FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hannaford v Telstra Corporation Limited [2005] FCA 1298
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – reviewable decisions – power to disturb findings underpinning a s 14 determination
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), ss 4, 14, 16, 19, 24, 27, 62, 64
Australian Postal Corporation v Oudyn (2003) 73 ALD 659 referred to
Rosillo v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2003) 77 ALD 396 referred to
Power v Comcare (1998) 89 FCR 514 considered
Comcare v Hill (1999) 56 ALD 487 considered
Lees v Comcare (1999) 56 ALD 84 appliedRONALD HANNAFORD v TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
NSD 1934 OF 2004MOORE J
16 SEPTEMBER 2005
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1934 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:
RONALD HANNAFORD
APPLICANTAND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MOORE J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 SEPTEMBER 2005
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
- The appeal be allowed.
- The respondent pay the applicant's costs.
3.The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in N2003/2003 and N2004/379 be set aside.
4.The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for consideration according to law.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1934 OF 2004
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:
RONALD HANNAFORD
APPLICANTAND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
MOORE J
DATE:
16 SEPTEMBER 2005
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act ("the AAT Act") from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") of 26 November 2004. The Tribunal affirmed two decisions made by the respondent concerning a claim by Mr Ronald Hannaford ("the applicant") for compensation under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ("the Act").
Before setting out the factual background it may be instructive to describe, in overview, the types of decisions which can be made under the Act and the procedures under the Act for reconsideration and review of those decisions both internally and by the Tribunal. In Comcare v Burton (1998) 157 ALR 522 at 525, Finn J described the decision making, reconsideration and review procedure as "three-tiered". First, there is a "determination" as defined in s 60 of the Act. There can then be a reconsideration of a s 60 determination under s 62 of the Act. This results in a "reviewable decision". Finally, s 64 of the Act provides for reviews by the Tribunal of reviewable decisions.
Determinations, as defined in s 60, can be made under a number of sections of the Act concerning, amongst other things:
(i)liability to pay compensation in accordance with the Act in respect of an injury resulting in death, incapacity for work, or impairment (s 14),
(ii) compensation in respect of medical expenses (s 16),
(iii) compensation for injuries resulting in incapacity for work (s 19),
(iv) compensation for injuries resulting in permanent…
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- Case
- [2005] FCA 1298
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case centred on whether the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to review and vary determinations under sections 16, 19, 24, and 27 of the Act based on findings inconsistent with the facts necessary to establish liability under section 14 of the Act. The applicant argued that a section 14 determination was immune from reconsideration by the Tribunal, whereas the respondent argued that the Tribunal could reconsider such determinations if it was open to the reconsideration decision-maker to do so. The court referenced the judgment in Power v Comcare to support the respondent's position, stating that the Tribunal could consider whether the facts underpinning a determination under section 14 ever existed and affirm determinations under other sections on the basis that a material fact did not exist.
The court found in favour of the respondent, allowing the appeal and setting aside the decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The court held that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to review determinations under sections 16, 19, 24, and 27 of the Act and to consider whether the facts underpinning a determination under section 14 ever existed. The court also held that the reconsideration decision-maker had the power to consider whether the applicant's condition had ever been causally related to his work when determining the respondent's continuing liability to compensate the applicant. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The respondent pay the applicant's costs.
3. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in N2003/2003 and N2004/379 be set aside.
4. The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for consideration according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MOORE J
The appeal was initially heard on 28 April 2005. On that occasion an issue arose about the nature of the case sought to be argued by the applicant. In the result, the appeal was adjourned and a further hearing took place on 31 May 2005. At that time the applicant formally sought to amend the notice of appeal to raise an additional question of law, namely:Whether, if the Tribunal had jurisdiction to make findings of fact inconsistent with one more of the elements necessary to establish liability under section 14 of the Act, the Tribunal failed to lawfully exercise the jurisdiction given by the Act.The respondent opposed the amendment. Consideration The application by the applicant to the Tribunal, raised for review determinations made under s 16 and s 19 (as affirmed and varied by the decision of 26 July 2004 being the reviewable decision for the purposes of s 62) and determinations made under s 24 and s 27 as affirmed by the decision of 9 March 2004 (being the reviewable decision for the purposes of s 62). As noted earlier in these reasons, counsel for the respondent eschewed any suggestion that the Tribunal had before it any determination made under s 14. In issue is whether, in reviewing determinations under ss 16, 19, 24 or 27 (but not a determination under s 14) it is open to the Tribunal to consider whether the facts underpinning a determination earlier made under s 14, ever existed and affirm determinations under any of these four sections on the basis that a material