Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2)

[2025] NSWSC 908

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 908

Hearing dates:

11 July 2025

Date of orders:

13 August 2025

Decision date:

13 August 2025

Jurisdiction:

Equity - Applications List

Before:

McGrath J

Decision:

Notice of motion dismissed.

Catchwords:

CIVIL PROCEDURE — Stay of judgment — application made after final determination of all issues — whether in interests of justice — finality of litigation — where applicant seeks a stay of judgment after final determination of issues in the proceedings — HELD — stay refused

CIVIL PROCEDURE — Transfer of proceedings — application to transfer to Common Law Division to be heard with related proceedings — proceedings already finally determined and judgment given — HELD — no transfer

CIVIL PROCEDURE — Stay of proceedings — Pending proceedings in other court — no stay where final judgment given

JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS — Amending, varying and setting aside — application to set aside judgment pursuant to rr 36.15 and 36.16 of the UCPR — discretionary power to be exercised sparingly and with great caution — public interest in finality of litigation — where no irregularity, illegality or bad faith — applicant’s disagreement with judgment insufficient basis for setting aside or varying judgment

JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS — Entry — Effect of — proceedings concluded — cannot be revived after entry of final judgment

APPEALS — Procedure — Time limits — where applicant did not appeal within 28 days — where applicant aware of appeal procedures

Legislation Cited:

Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 98, 135

Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW), ss 174, 178

Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 23

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 1.12, 13.4, 13.11, 20.14, 36.15, 36.16, 36.17, 51.2, 51.8, 51.9, 51.16

Cases Cited:

Autodesk Incv Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300; [1993] HCA 6

Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; [1971] HCA 49

Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464; [1939] HCA 23

Cappello v HomeBuilding Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 109

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Meredith (No 2) (2008) 75 NSWLR 462; [2008] NSWCA 133

Dickson v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 111

Dickson v Petrie (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 176

DJL v The Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226; [2000] HCA 17

Meehan v Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 146; [2002] NSWCA 22

FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268; [1988] HCA 13

Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145; [1977] HCA 7

Grierson v The King (1938) 60 CLR 431; [1938] HCA 45

Malouf v Prince (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 51

Miltonbrook Pty Ltd v Westbury Holdings Kiama Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 262; [2008] NSWCA 38

New South Wales Bar Association v Stevens [2003] NSWCA 95

Phillips v Walsh (1990) 20 NSWLR 206

Re Webuildem Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 708

Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 1675

Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 528

Scott v Kennedy [2025] NSWSC 544

Smithv New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256; [1992] HCA 36

Wentworthv Woollahra Municipal Council (1982) 149 CLR 672; [1982] HCA 41

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

R Sanjiv (Plaintiff/Applicant, self-represented)
Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (First Defendant/ Respondent)
Karina Ralston (Second Defendant/Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
K J Young (First Defendant/Respondent and Second Defendant/Respondent)

Solicitors:
Wotton Keary (First Defendant/Respondent and Second Defendant/Respondent)

File Number(s):

2023/00299506

Publication restriction:

Nil

Judgment

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a meritless application brought by the plaintiff, Rekha Sanjiv, against the defendants, Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd (CGL) and Karina Ralston (a Principal/Director of CGL) in proceedings between them that have been finally determined by Meek J against Ms Sanjiv.

2. Ms Sanjiv is a former client of CGL. CGL represented Ms Sanjiv in property settlement proceedings in the Family Court of Australia (Family Court proceedings). Ms Ralston was the principal solicitor from CGL acting for Ms Sanjiv in the Family Court proceedings. There is an extensive history of litigation between Ms Sanjiv, CGL and Ms Ralston, arising out of costs disputes concerning the Family Court proceedings.

3. On 20 September 2023, Ms Sanjiv commenced these proceedings in this court (as a self-represented litigant) by filing a summons against CGL and Ms Ralston in relation to CGL’s costs, costs agreements and costs disclosure in acting for Ms Sanjiv in the Family Court proceedings.

4. On 2 April 2025, Ms Sanjiv filed a statement of claim commencing proceedings in the Professional Negligence List of the Common Law Division of this court making claims of professional negligence against CGL (proceedings number 2025/126128) (Negligence proceedings).

5. On 26 May 2025, Meek J delivered a comprehensive, carefully reasoned and highly detailed judgment (spanning 574 paragraphs and 445 footnotes) dismissing the summons in these proceedings: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 528 (Principal Judgment). The Principal Judgment sets out the detailed history of the numerous proceedings initiated by Ms Sanjiv in various courts.

6. Ms Sanjiv did not appeal the Principal Judgment and the time for doing so has now expired.

7. By notice of motion filed 29 May 2025 (Notice of Motion), Ms Sanjiv seeks orders, including that:

1. the Principal Judgment be set aside or varied under rr 36.15 and 36.16(3A) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR);

2. these proceedings be transferred to the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales “to travel, be heard and determined” with the Negligence Proceedings; and

3. the Principal Judgment be stayed before it is transferred to the Common Law Division.

8. For the reasons set out below, I have determined to dismiss the Notice of Motion and order that Ms Sanjiv pay the costs of CGL and Ms Ralston in relation to the Notice of Motion on an indemnity basis.

RELEVANT FACTS

9. The background to these proceedings is set out in detail in the Principal Judgment. For the purposes of this judgment, I have summarised below certain salient matters from the Principal Judgment that deal with the history between Ms Sanjiv and CGL, the various proceedings initiated by Ms Sanjiv, the proceedings before Meek J in which he delivered the Principal Judgment and the issues now raised by the Notice of Motion.

The Family Court proceedings, the Epping property and engagement of CGL

10. Over a decade ago, Ms Sanjiv became involved in litigation following the breakdown of her marriage to Dr Sanjiv Shah and various disputes over the property settlement to be made between them (Principal Judgment, at [1]).

11. In October 2014, Dr Shah commenced proceedings in this court seeking the appointment of trustees to sell the matrimonial property in Epping, which was solely in Ms Sanjiv’s name (Epping property) (Principal Judgment, at [3]). Within two weeks, Ms Sanjiv commenced the Family Court proceedings seeking an adjustment of property interests between herself and Dr Shah (Principal Judgment, at [3]).

12. Ms Sanjiv has been represented by numerous law firms since the commencement of the litigation in this court and the Family Court of Australia (as it was previously known), including by Slater & Gordon, Prominent Lawyers and, relevantly, CGL (Principal Judgment, at [4]).

13. From about June 2018 to May 2019, CGL acted for Ms Sanjiv in the Family Court proceedings (Principal Judgment, at [6]). Ms Ralston was the solicitor from CGL who had the main carriage of the Family Court proceedings for Ms Sanjiv (Principal Judgment, at [4]).

