Thiess Pty Ltd v MCC Mining (Western Australia) Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   THIESS PTY LTD -v- MCC MINING (WESTERN AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD [2011] WASC 80

CORAM:   CORBOY J

HEARD:   7 OCTOBER 2010, 14 & 22 MARCH 2011

DELIVERED          :   29 MARCH 2011

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2320 of 2010

BETWEEN:   THIESS PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

MCC MINING (WESTERN AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD
Defendant

Catchwords:

Administrative law - Whether a determination by an adjudicator under the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) is subject to the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction - Grounds on which certiorari might be granted - Construction of a privative clause

Building and construction - Security of payment - Application for leave to enforce determination made under Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) as a judgment - Whether adjudication application made within time or contained 'recycled' claims - Whether a respondent who is aggrieved by a decision by an adjudicator to refuse to dismiss an adjudication application can seek a review of the decision in the State Administrative Tribunal

Legislation:

Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)

Result:

Application for leave to enter judgment in terms of the determination granted

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr B Dharmananda

Defendant:     Mr M J Feutrill

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Minter Ellison

Defendant:     Allens Arthur Robinson

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

A J Lucas Operations Pty Ltd v Mac‑Attack Equipment Hire Pty Ltd [2009] NTCA 4; (2009) 25 NTLR 14

ACD Tridon Inc v Tridon Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1230

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223

Blackadder Scaffolding Services (Aust) Pty Ltd and Mirvac Homes Pty Ltd [2009] WASAT 133

Brodyn Pty Ltd t/as Time Cost and Quality v Davenport [2004] NSWCA 394; (2004) 61 NSWLR 421

Buck v Bavone ((1976) 135 CLR 110

Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 190

Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) (1994) 35 NSWLR 689

Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission [2000] HCA 5; (2000) 199 CLR 135

Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163

Diploma Construction Pty Ltd v Windslow Corporation Ltd [2005] WASC 74

Foley v Padley (1984) 154 CLR 349

Gedeon v Commissioner of the NSW Crime Commission [2008] HCA 43; (2008) 236 CLR 120

Grocon Constructions Pty Ltd v Planit Cocciardi Joint Venture [No 2] [2009] VSC 426

Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy [1996] HCA 40; (1996) 185 CLR 149

Independent Fire Sprinklers (NT) Pty Ltd v Sunbuild Pty Ltd [2008] NTSC 46

Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales; Kirk Group Holdings Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Childs) [2010] HCA 1; (2010) 239 CLR 531

Marine & Civil Bauer Joint Venture and Leighton Kumagai Joint Venture [2005] WASAT 269

Match Projects Pty Ltd and Arccon (WA) Pty Ltd [2009] WASAT 134

MCC Mining (Western Australia) Pty Ltd and Thiess Pty Ltd

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Details
Case
[2011] WASC 80
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Thiess Pty Ltd, the applicant, filed an application under section 43 of the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) seeking leave to enforce a determination made by an adjudicator, who had determined that MCC Mining (Western Australia) Pty Ltd, the respondent, was liable to pay a certain sum in dispute. The applicant argued that the respondent had failed to pay the sum determined by the adjudicator within the required time, as stipulated by section 39 of the Act. The respondent opposed the application, arguing that the determination was invalid on several grounds, including that the application was made outside the prescribed time, contained recycled claims, and that the adjudicator had failed to consider relevant evidence. The Supreme Court of Western Australia was tasked with deciding whether the applicant was entitled to leave to enforce the determination as a judgment.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant was entitled to leave to enforce the determination as a judgment under section 43 of the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA). This required the court to consider the principles that have been applied in similar cases, particularly the principles that have been applied in applications under section 33 of the Construction Contracts Act. The court needed to determine whether the determination was final on the question of the liability of a party to immediately pay the amount that is the subject of the payment dispute and whether there was a sufficient reason for declining to grant leave under section 43.

The court held that the principles that have been applied in applications under section 33 of the Construction Contracts Act broadly apply to applications under section 43. The court noted that the requirement for leave confers a discretion on the court and that section 33 is not a dispute resolution provision. The subject matter of the award is not referred to the court, and there is no power conferred on the court to reconsider whether the award ought to have been made. The court held that prima facie, a party who has the benefit of an award is entitled to enforce it pursuant to section 33 of the Construction Contracts Act. However, the court also held that there must be a sufficient reason for declining to grant leave under section 43 having regard to the scheme and policy of the CC Act. The court found that the applicant had established a sufficient reason for declining to grant leave, as the determination was arguably vitiated by circumstances making it susceptible of being set aside according to the provisions of the CC Act.

The court granted the respondent leave to appeal the determination to the State Administrative Tribunal, stayed the enforcement of the determination, and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The principles that have been applied in applications under s 33 CA Act broadly are that:(a)The requirement for leave confers a discretion on the court: Diploma Construction Pty Ltd v Windslow Corporation Ltd [2005] WASC 74 [5] ‑ [6], applying ACD Tridon Inc vTridon Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1230.(b)Section 33 is not a dispute resolution provision. The subject matter of the award is not referred to the court and there is no power conferred on the court to reconsider whether the award ought to have been made: Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) (1994) 35 NSWLR 689, 695 (and in the context of an application under s 43 CC Act, see O'Donnell Griffin [2008] [47]). (c)Prima facie, a party who has the benefit of an award is entitled to enforce it pursuant to s 33 CA Act. It is necessary for the party resisting leave being granted to establish a reason why the award should not be enforced: Cockatoo Dockyard (695) (and in relation to s 43 CC Act, see O'Donnell Griffin [2008] [41]).(d)Reasons why leave might not be granted include that the award is arguably vitiated by appealable error or by circumstances making it susceptible of being set aside according to the provisions of the CA Act: Cockatoo Dockyard (695 ‑ 696). I agree with Beech J that those principles assist in considering an application under s 43 CC Act notwithstanding the observations of Chaney J concerning the difference between the finality of an award and a determination. The principles are sufficiently general that they do not cut across that difference. In my view, it not possible to further refine the approach to an application under s 43 by defining more precisely the kind of the reason that would justify refusing to grant leave. In Cockatoo Dockyard, Rolfe J apparently recognised that leave to enter judgment on an award might be refused for reasons other than that there was an arguable case that the award could be set aside. However, it is not easy to envisage other reasons for refusing leave under the CC Act. There is a risk of distorting the intended application of s 43 CC Act if an unduly adjectival description of the quality of the reason required to refuse leave is adopted. I think that the most that can be said at a general level is that:(a)With a limited exception, the determination is final on the question of the liability of a party to immediately pay the amount that is the subject of the payment dispute. Section 39 CC Act requires a party to pay an amount determined by the adjudicator. A party will seek leave under s 43 where the party liable under the determination has failed to discharge the statutory obligation imposed by s 39. Consequently, the scheme of the CC Act strongly reinforces the proposition derived from Cockatoo Dockyard that prima facie, a party who has the benefit of a determination is entitled to enforce it. That is particularly so under the CC Act, given its policy of maintaining cash flow to the parties during the performance of a construction contract.(b)Nevertheless, the Act requires the court to oversee the entry of judgment by imposing the requirement for leave. The grant of leave gives the plaintiff access to the court's processes for enforcing its orders. Further, judgment may have significant effects on the commercial interests of the defendant within the construction industry and in many instances, the reason advanced by the defendant as to why leave should not be granted will be directed to the validity of the determination. (c)Consequently, there must be a sufficient reason for declining to grant leave under s 43 having regard to the scheme and policy of the CC Act. What will be a sufficient reason will, of course, depend on a consideration of all of the relevant circumstances.