HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, KIRBY, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJYOLANDA GATTELLARO & ANOR APPELLANTS
AND
WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION RESPONDENT
Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation
[2004] HCA 6
11 February 2004
S77/2003ORDER
Appeal dismissed.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation:
G J McVay with D M Loewenstein for the appellants (instructed by Spencer Whitby and Co)
J C Sheahan SC with K A Rees for the respondent (instructed by Henry Davis York)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
From the late 1960s Falgat Constructions Pty Ltd ("the company") engaged in the business of acquiring, renovating and selling houses; extending and altering houses; and building houses and home units. Mr and Mrs Gattellaro were its sole directors and shareholders. The company and the Gattellaros had accounts with the Goulburn Street, Sydney branch of the Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd ("CBA").
On 17 June 1977 Mr and Mrs Gattellaro executed a mortgage over their home to secure their personal indebtedness to CBA ("the 1977 mortgage"). Following a merger between CBA and Westpac Banking Corporation ("Westpac") in October 1982, a statutory novation took place substituting Westpac for CBA in its contractual relationships with the company and the Gattellaros.
By late 1985 officers of Westpac were becoming concerned with the incapacity of the Gattellaros to finance the interest burdens on their loans from income.
On 2 June 1986 the accounts of the company and the Gattellaros at the Goulburn Street branch were closed. New accounts were opened at the Westpac Plaza branch. A bill acceptance line of credit in favour of the Gattellaros was arranged. This was used to pay out the indebtedness of the company and the Gattellaros at the Goulburn Street branch. The Gattellaros entered a mortgage over their home to secure the advance of $450,000 ("the 2 June 1986 mortgage"). The 1977 mortgage was discharged.
On 30 May 1990 Westpac instituted proceedings under the 2 June 1986 mortgage claiming $197,378.09 and also seeking judgment for possession of the Gattellaros' home.
After a trial on 1-3 and 5 November 1999, Hulme J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales delivered reasons for judgment on 11 August 2000 upholding Westpac's claims and rejecting the Gattellaros' defences[1]. On 25 August 2000 he ordered the Gattellaros to pay Westpac $983,339.02 and ordered them to give up possession of their home. On 6 April 2001 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the Gattellaros[2].
Among the defences advanced by the Gattellaros and rejected by the trial judge was a defence under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). That defence was that the 2 June 1986 mortgage was unjust in that it rendered the Gattellaros personally liable for the indebtedness of the company. It was contended that they had not been…
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- Case
- [2004] HCA 6
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine several legal issues. Primarily, it had to consider whether the Court of Appeal was correct in taking judicial notice that institutions like Westpac use a standard form of guarantee and inferring that the appellants had signed such a document. A further significant issue arose concerning the consequence of a person named as a co-surety not being shown to have executed a guarantee. The Court also had to consider whether Westpac should be granted leave to amend its Notice of Contention to include a specific ground and whether outstanding issues should be determined by the intermediate appellate court or the High Court itself.
The High Court ultimately dismissed the appeal. It acknowledged that the Court of Appeal had erred in relying on the doctrine of judicial notice to infer the existence and terms of the guarantee. However, Westpac was granted leave to amend its Notice of Contention to include a ground that succeeded. This ground established that Mr Gattellaro was bound by the November 1985 guarantee, which obliged him to pay the company's debts to Westpac. Consequently, the 1977 mortgage, which secured all monies for which Mr Gattellaro might be liable, remained applicable. As the 1986 mortgage did not increase the Gattellaros' liability, their appeal was dismissed. The Court ordered that Westpac should not have the costs of the appeal in the High Court due to its delay in conceding the error regarding judicial notice.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
In the Court of Appeal, Giles JA took judicial notice of the terms of cl 20 of a contemporaneous but different contract of guarantee[38]. Such evidentiary matters would have been superfluous if issue had been joined at trial only on whether Mr Gattellaro, alone, had signed the guarantee. It was clear from the diary entries produced by Westpac that the bank always envisaged that both Mr and Mrs Gattellaro were to give the 1985 guarantees[39]. If the Marston principle accurately states the common law, it enlivens a question of whether the signature of each of the sureties was required as a condition to the effectiveness of the promise of the other in the joint contract of guarantee that Westpac propounded. That is a question of law upon which views have differed. [38]The guarantee given by Mr and Mrs Falcomata in May 1986 securing the indebtedness of the Gattellaros to Westpac. See joint reasons at [13].[39]The trial judge referred to an internal memo of Westpac which provided that "Mr Gattellaro has signed … Guarantee to support Company advances. Mrs Gattellaro is to sign this week." Westpac Banking Corporation v Gattellaro [2000] NSWSC 775 at [37] (emphasis added).The operation of a principle of law If a true understanding of the law considered in Marston is that joint signatures to the guarantee, in the case of Mr and Mrs Gattellaro was necessary for the legal validity of the 1985 guarantee, the absence of Mrs Gattellaro's signature was fatal to Westpac's strategy in the trial. Moreover, if, upon a full examination of the applicable law there is an evidentiary presumption that, in the absence of acceptable evidence to the contrary, the execution by both sureties to a joint guarantee constitutes a condition precedent to its validity, Mr Gattellaro was released by the failure of Westpac to establish that it had secured the signature of Mrs Gattellaro. Upon this footing both Mr and Mrs Gattellaro would have had an arguable defence at law to Westpac's action on the 1985 guarantee. It would follow that, by assuming personal liability to Westpac in the 1986 mortgage for Falgat's debts, the Gattellaros had indeed altered their position to their disadvantage. And this was the evidentiary element they needed to establish their defence under the Contracts Review Act. If the foregoing analysis accurately describes this case, then the respective positions of the Gattellaros and Westpac are not decided by the state of the pleadings or the burden of proof which the respective parties bore to establish their competing claims. It was determined by the application of the law of guarantees to the evidence as found by the primary judge. Given the way the issue has arisen, this Court does not have the advantage either of an analysis of the applicable principles of law nor an examination of the application of that law to the facts of this case as found at trial. Nor do the parties, Westpac as well as the Gattellaros, have the opportunity to challenge any determination on either of these points by a further appeal. Instead, in the manner of a trial court, this Court proceeds on the assumption of the correctness of the principles stated by Powell J and upon views concerning the respective obligations of the parties based on those principles and on the state of pleadings which may, or may not, accurately reflect the ultimate way in which the trial was conducted.