14. On 17 January 2019, Ms Sanjiv provided a signed irrevocable authority to CGL, which confirmed that she had received a costs notice dated 17 January 2019 (Costs Notice) from CGL, acknowledged the outstanding debts indicated in the Costs Notice and agreed that they were properly incurred and due and payable, acknowledged that there had been work undertaken in the matter that had been incurred and not yet charged to her and confirmed that she would incur further legal fees in accordance with the Costs Notice (Principal Judgment, at [200]).

15. On 30 April 2019, consent orders were made in the Family Court proceedings (signed by Ms Sanjiv), which provided for the Epping property to be sold (Principal Judgment, at [215]–[216]).

16. In around May 2019, CGL ceased acting for Ms Sanjiv due to Ms Sanjiv’s failure to provide instructions in relation to the sale of the Epping property (Principal Judgment, at [513] and [553]).

17. At the time that CGL ceased acting for Ms Sanjiv, they had rendered 11 invoices to her in respect of their fees totalling $470,579.11 (Principal Judgment, at [7]).

CGL’s recovery of costs in the District Court proceedings

18. In around July 2019, CGL commenced legal proceedings in the District Court of New South Wales against Ms Sanjiv for the recovery of its outstanding fees plus pre-judgment interest and costs (District Court proceedings) (Principal Judgment, at [10]).

19. On 11 November 2019, CGL obtained a default judgment against Ms Sanjiv in the District Court proceedings in the amount of $266,860 (Principal Judgment, at [10]).

20. In December 2019, CGL obtained a garnishee order against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in respect of the default judgment sum and under it subsequently recovered the sum of $5,872.84 (Principal Judgment, at [10]).

Ms Sanjiv’s further engagement of CGL in relation to the Family Court proceedings

21. In around June 2022, Ms Sanjiv retained CGL with Ms Ralston acting again to assist her in implementing the Family Court orders and selling the Epping property (Principal Judgment, at [249]–[250]).

22. On 15 June 2022, Ms Sanjiv signed an undertaking authorising the proceeds of the sale of the Epping property to be paid, including a sum of $252,604.87 in payment of CGL’s outstanding invoices (Principal Judgment, at [503]).

23. By 22 July 2022, settlement of the sale of the Epping property occurred (Principal Judgment, at [257]).

24. On 25 July 2022, CGL received funds from the settlement of the sale of the Epping property into its trust account (Principal Judgment, [258]).

25. Following CGL’s receipt of $252,604.87 from the sale proceeds, a small part of the judgment debt obtained by CGL in the District Court proceedings of approximately $8,381 remained outstanding, payment for which has not been pressed by CGL (Principal Judgment, at [10]).

26. On 12 July 2022 and 2 August 2022 respectively, CGL rendered two further invoices for their fees in the further period acting for Ms Sanjiv totalling $12,286.25 (Principal Judgment, at [7]).

27. As a result, the total amount of the invoices rendered by CGL for their fees to Ms Sanjiv was $482,865.36 (Principal Judgment, at [7]).

Ms Sanjiv’s proceedings in the NCAT against Ms Ralston

28. On 31 August 2023, Ms Sanjiv commenced legal proceedings against Ms Ralston personally in the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) seeking copies of all trust account statements and itemised invoices (Principal Judgment, at [271]).

29. On 8 September 2023, CGL emailed a copy of certain trust statements and itemised invoices to Ms Sanjiv but maintained those documents had been previously provided to her (Principal Judgment, at [272]).

30. On 18 September 2023, Ms Sanjiv withdrew her NCAT application (Principal Judgment, at [273]).

Various proceedings before Meek J and the Principal Judgment

31. As stated above, on 20 September 2023, Ms Sanjiv commenced these proceedings by filing a summons in this court against CGL and Ms Ralston. Ms Sanjiv sought the following relief in the summons:

1.   An order declaring cost agreement, if any, between plaintiff and defendants void and invalid and unenforceable and non-existent and to be set aside.

2.   An order requiring defendants to repay under equity principles/inherent jurisdiction amount of exorbitantly charged and unauthorised costs to plaintiff who bore the costs.

3. An order to make a gross sum costs assessment under s 98 of the Civil Procedure Act or reference to a referee under UCPR 20.14.

4.   An order for contempt of court for wilful, knowing and deliberate breach and disobedience of court order 2.4.3 made by Court on 30 April 2019.

5.   An order for all invoices with number of hours and rate per hour to be given to the plaintiff.

6.   An order for pre-judgment interest and costs such as payment for court fees.

32. On 26 September 2024, these proceedings were heard for one day and adjourned part-heard before Meek J due to Ms Sanjiv’s inefficient conduct of them, as stated by Meek J in the Principal Judgment, at [115]:

… the proceedings were not conducted efficiently by the plaintiff, leading to the length of the hearing being extended into a three-day hearing, well beyond the initial time allocated, being a single day.

33. On the morning of 26 September 2024, Ms Sanjiv sought leave to file and rely on an amended summons, which included prior relief that was abandoned (Principal Judgment, at [274]). The leave sought was refused by Meek J. The proposed amended summons sought the following relief (strikethrough and underlining in original):

…

5.   An order for all invoices with number of hours and rate per hour to be given to plaintiff. An order to set aside under inherent jurisdiction or under UCPR r 36.16(2)(a)&(b)& (3B) District Court judgment obtained by defendants on 17 September 2024 at 11.19am.

…

7.   An order for leave to amend summons in this Supreme Court

8.   An order for Leave to appeal judgment of District Court or judicial review under Part 59 UCPR of judgment of District Court issued on 17 September 2024 at 11.19 AM and extension of time (if required) be granted.

34. On 30 September 2024, Ms Sanjiv filed a summons commencing separate proceedings in this court (proceedings number 2024/361481) against only CGL (Second proceedings) seeking the following relief (italics in original) (Principal Judgment, at [275]):

1.   Extension of time be GRANTED.

2.   Leave to appeal, if required, be GRANTED.

3. Judicial review under Part 59 of Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR) of judgment of District Court made on 11 November 2019 issued on 17 September 2024 at 11.19 AM., in the alternative, be GRANTED.

4.   Appeal ALLOWED.

5. Judgment made by District Court of New South Wales on 11 November 2019 and issued on 17 September 2024 be quashed and set aside under UCPR r 35.15 or UCPR r 36.16 (2)(a) & (b).

6. A declaration that the defendant law practice contravened its disclosure obligations under section 174(1) & (3) of LPUL.

7.   A declaration that defendant law practice must not commence or maintain proceedings for the recovery of any or all of the legal costs until they have been assessed and the plaintiff is not required to pay the legal costs until they have been assessed.

8. An order under this court’s inherent jurisdiction for defendant to repay plaintiff $266,859.42, paid by plaintiff to defendant pursuant to this District Court judgment that has no legal effect in view of section 178(1)(b) & (c) of Legal Profession Uniform Law (LPUL).

9.   An order for pre-judgment interest and costs for payment for court fees etc. or each party to bear own costs.

10.   An order that this summons be case managed and heard and determined together with 2023/299506 summons pending before Meek J.

