Commonwealth of Australia v Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      Commonwealth of Australia v Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd [2006]  NSWCA 322

FILE NUMBER(S):
40789/04
40124/05

HEARING DATE(S):               30 May 2006, 31 May 2006,1 June 2006

DECISION DATE:     23/11/2006

PARTIES:
Commonwealth of Australia
Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Limited

JUDGMENT OF:       Giles JA Santow JA Tobias JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          SC50165/01

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     McDougall J

COUNSEL:
A: P T Taylor SC / D Caspersonn
R: T G Parker SC / B F Katekar

SOLICITORS:
A: Australian Government Solicitor, Sydney
R: Allens Arthur Robinson, Sydney

CATCHWORDS:
ESTOPPEL – dispute arising after arbitration – res judicata – Anshun estoppel – issue estoppel – cause of action estoppel – principles – effect of a deed of settlement – whether estoppel “available” under a deed of settlement – whether special circumstances within meaning of Arnold v National Westminster Bank PLC [1991] 2 AC 93 – CONTRACT – contract with Commonwealth – whether contractual obligations subsisted after the expiry of a contract – PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS – whether denial of procedural fairness – whether primary judge searched for and found an estoppel substantially different than that alleged – TORTS – NEGLIGENCE – liability – whether conduct gave rise to liability – WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – ENTITLEMENT TO AND LIABILITY FOR COMPENSATION – persons liable to pay compensation – whether Commonwealth liable to reimburse a company for workers’ compensation costs pursuant to a contract – whether conduct of contractor gave rise to a liability to pay for costs itself – whether reimbursement for such costs capable of including a fee for profit margin

LEGISLATION CITED:
Administrative Law Act 1978 (Vic)
Arbitration Act 1979 (UK)
Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW)
Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (Vic)
Dried Fruits Act 1928–1935 (Cth)
Local Government Act 1989 (Vic)
Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW)

DECISION:
Appeal dismissed with costs

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40789/04
CA 40124/05
SC 50165/01

GILES JA
SANTOW JA
TOBIAS JA

Thursday 23 November 2006

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v COCKATOO DOCKYARD PTY LTD

Facts

Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd (Codock) occupied and used a Naval Dockyard on Cockatoo Island pursuant to a series of agreements made with the Commonwealth of Australia from 1 March 1933 to 31 December 1992. Asbestos products were used at the Dockyard throughout that time in pipes and equipment as well as in operations involving the fitting of ships. As a result, many of Codock’s employees contracted asbestos related diseases and commenced actions against Codock for damages.

Codock alleged that the Commonwealth was liable for such damages pursuant, inter alia, to the terms of a  trading agreement and lease that were entered into in 1972, and varied in 1976 and 1987. Together with some subsequent amendments, this document was referred to as the “1972 TAL”. The 1972 TAL adopted the Commonwealth’s Standard Conditions for the Determination of the Costs of Contracts and contained a provision that any dispute arising between the Commonwealth and Codock should be…

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Details
Case
[2006] NSWCA 322
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commonwealth of Australia appealed a decision of the primary judge concerning a dispute with Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd (Codock). The dispute arose from a long-standing contractual relationship between the parties concerning the operation of a naval dockyard. Codock sought reimbursement from the Commonwealth for workers' compensation costs incurred by Codock, which it claimed were "overhead expenses" under various agreements, particularly the 1972 Time Charter and Lease Agreement (TAL). The Commonwealth denied liability, arguing that certain claims were barred by principles of estoppel, specifically issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel, arising from a prior arbitration.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the primary judge erred in finding that the Commonwealth was not estopped from pursuing certain defences against Codock's claims. This involved determining whether the prior arbitration had definitively resolved the issues Codock sought to raise in the current proceedings, and whether the terms of a deed of settlement between the parties precluded the operation of estoppel. The Court also considered whether the primary judge had denied the Commonwealth procedural fairness by identifying an estoppel substantially different from that alleged by the Commonwealth.

