Samsung C&T Corporation v Loots

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION -v- LOOTS [2016] WASC 330

CORAM:   BEECH J

HEARD:   27 - 28 JULY & 2 AUGUST 2016

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS:  26 AUGUST 2016

DELIVERED          :   14 OCTOBER 2016

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1185 of 2016

BETWEEN:   SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION

Applicant

AND

PHILIP CORNELIUS LOOTS
Respondent

DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Other Party

FILE NO/S              :CIV 1257 of 2016

BETWEEN              :DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Applicant

AND

SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CIV 1596 of 2016

BETWEEN              :DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Applicant

AND

SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CIV 1773 of 2016

BETWEEN              :DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Applicant

AND

SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CIV 1899 of 2016

BETWEEN              :DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Applicant

AND

SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CIV 1255 of 2016

BETWEEN              :DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

Applicant

AND

SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Respondent

FILE NO/S              :CIV 1284 of 2016

BETWEEN              :SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION

Applicant

AND

RICHARD MACHELL
Respondent

DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Other Party

FILE NO/S              :CIV 1719 of 2016

BETWEEN              :SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION

Applicant

AND

PHILIP CORNELIUS LOOTS
Respondent

DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Other Party

FILE NO/S              :CIV 1809 of 2016

BETWEEN              :SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION

Applicant

AND

JOHN PATRICK FISHER
Respondent

DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Other Party

FILE NO/S              :CIV 1905 of 2016

BETWEEN              :SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION

Applicant

AND

CHIDAMBARA RAJ CHIDAMBARANADAR BASKARAN
Respondent

DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Other Party

Catchwords:

Administrative law - Prerogative writs - Judicial review - Whether adjudication determination under Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) should be set aside for jurisdictional error - Severance - Whether court can sever an adjudication determination

Building and construction - Security of payment legislation - Whether adjudicator acted outside jurisdiction in making determination of a payment dispute - Scope of payment dispute and payment claim - Whether adjudicator overlooked or failed to respond to substantial claim by a party - Whether reasons for determination inadequate - Scope of court's function on judicial review of an adjudicator's determination - Whether leave to enforce determination should be granted

Legislation:

Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA), s 31, s 43

Result:

Second and third determinations set aside
Leave to enforce first, fourth and fifth determinations granted

Category:    A

Representation:

CIV 1185 of 2016

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr C G Colvin SC & Ms E Luck

Respondent:     No appearance

Other Party                   :     Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr T J Porter

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Herbert Smith Freehills

Respondent:     No appearance

Other Party                   :     Jones Day

CIV 1257 of 2016

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr T J Porter

Respondent:     Mr C G Colvin SC & Ms E Luck

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Jones Day

Respondent:     Herbert Smith Freehills

CIV 1596 of 2016

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr T J Porter

Respondent:     Mr C G Colvin SC & Ms…

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Details
Case
[2016] WASC 330
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Samsung C&T Corporation v Loots involved a dispute between Samsung C&T Corporation and Duro Developments Pty Ltd, both parties in the construction industry, concerning five adjudication determinations under the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA). The dispute was heard by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. Samsung sought to set aside the determinations on the grounds of jurisdictional error, while Duro sought leave to enforce the determinations. The court had to decide whether the adjudication determinations should be set aside, whether the court could sever an adjudication determination, and whether leave to enforce the determinations should be granted.

The primary legal issues the court addressed were whether the adjudicator acted outside his jurisdiction, whether the reasons for the determination were inadequate, and whether the court could sever an adjudication determination. The court also considered whether the adjudicator overlooked or failed to respond to substantial claims by a party. The court's reasoning focused on the scope of the adjudicator's jurisdiction and whether the adjudicator exceeded that jurisdiction in making the determinations. The court found that the adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction in two instances: in refusing to credit Samsung with its payment on account and in making a determination regarding a sum of $32.4 million for which there was no payment claim. Consequently, the court set aside the second and third determinations but dismissed the other applications to set aside the determinations. The court also granted leave to Duro to enforce the first, fourth, and fifth determinations.