fact (necessary to support the determination under s 14) did not exist. Counsel for the respondent submitted it was open to the Tribunal to do so. Counsel for the applicant submitted, in effect, that a s 14 determination was immune from reconsideration by the Tribunal, including the facts underpinning it, unless the reviewable decision before the Tribunal was itself a decision under s 62 reconsidering the determination under s 14. The judgment of Sackville J in Power v Comcare provides clear support for the position of the respondent. The applicant in that matter had claimed to have suffered a work-related stress disorder and the acceleration of coronary heart disease. In 1990 Comcare accepted liability under s 14. In 1993 Comcare determined that compensation was payable under s 24 and s 27 for permanent impairment as a result of these compensable injuries. In 1995, however, Comcare received a medical opinion that there was no causal relationship between the applicant's employment and the coronary artery disease. On 27 March 1995 Comcare, on its own initiative, made a determination that there was no further liability to pay compensation in respect of the acceleration of this disease. A similar decision was made on reconsideration under s 62(5) and that decision was affirmed by the Tribunal on review. In the review, the Tribunal considered whether the applicant had ever suffered from a heart condition causally connected to his employment. It concluded he had not and, in so doing, reached a conclusion (about a matter of fact) contrary to a conclusion founding the determination under s 14 made in 1990 and underpinning the determinations made in 1993. Sackville J concluded that the Tribunal had not erred in adopting this approach. His Honour said (at 525-526):Only Comcare addressed in submissions the character of the 22 March 1995 decision. In supplementary written submissions, Mr Johnson argued that Comcare’s powers under ss 69(a) and 70 of the SRC Act authorised it to make a decision as to whether Comcare continued to be liable to compensate the applicant after March 1995. Mr Johnson did not identify explicitly the sections “under” which any such decision could be made, other than ss 69(a) and 70 (neither of which is referred to in the definition of “determination” in s 60(1) of the SRC Act). However, it was implicit in his submissions that the decision to terminate Comcare’s liability to compensate the applicant as from 9 March 1995 was made “under” ss 14 and 19 of the SRC Act. If this is correct, it would follow that Comcare had power to reconsider the decision under s 62. On this analysis, s 43(1) of the AAT Act conferred on the AAT the same powers and discretions as were available to the decision-maker, including the power under s 62(5) to affirm, revoke or vary the delegate’s decision that Comcare’s liability had ceased from 9 March 1995.I should interpose that it was common ground that the decision of 22 March 1995 was not a reconsideration, pursuant to s 62(1) of the SRC Act, of either the 1990 or the 1993 determinations. In other words, both parties explicitly agreed that Comcare had not purported to exercise the power, conferred by s 62(1) of the SRC Act, to reconsider the earlier determinations on its own motion. I must confess to thinking that, although the delegate who decided to terminate the applicant’s compensation for his coronary disease did not direct attention to the source of power for such a decision, the view adopted by the parties is not entirely self-evident, particularly having regard to the breadth of the power in s 62(1) and the absence of a temporal limitation on its exercise: De La Cruz v Australian Postal Commission (1997) 73 FCR 204 at 207-208 per Emmett J. Nonetheless, both parties were adamant on this question and the case proceeded on the basis that the decision of 22 March 1995 was not made pursuant to the power of reconsideration conferred by s 62(1) of the SRC Act.In these circumstances, I accept Mr Johnson’s analysis of the nature of the decision of 22 March 1995, namely, that it was made in exercise of the power conferred by s 69(a), but was also a decision under ss 14 and 19 of the SRC Act. This analysis is consistent with the authorities giving a broad construction to the power in s 69(a) of the SRC Act to make “determinations…in relation to claims”: Australian Postal Corporation v Nguyen (1996) 71 FCR 516 at 521-522 per Jenkinson J. Moreover, leaving s 62(1) to one side, unless a decision to cease compensation from a particular date is regarded as being made “under” ss 14 or 19 (or both), the claimant adversely affected by the decision would not be entitled to have the decision reconsidered under s 62(2) and, consequently, would not be entitled to seek review by the AAT. Parliament cannot have intended this result. Mr McManamey, who appeared on behalf of the applicant, did not suggest otherwise.The reconsideration decision of 7 April 1995 was made pursuant to s 62(4) of the SRC Act. As I have noted, the decision-maker had power to affirm, revoke or vary the determination made by the delegate on 22 March 1995: s 62(5). For the purpose of reviewing the reconsideration decision (the “reviewable decision”), the AAT could exercise all the powers and discretions conferred by the SRC Act on the reconsideration decision-maker: AAT Act, s 43(1); Fletcher v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1988) 19 FCR 442 at 453. The question is then whether the reconsideration decision-maker was entitled to affirm the decision of 22 March 1995, on the basis of a finding that the applicant’s coronary disease had never been causally related to his employment. If so, the AAT was also entitled to approach the matter on this basis.I think the better view is that the reconsideration decision-maker, for the purpose of determining whether Comcare had a continuing liability to compensate the applicant for his coronary condition, had power to consider whether that condition had ever been causally related to his work. The question of Comcare’s liability arose because Comcare was empowered under s 69(a) of the SRC Act to make a determination “in relation to” the claim made by the applicant to Comcare in about 1990 for compensation for acceleration of his coronary heart disease. It was required to make that determination accurately (s 69(a)) and in accordance with the “substantial merits of the case” (s 72(a)).(Emphasis added)