Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation

Link copied
Case Copied 54 min read

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, KIRBY, HAYNE AND HEYDON JJ

YOLANDA GATTELLARO & ANOR   APPELLANTS

AND

WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION  RESPONDENT

Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation

[2004] HCA 6

11 February 2004
S77/2003

ORDER

Appeal dismissed.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation:

G J McVay with D M Loewenstein for the appellants (instructed by Spencer Whitby and Co)

J C Sheahan SC with K A Rees for the respondent (instructed by Henry Davis York)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. From the late 1960s Falgat Constructions Pty Ltd ("the company") engaged in the business of acquiring, renovating and selling houses; extending and altering houses; and building houses and home units.  Mr and Mrs Gattellaro were its sole directors and shareholders.  The company and the Gattellaros had accounts with the Goulburn Street, Sydney branch of the Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd ("CBA"). 

  2. On 17 June 1977 Mr and Mrs Gattellaro executed a mortgage over their home to secure their personal indebtedness to CBA ("the 1977 mortgage").  Following a merger between CBA and Westpac Banking Corporation ("Westpac") in October 1982, a statutory novation took place substituting Westpac for CBA in its contractual relationships with the company and the Gattellaros. 

  3. By late 1985 officers of Westpac were becoming concerned with the incapacity of the Gattellaros to finance the interest burdens on their loans from income.

  4. On 2 June 1986 the accounts of the company and the Gattellaros at the Goulburn Street branch were closed.  New accounts were opened at the Westpac Plaza branch.  A bill acceptance line of credit in favour of the Gattellaros was arranged.  This was used to pay out the indebtedness of the company and the Gattellaros at the Goulburn Street branch.  The Gattellaros entered a mortgage over their home to secure the advance of $450,000 ("the 2 June 1986 mortgage").  The 1977 mortgage was discharged.  

  5. On 30 May 1990 Westpac instituted proceedings under the 2 June 1986 mortgage claiming $197,378.09 and also seeking judgment for possession of the Gattellaros' home. 

  6. After a trial on 1-3 and 5 November 1999, Hulme J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales delivered reasons for judgment on 11 August 2000 upholding Westpac's claims and rejecting the Gattellaros' defences[1].  On 25 August 2000 he ordered the Gattellaros to pay Westpac $983,339.02 and ordered them to give up possession of their home.  On 6 April 2001 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the Gattellaros[2]. 

  7. Among the defences advanced by the Gattellaros and rejected by the trial judge was a defence under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). That defence was that the 2 June 1986 mortgage was unjust in that it rendered the Gattellaros personally liable for the indebtedness of the company. It was contended that they had not been…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2004] HCA 6
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal by Mr and Mrs Gattellaro against Westpac Banking Corporation to the High Court of Australia. The dispute originated from Westpac's proceedings to enforce a mortgage over the Gattellaros' home, which secured an advance to re-finance a company in which they were interested. The Gattellaros sought to escape liability under the mortgage by invoking relief under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), arguing they had been unfairly induced into personal liability for the company's debts and had materially changed their position to their disadvantage. Westpac contended that the Gattellaros had not altered their position to their detriment, asserting that Mr Gattellaro had already executed an unlimited personal guarantee in November 1985 for the company's debts, and that Mrs Gattellaro was also intended to execute this guarantee. Westpac's difficulty lay in its inability to produce this guarantee document.

The High Court was required to determine several legal issues. Primarily, it had to consider whether the Court of Appeal was correct in taking judicial notice that institutions like Westpac use a standard form of guarantee and inferring that the appellants had signed such a document. A further significant issue arose concerning the consequence of a person named as a co-surety not being shown to have executed a guarantee. The Court also had to consider whether Westpac should be granted leave to amend its Notice of Contention to include a specific ground and whether outstanding issues should be determined by the intermediate appellate court or the High Court itself.

