JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION -v- LOOTS [2016] WASC 330
CORAM: BEECH J
HEARD: 27 - 28 JULY & 2 AUGUST 2016
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS: 26 AUGUST 2016
DELIVERED : 14 OCTOBER 2016
FILE NO/S: CIV 1185 of 2016
BETWEEN: SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Applicant
AND
PHILIP CORNELIUS LOOTS
RespondentDURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Other Party
FILE NO/S :CIV 1257 of 2016
BETWEEN :DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Respondent
FILE NO/S :CIV 1596 of 2016
BETWEEN :DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Respondent
FILE NO/S :CIV 1773 of 2016
BETWEEN :DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Respondent
FILE NO/S :CIV 1899 of 2016
BETWEEN :DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Respondent
FILE NO/S :CIV 1255 of 2016
BETWEEN :DURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Respondent
FILE NO/S :CIV 1284 of 2016
BETWEEN :SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Applicant
AND
RICHARD MACHELL
RespondentDURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Other Party
FILE NO/S :CIV 1719 of 2016
BETWEEN :SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Applicant
AND
PHILIP CORNELIUS LOOTS
RespondentDURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Other Party
FILE NO/S :CIV 1809 of 2016
BETWEEN :SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Applicant
AND
JOHN PATRICK FISHER
RespondentDURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Other Party
FILE NO/S :CIV 1905 of 2016
BETWEEN :SAMSUNG C&T CORPORATION
Applicant
AND
CHIDAMBARA RAJ CHIDAMBARANADAR BASKARAN
RespondentDURO FELGUERA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
Other Party
Catchwords:
Administrative law - Prerogative writs - Judicial review - Whether adjudication determination under Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) should be set aside for jurisdictional error - Severance - Whether court can sever an adjudication determination
Building and construction - Security of payment legislation - Whether adjudicator acted outside jurisdiction in making determination of a payment dispute - Scope of payment dispute and payment claim - Whether adjudicator overlooked or failed to respond to substantial claim by a party - Whether reasons for determination inadequate - Scope of court's function on judicial review of an adjudicator's determination - Whether leave to enforce determination should be granted
Legislation:
Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA), s 31, s 43
Result:
Second and third determinations set aside
Leave to enforce first, fourth and fifth determinations granted
Category: A
Representation:
CIV 1185 of 2016
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr C G Colvin SC & Ms E Luck
Respondent: No appearance
Other Party : Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr T J Porter
Solicitors:
Applicant: Herbert Smith Freehills
Respondent: No appearance
Other Party : Jones Day
CIV 1257 of 2016
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr T J Porter
Respondent: Mr C G Colvin SC & Ms E Luck
Solicitors:
Applicant: Jones Day
Respondent: Herbert Smith Freehills
CIV 1596 of 2016
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr S K Dharmananda SC & Mr T J Porter
Respondent: Mr C G Colvin SC & Ms…
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- Case
- [2016] WASC 330
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues the court addressed were whether the adjudicator acted outside his jurisdiction, whether the reasons for the determination were inadequate, and whether the court could sever an adjudication determination. The court also considered whether the adjudicator overlooked or failed to respond to substantial claims by a party. The court's reasoning focused on the scope of the adjudicator's jurisdiction and whether the adjudicator exceeded that jurisdiction in making the determinations. The court found that the adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction in two instances: in refusing to credit Samsung with its payment on account and in making a determination regarding a sum of $32.4 million for which there was no payment claim. Consequently, the court set aside the second and third determinations but dismissed the other applications to set aside the determinations. The court also granted leave to Duro to enforce the first, fourth, and fifth determinations.
The court's final orders included setting aside the second and third determinations on the grounds that the adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction. The court dismissed the other applications to set aside the determinations and granted leave to Duro to enforce the first, fourth, and fifth determinations. The court also ordered that the parties file written submissions on the question of the costs of the applications, with those costs to be determined on the papers. The specific costs orders were left to be determined separately, with both parties submitting their respective proposals for cost allocation.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In short, Samsung says that the lateness of the application arose from a combination of the delivery by the Court of Appeal on 21 July 2016 of its decision in Laing O'Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corporation[15] and the fact that, in the very late stages of preparation for the hearing, the definition of 'obligations' in s 3 came to the attention of counsel for Samsung for the first time. When attention was directed to this definition, it became apparent that it had consequences for Samsung's then existing grounds (a) ‑ (c). Further, it led to the formulation of the new proposed ground.[16] [15] Laing O'Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corporation [2016] WASCA 130. This case was an appeal from the decision of Mitchell J in Laing O'Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corporation [2015] WASC 237. To avoid confusion, I will refer to Mitchell J's decision as Laing O'Rourke v Samsung [2015] and the decision on appeal as Laing O'Rourke v Samsung [2016].[16] ts 56, 68, 100. It can safely be inferred from Samsung's written submissions, including its reply submissions of 4 July 2016, that counsel for Samsung had not then adverted to the definition of 'obligations' and its significance. That inference is reinforced by the fact that, on the second day of the hearing, Samsung abandoned grounds (a) ‑ (c). The definition of 'obligations' removed or at least substantially diminished one of the central planks of Samsung's contention as to how the term 'construction contract' was to be construed. While the question of the definition of 'obligations' came to counsel's attention only immediately before the hearing of these applications, the attention of Samsung's solicitors was directed to the definition, and its possible consequences in relation to excluded work, by an adjudication between the parties that occurred in June 2016.[17] It is to be inferred that Samsung's solicitors did not appreciate that a possible argument in relation to these applications might arise from analysis of that definition, and did not draw it to the attention of counsel for Samsung.[17] ts 134, 158 ‑ 160. This is not a case where a party has, for tactical reasons, left raising a point until the last minute. The proposed new ground only occurred to those appearing for Samsung at the very last stages of preparation for the hearing. The goal in O 1 r 4A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) and the objects in O 1 r 4B(1) are to be sought in exercising the power to grant leave to amend. In Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University,[18] the High Court made observations about the considerations relevant to the exercise of a discretionary power to allow or refuse an amendment to a pleading in the Australian Capital Territory. Notwithstanding some differences in the language of the relevant rules, their Honours' observations are of assistance in Western Australia, and have been applied by courts in Western Australia. Those observations include the following:[18] Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175.(a)The effect of an amendment on the court and on other litigants is relevant.(b)There is no right to amend to introduce an arguable case, and it is wrong to say that only in extreme circumstances would a party be shut out from litigating an arguable case.(c)Justice requires that parties have a proper opportunity to plead their case, but limits may be placed on repleading when delay and cost are taken into account.(d)A just resolution does not mean that a party will always be permitted to raise any arguable case at any point in the proceedings on payment of costs, even indemnity costs.(e)The inevitable strains of litigation must be taken into account in weighing the adverse consequences of delay (this applies to natural persons and other litigants).(f)The nature and importance of the amendment to the amending party must be taken into account.(g)Attention must be given to the extent of the delay, the costs associated with it, the prejudice which might reasonably be expected to follow from it, and any prejudice that is shown.(h)The point in the litigation relative to the trial may be an important consideration.(i)Where a party seeks to have a discretion exercised in their favour, they will generally need to explain the reason for their application and any delay in bringing it.(j)The point can be reached where it may be properly concluded that a party has had a sufficient opportunity to put its case and that it is too late for a further amendment.[19]