexus can be satisfied by either the discriminatory motivation of the perpetrators of the harm or the discriminatory failure of state protection. The mere inability on the part of a state to prevent harm is not sufficient to establish a refugee nexus. Rather, it must be shown that the failure on the part of the state or state agents to prevent the relevant conduct is the result of toleration or condonation of the conduct, not simply inability to prevent it[121]. The conduct of Hezbollah members in Hezbollah controlled areas of Lebanon is officially tolerated[122]. As a hybrid actor, Hezbollah has risen to become the most influential political organization in Lebanon… Hezbollah stands out among all political actors in Lebanon in having de facto control over Lebanon’s border with Syria[123].
[121] Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 6
[122] Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 7
[123] Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 8
Inability to subsist economically throughout Lebanon
·In relation to country conditions, relevant factors may include living conditions in the area of proposed relocation and whether the area of relocation is practically, safely and legally accessible[124].
·It is necessary to assess the living circumstances in the particular locations where the Applicant would be likely to reside in Lebanon, namely, the locations set out by the Tribunal during the hearing. The Applicant’s family members, namely his parents and siblings, are all unemployed in Lebanon given the country’s climate. They live in abject poverty. The Applicant’s entire family in Lebanon rely on his very modest income of $50,000 annually in order to merely survive, an income which he must also use to support himself and his wife in Australia. Had the Applicant not been employed in Australia, and had he not sent funds to his family on over 200 occasions, his family in Lebanon would have starved or worse, perished[125].
·To answer the Tribunal’s question in relation to why the Applicant cannot return to [Village 1] or surrounding villages in Akkar, the Tribunal must assess the availability of work in those areas, and accessibility to work in other locations. There are very few opportunities for employment in these areas, due to the rural and agricultural nature of the land[126].
·The applicant provided a list of adverse economic conditions currently existing in Lebanon relating to an ongoing economic crisis, the obstruction of investigations into the Beirut blast in August 2020, the consequences of three decades of deliberate reckless fiscal and monetary policy, loss of value of the currency, low median household income, poor public services, a failing healthcare system, large gaps in social welfare provision and the use of unlawful force by the Lebanese army[127].
Remittances to the home country
·The Applicant’s entire family in Lebanon rely on his very modest income of $50,000 annually in order to merely survive, an income which he must also use to support himself and his wife in Australia. Had the Applicant not been employed in Australia, and had he not sent funds to his family on over 200 occasions, his family in Lebanon would have starved or worse, perished[128].
·In this context the applicant provided screen shots of regular remittances from Australia to a [a name] in Tripoli, Lebanon of large sums of money amounting to many tens of thousands of dollars providing the receiver with sums in USD.
[124] as cited in Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 10
[125] Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 11
[126] Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 15
[127] Doc ID number 11460462 paragraphs 16 to 28 and cited sources therein.
[128] Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 14

The Tribunal accepts the applicant is employed in Australia and has for many years remitted large sums of money to his family in Lebanon. The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s employment in Australia supports and maintains his family in Lebanon. The Tribunal accepts these large remittances provide major financial support to his family in Lebanon.
Analysis, Findings and Conclusions
There is a considerable detail in the written submissions provided to the Department and Tribunal over time. The applicant gave lengthy evidence to the Tribunal. This oral evidence largely supplemented his prior interview statements. In addition, in the various submissions considerable information has been provided that addressed Country Information.
The applicant’s family comprising many siblings, his parents and a much wider extended family continue to live in his home village or nearby villages. It is a very large extended family.
The applicant was never involved in any political activity in his home country of Lebanon. There is no evidence he has been engaged in any political activity in his 8 years of residence in Australia.
The applicant’s parents in Lebanon and wider family are not strictly observant Muslims. The applicant sometimes attends mosque in Australia. The applicant grew up in an exclusively Sunni Muslim family in an exclusively Sunni Muslim locale in the north of Lebanon.
The applicant comes from a well-established family in the north of Lebanon. His family have lived in his village for many generations. His family are mainstream Sunni Muslim, and the applicant disavowed any involvement or engagement with more radical Islamic elements.
His family are well known in his home village and immediate surrounds. His father is a respected senior member of the local community. His father has held positions of civic authority in his home village.
Excluding the civic role of his father the applicant did not outline any personal engagement with political parties, political organisations, or political activism in his home country (excluding, of course the details as summarised in paragraph 24 above).
Incidents 5 and 6 above as set out in paragraph 24 above.
These incidents occurred in the applicant’s home area or in areas close to his home village.