The High Court ultimately dismissed the appeal. It acknowledged that the Court of Appeal had erred in relying on the doctrine of judicial notice to infer the existence and terms of the guarantee. However, Westpac was granted leave to amend its Notice of Contention to include a ground that succeeded. This ground established that Mr Gattellaro was bound by the November 1985 guarantee, which obliged him to pay the company's debts to Westpac. Consequently, the 1977 mortgage, which secured all monies for which Mr Gattellaro might be liable, remained applicable. As the 1986 mortgage did not increase the Gattellaros' liability, their appeal was dismissed. The Court ordered that Westpac should not have the costs of the appeal in the High Court due to its delay in conceding the error regarding judicial notice.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

This appeal[7] began as one concerned with the law of judicial notice. It was for that purpose that special leave to appeal was granted to the appellants. However, whilst it was before this Court, the case took a different turning. It has ended, essentially, as a trial before this Court of an issue relating to the liability of co-sureties under an alleged guarantee. As I shall show, that issue arose at a very late stage in the contest between the parties. Indeed, it could hardly have arisen later.[7]From the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales: Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corporation [2001] NSWCA 76.The facts and issues To discover how this Court became involved in such a trial (effectively deciding the point in issue for the first time), it is necessary to read the reasons of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Hayne and Heydon JJ ("the joint reasons"). Because the facts and course of the litigation are described there, those reasons relieve me of the obligation to repeat most of the material. As shown[8], Westpac Banking Corporation ("Westpac") instituted proceedings as long ago as 1990 against the appellants, Mr and Mrs Gattellaro ("the Gattellaros"). The proceedings were based on Westpac's rights under a mortgage which the Gattellaros had executed over their home. The mortgage secured an advance from Westpac to re-finance the debts of a company in which the Gattellaros were interested, Falgat Constructions Pty Ltd ("Falgat"). There was no dispute that the Gattellaros executed that mortgage in 1986. Relevantly, the way they sought to escape their liability as mortgagors was to invoke relief under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW). Their complaint was that they had been unfairly led by Westpac into personal liability for the debts of Falgat. Proof of that complaint depended upon the Gattellaros being able to establish that, by entering the 1986 mortgage, they had materially changed their personal positions, to their joint and several disadvantage. They asserted that they had. They claimed that the 1986 mortgage extended liability to them personally for Falgat's debts and did so for the first time.[8]Joint reasons at [5]. For its part, Westpac argued that the Gattellaros had not changed their position to their disadvantage. If Westpac could make good that assertion, it would knock away any hope that the Gattellaros could obtain relief under a defence based on the Contracts Review Act. So much was accepted by the Gattellaros. Westpac submitted that, in November 1985, Mr Gattellaro had already executed an unlimited personal guarantee in favour of Westpac for the debts of Falgat. Westpac's evidentiary problem in making this submission good was that it could not produce the contract of guarantee. This was so although reference was made in Westpac's contemporary records to the fact that the guarantee had been given by Mr Gattellaro and that it was also to be executed by Mrs Gattellaro. Identifying the burden of proof Forensically, where there was a dispute over such a matter, and where the fact contested was legally relevant to the Contracts Review Act issue, one would normally have expected Westpac to bear the burden of proving, by the best evidence available to it, the giving of the guarantee by Mr Gattellaro and the terms of the guarantee. Normally, it would be inferred that security documents of such a kind would not be mislaid; that they would typically be kept by a bank in a safe place, available for proof when needed; and that Westpac would have forms and systems to govern such cases.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIRBY J (dissent)
Leave to amend the Notice of Contention to include ground 4 should be granted, and the ground should be upheld. Conclusion It follows that Mr Gattellaro's contention that he is not bound by the November 1985 guarantee fails. Since it obliged him to pay to Westpac the debts owed by the company, the 1977 mortgage applied. The 1977 mortgage made Mrs Gattellaro liable for, and secured against the Gattellaros' home, all monies for which Mr Gattellaro might be liable to Westpac. In consequence the 2 June 1986 mortgage did not increase the Gattellaros' liability, and the appeal to this Court must be dismissed. What should be done about costs? Special leave to appeal was granted to determine an important point concerning judicial notice. The Court of Appeal of New South Wales had rejected the appellants' appeal because it held that courts could take judicial notice that banks such as Westpac used a standard form of guarantee and that it could be inferred that the appellants had signed Westpac's standard form. That was a far-reaching proposition of great practical importance in the conduct of commercial litigation. Special leave was granted to test the correctness of that ruling. In Westpac's written submissions, however, it conceded "that the doctrine of judicial notice did not permit the majority of the Court of Appeal to find that [Westpac] in 1985 used a standard form of guarantee." It had made no such concession on the special leave hearing. After conceding that the Court of Appeal had erred in relying on the doctrine of judicial notice, Westpac sought to uphold the Court of Appeal's decision on certain factual grounds. Thus, by reason of Westpac's concession concerning judicial notice, the Court of Appeal's decision could not stand unless Westpac made good one or both of the two grounds in its Notice of Contention. From this Court's point of view, the better course would have been to allow the appeal and remit the Notice of Contention to the Court of Appeal. That course would, however, have put the parties to further expense and delay. In the circumstances, the interests of justice have been best served by this Court determining the factual and procedural questions, questions of a kind with which ordinarily it should have no concern. For the reasons given above, the second of the grounds relied on by Westpac must succeed and the appeal must be dismissed. But in our opinion, Westpac should not have the costs of the appeal in this Court. Its dilatoriness in conceding that the Court of Appeal had erred caused the appellants to incur the expense of filing a notice of appeal, preparing appeal books, briefing counsel and preparing written submissions. This expense could have been avoided if Westpac had conceded at the special leave application that the Court of Appeal had erred. If it had, this Court could have allowed the appeal instanter and remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal to determine at least the first ground in the Notice of Contention which had been raised in the Court of Appeal but not decided. Whether on a remitter Westpac could have raised the second ground of the Notice of Contention – the ground on which it succeeds in this Court – may be debatable. In this Court, it was entitled to support the decision in its favour on that ground, even if the point was being raised for the first time, because it involved a question of law that could not be affected by further evidence[6]. If the matter had been remitted to the Court of Appeal, however, the public interest in the finality of litigation might have induced that Court in its discretion to refuse to allow the second ground to be argued, if it had not been raised on the first hearing of the appeal. Thus, Westpac may have gained a considerable advantage in not making its concession earlier than it did. [6]Connecticut Fire Insurance Co v Kavanagh [1892] AC 473 at 480; Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd (1950) 81 CLR 418 at 438.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

