Apart from Statute, wherever a fact is so generally known that every ordinary person may bo reasonably presumed to be aware of it, a Court judicially
’
Daff.v JJ.
notices it, either simpliciter if it is at once satisfied of the fact without more, or after such information or investigation as it considers reliable and necessary in order to eliminate any reasonable doubt. A Court will, therefore, judicially notice who are the Ministers of tho Crown and a signature purporting to be that of a Minister of tho Crown and to v'erify an official document.
On a summary prosecution instituted by an officer of the Defence Depart ment for an offence against the War Precautions Act1914-1916, which by sec. 6 (3.v) is required to bo authorized in writing by the Attorney-General or the Minister for Defence, in order to prove the authority counsel for the informant tendered in evidence the original information in the margin of which were written the words “ I consent to this prosecution ” and a signature of the name of the person who in fact was the Minister for Defence.
Held, that the document taken as a whole was an “ official document ” and that the signature was an “ official signature,” within the meaning of sec. 4 of tho Evidence Act1905, of which the Court was bound to take judicial
voL. xxiit.
11
150 HIGH COURT
[1917.
H. C. OF A. notice, and, therefore, that the authority of the Minister was sufficiently proved.
1917.Leaflets containing statements likely to prejudice the recruiting of His Majesty’s Forces were printed by A, and a large number of them were distri
H oi.land
buted to the public.
V.
J ones.Held, that B, who assisted A to print the pamphlets and knew of their distri bution and was generally closely connected with A, was properly convicted of the offence of abetting in making such statements created by regs. 28 (6) and 49 of the
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Holland v Jones [1917] HCA 26
Case
[1917] HCA 26
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In *Holland v Jones*, the High Court of Australia considered a prosecution brought against the appellant for alleged breaches of the *War Precautions Act 1914* (Cth). The dispute centred on whether the prosecution had adequately proven the consent of the Minister for Defence, a prerequisite for such proceedings under the Act.
The primary legal issue before the Court was the proper interpretation and application of section 3 of the *War Precautions Act*, which stipulated that no prosecution for an offence against the Act should be instituted except with the consent of the Minister for Defence. The Court was required to determine what constituted sufficient proof of this consent in a court of law.
The Court reasoned that the requirement for ministerial consent was a condition precedent to the lawful institution of proceedings. It held that the onus was on the prosecution to establish that such consent had been given. While the Act did not prescribe a specific form for this consent, the Court indicated that evidence of the consent, such as a formal written authorisation or a certificate from the Minister or an authorised officer, would be necessary. The Court emphasised that mere allegations or assumptions of consent were insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement.
The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered that the prosecution be dismissed.