35. On 10 December 2024, Meek J heard and determined an application by CGL to dismiss the summons in the Second proceedings pursuant to r 13.4 of the UCPR (Principal Judgment, at [276]). Meek J delivered an ex tempore judgment dismissing the summons: Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 1675 (Second proceedings Judgment).

36. CGL and Ms Ralston assert that Ms Sanjiv filed a notice of intention to appeal the Second proceedings Judgment (Principal Judgment, at [36]) but the court file does not indicate that any such notice of intention to appeal was filed. In any event, no notice of appeal in respect of the Second proceedings Judgment was filed by Ms Sanjiv.

37. On 2 April 2025, shortly before the hearing of these proceedings was due to recommence on 7 April 2025 before Meek J, Ms Sanjiv filed a statement of claim commencing the Negligence proceedings against CGL (Principal Judgment, at [83]).

38. On 7 and 8 April 2025, the hearing of these proceedings recommenced. At the hearing, Ms Sanjiv did not request the court to defer the delivery of judgment, adjourn the proceedings or seek any other specific orders in relation to these proceedings by reference to the existence of the Negligence proceedings.

39. On 8 April 2025, Meek J reserved judgment in these proceedings.

40. On 14 April 2025, Ms Sanjiv filed closing written submissions in the Supreme Court proceedings, which stated:

I respectfully request for findings and conclusions that do not create issue estoppel or issue preclusion or anshun estoppel or res judicata in relation to my claim for negligence against defendants in 2025/126128 where assessed costs are claimed as damages.

41. On 22 May 2025 in these proceedings, Meek J made the following orders (set out in full in the Principal Judgment, at [96]):

THE COURT:

1. Notes that:

…

c.   the plaintiff in closing written submissions filed on 14 April 2025 stated ”I respectfully request for findings and conclusions that do not create issue estoppel or issue preclusion or anshun estoppel or res judicata in relation to my claim for negligence against defendants in 2025/126128 where assessed costs are claimed as damages”;

d.      the plaintiff in closing written reply submissions filed on 26 April 2025 stated ”51 I filed and served a statement of claim against first defendant for negligence and loss of opportunity. I respectfully request for an adjournment of decision-making in these proceedings or a decision that will not create issue estoppel or claim preclusion or res judicata in my above negligence proceedings in Supreme Court common law division”;

…

g.      at no stage during the final two hearing days on 7 and 8 April 2025 nor prior to receipt of the submissions in 1c and 1d did the plaintiff request the Court to defer the delivery of judgment, adjourn the proceedings or to seek other specific orders in relation to the hearing of the proceedings by reference to the existence of the new proceedings or the relief being sought in the new proceedings;

…

j.      Mrs Young confirmed to the Court that she had made forensic decisions based on the fact that the plaintiff had not raised in these proceedings, or sought to raise, her claims in the new proceedings;

k.      the plaintiff orally requested Meek J to defer judgment in these proceedings for the purposes of his Honour taking over case management of and concurrently hearing the plaintiff’s claims in the new proceedings with these existing proceedings;

l.      his Honour gave the plaintiff an opportunity to clarify (i) why she wished to seek the relief identified in notations 1c and 1d, and (ii) why his Honour should deal with the existing proceedings on any basis other than that claims in negligence had not been fairly and adequately notified and raised as issues to be dealt within the existing proceedings; and

m.      his Honour not being satisfied that he should (i) proceed on the basis that claims in negligence had been fairly and adequately notified and raised as issues to be dealt within the existing proceedings; (ii) adjourn the existing proceedings to allow the new proceedings to be dealt with concurrently with the existing proceedings and (iii) defer for any significant further length of time judgment in these proceedings based on the existing litigated issues, foreshadowed those matters and indicated that he proposed to deliver judgment on Monday, 26 May 2025.

42. On 26 May 2025, Meek J delivered the Principal Judgment dismissing Ms Sanjiv’s summons (Principal Judgment, at [573]).

43. In summary, Meek J made the following findings in relation to the main issues raised by Ms Sanjiv:

1. Ms Sanjiv’s claim that she was promised the fees would be limited to the sum of $50,000 was rejected (Principal Judgment, at [323]–[334]).

2. In giving the initial estimate of costs, Ms Ralston or CGL did not act in such a way, or fail to act in such a way, as to transgress the disclosure obligation to provide an estimate of the total legal costs “as soon as practicable after instructions are initially given” within the meaning of s 174(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW) (Principal Judgment, at [335]–[359]).

3. The estimates of costs were genuine and appropriate given the difficult circumstances (Principal Judgment, at [360]–[368]).

4. CGL sent the fee proposal to Ms Sanjiv, she signed and dated it and there was no material to support that she did so under pressure (Principal Judgment, at [380]–[389]).

5. Except for four invoices, Ms Sanjiv received all other invoices, none of the specific work referable to two of those invoices was challenged by Ms Sanjiv, Ms Sanjiv paid the other two invoices and no specific relief regarding provision of those two invoices is now warranted (Principal Judgment, at [390]–[399]).

6. The assertion that Ms Sanjiv was not provided with invoices showing the rate per hour of the person doing the work and number of hours utilised by that person is incorrect (Principal Judgment, at [400]–[405]).

7. CGL did not breach any entitlement that Ms Sanjiv had to receive a copy of specific instructions she asserts she provided to CGL (Principal Judgment, at [406]–[436]).

8. No case of duress in relation to costs notices and the authority for payment of costs was made out (Principal Judgment, at [437]–[449]).

9. Ms Sanjiv’s contention that CGL’s costs were exorbitant was rejected (Principal Judgment, at [450]–[459]).

10. Ms Sanjiv’s contention that she did not agree to brief Mr Grew and his fees were exorbitant was rejected (Principal Judgment, at [460]–[474]).

11. There was no substance in Ms Sanjiv’s complaints that CGL had no authority to transfer funds paid by Ms Sanjiv into trust in order to pay invoices rendered by CGL (Principal Judgment, at [475]–[503]).

12. There was no principled basis for the court to proceed as if the District Court judgment was invalid or void (Principal Judgment, at [504]–[509]).

13. CGL was not required to repay any monies to Ms Sanjiv (Principal Judgment, at [510]–[518]).

14. No gross sum costs order should be made (Principal Judgment, at [519]–[530]).

15. There was no basis to appoint a referee to make a determination in relation to costs (Principal Judgment, at [531]–[536]).

16. The notion that CGL breached an order in the Family Court proceedings such that it amounted to a civil and/or criminal contempt of court is misconceived (Principal Judgment, at [537]–[562]).

17. Having regard to the other findings, it was unnecessary to decide whether Ms Sanjiv was entitled to any order for pre-judgment interest (Principal Judgment, at [563]–[568]).

