JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: O'DONNELL GRIFFIN PTY LTD -v- JOHN HOLLAND PTY LTD [2008] WASC 58
CORAM: BEECH J
HEARD: 15 APRIL 2008
DELIVERED : 17 APRIL 2008
FILE NO/S: CIV 1210 of 2008
BETWEEN: O'DONNELL GRIFFIN PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND
JOHN HOLLAND PTY LTD, MACMAHON CONTRACTORS PTY LTD and MULTIPLEX CONTRACTORS PTY LTD trading as RAILLINK JOINT VENTURE
Defendants
Catchwords:
Building and construction - Payment dispute - Security of payment legislation - Determination by adjudicator under Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) - Application for leave to enforce as a judgment of the Supreme Court - Principles governing the exercise of discretion to grant leave
Legislation:
Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA), s 43
Result:
Leave granted
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr J Simpkins SC and Mr P G McGowan
Defendants: Mr G R Donaldson SC
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Kott Gunning
Defendants: Minter Ellison
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [No 3] (1994) 35 NSWLR 689
Devaugh Pty Ltd v Lamac Developments Pty Ltd [2000] WASC 314
Diploma Construction Pty Ltd v Windslow Corporation Ltd [2005] WASC 74
Doric Building Pty Ltd v Marine and Civil Construction Co Pty Ltd [2005] WASC 155
Miles v Palm Bridge Pty Ltd [2001] WASC 113
Premium Grain Handlers Pty Ltd v Elite Grains Pty Ltd [2005] WASC 103
Re Alcan Australia Ltd; ex parte Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing & Engineering Employees (1994) 181 CLR 96
State Bank of Victoria v Parry [1989] WAR 240
BEECH J:
Introduction
The plaintiff applies for leave pursuant to s 43 of the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) to enforce a determination under that Act in the same manner as a judgment of this court.
The defendants (RLJV) are the main contractor for what is termed the package 'A' works of the South West Metropolitan Railway.
The plaintiff (ODG) is a subcontractor to RLJV. The subcontract dated 14 February 2005 (the Subcontract) was for a lump sum of $89,796,678.93 (excluding GST) and, in broad outline, it required ODG to supply and install electrical equipment and systems for the supply of power to trains, signalling systems and communications systems.
The Subcontract included provisions for progress payments.
Monthly progress claims have been made by ODG since no later than 2006. Each month a payment certificate was issued by the Subcontract Superintendent of RLJV.
On 25 October 2007, Mr van Zijl, project manager of ODG, wrote to Mr Cormac Brady, the Subcontract Superintendent of RLJV, enclosing ODG's progress claim for October 2007. The progress claim was for an amount of approximately $22.5 million excluding GST.
Mr Brady, as Subcontract Superintendent, issued a payment certificate on 7 November 2007. That payment certificate assessed ODG as being entitled to $589,533.70 (exclusive of GST) for the month of October 2007.
In December 2007, ODG applied, pursuant to s 26 of the Construction Contracts Act, for an adjudication of its payment claim in respect of the October progress payment.
Mr Roger…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read O'Donnell Griffin Pty Ltd v John Holland Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2008] WASC 58
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the principles governing the exercise of discretion under section 33 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) could be applied to an application for leave to enforce a determination under section 43(2) of the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA). The court had to determine if the discretion to refuse leave to enforce could be exercised in circumstances other than those provided for in the Act, such as when an application to set aside the adjudicator's determination was not on foot.
The court concluded that the principles guiding the exercise of discretion under section 33 of the Commercial Arbitration Act were pertinent to the discretion under section 43(2) of the Construction Contracts Act. The court reasoned that section 43(2) did not provide another method for a party to challenge an adjudicator's award, nor did it give the court power to reconsider the adjudicator's exercise of discretion. The court emphasised that section 33 was a summary procedure for enforcing awards and did not allow the court to revisit the adjudicator's discretionary decisions. The court granted leave to enforce the adjudicator's determination, indicating that the discretion should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances, such as when an application to set aside the award was pending.