The Court of Appeal, in a joint judgment, dismissed the Commonwealth's appeal. The judges reasoned that the principles of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel, as established in cases like *Jackson v Goldsmith* and *Blair v Curran*, require a clear and solemn finding on a point distinctly put in issue. They found that the prior arbitration did not necessarily involve such definitive findings on the specific issues Codock sought to recover for in the present proceedings, particularly concerning workers' compensation costs incurred after the expiry of the 1972 TAL. The Court also considered the effect of a deed of settlement, concluding that it did not prevent the operation of estoppel in this context, nor did it find that the primary judge had denied the Commonwealth procedural fairness.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs

Background

Background to the litigation

In this respect it is to be noted that the Commonwealth’s allegations that it was denied procedural fairness generally arose out of complaints it had made about Codock’s pleadings in the current proceedings and the manner in which it conducted its case before the primary judge with respect to the type of estoppel upon which it relies to resist certain of the Commonwealth’s defences in those proceedings. However, to understand the Commonwealth’s primary contentions with respect to its procedural fairness ground, it is appropriate to state those contentions before considering the substantive issues.Background to the appeal(a)The origins of the dispute between Codock and the Commonwealth For more than 59 years, from 1 March 1933 to 31 December 1992, Codock occupied and used the Naval Dockyard on Cockatoo Island (the Dockyard) pursuant to a series of agreements made with the Commonwealth or a statutory body representing the Commonwealth. For many of those years asbestos products were used in the operations carried on by Codock at the Dockyard. Many of those operations involved the fitting and refitting of naval and non-naval ships. Asbestos was used to lag pipes such as steam lines as well as other equipment, especially in the ship’s engine rooms. Furthermore, there were other facilities at the Dockyard such as the turbine and boiler shops where asbestos products were also used extensively in the lagging of pipes and other plant equipment. As a consequence of Codock’s employees being exposed to asbestos products during the course of their employment, many contracted diseases associated with that exposure which, typically, took many years to manifest. When this occurred, the employee made a claim against Codock seeking damages for his or her injuries. Codock was either uninsured or only partly insured for the purposes of some of those claims. As a consequence of the terms of the agreements with the Commonwealth (to which I refer below), Codock claimed that it was entitled to be indemnified by the Commonwealth in respect of those uninsured or partly insured claims. The parties came into dispute when the Commonwealth denied that it was liable to so indemnify Codock.(b) The history of the agreements between the parties On 3 February 1933 an agreement (the 1933 Agreement) was entered into between, inter alia, the Commonwealth and Codock whereby the Dockyard would be leased to Codock for a term of 21 years commencing on 1 March 1933. A lease giving effect to that agreement was entered into on 16 February 1935 (the 1935 Lease). Codock entered into occupation of the Dockyard pursuant to the 1933 Agreement as and from 1 March 1933 and continued in occupation until 31 December 1992. In 1941, during a time of war, the Commonwealth took substantial control of the Dockyard. For that purpose, the Commonwealth entered into an agreement with Codock on 20 November 1941 (the Wartime Agreement). This agreement took effect on 1 March 1940 and remained in force until 30 June 1954, and altered the trading arrangements under which the Dockyard had previously operated.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The joint judgment later continued at 386 in these terms (omitting citations):“60… A failure to find a matter alleged does not establish the truth of the contrary of that which is alleged. There are many general statements about the operations of issue estoppel, approved in this Court, which require more than non-satisfaction to establish an estoppel in later proceedings. 61For example, in Jackson v Goldsmith, Williams J approved a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England including the following: ‘A party is precluded from contending the contrary of any precise point which, having been once distinctly put in issue, has been solemnly found against him.’ Much here turns upon what is involved in the phrase ‘solemnly found’. The form of the first proceeding, particularly the issues joined or admitted on any pleadings, will be important. In Hoysted v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Higgins J said:‘A point or an issue may be actually controverted, may be in actual controversy, in actual litigation, although it is not argued, or argued properly. A point may be in controversy although counsel may address no arguments to it, or may overlook certain aspects.’ 