HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mason, Wilson and Brennan JJ.
STATE RAIL AUTHORITY OF N.S.W. V. CODELFA CONSTRUCTION PTY. LTD.
15 September 1982
Courts
Courts—Practice and procedure—Judgments and orders—Power to vacate before order passed and entered—Exceptional circumstances—Irremediable injustice.
Decisions
September 15.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
MASON AND WILSON JJ. This is an application by the State Rail Authority of New South Wales ("the Authority") for an order vacating certain of the orders made by this Court in a judgment delivered on 11 May 1982 (Codelfa Construction Pty. Ltd. v. State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 . The orders in question were made in part determination of appeals from two decisions of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. One appeal related to the determination of questions raised by an Award of the Arbitrator stated in the form of a case stated, proceedings which in this Court are numbered 71 of 1981 ("the Arbitration proceedings"). The second appeal related to proceedings commenced in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and heard in the first instance before Ash J. who stated a case for decision of the Court of Appeal. In this Court these proceedings are numbered 72 of 1981 ("the frustration proceedings"). (at p31)
2. The orders which the applicant seeks to have vacated are the following: (at p31)
3. In the Arbitration proceedings -
"3. Remit the Award to the Arbitrator - (a) to make a decision on the frustration claim, (b) . . .(c) in the event of a finding that the contract was frustrated to resolve the claims of the parties in relation to work performed subsequently to that frustration." (at p31)
4. In the frustration proceedings -
"1. Set aside the order of Ash J. and the order of the Court of Appeal.2. Strike out the action for want of jurisdiction." (at p32)
5. The litigation to which this application relates, described elsewhere as an "ocean of litigious controversy" (see Codelfa (1982) 149 CLR, at p 345 ), arose generally out of a contract wherein the respondent ("Codelfa") agreed to construct for the Authority a segment of the mass transit railway in Sydney known as the Eastern Suburbs Railway. Codelfa began work under the contract in 1972. It was contemplated by the contract that certain of the work would be performed by a continuous three shift a day operation six days a week. However, on 28 June 1972, the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Street J., as he then was) held that such an operation constituted a nuisance at law and Codelfa was restrained from working more than two shifts each day. Further injunctions followed in the ensuing months. A description of the manner in which the construction of the works then proceeded and of the subsequent history of the contract is contained in the reasons for judgment of Brennan J. in Codelfa. It suffices to say,…
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Details
- Case
- [1982] HCA 51
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The State Rail Authority of New South Wales (SRA) engaged Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd (Codelfa) to construct a railway line. A dispute arose concerning the interpretation of the contract, particularly regarding the extent of Codelfa's liability for damages caused by noise and disruption to nearby residents. The High Court of Australia was required to determine the contractual rights and obligations of the parties.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the contract impliedly contained a term that Codelfa would be excused from liability for nuisance and breach of statutory duty arising from its work, on the basis that the SRA had represented that the work could be carried out without such liability. This involved considering the principles of implied terms in contracts and the effect of representations made by one party to another during contractual negotiations.
The Court held that the contract did not contain an implied term that Codelfa would be indemnified by the SRA against liability for nuisance and breach of statutory duty. Mason, Wilson and Brennan JJ reasoned that while the SRA had represented that the work could be performed without causing nuisance, this representation did not extend to an indemnity against all liability. The Court applied the test for implied terms, which requires the term to be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract and to be so obvious that it goes without saying. The Court found that such a term was not necessary for the contract to operate and was not obvious in the circumstances.
The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the New South Wales Court of Appeal was set aside.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the contract impliedly contained a term that Codelfa would be excused from liability for nuisance and breach of statutory duty arising from its work, on the basis that the SRA had represented that the work could be carried out without such liability. This involved considering the principles of implied terms in contracts and the effect of representations made by one party to another during contractual negotiations.
The Court held that the contract did not contain an implied term that Codelfa would be indemnified by the SRA against liability for nuisance and breach of statutory duty. Mason, Wilson and Brennan JJ reasoned that while the SRA had represented that the work could be performed without causing nuisance, this representation did not extend to an indemnity against all liability. The Court applied the test for implied terms, which requires the term to be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract and to be so obvious that it goes without saying. The Court found that such a term was not necessary for the contract to operate and was not obvious in the circumstances.
The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the New South Wales Court of Appeal was set aside.
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Ratio Decidendi