In the Court of Appeal, Giles JA took judicial notice of the terms of cl 20 of a contemporaneous but different contract of guarantee[38]. Such evidentiary matters would have been superfluous if issue had been joined at trial only on whether Mr Gattellaro, alone, had signed the guarantee. It was clear from the diary entries produced by Westpac that the bank always envisaged that both Mr and Mrs Gattellaro were to give the 1985 guarantees[39]. If the Marston principle accurately states the common law, it enlivens a question of whether the signature of each of the sureties was required as a condition to the effectiveness of the promise of the other in the joint contract of guarantee that Westpac propounded. That is a question of law upon which views have differed. [38]The guarantee given by Mr and Mrs Falcomata in May 1986 securing the indebtedness of the Gattellaros to Westpac. See joint reasons at [13].[39]The trial judge referred to an internal memo of Westpac which provided that "Mr Gattellaro has signed … Guarantee to support Company advances. Mrs Gattellaro is to sign this week." Westpac Banking Corporation v Gattellaro [2000] NSWSC 775 at [37] (emphasis added).The operation of a principle of law If a true understanding of the law considered in Marston is that joint signatures to the guarantee, in the case of Mr and Mrs Gattellaro was necessary for the legal validity of the 1985 guarantee, the absence of Mrs Gattellaro's signature was fatal to Westpac's strategy in the trial. Moreover, if, upon a full examination of the applicable law there is an evidentiary presumption that, in the absence of acceptable evidence to the contrary, the execution by both sureties to a joint guarantee constitutes a condition precedent to its validity, Mr Gattellaro was released by the failure of Westpac to establish that it had secured the signature of Mrs Gattellaro. Upon this footing both Mr and Mrs Gattellaro would have had an arguable defence at law to Westpac's action on the 1985 guarantee. It would follow that, by assuming personal liability to Westpac in the 1986 mortgage for Falgat's debts, the Gattellaros had indeed altered their position to their disadvantage. And this was the evidentiary element they needed to establish their defence under the Contracts Review Act. If the foregoing analysis accurately describes this case, then the respective positions of the Gattellaros and Westpac are not decided by the state of the pleadings or the burden of proof which the respective parties bore to establish their competing claims. It was determined by the application of the law of guarantees to the evidence as found by the primary judge. Given the way the issue has arisen, this Court does not have the advantage either of an analysis of the applicable principles of law nor an examination of the application of that law to the facts of this case as found at trial. Nor do the parties, Westpac as well as the Gattellaros, have the opportunity to challenge any determination on either of these points by a further appeal. Instead, in the manner of a trial court, this Court proceeds on the assumption of the correctness of the principles stated by Powell J and upon views concerning the respective obligations of the parties based on those principles and on the state of pleadings which may, or may not, accurately reflect the ultimate way in which the trial was conducted.