FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BGG19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 457
File number(s): ADG 104 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD Date of judgment: 31 March 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal misapplied s 36(2)(a) and (aa) – whether applicant’s conversion to Christianity was genuine – whether the Tribunal made unreasonable findings – irrationality – whether applicant was denied procedural fairness – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 36(2), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 91R, 91S, 422B, 425, 476, 499 Cases cited: CLS15 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2017] FCA 577
CLS15 v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 2164
DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 577
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
NADH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264
NAEB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 719
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 458
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 79 Date of last submission/s: 21 February 2025 Date of hearing: 25 February 2025 Place: Adelaide Counsel for the Applicant: Peter Barnes Solicitor for the Applicant: Ujvari Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Oliver Morris Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
ADG 104 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BGG19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GERRARD
DATE OF ORDER:
31 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE GERRARD:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), affirming an earlier decision of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant him a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (the visa). For the applicant to succeed in this Court, he must establish that…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 457
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicant sought judicial review of the AAT’s decision, arguing that the AAT had misapplied the relevant statutory provisions, was irrational in its findings, and had denied him procedural fairness. The court considered whether the AAT had made a jurisdictional error in its decision. The court found that the applicant’s arguments essentially boiled down to a claim of irrationality, as the applicant argued that the AAT had conducted an irrational process of reasoning in concluding that his conversion to Christianity was not genuine and that he would not face harm if returned to Iran.
The court found that the applicant had failed to establish any jurisdictional error in the AAT’s decision. The court held that the AAT was entitled to consider the genuineness of the applicant’s conversion to Christianity and to find that it was not genuine. The court also found that the AAT’s conclusion that the applicant would not face harm if returned to Iran was not irrational, as the applicant had not provided evidence to support his claim that he would be persecuted for his Christian beliefs. The court found that the AAT had not denied the applicant procedural fairness and that the AAT’s decision was not affected by any apprehended bias. Accordingly, the court dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At the commencement of the hearing, the Court addressed the applicant’s counsel, Mr Barnes, on an issue raised in the Minister’s submissions, namely, that the applicant’s submissions appeared to raise an argument directed towards apprehended bias by the Tribunal. Mr Barnes confirmed that he did not allege bias and did not seek to amend their application for that purpose. CONSIDERATION As outlined above, the application for judicial review contains five grounds. However, it became clear at the hearing that all of those grounds had, as the Minister submitted, coalesced into a single ground alleging irrationality. This was essentially confirmed by Mr Barnes at the hearing who stated that the applicant’s case could be simply put as follows:The Tribunal, through what we say is an irrational process of reasoning, concluded that although the applicant had been formally baptised as a Christian, he was not and is not a genuine believer, and therefore, he would not face harm if returned to Iran, including because he would not behave in a manner which would fall foul of the Iranian authorities’ prohibition on the certain practices of Christianity. Some of the grounds set out in the application were not elaborated on by the applicant in either written or oral submissions. Nevertheless, they were not withdrawn and the Court will address each of the grounds as pleaded.Grounds one and two – did the Tribunal misconstrue ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa)? In his application, the applicant contends that the Tribunal misconstrued its statutory obligations under ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The applicant contends that the Tribunal erred by treating the genuineness of the applicant’s conversion to Christianity as being dispositive of those statutory obligations. The applicant submitted that the correct enquiries for the Tribunal were:(a)For the purposes of s 36(2)(a): whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his religious beliefs and was therefore someone to whom Australia owes protection obligations; and(b)For the purposes of s 36(2)(aa): whether as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant’s removal from Australia, there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm by reason of him practising Christianity in Iran. The applicant did not expressly address these grounds in his submissions. It appears that through these grounds, the applicant essentially re-frames his central argument of irrationality in terms of a statutory question. The Minister submitted that there is “a logic deficit” in the applicant’s contention that the Tribunal was required by s 36(2)(a) to consider whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his religious beliefs, but then also argued that the genuineness of that belief was not dispositive of the statutory question. As the Tribunal had found that the applicant’s Christian beliefs were not genuine, the Minister therefore submitted that there could be no question of persecution on the basis of those beliefs.