44. Importantly, in the Principal Judgment, Meek J also made findings as to Ms Sanjiv’s asserted vulnerability and special disadvantage, stating at [100]–[101] and [103] that (footnotes omitted, emphasis added):

[100]   The plaintiff is well educated and credentialled. She graduated from Bombay University with a bachelor’s degree in chemistry and physics. She appears to have qualified for a medical technology degree and worked as a laboratory technician at a biochemist in a local hospital in India. She has a postgraduate bachelor’s degree in computer management and has completed a master’s degree in business systems analysis and design in computers. She worked in South Kensington, London as a business analyst for about three and a half years before moving to Australia in 1984. She worked at Telstra as an IT consultant and moved to Wellington, New Zealand, to assist Dr Shah (her then husband) to set up and run his medical practice and was a director of the company that operated the practice. She understood “business” and oversaw all the management, contracts, accounts and bookkeeping aspects of the management company and attended to payment of tax and GST. She has also had involvement as a director in other companies.

Plaintiff’s asserted vulnerability

[101]   The plaintiff in her affidavit asserted that she is “a vulnerable person with special disadvantages”, “unwell” and that “both defendants greatly abused my trust and confidence”. It is unclear what the plaintiff meant by the asserted vulnerability and special disadvantages. … I am not persuaded that the plaintiff had any vulnerability or special disadvantage that amounts to any factor affecting her claim against the defendants in respect of costs.

…

[103]    In any event, the plaintiff did not adduce any independent medical or other expert evidence suggestive that she had any particular vulnerability or “special disadvantage”.

The Notice of Motion

45. On 29 May 2025, three days after Meek J delivered the Principal Judgment, Ms Sanjiv filed the Notice of Motion seeking the following orders:

1. An order that judgment be set aside or varied under UCPR 36.15 and 36.16(3A).

2.   An order that proceedings 2023/299506 be transferred to Supreme Court Common law division - professional negligence list to travel, be heard and determined with 2025/126128 Rekha Sanjiv v Coleman Greig Lawyers Pty. Ltd.

3.   An order that judgment in 2023/299506 be stayed before transfer to common law.

4.   Costs be costs in the cause.

5.   Any order Court sees fit as applicant is vulnerable and has no legal training.

Hearing of the Notice of Motion on 11 July 2025

46. On 11 July 2025, I heard the Notice of Motion and reserved my judgment. Ms Sanjiv was again self-represented. Ms K Young appeared as counsel for CGL and Ms Ralston.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

47. The Notice of Motion raises issues concerning the setting aside of a judgment under rr 36.15 and 36.16(3A) of the UCPR, the stay of a judgment and the procedure for appealing orders made pursuant to a judgment.

Effect of entry of a judgment

48. A fundamental aspect of the rule of law is that when proceedings have been disposed of by a final order which has been entered, subject to limited qualification, the proceedings are at an end and cannot be revived: Phillips v Walsh (1990) 20 NSWLR 206, McLelland J at 209–10, citing Bailey v Marinoff (1971) 125 CLR 529; [1971] HCA 49; Gamser v Nominal Defendant (1977) 136 CLR 145; [1977] HCA 7; and FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v Southern Cross Exploration NL (1988) 165 CLR 268; [1988] HCA 13. See also Grierson v The King (1938) 60 CLR 431, Dixon J (with whom McTiernan J agreed) at 436; [1938] HCA 45; DJL v The Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 245; [2000] HCA 17; Meehan v Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 54 NSWLR 146; [2002] NSWCA 22, Giles JA (with whom Sheller and Beazley JJA agreed) at [26].

49. In Bailey, Barwick CJ stated at 530 that:

Once an order disposing of a proceeding has been perfected by being drawn up as the record of a court, that proceeding apart from any specific and relevant statutory provision is at an end in that court and is in its substance, in my opinion, beyond recall by that court. It would, in my opinion, not promote the due administration of the law or the promotion of justice for a court to have a power to reinstate a proceeding of which it has finally disposed.

50. This general rule, which provides for the finality of a perfected judgment or order, continues to operate at common law: DJL, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [38], citing Bailey, Barwick CJ at 530.

51. In the interests of expediency, and pursuant to r 36.11 of the UCPR, the entry of orders and judgments in this court now occurs electronically and a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the computerised court record system. Consequently, orders are now generally entered or “perfected” on the same day upon which judgment is delivered.

52. A judgment that has been entered can only be varied or discharged on appeal subject to some exceptions, including the court’s power under the UCPR to set aside or vary a judgment.

Setting aside or varying a judgment or order under the UCPR

53. The court has a general power to set aside a judgment or order in any proceedings if the judgment was given or entered or the order was made irregularly, illegally or against good faith: r 36.15(1) of the UCPR. A denial of procedural fairness by a court would constitute a fundamental irregularity which would entitle a person aggrieved to set aside an order as a matter of unconditional right because the court must not be, nor appear to be, an instrument for procedural unfairness: Miltonbrook Pty Ltd v Westbury Holdings Kiama Pty Ltd (2008) 71 NSWLR 262; [2008] NSWCA 38, Spigelman CJ (with whom Tobias and Campbell JJA agreed) at [85]–[87].

54. A judgment or order of the court in any proceedings may be set aside by order of the court if the parties to the proceedings consent: r 36.15(2) of the UCPR.

55. The court may set aside or vary a judgment or order if a notice of motion for the setting aside or variation is filed before entry of the judgment or order: r 36.16(1) of the UCPR.

56. If the notice of motion for the setting aside or variation of a judgment or order is filed within 14 days after the judgment or order is entered, the court may determine the matter and (if appropriate) set aside or vary the judgment or order under r 36.16(1), as if the judgment or order had not been entered: r 36.16(3A) of the UCPR.

57. The general power of the court in r 1.12 of the UCPR to extend time is expressly excluded by r 36.16(3C) of the UCPR, which prevents any extension of the 14-day period for filing a notice of motion. This prohibition confirms that the 14-day time limit is fixed and “reflects the need for judgments and orders to be final and certain as to their operation”: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Meredith (No 2) (2008) 75 NSWLR 462; [2008] NSWCA 133, Basten JA (with whom Ipp JA agreed) at [15]. See also Malouf v Prince (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 51, McColl and Macfarlan JJA and Nicholas J at [17].

58. In addition to the powers in rr 36.16(1) and (2) of the UCPR, the court may set aside or vary any judgment or order, except so far as it determines any claim for relief or determines any question of fact or law arising from any claim for relief, or where it dismisses proceedings or dismisses proceedings so far as concerns the whole or any part of any claim for relief: r 36.16(3) of the UCPR.

59. Rule 36.16(4) of the UCPR makes it clear that nothing in r 36.16 affects any other power of the court to set aside or vary a judgment or order.

60. In addition to the powers in r 36.16 of the UCPR, the court may, on application of any party or of its own motion, correct clerical mistakes or errors arising from an accidental slip or omission in a judgment or order: r 36.17 of the UCPR.