The court's final orders included setting aside the second and third determinations on the grounds that the adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction. The court dismissed the other applications to set aside the determinations and granted leave to Duro to enforce the first, fourth, and fifth determinations. The court also ordered that the parties file written submissions on the question of the costs of the applications, with those costs to be determined on the papers. The specific costs orders were left to be determined separately, with both parties submitting their respective proposals for cost allocation.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Conclusion My major conclusions may be summarised as follows:(1)I would set aside the Second Determination on ground (h): in refusing to credit Samsung with its payment on account, the adjudicator exceeded his jurisdiction.(2)I would set aside the Third Determination on ground (f), alternatively ground (e), relating to the adjudicator's response to Samsung's submission to him that there was no payment claim for the $32.4 million so that he had no jurisdiction to make any determination in relation to that sum.(3)I would dismiss grounds (d), (g) and (i).(4)I would dismiss Samsung's applications to set aside the first, fourth and fifth determinations.(5)I would grant leave to Duro to enforce the first, fourth and fifth determinations. I will hear from the parties as to the orders to be made, and as to costs. On 14 October 2016, I published reasons for decision on the ten applications before me.[342] The applications concerned five determinations under the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA). Samsung made five applications, each an application to set aside one of the determinations on grounds of jurisdictional error. Duro made five applications, each an application for leave to enforce one of the determinations.[342] Samsung C&T Corporation v Loots [2016] WASC 330 (Primary Reasons). Samsung succeeded in its applications to set aside the second and third determinations. It failed in relation to the first, fourth and fifth determinations. I granted leave to Duro to enforce the first, fourth and fifth determinations. On 14 October 2016, I made orders to that effect. I also ordered that the parties file written submissions on the question of the costs of the applications, with those costs to be determined on the papers. Samsung submits that orders to the following effect should be made:(1)The costs of initiating the ten applications should be dealt with individually, with, in each application, those costs following the event.(2)Otherwise, Duro pay 50% of Samsung's costs of Samsung's applications, such costs to be taxed as one set of costs.(3)Samsung pay Duro's costs thrown away by reason of Samsung's abandonment of grounds (a) to (c).(4)Subject to (1), Samsung pay Duro's costs of Duro's applications for leave to enforce. Duro seeks orders that:(1)Samsung pay 80% of the costs incurred by Duro in the period prior to 27 July 2016;(2)Samsung pay 60% of Duro's costs incurred on 27 July and 28 July 2016; and(3)Samsung pay Duro's costs incurred after 28 July 2016. The parties agree that, whatever costs orders are made, costs should be taxed without regard to the limits in the relevant items of the applicable scales. Duro also seeks orders that its costs include its costs of the transcripts of the hearings on 25 May 2016 and 27 and 28 July 2016, as well as the costs of two instructing solicitors on 27 and 28 July 2016. I begin with the broad question of the approach to be taken to costs in circumstances where ten applications were heard on 27 and 28 July 2016, and both parties had some success. There are many cases explaining the approach to be taken to questions of costs in an action where the ultimately successful party failed on some claims and issues in the action. For example, in Souter v Condor Developments Pty Ltd,[343] Newnes JA set out a helpful outline of the approach to be taken in such circumstances. The fact that there were ten applications in these proceedings adds a complicating factor: it cannot be assumed that, because the applications were heard together, they can be treated in all respects and for all purposes as one action.[343] Souter v Condor Developments Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 227 [28] - [30].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In short, Samsung says that the lateness of the application arose from a combination of the delivery by the Court of Appeal on 21 July 2016 of its decision in Laing O'Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corporation[15] and the fact that, in the very late stages of preparation for the hearing, the definition of 'obligations' in s 3 came to the attention of counsel for Samsung for the first time. When attention was directed to this definition, it became apparent that it had consequences for Samsung's then existing grounds (a) ‑ (c). Further, it led to the formulation of the new proposed ground.[16] [15] Laing O'Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corporation [2016] WASCA 130. This case was an appeal from the decision of Mitchell J in Laing O'Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corporation [2015] WASC 237. To avoid confusion, I will refer to Mitchell J's decision as Laing O'Rourke v Samsung [2015] and the decision on appeal as Laing O'Rourke v Samsung [2016].[16] ts 56, 68, 100. It can safely be inferred from Samsung's written submissions, including its reply submissions of 4 July 2016, that counsel for Samsung had not then adverted to the definition of 'obligations' and its significance. That inference is reinforced by the fact that, on the second day of the hearing, Samsung abandoned grounds (a) ‑ (c). The definition of 'obligations' removed or at least substantially diminished one of the central planks of Samsung's contention as to how the term 'construction contract' was to be construed. While the question of the definition of 'obligations' came to counsel's attention only immediately before the hearing of these applications, the attention of Samsung's solicitors was directed to the definition, and its possible consequences in relation to excluded work, by an adjudication between the parties that occurred in June 2016.[17] It is to be inferred that Samsung's solicitors did not appreciate that a possible argument in relation to these applications might arise from analysis of that definition, and did not draw it to the attention of counsel for Samsung.[17] ts 134, 158 ‑ 160. This is not a case where a party has, for tactical reasons, left raising a point until the last minute. The proposed new ground only occurred to those appearing for Samsung at the very last stages of preparation for the hearing. The goal in O 1 r 4A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) and the objects in O 1 r 4B(1) are to be sought in exercising the power to grant leave to amend. In Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University,[18] the High Court made observations about the considerations relevant to the exercise of a discretionary power to allow or refuse an amendment to a pleading in the Australian Capital Territory. Notwithstanding some differences in the language of the relevant rules, their Honours' observations are of assistance in Western Australia, and have been applied by courts in Western Australia. Those observations include the following:[18] Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175.(a)The effect of an amendment on the court and on other litigants is relevant.(b)There is no right to amend to introduce an arguable case, and it is wrong to say that only in extreme circumstances would a party be shut out from litigating an arguable case.(c)Justice requires that parties have a proper opportunity to plead their case, but limits may be placed on repleading when delay and cost are taken into account.(d)A just resolution does not mean that a party will always be permitted to raise any arguable case at any point in the proceedings on payment of costs, even indemnity costs.(e)The inevitable strains of litigation must be taken into account in weighing the adverse consequences of delay (this applies to natural persons and other litigants).(f)The nature and importance of the amendment to the amending party must be taken into account.(g)Attention must be given to the extent of the delay, the costs associated with it, the prejudice which might reasonably be expected to follow from it, and any prejudice that is shown.(h)The point in the litigation relative to the trial may be an important consideration.(i)Where a party seeks to have a discretion exercised in their favour, they will generally need to explain the reason for their application and any delay in bringing it.(j)The point can be reached where it may be properly concluded that a party has had a sufficient opportunity to put its case and that it is too late for a further amendment.[19]