FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DCU19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 654
File number(s): ADG 291 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD Date of judgment: 9 May 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Safe Haven Enterprise visa – decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – application of ss 486E and 486F – whether the IAA failed to correctly interpret the meaning of ‘receiving country’ – where Australia is the country of former habitual residence – whether the IAA failed to consider situation of a member of a family unit where no claims advanced – whether the IAA was legally unreasonable – whether the IAA failed to consider claims or evidence – whether IAA properly identified country information – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) Schedule 1 (da), (db)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5(1), 5H(1), 5H(1)(b), 5J(1)(b), 36, 36(2), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2)(b), 36(2)(c), 473CB, 473DC, 473EA, 476, 486E, 486F, 486I
Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] 2 All ER 680
DXG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 302 FCR 613
FLO17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 380
Leka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 123
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 441
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 104 Date of last submission/s: 6 February 2025 Date of hearing: 12 December 2024 and 19 February 2025 Place: Adelaide Counsel for the Applicants: Anthony Krohn Solicitor for the Applicants: Elderwood Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Tim Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
ADG 291 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: DCU19
First Applicant
DCV19
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GERRARD
DATE OF ORDER:
9 MAY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read DCU19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 654
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the IAA erred in interpreting the term'receiving country' under sections 5(1) and 5H(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), whether the IAA failed to consider the situation of a member of a family unit where no specific claims were advanced, and whether the IAA was legally unreasonable by not considering certain evidence and country information. The applicant argued that Australia, being the country of former habitual residence, should be considered the receiving country for the child, and that the IAA's failure to consider this amounted to jurisdictional error. The court examined whether the IAA had correctly applied the law and whether there were any errors that warranted judicial intervention.
The Court found that no jurisdictional error was evident in the IAA's decision. It concluded that the IAA had appropriately considered the materials before it and had not erred in its interpretation of the term'receiving country' or in its consideration of the child's situation. The Court held that the IAA was not legally unreasonable and had properly identified and considered the country information. The applicant's arguments did not establish any jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA, leading the Court to dismiss the application for judicial review.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The materials before the Court include a Court Book numbering 673 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), a further amended application and further written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant on 7 January 2025, and further written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 6 February 2025.CONSIDERATION As outlined above, the amended application for judicial review contains several particularised grounds. These were essentially divided between grounds alleging error in the IAA’s findings made in respect of the second applicant, and findings made in respect of the first applicant.Grounds relating to the second applicant Grounds one, three and five contend that the IAA erred in its findings in relation to the second applicant. Through ground one, the applicant contends that the IAA erred in interpreting the meaning of ‘receiving country’ in respect of the second applicant, in accordance with s 5(1) of the Act, for purposes of assessment against ss 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Act. Section 5(1) of the Act relevantly provides:5 Interpretation (1)…receiving country, in relation to a non-citizen, means:(a)a country of which the non-citizen is a national, to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country; or(b)if the non-citizen has no country of nationality—a country of his or her former habitual residence, regardless of whether it would be possible to return the non-citizen to the country. This is also reflected in s 5H(1) of the Act which provides that a person is a refugee if the person:(a) in a case where the person has a nationality – is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or (b) in a case where the person does not have a nationality – is outside the country of his or her former habitual residence and owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to return to it. These provisions were helpfully explained by Judge Forbes in FLO17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 380 at [86]-[88]:[86] In assessing the criteria for a protection visa, it is necessary to establish the person’s ‘country of reference’ – usually the country in which they claim to fear harm. It is not a jurisdictional fact, but an error in determining this important issue can lead to jurisdictional error.[87] For persons who have a nationality, the “receiving country” is the country of nationality. Whether a person is a national of a particular country is to be determined solely by reference to the law of the relevant country.[88] For persons without a nationality, the receiving country is the country of their former habitual residence, with the added (but not unimportant) qualification that it does not matter whether return to that country would be possible. It was not in dispute, and indeed the IAA made a finding in this respect, that the second applicant is stateless. It was also accepted as a matter of fact that the second applicant was born in Australia and had never resided anywhere other than this country.