These incidents appear to be acts of robbery and property damage inflicted by a group of men late at night in the home locale of the applicant. Both incidents appear to be one off events. The applicant did not report incident 5 to local police. There is nothing in the written submissions or oral statements to the Department that suggest the applicant pursued the robbery and property damage with more senior persons in his village.
Robberies occur in all parts of the world. Property damage is often part of robberies. There is little in the evidence to suggest the robbery and property damage was in motivated by anything but criminal pursuits.
Incident 5 appears to be a one-off event. There is little evidence to suggest it was related to any form of political interest whether it be that of Hezbollah or Shia Muslims. Indeed, the evidence suggests there is no immediate presence of Hezbollah or Shia Muslims in the applicants exclusively Sunni village or surrounding areas.
The Tribunal is satisfied incident 5 was a one-off act of criminal activity in the form of a robbery and assault that not unnaturally caused a degree of fear on the part of the applicant. The Tribunal is unable to see any relationship to refugee grounds.
Incident 6 appears to have been a discussion with a group of friends concerning joining ISIS and going to fight in Lebanon. The evidence is that it was a one-off discussion. In a time dominated by terrorist activity and ongoing warfare in nearby countries it is not surprising that young men discuss the option of joining and fighting with a group of combatants. One only has to review daily papers in Australia round this time to see the importance of these middle east conflicts and attempts to recruit potential actors.
There is little evidence to suggest that there were any ongoing discussions. There is no evidence to suggest the applicant was forced in any way to participate in these talks. There is no evidence that there was any interest on the part of actors in Lebanon or the middle east to recruit the applicant as a potential combatant. There is no evidence the applicant suffered any harm at the time arising out of these discussions. There is no evidence that the applicant suffered any harm in the future that relates to these discussions. There is no evidence that any person in authority raised the discussions with the applicant at any time after 2014.
The Tribunal is satisfied incident 6 was a one-off discussion concerning topical political events of the day. The Tribunal is unable to see any relationship to refugee grounds.
Incidents 1 to 4 as set out in paragraph 24 above
The Tribunal now turns to incidents 1 to 4 as set out in paragraph 24 above.
The Tribunal finds as follows:
·The applicant as a Sunni Muslim found work as [an occupation 1] and or driver for a brief period of 3 or 4 months with a family member in a [product 1] shop in an almost exclusively Shia Muslim[129] areas known as Dannieh largely if not totally controlled by Hezbollah.
·The applicant will most likely return to his home village in the north of Lebanon.
[129] For more exact detail see paragraph 12 and relevant citations therein.
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant was employed for a brief period as outlined in paragraph 57 above.
At the time of the incidents, he was something of a stranger to most of the people in the areas where he worked and lived. Prior to the incidents he had not been engaged in any political activity of any kind. In fact, he came from a relatively well insulated and homogenous Sunni Muslim community in the north of Lebanon. His family are well known in this area.
At the time of the incidents, he was not engaged in any political activity of any kind. As a delivery driver working very long hours 7 days per week outside his [product 1] shop, he would have been sighted or observed as he went about his delivery duties. As a stranger working in the local [product 1] shop, he would have been known to the local community or at least those who availed themselves of his services in the shop or delivery duties.
In the summer of 2015, he was a boy working his uncle’s [product 1] shop. He worked in the shop and lived above the shop. It is not an unreasonable conclusion this might have been the subject of some comment in the areas serviced by the [product 1] shop. New people, strangers, a young boy would be of interest to a local community.
The Tribunal notes the finding of the delegate that “…the applicant was still a student in 2014, and he was fully supported financially by his parents. I find it was not crucial for the applicant’s subsistence to go and work at all. It was the applicant’s free choice to go and work in Dahieh during the school holidays…”[130]
[130] Decision record page 6.
There is no evidence on any formal licensing system in Dannieh as to the hiring of workers in retail outlets. In a depressed community in an economically deprived suburb in a large town marred by generational sectarian and religious conflict in a war-ravaged country that barely exists as a sovereign state it is not surprising a new young worker might be of interest to a local community.
There is little evidence before the Tribunal that suggests that Hezbollah or its agents were involved in any of the incidents. There is little evidence that suggests that the applicant might have been of any interest to Hezbollah or its agents. There is little evidence to suggest that the applicant engaged in any activities that might draw his identity to the attention of Hezbollah in any adverse way.
The Tribunal has studied the information set out in paragraph 24 with great interest. The Tribunal paid close heed to the oral evidence of the applicant. The Tribunal reviewed the available Country Information. The Tribunal has considered the post-hearing submission of the applicant.