61. In Dickson v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 111, Meagher and Brereton JJA summarised the key principles in relation to r 36.16 of the UCPR, at [4] (emphasis added):

The relevant principles are well established (Johnston v The Greens NSW Inc (No 2) [2021] NSWCA 291 at [8]). The power conferred by UCPR r 36.16 is to be exercised ”sparingly and with caution” and ”does not give a licence to disgruntled litigants to re-agitate, in the hope of obtaining a more favourable outcome, issues that have been determined against them” (Majak v Rose (No 5) [2017] NSWCA 238 at [12]-[13] (“Majak”)). The purpose of the power is ”to permit readily identifiable, readily rectifiable, inadvertent errors to be corrected without the complication and expense of an appeal” (Majak at [12]; Owlstara v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2020] NSWCA 335 at [5]). “Generally speaking, it will not be exercised unless the applicant can show that by accident without fault on his part he has not been heard” (Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (No 2) (1982) 149 CLR 672 at 684; [1982] HCA 41 at [3]; Autodesk v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 at 302; [1993] HCA 6 at [2] (“Autodesk”)). It is true that it may also be exercised where ”the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and ... this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing” (Autodesk at 303 [4]). However, the reference to misapprehension in this context is concerned with matters of oversight and inadvertence, and not with deliberate decisions which are said to be incorrect.

62. In Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256; [1992] HCA 36, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ stated at 265 (in respect of Part 40 r 9 of the Supreme Court Rules1970 (NSW), the predecessor to r 36.16 of the UCPR) that:

... The power is discretionary and, although it exists up until the entry of judgment, it is one that is exercised having regard to the public interest in maintaining the finality of litigation (Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (1982) 149 CLR 672 at 684). Thus, if reasons for judgment have been given, the power is only exercised if there is some matter calling for review (Marinoff v Bailey (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 280 at 284; National Benzole Co Ltd v Gooch [1961] 1 WLR 1489 at 1492-1494). And there may be more or less reluctance to exercise the power depending on whether there is an avenue of appeal (State Rail Authority of NSW v Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 29 at 38-39, 45-46; Wentworth v Rogers (No 9) (1987) 8 NSWLR 388 at 394-395). It is important that it be understood that these considerations may tend against the re-opening of a case, but they are not matters which bear on the nature of the review to be undertaken once the case is re-opened, as this case was.

63. In Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (1982) 149 CLR 672; [1982] HCA 41, Mason ACJ, Wilson and Brennan JJ stated at 684 that (footnotes omitted, emphasis added):

… as we had occasion to point out recently in State Rail Authority of New South Wales v. Codelfa Construction Pty. Ltd., the circumstances in which this Court will reopen a judgment which it has pronounced are extremely rare. The public interest in maintaining the finality of litigation necessarily means that the power to reopen to enable a rehearing must be exercised with great caution. Generally speaking, it will not be exercised unless the applicant can show that by accident without fault on [their] part [they have] not been heard.

64. In Autodesk Incv Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300; [1993] HCA 6, Mason CJ at 301–3 stated (citations omitted, emphasis added):

The exercise of the jurisdiction to reopen a judgment and to grant a rehearing is not confined to circumstances in which the applicant can show that, by accident and without fault on the applicant’s part, he or she has not been heard. It is true that the jurisdiction is to be exercised with great caution, having regard to the importance of the public interest in the finality of litigation. It is equally true, as this Court said in Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council, that “[g]enerally speaking, it will not be exercised unless the applicant can show that by accident without fault on his part he has not been heard.”

But these statements do not exclude the exercise of jurisdiction to reopen a judgment which has apparently miscarried for other reasons, at least when the orders pronounced have not been perfected by the taking out of formal orders. So much was acknowledged by Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ. in Smith v N.S.W. Bar Association when their Honours said: “if reasons for judgment have been given, the power is only exercised if there is some matter calling for review.”…

…it must be emphasized that the jurisdiction is not to be exercised for the purpose of re-agitating arguments already considered by the Court; nor is it to be exercised simply because the party seeking a rehearing has failed to present the argument in all its aspects or as well as it might have been put. What must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing. The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a backdoor method by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to reargue their cases.

65. I note that Mason CJ dissented on the ultimate issue in Autodesk, but his Honour’s statements of general principle were not questioned in the majority judgments and were cited in Aktas v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 2) (2010) 241 CLR 570; [2010] HCA 47, French CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ at [6] as accurate propositions.

66. In Dickson v Petrie (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 176, Stern, Ball JJA and Griffiths AJA at [7] endorsed the following summary of the principles concerning the operation of r 36.16:

[7] The Court’s power to vary an order under r 36.16 of the UCPR requires the identification of some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law which caused an error to have been made. The relevant principles guiding the exercise of the Court’s power under r 36.16 were helpfully summarised in Majak v Rose (No 5) [2017] NSWCA 238 at [12]ff (emphasis added):

[12]   The rule is, like all rules made under the Uniform Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), subject to the “overriding purpose” of facilitating the “just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues” between the parties to litigation (s 56). It does not give a licence to disgruntled litigants to re-agitate, in the hope of obtaining a more favourable outcome, issues that have been determined against them. Nor does it make of a court some sort of magic pudding from which unsuccessful litigants may take slice after slice, ever hopeful that the next will be more palatable than the last. The rule has a serious, but limited, purpose which is to permit readily identifiable, readily rectifiable, inadvertent errors to be corrected without the complication and expense of an appeal (or, in the case of this Court, an application for special leave to the High Court). Abuse of the rule is detrimental to the administration of justice in unnecessarily and unfairly (to other litigants) taking up the time of the court. Nor does abuse of the rules facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the issues between parties. On the contrary, unwarranted reliance on r 36.16 is oppressive to the successful party and a drain on the Court’s resources.

[13]   It is well established that a court’s jurisdiction to set aside orders should be exercised sparingly and with caution, having due regard to the importance of the finality of litigation (see, for example, Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council (No 2) (1982) 149 CLR 672 at 684; [1982] HCA 41; State Rail Authority of NSW v Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 29 at 38; [1982] HCA 51; Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) (1993) 176 CLR 300 at 302; [1993] HCA 6; Rockcote Enterprises Pty Ltd v FS Architects Pty Ltd (No 2); Carelli v FS Architects Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 205 at [9]).

[14]   In Autodesk v Dyason (No 2) at 302 Mason CJ said:

“What must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and that this misapprehension cannot be attributed solely to the neglect or default of the party seeking the rehearing.”

[15]   Mason CJ was there particularly concerned with the potential for misuse of the jurisdiction. He said:

“However, it must be emphasized that the jurisdiction is not to be exercised for the purpose of re-agitating arguments already considered by the Court; nor is it to be exercised simply because the party seeking a rehearing has failed to present the argument in all its aspects or as well as it might have been put. … The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a backdoor method by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to re-argue their cases” (at 303).