62An issue admitted on pleadings or other formal process or otherwise conceded at a hearing may, from the nature of the outcome, necessarily have been decided. But what of other questions arising in the first proceeding? In Blair v Curran, Dixon J observed that a ‘judicial determination concludes, not merely as to the point actually decided, but as to a matter which it was necessary to decide and which was actually decided as the groundwork of the decision itself, though not then directly the point at issue’. His Honour went on to distinguish findings concerning only ‘evidentiary facts’ not the ’ultimate facts’ which formed the very title to rights in dispute. This analysis, with the emphasis on decision-making, would require more than non-satisfaction.” (j)The application by the primary judge in the first judgment of the above principles Returning to the first judgment of the primary judge, his Honour, after referring to Abi-Saab, observed (at [50]):“Again, whether there are alternative factual grounds to support a cause of action and the court finds more than one in favour of the successful party, there can be no estoppel based on any of the separate grounds because an appeal against any one of them cannot displace the judgment appealed from. None of the issues can be regarded as fundamental to the decision.” The Commonwealth submitted before the primary judge (and repeated in its submissions to this Court) that Codock’s claim as “pleaded” in the arbitration differed from that “pleaded” in the Summons. Moreover, the Commonwealth submitted that no element of the cause of action pleaded in the latter had been decided in the arbitration. In particular, it submitted that a number of issues which it had sought to raise before the Arbitrator were not decided or were not decided in a manner that gave rise to an estoppel. Accordingly it was submitted that the issue of the recoverability of Workers Compensation Costs incurred after 31 December 1992 had been abandoned by Codock in the arbitration.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In June 1990, the Commonwealth announced its decision to decommission the Dockyard. The 1972 Lease expired on 31 December 1992 whereupon Codock ceased occupation of the Dockyard. The 1972 TAL also expired or terminated on that date.(c) The disputes between the parties leading to the arbitration It was a term of the Wartime Agreement, the 1956 Agreement and the 1963 Agreement that if any dispute or difference arose between the Commonwealth and Codock, it should be referred to arbitration. The 1954 Lease and the 1972 TAL contained a similar provision. A number of disputes arose between the parties upon the expiry of the 1972 TAL on 31 December 1992. These arose from the Australian Government’s announcement that it intended to sell Cockatoo Island and allocate the refitting of two of the Navy’s submarines, HMAS Onslow and HMAS Otama, to the Garden Island Dockyard. Codock contended that this decision gave rise to its main contractual claim against the Commonwealth because of its incompatibility with an alleged collateral agreement whereby, in consideration of Codock’s entry into the 1972 TAL, the Commonwealth had undertaken to place orders with Codock for the carrying out by it of all refits of Oberon Class submarines until the completion of any program for such refits. Codock also made an unrelated claim against the Commonwealth in which it sought to recover monies it had paid, up to and in October 1995. Those monies were said to have arisen out of common law claims made by Codock’s former employees in respect of asbestos-related injuries they had suffered and which arose out of their employment at the Dockyard (the Claims). Codock maintained that these amounts (to the extent to which they had not been wholly or partially paid by its insurers) constituted “overhead expenses” in respect of which it was entitled to be reimbursed by the Commonwealth. The expression “overhead expenses” was alleged to encompass the indirect costs attributable to the work Codock had undertaken for the Commonwealth where those expenses were attributable to what was known as “costs-plus work” performed by Codock for the Commonwealth and which constituted the predominant operations of Codock at the Dockyard. Relevantly, those costs were said to include not only the costs of defending and settling personal injury actions by former employees of Codock where those injuries were asbestos related (such as asbestosis and mesothelioma) but also the net amount of damages paid to those ex-employees in respect of which Codock had not been indemnified either in whole or in part by its insurers. The principal basis upon which this claim was propounded by Codock was founded upon the terms of the 1972 TAL. In particular, Codock relied upon cll 2(3) and 2(4) of the 1972 TAL which provided as follows:“2(3)The Commonwealth shall pay the Company for work ordered under this Agreement on the price basis specified in each order. … Where payment under any order is calculated on a cost plus profit or incentive basis, costs shall not include rent and the profit for work done on a cost plus basis shall be 5% of the cost of direct labour, direct material, direct expense (including subcontracts) and overhead. In this clause, ‘cost’ or ‘costs’ shall mean and shall be the cost as determined in accordance with the Department of Supply Standard Conditions Applicable to Contracts on a Cost Plus Profit Basis, as revised from time to time.2(4)The Company shall not increase the overhead rate as agreed from time to time chargeable to cost plus profit or cost incentive price orders without the prior approval of the Commonwealth.”