The applicant worked in his uncle’s [product 1] shop with at least the acquiescence of the local community and by implication the political controllers of an almost exclusively Shia area.
The Tribunal is unable to conclude the incidents are part of any continuum. The Tribunal is unable to conclude Hezbollah or its agents in any way authorised, encouraged, facilitated, permitted, or required its members or supporters to engage in the incidents as outlined.
Available Country Information outlines the significant control of Hezbollah around the area of Dannieh. The delegate referred to the common practice of verifying the identity of people as a widespread practice to secure the area and maintaining as a safe locale[131]. Country Information[132] suggests checkpoints or barriers to entry were established by the state, often use the Lebanese Armed Forces, local political actors effectively control areas of Dannieh but “…it is not possible to say State security agencies are unable, in all circumstances, to enforce the law in these areas. Civilian authorities maintain effective control over the armed forces and other security forces…” Considering the dominance of Hezbollah in this area of Dannieh the Tribunal is inclined to the view the applicant’s uncle employer operated with the approval of Hezbollah. The Tribunal notes that when the applicant provided proof of identity, he was released by his detainers within 10 minutes[133].
[131] Decision record page 6.
[132] See paragraph 5.1 as set out in paragraph 29 of this decision record
[133] Decision record page 6.
Country Information suggests barriers to entry and checkpoints were prevalent in Dannieh in 2014 and 2015. That being the case the applicant as a temporary local resident, family of the owner of a local retail enterprise, living above his uncle’s [product 1] shop and engaged in deliveries for at least 50% of his working week would have been known to Hezbollah. If he had been of adverse interest to Hezbollah it is highly unlikely that he would have been able to live and work in their area of control.
The Tribunal is of the view there is insufficient evidence and little credible information to suggest the applicant was of adverse interest to any of the Sunni population in Northern Lebanon or Tripoli for political or religious reasons and mistreated or harmed as a result. It appears to the Tribunal the incident in Tripoli was little more than that of an unfortunate chance encounter with a group of local toughs. In this respect it is of some minor concern the applicant advised the Tribunal he was unable to provide any medical evidence relating to his alleged attack in Bab Al Tabbanah.[134]
[134] See paragraph 34 above
The Tribunal is of the view that the applicant’s claims as to mistreatment or harm by Shia resident of Dannieh or by Hezbollah or its agents are without substance. The Tribunal is of the view that the applicant’s claims lack credibility.
The Tribunal is of the view that the incidents that occurred in Dannieh were occasional or chance incidents. The Tribunal is of the view that the altercations, verbal arguments, actual or implied threats were one-off incidents. The Tribunal is of the view that these incidents were not in any way related to or connected to Hezbollah. The Tribunal is of the view that there is little information or credible evidence to suggest that the applicant was of adverse interest to the Sunni population in Tripoli or northern Lebanon for political or religious reasons and mistreated and harmed as a result. Whilst the applicant may have been involved in a chance incident in Tripoli and Akkar, these were general crimes by nature and did not amount to persecution.
The Tribunal accepts that the economic situation in Lebanon is terrible. Unemployment is high. Government services are barely in existence. Work is difficult to find. Social services are limited. Health services are affected by cost and lack of availability.
The Tribunal finds that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution and his claims do not have a credible basis.
The Tribunal finds that there is little chance that he will be harmed for any of the reasons he has claimed either on an individual basis or in aggregation. The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance he would be persecuted for any of the reasons outlined in s 5J(1)(a) of the Migration Act. It follows that the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are grounds the applicant being removed from Australia to Lebanon, there is a real chance the applicant will be persecuted.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under section 36(2)(a). Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criteria, the Tribunal now turns to consider the alternative complementary protection criteria.
Complementary Protection (CP) s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act
The Tribunal now turns to consideration of CP. The wording of s 36(2)(aa) is different to that in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act. S 36(2)(aa) is not limited to the 5 core criteria of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
S 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act refers to the fact Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm.
Each review application is a standalone matter. In each review application what is required will depend on the particular facts and the reasoning of the decision-maker. In assessing the risk of harm the Tribunal is required to have regard to “substantial grounds for believing” that as a “necessary and foreseeable consequence” of the non-citizen being removed from Australia there is a “real risk” that the non-citizen will face significant harm. The Tribunal notes the applicant provided post-hearing submissions that addressed CP.[135]
[135] See paragraphs 39 and 40 above for the Tribunal summary.