[16]   In the course of his reasons, Mason CJ cited the following passage from Wentworth v Woollahra Municipal Council at 684:

“[T]he circumstances in which this Court will reopen a judgment which it has pronounced are extremely rare. The public interest in maintaining the finality of litigation necessarily means that the power to reopen to enable a rehearing must be exercised with great caution. Generally speaking, it will not be exercised unless the applicant can show that by accident without fault on his part he has not been heard.” (italics added) [Emphasis in original]

…

[18] In considering an application pursuant to UCPR 36.16, this Court in Waterhouse v Independent Commission Against Corruption (No 2) [2015] NSWCA 362 at [17], after quoting the passage in the judgment of Mason CJ in Autodesk v Dyason (No 2) extracted at [14] above, said:

“To that statement one may add two further notes of caution. First, there is a distinction to be drawn between the court acting upon a misapprehension as to the facts or the relevant law, on the one hand, and, on the other, the court reaching a conclusion which, in the view of the applicant for re-opening, involves a mistake. Secondly, there is a distinction to be drawn between the situation where the court misapprehends the facts, on the one hand, and, on the other, the situation where the court does not refer in its reasons to some matter which, in the belief of the person seeking re-opening, deserved express reference.”

[19]   The applicant bears the onus of showing that the jurisdiction ought to be exercised in her favour. That entails demonstrating some misapprehension on the part of the Court, and that that misapprehension is not attributable to her conduct of the proceedings.

Stay of a judgment

67. The court has an inherent power to grant a stay of a judgment in the interests of justice, which is confirmed by the express terms of s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), under which the court has “all jurisdiction which may be necessary for the administration of justice in New South Wales”: New South Wales Bar Association v Stevens [2003] NSWCA 95, Spiegelman CJ (with whom Meagher and Sheller JJA agreed) at [83].

68. The court may also make an order prohibiting any other person from taking any further action, either permanently or until a specified day, to enforce a judgment or order of the court: s 135(2)(c) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW). In Re Webuildem Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 708, Black J at [13] stated:

… The court’s power to grant a stay under s 135 of the Civil Procedure Act is exercisable where the interests of justice so demand; the person seeking a stay must satisfy the court that the requirements of justice require one; and the court has a wide discretion whether to grant a stay and whether terms should be imposed on the grant of such a stay: Joskovitz v Bonnick [1964] VR 654 at 656; Tringali v Stewardson Stubbs & Collett Pty Ltd [1966] 1 NSWR 354 at 360–361; Victorian Securities Corporation Ltd v Icehot Pty Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd) [2010] NSWSC 1413 at [9].

Time to appeal and extensions of time to appeal

69. A notice of intention to appeal must be filed and served on each prospective respondent within 28 days after the material date: r 51.8 of the UCPR. The material date for a judgment given in proceedings in this court is the date on which the judgment is given and the material date for an order in proceedings in this court is the date on which the order is made: r 51.2 (definition of “material date”) of the UCPR.

70. An applicant who has filed and served a notice of intention to appeal must file and serve the notice of appeal within three months after the material date or within such other period as the court may order: r 51.9(1) of the UCPR. The filing and service of a notice of intention to appeal does not operate to commence proceedings in the court: r 51.9(3) of the UCPR.

71. An applicant who has not filed a notice of intention to appeal must file and serve a notice of appeal within 28 days of the material date or such other time as the Court may fix: r 51.16 of the UCPR.

72. The time for the filing of a notice of appeal can be extended by the court at any time: r 51.16(2) of the UCPR.

SUBMISSIONS

Submissions of Ms Sanjiv

73. Ms Sanjiv submits that it is “in the interest of justice” that these proceedings be stayed and then transferred to the Professional Negligence List of the Common Law Division to avoid any issues of estoppel, risk of inconsistent findings and abuse of process and because these proceedings and the Negligence proceedings are “interrelated” (T3).

74. Ms Sanjiv submits that CGL and Ms Ralston previously consented to Ms Sanjiv’s proposed order that the Notice of Motion be transferred to the Common Law Division to be case managed together with the Negligence proceedings but then reneged on that consent.

75. In the hearing before me, Ms Sanjiv recognised that she has a final judgment against her in the form of the Principal Judgment and that she has not sought to appeal it (T10 and T12). Ms Sanjiv claimed that she did not know what to do about appealing the Principal Judgment because she is “not aware of how things work here” (T11).

76. Ms Sanjiv spent most of her time before me making oral submissions that were discursive and very difficult to follow, raising many matters which were the subject of careful consideration and determination in the Principal Judgment, including the conduct of CGL and Ms Ralston and other extraneous matters such as the domestic violence she claims to have experienced in her marriage to Dr Shah.

77. Ms Sanjiv’s submissions in this regard are captured in the following extract from the transcript of the hearing (T13–16):

PLAINTIFF: I’m not aware of the - whatever the fact has been provided, the evidence has been provided, everything has not been considered.

HIS HONOUR: Well, you haven’t appealed it.

PLAINTIFF: Where do I go from here?

HIS HONOUR: Well, you go--

PLAINTIFF: I don’t know why he has not done that. I’m not sure - I thought I came for justice. I have been suffered, for last 20 years, it is domestic violence, financial abuse by the lawyer, my own lawyer, and the ex-husband and his lawyer and barrister. What am I supposed to do? They just keep exorbitantly keep charging, keep charging me the amount where only even - even they have not followed the court orders, and still I have been charged for over half a million dollar, for what? They have not done any work, and still keep charging me.

I’m not sure, your Honour, what is - where the justice when the work is not done, court order has not been followed, costs assessment they have not done and garnished my account, and even though the - my house has been sold, money should have gone to the trust account. Court order says it has to go to the trust account. They did not put that, and without my permission, everything has been just taken away, and they say that they have done the right thing. Where do I stand? I have been made homeless. Where do I stand, your Honour? I need a justice. I’m a single mother, honest--

HIS HONOUR: Well, you--

PLAINTIFF: --say the truth, and this is what I end up with, that they take away over half a million dollar. When I approach this lawyer, I was having over $8 million joint assets, and when I left I’ve been homeless. How do - how do you explain this, your Honour, that they have done the right thing? And still they keep asking me cost, cost. I have got nothing. You can have my blood now. That is all I can give now. I have got nothing left. There is no money in the bank account. There is no house. Truly, I have got nothing - I had two sons, I had to protect them from domestic violence and keep them alive. I’m - I’ve been having attack three times, and still I’m alive, and they are saying they have done the right thing? Taking of all my money without my permission from the trust account?

And not only that, there is - three property were there, all valuation was done, and during the final hearing they never brought the two property, and they just wanted to - me to sign to sell the property, and take away all the money of the property. I have got nothing left, your Honour, and she keeps - she keeps saying I’m educated, I have got degrees and everything.

