Perrinepod Pty Ltd v Georgiou Building Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   PERRINEPOD PTY LTD -v- GEORGIOU BUILDING PTY LTD [2011] WASCA 217

CORAM:   MARTIN CJ

McLURE P
MURPHY JA

HEARD:   2 MAY 2011

DELIVERED          :   13 OCTOBER 2011

FILE NO/S:   CACV 98 of 2010

BETWEEN:   PERRINEPOD PTY LTD

Appellant

AND

GEORGIOU BUILDING PTY LTD
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :JUDGE T SHARP (DEPUTY PRESIDENT)

MR T CAREY (MEMBER)

Citation  :PERRINEPOD PTY LTD and GEORGIOU BUILDING PTY LTD [2010] WASAT 136

File No  :CC 991 of 2010

Catchwords:

Administrative law - 'Jurisdictional facts' - Principles - Whether matters in s 31(2)(a) Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) are 'jurisdictional facts'

Administrative law - Whether adjudicator's exercise of powers under s 31(2) Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) amenable to prerogative writs of prohibition and certiorari - Construction of privative clause

Building and construction - Security of payment legislation - Application for review to State Administrative Tribunal pursuant to s 46(1) Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) - Construction of s 31 and s 46 - Whether review available where an adjudicator refuses to dismiss an application for adjudication under s 31(2)(a)

Legislation:

Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA), s 31(2), s 46(1), s 46(3)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 105(1)

Result:

Leave to appeal granted
Appeal dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr S G Leslie

Respondent:     Mr S K Dharmananda SC

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Metaxas & Hager

Respondent:     Tottle Partners

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321

Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1995) 60 FCR 456

Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd [1997] HCA 10; (1997) 187 CLR 297

Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245

Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 190; (2010) 272 ALR 750

Coordinated Construction Co Pty Ltd v Climatech (Canberra) Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 229

Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission [2000] HCA 5; (2000) 199 CLR 135

Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163

Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 13; (2008) 234 CLR 124

Fleming v The Queen [1998] HCA 68; (1998) 197 CLR 250

Gedeon v Commissioner of the New South Wales Crime Commission [2008] HCA 43; (2008) 236 CLR 120

Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; (2010) 239 CLR 531

Marshall v Watson [1972] HCA 27; (1972) 124 CLR 640

Match Projects Pty Ltd and Arccon (WA) Pty Ltd [2009] WASAT 134

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; (1999) 197 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs…

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Details
Case
[2011] WASCA 217
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Perrinepod Pty Ltd v Georgiou Building Pty Ltd, the dispute involved the interpretation and application of the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA), specifically concerning the powers of an adjudicator under that Act. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, with the Court being asked to review the decision of an adjudicator who had refused to dismiss an application for adjudication under the Act.

The primary legal issues that the Court had to decide involved the characterisation of certain statutory criteria as 'jurisdictional facts' and the extent to which an adjudicator's exercise of powers under the Act could be subject to judicial review through prerogative writs of prohibition and certiorari. The case also required the Court to interpret the privative clause in the Act and determine the availability of review where an adjudicator refused to dismiss an application for adjudication. The Court was tasked with determining whether the matters in s 31(2)(a)(i)-(iv) of the Act were indeed jurisdictional facts and, if so, in relation to what power.

The Court found that both parties agreed that the matters in s 31(2)(a)(i)-(iv) are jurisdictional facts. The Court did not need to delve into the full scope of the term 'jurisdictional fact', but it was sufficient to define it as a statutory criterion that must be satisfied to enliven the statutory power. The existence of the power or jurisdiction of the decision-maker is contingent upon the actual existence of the nominated facts or other criteria. The Court noted that characterising a fact as jurisdictional significantly enlarges the scope of judicial review, as it allows the court to intervene when a decision-maker has made a jurisdictional error. The Court also found that s 31(2) is not an express source of the power to dismiss an application for adjudication, but such a power is implicit in the Act as a whole. The Court concluded that the adjudicator must have the implicit power to dismiss an application for adjudication on its merits under s 31(2)(b) of the Act.

The Court's final orders were that the matters in s 31(2)(a)(i)-(iv) of the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) are jurisdictional facts, and that the adjudicator has the implicit power to dismiss an application for adjudication on its merits under s 31(2)(b) of the Act. The Court found that the adjudicator's exercise of powers under the Act is amenable to judicial review through prerogative writs of prohibition and certiorari where a jurisdictional error has been made. The Court's interpretation of the privative clause in the Act limited the availability of review where an adjudicator refused to dismiss an application for adjudication.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Both parties agreed that the matters in s 31(2)(a)(i) ‑ (iv) are jurisdictional facts. The determination of this appeal does not require consideration or determination of the full scope of the expression 'jurisdictional fact'. It is sufficient for present purposes to define 'jurisdictional fact' as a statutory criterion that must be satisfied in order to enliven the statutory power in question. That is, the existence of the power or jurisdiction of the decision‑maker is contingent upon the actual existence of the nominated facts or other criteria. For the most recent discussion by the High Court on the topic see Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] HCA 32 [57], [107] ‑ [109]. Whether a criterion is a jurisdictional fact is a question of statutory construction. A consequence of characterising a fact as 'jurisdictional' is that it significantly enlarges the scope of judicial review. The court's judicial review power is confined to intervening when a decision‑maker has made a jurisdictional error (or there is an error of law on the face of the record). Ordinarily, an error of fact does not give rise to a jurisdictional error and thus is outside the scope of the court's review power. Not so when a fact is jurisdictional. The court must be satisfied that a jurisdictional fact actually (objectively) exists. To satisfy a criterion of the type in s 31(2)(a)(iv), the decision‑maker must actually have the requisite state of mind (satisfaction) for which there must exist reasonable grounds. Another consequence (at least for inferior courts, tribunals and administrative decision‑makers) is that the non‑existence of a jurisdictional fact invalidates any order, determination or other outcome flowing from the exercise of the relevant statutory power. Any purported exercise of the power is invalid (that is, it is void not voidable). This consequence underpinned the historical reluctance of the courts to characterise a statutory criterion as a jurisdictional fact: Parisienne Basket Shoes Pty Ltd v Whyte (1938) 59 CLR 369. I turn now to whether the matters in s 31(2)(a)(i) ‑ (iv) are jurisdictional facts and if so, in relation to what power. Section 31 is the primary source of the powers and duties of an adjudicator in relation to an application for adjudication. At the time the adjudicator comes to consider the exercise of the powers and duties in s 31, he or she will have the information to be relied on by the parties in relation to the application, including its merits: s 26(2), s 27(2). The adjudicator must exercise the powers and duties in s 31(2) within the prescribed time (in this case, 14 days after the date of service of the response under s 27 of the Act). The purpose of s 31(2)(a) is to direct both the sequence in which the tasks in pars (a) and (b) are to be addressed and the order to be made if the criteria in s 31(2)(a)(i) ‑ (iv) are not met. In my view, s 31(2) is not an express source of the power to dismiss an application for adjudication. The Act makes no express provision on this subject. However, the existence of a power to dismiss is implicit in s 31 as a whole. An arbitrator would be unable to fulfil his duties and functions under that section without a power to dismiss. The existence of such a power is implicit in the direction to the adjudicator in s 31(2)(a) to dismiss the application before making a determination of the merits. Further, the adjudicator must also have implicit power to dismiss an application for adjudication on its merits under s 31(2)(b) of the Act.