In this review application the applicant has departed his home country as a boy, established continuing residence in Australia at time of decision of 8 years, is settled in this country and was married in January 2023. His joint family income in Australia is approximately $100,000 per year. The applicant sends large remittances to his family in Lebanon and the evidence suggests that he is the financial mainstay of his Lebanon based family. The applicant made it quite clear on a number of occasions that he does not wish to return to Lebanon and wishes to remain in Australia. His reasons are readily understandable in that he has established a well ordered, well structure life with a new wife and ongoing employment in Australia that generates substantial income and certainly sufficient to provide exceptional levels of assistance to his remaining family in Lebanon. In addition his post hearing submissions addressed this point.
In this respect the post hearing submissions of the applicant’s post hearing submissions set out the median monthly family income in Lebanon at the end of 2022 was $US122[136], the real wages of Lebanese army soldiers has decreased from $900 to less than $50 per month[137] and the local currency has lost more than 95% of its pre-crisis value[138]. In this respect the Tribunal accepts the hundreds of remittances amounting to over $50,000 over a period of years to his family in Lebanon have provided a significant degree of comfort in their time of need. In addition the Tribunal is of the view the applicant has demonstrated by his actions a concern for the welfare of his family in Lebanon and a consistent willingness to provide them was real assistance. Indeed it is not a remarkable conclusion that the earnings and remittances of the applicant from Australia to Lebanon provide a standard of living in the top percentiles of that country to his family in Lebanon.
[136] Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 19
[137] Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 22
[138] Doc ID number 11460462 paragraph 18
The Tribunal accepts that the applicant has concerns about being able to find work if he returns to Lebanon and the general economic situation there as outlined above in this decision record. The Tribunal accepts that there may be some difficulty in doing so at least initially.
The applicant provided little detail as to his economic situation in Australia. From the evidence and post hearing submissions it is clear his family income in Australia is substantial and a large portion of that income is dedicated to supporting his family in Lebanon.
The applicant does not suggest that any person or group will seek to harm him for any reason relating to his economic situation and/or prevent him from obtaining work. The evidence suggests there are no Shia Muslims in his home village or immediate surrounds. The evidence suggest that Hezbollah does not have any presence in his home village or immediate surrounds. Indeed, as a boy in the summer of 2014 he was employed in the Shia dominated and Hezbollah controlled area of Dannieh. The available Country Information suggests that there is a general lack of availability of work in parts of Lebanon.
Australian courts[139] have held that complementary protection obligations are concerned with acts or omissions occurring in the relevant country and how a visa applicant might be treated by another person or group. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that any economic hardship the applicant might experience if removed to Lebanon would not amount to significant harm for the purposes of the Act, because the harm would not be as a result of any deliberate act or omission of any group or person done with the intention of causing him to suffer significant harm.
[139] GLD18 v MHA [2020] FCAFC 2
Indeed, the Tribunal is of the view the applicant in returning to his home village or the wider home areas around his village would be safe amongst friends, family, neighbours and possible future colleagues as he grew up with them as part of a well-established and respected family and in his period of absence from Lebanon has been an exemplary figure providing comfort and support to his extant wider family in Lebanon.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk the applicant will face significant harm, as defined in s.36(2A) of the Act if he is removed from Australia and returned to Lebanon. The Tribunal is therefore not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa) of the Act.
In reviewing all of the information outlined, summarised and discussed above the Tribunal is unable to conclude there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Lebanon there is a real risk the applicant will suffer significant harm.
CONCLUDING PARAGRAPHS
The Tribunal has given careful and detailed consideration to the applicant’s claims and the evidence provided in his written statements, oral evidence interview commentary, Country Information and post hearing written submission. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant genuinely fears persecution in Lebanon for the reasons claimed, or that his claimed fear of harm is credible.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a).
Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).

There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2).
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Mark Bishop
Senior Member
ATTACHMENT - Extract from Migration Act 1958
5 (1) Interpretation
…
cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment means an act or omission by which:
(a)     severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person; or
(b)     pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as, in all the circumstances, the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman in nature;
but does not include an act or omission:
(c)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(d)     arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
degrading treatment or punishment means an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable, but does not include an act or omission:
(a)     that is not inconsistent with Article 7 of the Covenant; or
(b)     that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
torture means an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person:
(a)     for the purpose of obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a confession; or
(b)     for the purpose of punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
(c)     for the purpose of intimidating or coercing the person or a third person; or
(d)     for a purpose related to a purpose mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c); or
(e)     for any reason based on discrimination that is inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant;
but does not include an act or omission arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions that are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Covenant.