HIS HONOUR: No, she was just - she was--

PLAINTIFF: Yes, your Honour, I have educated myself, and I earn money, I brought my own house on my single name, and that single name house, $4 million house, is gone. Zero money. I’ve got nothing left, and I’ve been kicked out of the house by the sheriff, the enforcement order, and nobody - she’d - even the lawyer, the court order was there, 2019, April that court order was there with Judge Harper(?), that she - that Coleman and Creig(as said) has to prepare the sales contract and take part into the selling of the property for both - from both the sides, they have to act. They did not do that. They did not come. They’ve broken every court orders. Not only that, every court orders. Where do I go from that?

I trust that person and I gave all my information. Not only that year, your Honour, then I’d been told that, “You want to save your house, then you have to do the domestic violence, file the domestic violence”. I said, “Okay, file it”. They charge - I didn’t have money, I said, “I’ll give it from the house, what I get”, and what they did? They forced me, my emergency money was sitting in super fund, there was no other money, and she forced me and she took $130,000 from my super fund, and she never run the domestic violence case. This is everything what she said, she used to keep telling, “You want to save the house, you have to sign this document”, “You want to save this house, you have to do this”, and they used to lock me into the cabinet, and she used to make my sign. I was crying. I said, “Save my house, my two children. We need a roof”, and she did not - she did not give us that.

HIS HONOUR: All right.

PLAINTIFF: I lived a car for so many days. This is not what they have done, the right thing, I trusted them. I trusted them. I borrowed so much money, every time she tell me that, “You want to save the house, go and get the money”; I borrowed from everyone. All I have got is debt, and no house, no money, and how can it be that is the right judgment. They - I told her I want my own barrister, and she did not allow me. She brought her own barrister. For one day she charged me $50,000. I told her my barrister will charge only 5,000, 7,000; she said, “No, no. I’ll get it cheaper”. She sending one invoice of $50,000, and she has taken from my house money without my permission. How can it be justified, your Honour? I respect every judge, whatever they give me the decision, but this is not I’m accepting, your Honour. I don’t know how to do - how to deal with this. I’m 68 year old now, last 11 years I am in the Court. No court order has been followed. Nothing has been followed by them.

HIS HONOUR: Well, the court--

PLAINTIFF: Where do I go from here, your Honour?

HIS HONOUR: Well, the court order that you’re not following is that your summons was dismissed by Meek J on the--

PLAINTIFF: I expect justice.

HIS HONOUR: Well, I will--

PLAINTIFF: Where is the justice, your Honour? Where is the justice? I’m a single mother. I lost everything, 38 years of my own earnings, my house. My children and I, no house, no money.

HIS HONOUR: As sad as all of that is, there is a judgment which dismisses your--

PLAINTIFF: Because I trust--

HIS HONOUR: Ms Sanjiv. There is a judgment from Meek J on 26 May 2025 which you haven’t appealed. You haven’t sought to appeal - make an application that you be allowed to appeal out of time. If you want to bring an application that you appeal out of time, then you’ll have to do that. You haven’t done that, and as a result, his judgment - which is a very lengthy, comprehensive judgment - stands as a dismissal of those proceedings.

PLAINTIFF: I’m sure, for the justice, your Honour, all the concern about the cost, all my trust has been - has been taken on a ride. All they want is the money. Behind my back, they garnish my account. Behind my back, they have taken all money from the super fund. They have done everything and I’ve got nothing left. Nothing left, and I’ve been suffering from domestic violence for such a long time. She knew it. She prepared for me, domestic violence whole case, they never allowed me to run. I told her I want it, she didn’t allow me. And they want the costs - she has taken more than half a million dollar from me, for what? What she has given me? She did not even

give me the subpoena documents. Every time the documents - I ask for the subpoena document, she will - she will say, “No, we will give you, we will give you”, and she never gave me. That was the papers which has won my whole case, and she hide that paper.

And now all they are talking about the cost. They’ve already taken almost $262,000, they’ve taken - and again, the last - she is asking for another $5,000, another money. All they are worried about, the money. They have not provided what I have trusted, they have not act in my best interest. Why I’m here is just justice, your Honour. For 11 years, I’ve been going through the court cases. My life - I’m alive through the domestic violence, it’s not my life to come to the court and just pay them cost. That is not - I am here. I am here for justice.

78. It appeared to me that Ms Sanjiv’s submissions for “justice” ultimately amounted to her disagreement with the findings made in the Principal Judgment on the arguments she had raised before Meek J.

Submissions of CGL and Ms Ralston

79. CGL and Ms Ralston oppose the orders sought and submit that the Notice of Motion is misconceived, a re-run of an earlier application made by Ms Sanjiv before Meek J on 22 May 2025, and a re-agitation of issues already raised and dealt with by the court in the Principal Judgment.

80. Specifically, CGL and Ms Ralston raised six principal submissions opposing Ms Sanjiv’s application as summarised below:

1. The Notice of Motion seeks the same orders on the same grounds as the oral application made by Ms Sanjiv on 22 May 2025 that was refused by Meek J. In that oral application, Ms Sanjiv requested the Principal Judgment not be handed down, be stayed or otherwise be dealt with concurrently with the Negligence proceedings to prevent a res judicata, issue estoppel or Anshun estoppel arising. Nothing has changed since 22 May 2025 that warrants a different approach to the same application.

2. There is no legal or factual basis or any evidence before the court that justifies setting aside or varying the Principal Judgment under rr 36.15 or 36.16(3A) of the UCPR. There is no evidence that there has been any irregularity, illegality or that the Principal Judgment was entered against good faith. Ms Sanjiv’s disagreement with the decision is not sufficient cause to set aside or vary the Principal Judgment, nor is the fact that she has commenced the Negligence proceedings.

3. There is no legal or factual basis, or any evidence before the court, that justifies setting aside or varying the Principal Judgment under r 36.16(3A) of the UCPR. While it is accepted that the Notice of Motion was filed within 14 days after the Principal Judgment, Ms Sanjiv’s application should be seen as an attempt to re-argue or re-agitate the same matters in these proceedings, given the lack of error or procedural issues that justify the re-opening of the proceedings and variation of the Principal Judgment. The discretionary power which Ms Sanjiv calls upon me to invoke should be exercised with great caution having regard to the public interest in maintaining the finality of litigation (citing Wentworth, Autodesk and Smith), with more reluctance if there is (or was) an avenue of appeal (citing State Rail Authority).

4. An order that these proceedings be transferred to the Common Law Division would be misconceived because these proceedings have already been finally determined by Meek J in the Principal Judgment. There is nothing left to be heard or determined in these proceedings and nor can the Common Law Division of this court amend or alter the decision or findings made in the Principal Judgment. CGL and Ms Ralston previously consented to Ms Sanjiv’s proposed order that the Notice of Motion be transferred to the Common Law Division to be case managed with the Negligence proceedings, but that consent was given in circumstances where CGL was about to file an application to strike out the Negligence proceedings on the basis of Anshun estoppel. CGL took the view that there may be cost savings if both applications could be determined together. Ms Sanjiv then indicated that she intended to propose amendments to her claim in the Negligence proceedings and a timetable was put in place for her to propose those amendments. As a result, CGL has not yet filed a strike out application in the Negligence proceedings and CGL and Ms Ralston no longer consent to Ms Sanjiv’s proposed orders that these proceedings be transferred to the Common Law Division to be case managed together with the Negligence proceedings.