The court's final order was to grant leave to enforce the adjudicator's determination as a judgment of the Supreme Court, in line with the statutory provisions and the guiding principles discussed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Leave granted
Background
Background to the litigation
O'Donnell Griffin filed an application for leave to enforce the adjudicator's determination as a judgment of the Supreme Court under section 43(2) of the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA). The matter was heard by the Supreme Court, which considered the principles governing the exercise of discretion to grant such leave. The court heard submissions from both parties and reviewed relevant legislation and precedents, particularly those concerning the enforcement of arbitral awards under the Commercial Arbitration Act.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What are the principles that govern the exercise of the court's discretion to grant leave to enforce an adjudicator's determination as a judgment of the court?
2. Can section 43(2) of the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) be interpreted in a way that allows the court to reconsider the merits of the adjudicator's determination?
3. In what circumstances, if any, may the court refuse to grant leave to enforce an adjudicator's determination?
Held
1. The court held that the principles governing the exercise of the court's discretion to grant leave to enforce an adjudicator's determination as a judgment of the court are similar to those under s 33 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA). The court cannot reconsider the merits of the adjudicator's determination unless an application for leave to appeal is on foot or if an application has been made to set aside the award on specific grounds.
2. The court held that section 43(2) of the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) does not allow the court to reconsider the merits of the adjudicator's determination. The section provides a summary procedure to enforce the award and allows judgment to be entered in terms of the award.
3. The court held that it may refuse to grant leave to enforce an adjudicator's determination if an application for leave to appeal is on foot or if an application has been made to set aside the award on specific grounds. The court may also refuse to grant leave if the award is arguably vitiated by appealable error or other circumstances making it susceptible to being set aside in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There may be a question as to whether the use in s 43(2) of the Construction Contracts Act of the language of the Commercial Arbitration Act engages the principle of statutory construction that when Parliament enacts words which have been judicially construed, Parliament may be taken to have intended them to bear the meaning already judicially attributed to them: Re Alcan Australia Ltd; ex parte Federation of Industrial, Manufacturing & Engineering Employees (1994) 181 CLR 96, 106. However, the parties did not rely upon that principle. It was submitted by the plaintiff, and accepted by the defendants, that given the substantially identical language of the two sections, the principles respecting the exercise of discretion under s 33 of the Commercial Arbitration Act were of valuable assistance in the exercise of discretion under s 43(2) of the Construction Contracts Act. I accept that submission. In Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [No 3] (1994) 35 NSWLR 689, Rolfe J discussed the principles regarding s 33 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) (which is in identical terms to s 33 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA)). At 694 ‑ 696, his Honour said as follows:In my opinion s 33 of the Act does not provide another method whereby a party may call in question the award of an arbitrator and, although perhaps under another guise, provide the court with the power to reverse what the arbitrator has done …In my opinion, s 33 is not a dispute resolving provision referring a matter the subject of arbitral proceedings to the court. It provides a summary procedure whereby awards may be enforced 'in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court to the same effect', and allows judgment to be entered in terms of the award. In the context of the Act that cannot, in my opinion, mean the court is given power under s 33 to reconsider whether the award should have been made and, if for some reason it concludes that it should not, to refuse to enforce the award.Prima facie, and so much was conceded by Mr Bennett, a party with the benefit of an award can seek to enforce it by resort to s 33. It is necessary for a party resisting an order under s 33 to establish a reason why the award should not be enforced. A reason may be that the court considers the award is arguably vitiated by appealable error, or by other circumstances making it susceptible of being set aside in accordance with the provision of the Act. In other words it may well be an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion not to grant leave if an application for leave to appeal is on foot or if an application has been made to set aside [the] award, for example, on the ground of misconduct. However unless an attempt is being made to have the award set aside I have difficulty envisaging other circumstances in which the discretion can be exercised. Certainly I do not regard s 33 as a 'back door' method of appealing against an award insofar as it constitutes a decision by the arbitrator how he should exercise his discretion. The discretion given does not include, in my opinion, an ability to re‑visit the way in which the arbitrator exercised his discretion where, otherwise, his discretion is not subject to attack in accordance with the Act. A contrary conclusion would, I believe, be totally at odds with the obvious intention and philosophy of the Act.