…
receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:
(a)     a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or
(b)     if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country.
…
5H    Meaning of refugee
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person is:
(a)     in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or
(b)     in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it.
Note:     For the meaning of well-founded fear of persecution, see section 5J.
…
5J     Meaning of well-founded fear of persecution
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well-founded fear of persecution if:
(a)     the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and
(b)     there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c)     the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.
Note:     For membership of a particular social group, see sections 5K and 5L.
(2)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.
Note:     For effective protection measures, see section 5LA.
(3)A person does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the person could take reasonable steps to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid a real chance of persecution in a receiving country, other than a modification that would:
(a)     conflict with a characteristic that is fundamental to the person’s identity or conscience; or
(b)     conceal an innate or immutable characteristic of the person; or
(c)     without limiting paragraph (a) or (b), require the person to do any of the following:
(i)alter his or her religious beliefs, including by renouncing a religious conversion, or conceal his or her true religious beliefs, or cease to be involved in the practice of his or her faith;
(ii)conceal his or her true race, ethnicity, nationality or country of origin;
(iii)alter his or her political beliefs or conceal his or her true political beliefs;
(iv)conceal a physical, psychological or intellectual disability;
(v)enter into or remain in a marriage to which that person is opposed, or accept the forced marriage of a child;
(vi)alter his or her sexual orientation or gender identity or conceal his or her true sexual orientation, gender identity or intersex status.
(4)If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):
(a)     that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and
(b)     the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and
(c)     the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.
(5)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:
(a)     a threat to the person’s life or liberty;
(b)     significant physical harassment of the person;
(c)     significant physical ill‑treatment of the person;
(d)     significant economic hardship that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(e)     denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist;
(f)     denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person’s capacity to subsist.
(6)In determining whether the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a), any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia is to be disregarded unless the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a refugee.
5K    Membership of a particular social group consisting of family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person (the first person), in determining whether the first person has a well‑founded fear of persecution for the reason of membership of a particular social group that consists of the first person’s family:
(a)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced, where the reason for the fear or persecution is not a reason mentioned in paragraph 5J(1)(a); and
(b)     disregard any fear of persecution, or any persecution, that:
(i)the first person has ever experienced; or
(ii)any other member or former member (whether alive or dead) of the family has ever experienced;
where it is reasonable to conclude that the fear or persecution would not exist if it were assumed that the fear or persecution mentioned in paragraph (a) had never existed.
Note:     Section 5G may be relevant for determining family relationships for the purposes of this section.
5L    Membership of a particular social group other than family
For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person is to be treated as a member of a particular social group (other than the person’s family) if:
(a)     a characteristic is shared by each member of the group; and
(b)     the person shares, or is perceived as sharing, the characteristic; and
(c)     any of the following apply:
(i)the characteristic is an innate or immutable characteristic;
(ii)the characteristic is so fundamental to a member’s identity or conscience, the member should not be forced to renounce it;
(iii)the characteristic distinguishes the group from society; and
(d)     the characteristic is not a fear of persecution.
5LA Effective protection measures
(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country if:
(a)     protection against persecution could be provided to the person by:
(i)the relevant State; or
(ii)a party or organisation, including an international organisation, that controls the relevant State or a substantial part of the territory of the relevant State; and
(b)     the relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) is willing and able to offer such protection.
(2)A relevant State, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) is taken to be able to offer protection against persecution to a person if:
(a)     the person can access the protection; and
(b)     the protection is durable; and
(c)     in the case of protection provided by the relevant State—the protection consists of an appropriate criminal law, a reasonably effective police force and an impartial judicial system.
…
36     Protection visas – criteria provided for by this Act
…
(2)A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:
(a)     a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or
(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant; or
(c)     a non-citizen in Australia who is a member of the same family unit as a non-citizen who:
(i)is mentioned in paragraph (aa); and
(ii)holds a protection visa of the same class as that applied for by the applicant.
(2A)A non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:
(a)     the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or
(b)     the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or
(c)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or
(d)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or
(e)     the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.
(2B)However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:
(a)     it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(b)     the non‑citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; or
(c)     the real risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non‑citizen personally.
…

[34] "Encyclopedia of the Nations". Nationsencyclopedia.com. Archived from the original on 13 January 2010. Retrieved 17 January 2010

[43] Riad Yazbeck. "Return of the Pink Panthers?" Archived 2012-02-19 at the Wayback Machine. Mideast Monitor. Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2008

[2023] AATA 4161

1 September 2023

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