5. An order that the Principal Judgment be stayed before it is transferred to the Common Law Division to avoid issues of estoppel or inconsistent findings is also misconceived because a stay of judgment only operates to prevent enforcement of the judgment. A stay of the Principal Judgment does not prevent it from giving rise to res judicata, issue estoppel or an Anshun estoppel, citing the criteria set out in Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464, by Dixon J at 531–2; [1939] HCA 23. The risk of inconsistent findings does not give rise to a stay where a final judgment has been given, as opposed to seeking a stay of one of two proceedings before either of the proceedings is determined. The Principal Judgment is final irrespective of any stay.

6. The order sought by Ms Sanjiv that the court make any order it sees fit based on her being a “vulnerable person” has no legal basis as it contradicts the findings made by Meek J in the Principal Judgment at [100]–[101] and [103], where his Honour referred to Ms Sanjiv’s extensive background of education and employment and was not persuaded that Ms Sanjiv had any particular vulnerability or special disadvantage.

81. CGL and Ms Ralston raised concerns about the significant costs and delays in the proceedings as a result of Ms Sanjiv’s “wasteful and misconceived efforts” initiating multiple proceedings and raising the same or similar issues across them.

82. CGL and Ms Ralston submit that the Notice of Motion should be dismissed with indemnity costs.

Further submissions of Ms Sanjiv after the hearing of 11 July 2025

83. At 2:48pm on 11 July 2025, after I had reserved my judgment on the Notice of Motion and without any prior leave of the court, Ms Sanjiv sent written submissions by email to my Associate (copied to counsel and the solicitors for CGL and Ms Ralston) purporting to be submissions in reply. CGL and Ms Ralston have stated that they do not object to me considering these submissions if I deem them to be appropriate. In these submissions, Ms Sanjiv claimed that the “respondents knowingly and deliberately served [Ms Sanjiv] with their submissions in Court with the purpose of denying [Ms Sanjiv] procedural fairness to reply”. Ms Sanjiv then sought the proceedings to be re-opened “in the interest of justice”, submitting that there is no prejudice to the CGL and Ms Ralston. Ms Sanjiv claimed that the CGL and Ms Ralston inaccurately submitted that the Principal Judgment is final irrespective of any stay of proceedings.

84. Ms Sanjiv submitted that she made a timely application pursuant to r 36.16(3A) of the UCPR to vary the orders of Meek J, citing Scott v Kennedy [2025] NSWSC 544, Brereton J at [17], to stay the Principal Judgment and transfer these proceedings to the Professional Negligence List in the Common Law Division.

CONSIDERATION

85. Applying the principles stated in Bailey and DJL, once the orders made pursuant to the Principal Judgment were entered, subject to limited exceptions (none of which arise in the present case), these proceedings were at an end and cannot revived by Ms Sanjiv.

85. To the extent that Ms Sanjiv seeks an order under rr 36.15 and 36.16(3A) of the UCPR to set aside or vary the Principal Judgment and the orders made pursuant to it, the principles expounded in Dickson, Wentworth, Smith and Autodesk inform me that the discretionary power must be exercised sparingly and with great caution, having regard to the public interest in maintaining the finality of litigation. Ms Sanjiv did not propose a single basis on which that discretion might be exercised in her favour. Her general disagreement with the ultimate outcome of, and specific findings within, the Principal Judgment does not support the setting aside or variation of Principal Judgment or the orders made pursuant to it. Ms Sanjiv points to nothing that suggests that there was any irregularity, illegality or that the Principal Judgment was entered against good faith.

86. Further, Ms Sanjiv had an avenue to appeal the Principal Judgment which she chose not to pursue within the 28 days required by either filing a notice of intention to appeal or a notice of appeal, which tells against the exercise of the discretion for her benefit even more. I do not accept Ms Sanjiv’s submission that she did not know what to do about appealing the Principal Judgment and in any event she was informed by me during the hearing that if she wished to appeal the Principal Judgment out of time then she needed to take the necessary steps to do so (T15). Ms Sanjiv has not taken those steps.

87. There is also no basis on which there should be a stay of the Principal Judgment. The interests of justice do not require there to be any stay of a judgment which has finally determined the controversy raised in these proceedings. The final determination of these proceedings also dictates that they should not be transferred to the join the Negligence proceedings in the Common Law Division of this court. There is nothing left to be heard and determined in these proceedings.

88. I also agree with CGL and Ms Ralston that the request for a stay based on res judicata, issue estoppel or an Anshun estoppel is misconceived because a stay of the Principal Judgment would only operate to stay its enforcement, not whether it gave rise to res judicata, issue estoppel or an Anshun estoppel.

89. In relation to Ms Sanjiv’s request that the court makes an order that she is vulnerable and has no legal training, I refuse to make any such order as it is misconceived, and would be completely inconsistent with the Principal Judgment, at [100]–[101] and [103], where Meek J explained why Ms Sanjiv failed in her claim that she suffers from any vulnerability or special disadvantage. Additionally, as Meek J observed in the Principal Judgment, there is also insufficient evidence before me which could support any such finding, order or declaration.

90. I can briefly dispense with Ms Sanjiv’s claim that the “respondents knowingly and deliberately served [Ms Sanjiv] with their submissions in Court with the purpose of denying [Ms Sanjiv] procedural fairness to reply” and that the proceedings be re-opened “in the interest of justice”. In light of my findings that Ms Sanjiv’s application is bereft of any merit, this submission fails as well. Ms Sanjiv has been given significant procedural fairness in this court and there can be doubt that the interests of justice are best served by dismissing the Notice of Motion.

91. Finally, I note that Ms Sanjiv’s reliance on Scott v Kennedy [2025] NSWSC 544 at [17] is misguided as it addresses the entirely separate and unrelated issue of the court’s approach to ordering a short stay of interlocutory orders dismissing proceedings by consent during ongoing litigation to enable a plaintiff to seek interim relief in proceedings in another court.

92. For all of these reasons, I find that Ms Sanjiv has failed in every aspect of the Notice of Motion. Applying the principles in Cappello v HomeBuilding Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 109, as explained by Mitchelmore JA (with whom Simpson AJA and Meagher JA agreed) at [46]–[48], I regard her claim for the orders sought to be hopeless and based upon groundless contentions. As such, I will award indemnity costs to CGL and Ms Ralston.

ORDERS

94. For the reasons stated above, the orders I propose to make are as follows:

1. The notice of motion filed 29 May 2025 by the plaintiff is dismissed.

2. The plaintiff is to pay the costs of the defendants in relation to the notice of motion filed 29 May 2025 on an indemnity basis.

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Decision last updated: 13 August 2025